A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


A  STUDY  OF  THE  ORGANIZATION  OF 
A  FEDERAL  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 


BY 

RALEIGH   C.   MINOR 

Professor  of  Constitutional  and  International  Law  at  the 
University  of  Virginia 


NEW  YORK 

OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

AMERICAN  BRANCH  •  35  WEST  32ND  STREET 
LONDON,  TORONTO,  MELBOURNE,  AND  BOMBAY 

1918 


COPYRIGHT  1918 

BT   THK 

OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 
AMERICAN  BRANCH 


PREFACE 

No  discussion  of  international  relations  during  the 
progress  of  a  great  war  such  as  is  now  raging  can  be 
expected  to  be  altogether  accurate  in  respect  of  mere 
details.  Not  only  the  geographical  boundaries  of 
states,  but  forms  of  government  and  important  na- 
tional policies,  are  shifting  from  day  to  day.  Even 
a  discussion  limited  to  fundamental  principles  like  that 
contained  in  the  following  pages  cannot  be  entirely 
free  from  the  influence  of  these  sudden  and  far-reach- 
ing changes. 

For  example,  Russia  is  treated  throughout  this 
work  as  a  great  empire  under  one  government,  indeed 
as  one  of  the  Great  Powers.  As  these  words  are 
written  this  is  far  from  the  fact,  but  who  can  tell  what 
will  transpire  in  that  wide  unknown  region  before  the 
war  is  ended  or  within  a  limited  period  afterwards? 
She  may  reappear  a  great  despotic  empire  as  before, 
or  a  united  limited  monarchy,  or  a  magnificent  federal- 
ized  republic  of  many  states;  or  she  may  ultimately 
be  divided  into  many  small  states  or  groups  of  states, 
thus  forfeiting  her  claim  to  be  one  of  the  Great 
Powers. 

In  view  of  these  uncertainties  it  has  not  been  deemed 
wise  to  make  any  modification  of  the  tentative  plan 
of  international  government  herein  proposed,  which 


vi  PREFACE 

supposes  the  continued  existence  of  Russia  under  a 
single  government  as  one  of  the  Great  Powers. 

In  other  respects  also  it  has  been  found  necessary 
to  base  this  discussion  upon  facts  as  they  were  known 
to  exist  before  the  war,  without  heeding  alterations 
that  may  have  resulted,  or  may  in  the  future  result, 
from  the  conflict.  Thus,  in  estimating  the  populations 
of  the  various  states  engaged,  no  regard  has  been 
paid  to  possible  reductions  due  to  the  casualties  of 
war,  or  to  the  conquest  and  temporary  occupation  of 
territory. 

These  things,  however,  are  not  of  the  essence  of  our 
theme.  The  fundamental  principles  of  an  interna- 
tional government  would  be  much  the  same  whether 
Russia  constitutes  one  great  nation  or  many  small  in- 
dependent states;  whether  or  not  there  be  a  shift  of 
population  from  the  control  of  one  state  to  that  of 
another;  whether  or  not  forms  of  government  shall 
have  changed  from  monarchy  to  republic. 

But  there  are  certain  principles,  for  the  establish- 
ment of  which  this  war  is  now  being  waged,  which 
are  essential  to  the  foundation  of  any  league  of  na- 
tions leading  to  an  international  control  of  the  causes 
of  war.  Among  these  are  the  inviolability  of  treaties 
and  the  dominance  of  international  good  faith;  the 
abolition  of  militarism;  the  right  settlement  of  great 
war-breeding  political  issues  now  pending,  such  as  the 
self-determination  of  nationalities  and  the  rectification 
of  ancient  wrongs;  and  the  substitution  of  a  spirit  of 
justice  and  equality  among  the  nations  in  the  place  of 


PREFACE  vii 

the  selfish  and  oppressive  policies  too  prevalent  in  the 
past. 

All  these  results  may  reasonably  be  hoped  for  in 
the  event  of  a  complete  victory  for  the  United  States 
and  their  Allies,  and  with  their  advent  it  would  not 
be  so  great  a  step  to  an  adoption  by  the  nations  of  some 
such  form  of  international  government  as  that  advo- 
cated in  the  pages  to  follow. 

As  the  thirteen  American  Colonies  were  prepared 
through  their  joint  labors  and  sufferings  during  the 
American  Revolution  for  the  Articles  of  Confedera- 
tion, and  later  for  their  closer  union  under  the  Consti- 
tution, so  the  Allied  Nations  at  least,  having  passed 
through  years  of  co-operation,  trial,  and  suffering  to- 
gether, seem  now  ready  to  accept  some  form  of  per- 
manent league  or  alliance  which,  while  guaranteeing 
to  each  its  rightful  and  proper  independence  in  the 
control  of  its  internal  affairs,  will  also  adequately 
guarantee  each  against  oppressive  and  unjust  viola- 
tions of  that  independence  by  neighbors  stronger  or 
better  prepared  to  utilize  their  strength. 

The  author  will  indeed  be  glad  if  the  book  shall 
contribute  in  any  degree  to  the  solution  of  the  many 
profound  problems  of  statecraft  that  must  be  settled 
satisfactorily  before  there  can  be  assurance  that  never 
again  shall  humanity  be  subjected  to  such  an  ordeal 
as  it  will  have  passed  through  during  the  terrible  years 
of  this  war.  R.  c.  M. 

University  of  Virginia, 
May,  1918, 


INTRODUCTION 

The  human  race  has  with  greater  or  less  success 
worked  out  many  difficult  governmental,  political  and 
sociological  problems,  but  all  would  doubtless  agree 
that  it  has  never  set  for  itself  a  more  serious  task  than 
the  discovery  and  application  of  a  feasible  and  prac- 
ticable plan  that  will  abrogate  the  necessity  of  war  as 
a  method  of  redressing  disputes  between  nations. 

Of  late  years  considerable  progress  has  been  made 
in  the  organization  and  establishment  of  "  arbitral 
courts,"  to  which  the  nations  may  submit  their  disputes, 
and  "  commissions  of  inquiry  "  whose  duty  it  is  to 
ascertain  the  facts  in  an  international  controversy. 
Steps  have  also  been  taken  to  encourage  and  facilitate 
the  effectual  use  of  the  "  good  offices "  of  mutual 
friends,  and  the  use  of  mediation  and  conciliation. 
And  the  time  seems  to  be  near  when  the  nations  may 
establish  an  international  court,  with  judicial,  instead 
of  merely  arbitral,  authority  and  jurisdiction,  which 
will  perhaps  be  able  to  deal  with  certain  cases  with 
which  courts  of  arbitration  could  not  satisfactorily 
cope. 

The  judicial  court  differs  from  a  court  of  arbitration 
in  the  manner  of  its  organization,  in  the  mode  of  reach- 
ing its  decision,  in  the  decision  itself,  and  in  the  value 

ix 


x  INTRODUCTION 

of  the  decision  as  an  authoritative  precedent  upon  the 
matter  with  which  it  deals. 

A  judicial  court  is  created,  and  fully  organized  in 
advance  of  litigation,  so  that  its  members  are  not  se- 
lected by  the  parties  to  the  controversy  and  are  able  to 
decide  impartially  between  the  contentions  of  the  liti- 
gants. On  the  other  hand,  an  arbitral  court  is  com- 
posed of  members  selected  by  the  parties  after  the  dis- 
pute has  arisen  (usually  two  by  each  who,  themselves, 
select  an  umpire).  From  this  circumstance  there  usu- 
ally results  more  or  less  of  a  tendency  on  the  part  of 
the  arbitrators  to  regard  themselves,  not  as  impartial 
judges,  but  as  advocates  or  representatives  or  personal 
friends  of  the  party  selecting  them. 

While  therefore  a  judicial  court  will  attempt  to  ar- 
rive at  the  facts  and  the  law  governing  the  case,  and 
thus  reach  a  decision,  the  tendency  of  an  arbitral 
court  is  in  many  cases  to  conciliate,  mediate  or  com- 
promise the  claims  of  the  litigants,  so  that  its  decision 
is  quite  likely  to  be  unsatisfactory  to  both  parties.  The 
decision  of  the  judicial  court,  on  the  other  hand,  will 
generally  be  favorable  to  one  party  or  the  other,  and 
while  of  course  eminently  satisfactory  to  the  successful 
litigant,  will  often,  if  fair  and  just,  be  less  objection- 
able to  the  unsuccessful  party  than  would  be  a  mere 
compromise. 

Finally,  the  mode  of  organization  of  the  judicial 
court,  the  greater  learning  and  distinction  of  its  mem- 
bers, and  the  fact  that  it  seeks  impartially  to  construe 
the  law  and  apply  it  to  the  facts  of  the  case,  all  tend 


INTRODUCTION  xi 

to  give  it  a  greater  dignity  and  its  opinion  greater  au- 
thority than  an  arbitral  court  can  claim. 

In  cases  susceptible  of  these  modes  of  trial,  if  each 
party  to  the  dispute  is  sure  of  his  rights  and  bona  fide 
desires  and  designs  a  peaceable  settlement)  he  would 
prefer  usually  to  submit  his  case  to  a  judicial  court 
which  would  decide  the  questions  involved  without 
compromise,  rather  than  submit  it  to  an  arbitral  court 
in  whose  decision  each  litigant  will  perhaps  find  only 
part  of  the  redress  to  which  he  deems  himself  entitled. 
But  if  each  is  more  or  less  doubtful  of  his  claims,  or 
suspects  that  he  is  claiming  more  than  he  is  really 
entitled  to,  both  would  probably  welcome  a  resort  to 
an  arbitral,  in  preference  to  a  judicial  court,  since  each 
would  be  sanguine  of  securing  something.  Finally,  a 
third  case  might  arise  wherein  one  of  the  parties  feels 
sure  of  his  rights,  while  the  other  is  very  uncertain 
of  his.  In  such  case,  the  tendency  of  the  former  would 
be  toward  the  judicial  court,  while  that  of  the  latter 
would  be  toward  the  court  of  arbitration,  and,  should 
neither  yield,  a  settlement  by  court  procedure  would 
become  impossible.  Such  a  situation  might  well  be 
fraught  with  grave  perils. 

It  seems  to  be  the  belief  of  many  that  the  mere  es- 
tablishment of  a  judicial  court  to  which  the  nations 
may  resort  for  a  settlement  of  their  disputes  will  in 
itself  go  far  to  solve  the  problem  of  international  wars. 
But  this  can  scarcely  be  said  to  be  the  conviction  of 
those  who  have  given  the  most  profound  thought  and 
study  to  the  subject.  They  realize  that  the  field  of 


xii  INTRODUCTION 

usefulness  of  such  a  court  is  limited,  as  is  that  of  the 
court  of  arbitration,  the  commission  of  inquiry,  con- 
ciliation and  mediation,  the  good  offices  of  mutually 
friendly  nations  and  diplomatic  correspondence.  Each 
has  its  appropriate  function  in  settling  or  helping  to 
settle  certain  sorts  of  international  controversies;  but 
despite  all,  there  is  a  large  and  important  field  of  dis- 
putes, for  the  settlement  of  which  none  of  these  is  in 
the  least  adequate. 

Even  an  incomplete  analysis  of  the  various  sorts  of 
controversies  that  may  arise  between  nations  will  suf- 
fice to  show  how  many  and  how  constantly  recurring 
are  the  disputes  in  which  none  of  the  modes  of  re- 
dress above  mentioned  is  of  great  value. 

If  we  classify  all  international  controversies  into 
two  great  classes, — first,  disputes  behind  which,  on  one 
side  or  both,  lie  ulterior  evil  or  illegitimate  designs  of 
aggression  or  attack  upon  the  rights  of  other  nations, 
and  second,  disputes  arising  spontaneously  and  without 
ulterior  designs,  it  is  obvious  that  none  of  those  of  the 
first  class  would  be  subject  to  treatment  in  any  of  the 
modes  already  considered,  and  indeed  that  under  pres- 
ent conditions  nothing  but  war  or  the  fear  of  war  would 
prove  adequate  to  prevent  the  threatened  attack.  The 
offender  in  such  case  would  doubtless  put  forward 
untenable  claims  as  an  excuse  for  his  oppressive  and 
tyrannical  conduct,  but  such  claims  would  not  be  justi- 
ciable, that  is,  capable  of  settlement  in  a  court  of  justice 
or  arbitration,  because  the  offender  does  not  intend, 
and  would  not  allow,  them  to  be  thus  settled.  For  the 


INTRODUCTION  xiii 

like  reason,  commissions  of  inquiry,  conciliation,  medi- 
ation, good  offices,  and  diplomatic  protests  would  all 
alike  be  of  no  avail.  His  design  is  to  use  force  or 
fraud  against  his  neighbor  and  under  existing  condi- 
tions nothing  but  force  or  the  fear  of  it  will  deter 
him. 

Suppose,  for  example,  a  nation  urged  by  dynastic, 
military,  or  territorial  ambitions  bent  on  taking  the 
territory  of  its  neighbor;  or  suppose  it,  influenced  by 
cupidity  and  greed  of  wealth,  determined  to  capture 
forcibly  or  fraudulently,  and  without  regard  to  the 
rights  of  its  neighbors,  certain  trade  routes  or  seats  of 
commercial  influence,  or  resolved,  by  the  use  of  tariffs 
or  the  unfair  use  of  a  favorable  geographical  position, 
to  engage  in  unfair  competition  against  other  nations; 
or  suppose  it,  influenced  by  the  spirit  of  nationalism, 
to  contemplate  a  union  of  those  of  its  race  who  are  the 
subjects  of  neighboring  powers  through  the  use  of 
force;  or  suppose  it  is  filled  with  a  desire  to  overawe 
and  bully  its  neighbors,  so  that  it  indulges  to  a  dan- 
gerous extent  in  militarism  and  jingoism.  These  are 
not  uncommon  manifestations  among  the  nations,  and 
none  of  them  are  justiciable  or  remediable  in  any  way 
except  by  war  or  the  threat  of  it. 

But  this  is  not  the  only  class  of  disputes  whjerein 
the  remedies  before  mentioned  would  be  often  inade- 
quate to  prevent  war.  Even  in  the  case  of  honest  dis- 
putes behind  which  lurks  no  evil  design  of  aggression, 
many,  indeed,  most,  would  not  be  justiciable,  and  could 
only  be  adjusted,  short  of  war,  through  diplomacy, 


xiv  INTRODUCTION 

the  good  offices  of  mutual  friends,  mediation,  compro- 
mise, or  possibly  arbitration.  Whether  they  would 
actually  be  settled  in  any  of  these  modes  or  would  lead 
to  war  would  depend,  as  such  matters  always  have 
depended,  on  the  self-restraint  of  the  nations  involved 
and  the  earnestness  of  their  desire  to  reach  a  peaceful 
settlement. 

Among  this  group  of  controversies  may  be  classed: 

1.  Misunderstandings   and  wrongs   committed  un- 
intentionally, or  by  accident  or  mistake. 

Such  disputes  as  these  lose  all  their  importance  after 
the  facts  are  understood  and  usually  are  readily  ad- 
justed by  diplomatic  correspondence.  They  need  no 
special  consideration. 

2.  Disputes    arising    from    invasions    of    national 
pride,  honor,  or  prestige. 

If  these  invasions  result  from  mere  accident,  mis- 
take, or  innocent  misunderstanding,  they  belong  prop- 
erly to  the  first  class,  and  involve  little  danger  of  war. 
They  are  dismissed  with  a  diplomatic  explanation  or 
apology. 

But  if  they  are  intentional, — the  result  of  a  bona 
fide  insistence  upon  its  rights  by  each  nation,  confident 
in  the  rightfulness  of  its  attitude  and  assured  that  it 
would  be  injurious  to  its  honor,  dignity,  interest,  or 
safety  to  recede,  then  the  controversy  becomes  danger- 
ous and  carries  the  seeds  of  international  complica- 
tions. 

Such  disputes,  involving  as  they  do  national  honor 
or  national  prestige, — the  position  of  the  nation  among 


INTRODUCTION  xv 

its  fellows, — are  not  easily  justiciable,  but  must  ordi- 
narily be  adjusted,  short  of  war,  by  the  good  offices 
of  mutual  friends,  mediation,  suggestions,  or  offers  of 
compromise,  and  the  like, — only  occasionally,  if  turn- 
ing on  questions  of  fact  or  of  law,  by  arbitral  or  judi- 
cial action. 

3.  The  next  class  of  bona  fide  international  dis- 
putes consists  of  those  which  arise  from  clashes  of 
sincere  and  honest  national  policies,  such  as  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  the  Balance  of  Power,  national  and 
racial  sympathies,  military  preparedness,  commercial 
policies,  etc. 

Such  disputes  are  neither  justiciable  nor  arbitrable. 
We  cannot,  for  instance,  conceive,  under  existing  con^ 
ditions,  of  the  American  people  agreeing  to  submit 
to  a  judicial  or  arbitral  court  the  question  whether  a 
strong  foreign  power  shall  be  permitted  to  seize  terri- 
tory in  Central  or  South  America  or  in  Canada.  It 
is  not  a  question  of  law  or  justice  at  all,  but  one  of 
policy,  of  self-preservation,  the  decision  of  which 
would  never  willingly  be  left  to  an  alien  body,  be  it  a 
judicial  court  or  a  court  of  arbitration  or  concilia- 
tion. 

And  what  is  true  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  it  ap- 
plies to  America,  is  equally  true  of  the  great  principle 
of  the  Balance  of  Power  in  Europe,  of  the  open  door 
to  trade  in  China,  of  the  right  of  a  nation  to  prepare 
itself  in  a  military  way  against  dreaded  attacks,  of 
great  nationalistic  and  racial  movements  like  Pan- 
Slavism,  Pan-Germanism,  and  others.  Disputes  like 


xvi  INTRODUCTION 

these,  arising  from  sources  of  profound  national  in- 
stinct or  policy  cannot  be  settled  or  checked  by  judi- 
cial or  arbitral  decrees. 

Aside  from  conciliatory  and  persuasive  measures, 
there  is  at  present  no  recourse  save  to  war  or  the  threat 
of  it,  if  the  execution  of  such  national  policies  results 
in  the  invasion  of  the  rights  and  liberties  of  other 
States.  The  establishment  of  international  judicial 
or  arbitral  courts  would  be  of  no  avail. 

4.  Another  class  of  disputes  between  nations  would 
consist  of  those  of  long  standing,  arising  from  some 
long  past  act  of  gross  injustice,  such  as  the  annexation 
of  territory  formerly  belonging  to  another  nation,  or 
the   robbery   of   a   nation's   liberty   or  independence. 
That  these  unjust  acts  of  the  distant  past  are  not  al- 
ways forgotten  is  sufficiently  proved  by  the  French 
yearning  for  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  the  Italian  call  to 
"  Italy  Unredeemed,"  and  the  Polish  vision  of  a  re- 
united Poland. 

Such  festering  sores  as  these  upon  the  international 
body  are  not  curable  by  judicial  or  arbitral  treatment. 
They  can  only  be  healed,  if  at  all,  by  the  slow  lapse  of 
time  or  by  the  bleeding  process  of  war. 

5.  Another  class  of  disputes  consists  of  those  aris- 
ing from  breach  of  treaty. 

These  may  often  be  adjusted  without  resort  to  war. 
The  breach  may  be  regarded  as  an  abrogation  of  the 
treaty,  justifying  the  other  party  in  regarding  it  as 
void.  In  many  cases,  doubtless,  the  breach  would  pre- 
sent an  arbitral  or  justiciable  question,  in  the  settle- 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 

ment  of  which  the  international  courts  might  take  a 
prominent  part.  But  in  other  cases  the  breach  would 
present  political  and  not  justiciable  questions,  and  for 
the  decision  of  these  courts  would  be  useless.  Thus, 
many  writers  on  International  Law  lay  down  the  doc- 
trine that  a  nation  is  justified  in  violating,  and  is  bound 
to  violate,  a  treaty,  if  its  execution  becomes  morally 
impossible  by  reason  of  the  destructive  damage  such 
execution  would  inflict  on  itself  or  on  another  nation. 
It  is  evident  that  the  question  raised  by  the  violation 
of  a  treaty,  when  based  upon  this  ground,  is  much 
more  of  a  political  than  a  legal  nature, — one  which  it 
would  be  impossible  to  expect  any  nation  to  leave  to  a 
judicial  or  arbitral  tribunal  to  decide. 

6.  The  last  class  of  international  controversies  to 
which  reference  will  be  made  would  embrace  those  aris- 
ing from  disputed  facts  or  from  disputed  principles 
of  law  applicable  to  the  facts.  Given  both  litigants 
willing  to  rest  upon  their  legal  rights,  these  constitute 
clearly  and  distinctly  justiciable  questions,  to  the  de- 
cision of  which  an  international  court  would  be  fully 
competent. 

While  a  considerable  proportion  of  the  disputes 
likely  to  arise  between  nations  may  be  expected  to 
partake  more  or  less  of  the  character  of  this  class  of 
controversies,  not  so  many  would  be  entirely  of  this 
sort,  but  rather  partly  of  this  class  and  partly  belonging 
to  one  of  the  other  classes  before  mentioned.  And  the 
more  the  characteristics  of  other  sorts  of  disputes 
enter  into  the  case,  the  less  the  chance  of  the  questions 


xviii  INTRODUCTION 

raised  being  justiciable  and  capable  of  decision  by 
judicial  or  arbitral  process. 

While  the  enumeration  above  given  is  perhaps  not 
exhaustive  of  all  the  various  sorts  of  dispute  that  may 
arise  between  nations,  it  is  sufficiently  complete  to 
demonstrate  how  few  of  such  cases  would  be  suscep- 
tible of  settlement  through  an  international  court. 
Under  existing  conditions,  therefore,  it  cannot  be  ex- 
pected that  the  establishment  of  international  judicial 
courts  or  courts  of  arbitration  will  go  very  far  to 
prevent  wars  between  nations. 

The  fact  is  that  these,  as  well  as  all  the  other  reme- 
dies that  have  been  mentioned,  have  for  their  object 
the  redress  of  grievances  after  they  have  arisen.  They 
do  not  propose  or  attempt  to  prevent  the  original  rise 
of  the  grievance.  The  international  doctor  has  habitu- 
ally treated  the  symptoms  and  effects  of  the  disease, 
but  has  not  attempted  to  go  to  the  root  of  the  trouble, 
find  the  cause  of  the  disease  and  prevent  the  occurrence 
of  that  cause.  Not  until  this  is  recognized  as  the 
scientific  method  of  dealing  with  the  problem  will 
its  solution  be  near. 

If  it  were  possible  today  to  erect  a  world  court,  with 
the  widest  judicial  jurisdiction  conceivable,  and  to  gain 
or  compel  the  consent  of  every  nation  to  submit  to 
that  court  every  international  dispute  of  a  justiciable 
character,  the  world  would  be  but  little  better  off,  so 
far  as  the  actual  danger  of  war  is  concerned.  While 
human  nature  remains  as  it  is,  with  no  other  restraint 
than  that  of  an  international  court,  there  would  be  the 


INTRODUCTION  xix 

same  national  ambitions  and  greed,  the  same  use  or 
dread  of  force  or  fraud,  the  same  need  of  preparedness 
against  attack,  the  same  fear  of  the  stronger  by  the 
weaker  and  smaller  States,  and  often  the  same  con- 
quest and  destruction  of  the  liberties  of  the  less  pow- 
erful of  the  family  of  nations.  Only  justiciable  dis- 
putes could  be  settled  by  the  court  and  wars  grow  far 
more  frequently  out  of  political,  than  out  of  justiciable 
or  legal,  controversies. 

But,  it  will  be  said,  if  the  experience  of  the  United 
States  be  examined,  it  will  be  found  that  the  Supreme 
Court  has  habitually  exercised  the  jurisdiction  to  de- 
cide disputes  arising  between  the  sovereign  States  of 
the  American  Union,  as  the  British  Judicial  Committee 
of  the  Privy  Council  has  also  determined  controversies 
between  British  colonies  and  provinces.  It  will  be 
pointed  out  that,  in  all  the  many  interstate  controver- 
sies so  far  brought  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  that  court  has  never  yet  failed  to  find 
that  the  dispute  was  justiciable  nor  declined  jurisdic- 
tion on  the  ground  that  the  question  was  political.  The 
consequence  has  been  that  all  these  disputes  have  been 
amicably  settled,  and  neither  war  nor  the  threat  of  it 
has  arisen  out  of  any  of  them.  Why  then,  it  may  be 
asked,  would  not  the  analogy  hold  in  the  case  of  an 
international  court,  if  the  nations  will  agree  to  submit 
their  disputes  to  its  cognizance? 

If  it  could  be  shown  that  the  happy  results  apparent 
in  the  American  system  were  due  solely  or  even  chiefly 
to  the  establishment  of  a  court  with  jurisdiction  to  de- 


xx  INTRODUCTION 

cide  interstate  disputes,  the  analogy  between  it  and  a 
world  court  would  indeed  be  striking,  and  the  presump- 
tion strong  that  similar  results  would  follow  as  between 
the  nations  upon  the  establishment  of  a  world  court. 
But  when  we  carefully  contrast  the  circumstances  that 
would  surround  the  two  courts,  we  find  that  there  is 
no  real, — at  least  no  close, — analogy  between  them. 

The  powers  and  rights  that  may  be  exercised  by 
one  nation  towards  another  may  with  accuracy  be 
divided  into  two  classes,  first,  political  powers,  and 
second,  legal  rights.  Out  of  the  exercise  of  political 
powers  would  arise  for  the  most  part  political  or  non- 
justiciable  disputes;  out  of  the  exercise  or  invasion  of 
legal  rights  would  arise  the  legal  or  justiciable  con- 
troversies. The  only  way,  therefore,  to  eliminate  the 
possibility  of  any  disputes  between  nations  or  States 
other  than  those  which  are  justiciable  or  susceptible 
of  judicial  or  arbitral  determination,  would  be  to  elimi- 
nate the  international  or  interstate  political  powers, 
which  are  the  war-breeding  powers. 

This  elimination,  as  between  the  States  of  the  Amer- 
ican Union,  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  has 
accomplished,  as  has  also  the  constitution  of  every 
federal  republic  or  empire  in  the  world  today,  as  be- 
tween its  component  States.  It  is  because  of  this  great 
accomplishment,  not  because  of  the  mere  establish- 
ment of  a  court  with  jurisdiction  to  determine  disputes 
between  the  component  States,  that  such  disputes  are 
always  justiciable  and  are  always  susceptible  of  judi- 
cial settlement. 


INTRODUCTION  xxl 

An  examination  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  for  example,  will  reveal  that  each  of  the  United 
States  has  surrendered  either  entirely  or  to  the  States 
United,  to  be  exercised  by  them  all  jointly,  and  not  by 
each  separately,  the  following  powers :  ( i )  to  declare 
war;  (2)  to  keep  troops  (exclusive  of  militia)  and 
ships  of  war;  (3)  to  acquire  the  territory  of  another 
State,  except  by  consent  of  the  legislatures  of  the 
States  concerned  as  well  as  of  Congress;  (4)  to  levy 
duties  on  imports  or  exports;  (5)  to  regulate  inter- 
state or  foreign  commerce;  (6)  to  make  treaties  or 
alliances  with  foreign  States;  (7)  to  make  agreements 
or  compacts  with  other  States  except  with  the  consent 
of  Congress;  and  (8)  to  deny  to  citizens  of  sister 
States  the  rights  and  immunities  of  citizens.  The  sur- 
render of  these  political  and  military  powers  has  at 
one  stroke  removed  from  the  realm  of  interstate  re- 
lations the  right  and  the  ability  of  each  State  to  exert 
political  power  or  influence  as  against  sister  States 
of  the  Union.  It  follows  that  no  dispute  thenceforth 
arising  between  two  of  the  United  States  could  be 
political  in  character,  but  must  always  be  within  the 
limit  of  legal  and  justiciable  questions. 

How  different  the  existing  situation  of  the. nations 
of  the  world!  They  have  not  only  not  surrendered 
to  the  whole  jointly  their  individual  power  to  declare 
war  and  to  keep  troops  and  war  vessels,  but  have  been 
steadily  and  persistently  increasing  their  armaments 
year  by  year.  They  therefore  not  only  possess  in- 
herently the  force  to  compel  other  States  to  do  their 


xxll  INTRODUCTION 

will,  but  their  ability  to  use  it  promptly  and  efficiently 
constantly  increases. 

Possessing  this  inherent  and  constantly  augmenting 
power,  they  are  more  and  more  subjected  to  the  temp- 
tation to  exert  it  unlawfully  and  tyrannically  against 
weaker  sister  nations,  since  they  have  never  surrend- 
ered, as  have  the  American  States,  the  power  to  acquire 
the  territory  of  another  State  without  its  consent  or  to 
maltreat  its  citizens  or  subjects,  or  the  right  to  levy 
heavy  tariff  duties  on  international  commerce  or  to 
secure  control,  as  far  as  might  be  within  their  power, 
of  international  trade,  trade  routes  and  seats  of  com- 
merce, regardless  of  the  just  and  equal  rights  of  other 
nations.  None  of  these  powers,  nor  the  right  to 
make  alliances,  whether  for  aggressive  or  defensive 
purposes,  nor  the  right  to  make  (or  break)  treaties 
with  other  nations  have  they  surrendered.  And  out 
of  the  exercise  of  these  powers  arise  the  so-called 
"  political  "  questions,  which  are  usually  non-justiciable, 
having  no  relation  to  abstract  justice,  but  based  on 
theories  of  policy,  self-interest,  or  self-preservation. 

If  therefore  we  would  have  an  international  court 
serve  the  same  purpose  as  between  the  nations  as  a 
supreme  federal  court  among  the  component  States 
of  a  federal  union,  some  device  must  be  utilized  that 
will  eliminate  "  political "  controversies  between  them, 
arising  out  of  the  exercise  of  interstate  "  political " 
powers,  and  reduce  their  disputes  to  those  of  a  legal 
or  justiciable  character. 

That  the  only  effective  device  by  which  this  may 


INTRODUCTION  xxiii 

be  accomplished  is  the  creation  of  some  sort  of  federal 
union  of  nations  and  a  surrender  by  each  to  all  jointly 
of  its  right  to  exercise  individually  those  of  its  po- 
litical powers  (and  no  other)  the  exercise  of  which 
would  tend  to  breed  war,  is  the  conclusion  to  which  the 
writer's  reflections  and  study  have  led  him,  and  his 
efforts  will  be  devoted  in  the  following  pages  to  es- 
tablish this  contention  and  to  work  out  feasible  and 
practicable  international  agreements  as  to  the  respec- 
tive powers  of  the  league  and  its  component  nations, 
together  with  such  checks  as  will  effectively  safeguard 
the  real  rights  and  liberties  of  the  States  and  peoples 
concerned.  These  agreements,  for  the  sake  of  con- 
venience, have  been  phrased  in  the  language  of  a 
tentative  written  constitution,  which  will  be  found  in 
the  Appendix,  and  which  will  form  the  basis  or  frame- 
work of  the  future  discussion,  though  it  would  be  pos- 
sible perhaps  to  arrive  at  fairly  similar  results  in  some 
other  form. 

It  may  be  said  also  in  this  connection  that  while^in 
form  the  Constitution  herein  proposed  bears  some 
resemblance  to  that  of  the  United  States,  it  differs 
widely  from  it  in  many, — it  might  perhaps  with  truth 
be  said  in  most, — substantial  respects. 

Before  entering  upon  that  discussion,  however,  it 
may  be  well  to  inquire  whether  any  device  might  be 
suggested,  short  of  a  surrender  by  the  nations  of  the 
right  individually  to  exercise  the  "  political  "  powers 
above  mentioned,  which  would  attain  the  end  desired, 
and  whether  the  attainment  of  that  end  wou!4  be 


xxiv  INTRODUCTION 

worth  the  sacrifice  of  national  political  independence 
involved. 

Taking  the  last  point  first,  it  presents  a  question,  the 
answer  to  which  would  obviously  depend  upon  how 
desirable  is  the  end  to  be  attained  and  upon  the 
amount  of  sacrifice  involved.  These  values  in  turn 
must  be  measured  by  the  yardstick  of  the  individual 
reader's  convictions  and  judgment. 

Certainly,  prior  to  the  great  European  War,  few  of 
this  generation  would  have  been  found  of  an  imagi- 
nation so  vivid  as  to  possess  a  real  vision  of  war's 
horrors,  or  so  impressed  by  them  as  to  advocate  the 
slightest  surrender  of  the  sovereignty  and  independ- 
ence of  the  individual  nation  in  order  to  secure  the 
blessings  of  a  rightful  and  abiding  peace. 

But  that  war  has  searched  the  hearts  of  many,  es- 
pecially in  the  bleeding  countries  of  Europe.  The 
world  is  prepared  to  examine  realities  and  discard  an- 
cient illusions  and  shibboleths  which  would  formerly 
have  presented  impassable  barriers  to  freedom  of 
thought. 

Has  not  the  general  conception  of  the  sovereignty 
and  independence  of  nations  hitherto  been  somewhat 
of  an  illusion — somewhat  of  form  without  substance, 
— somewhat  of  a  mental  confusion  between  an  un- 
bridled license  and  a  true  liberty  and  independence? 
Is  any  nation  in  the  world  today  absolutely  sovereign 
and  independent?  Are  they  not  all  bound  in  chains 
by  inviolable  treaties  and  by  national  necessities  of 
policy,  greed,  jealousy,  dread  of  attack?  Even 


INTRODUCTION 


XXV 


prior  to  the  great  war,  despite  their  boasted  inde- 
pendence, have  not  the  nations  groaned  under  the 
burden  of  armaments,  and  will  not  their  groans  be 
doubled  and  redoubled  when  they  feel  the  full  weight 
of  the  burdens  added  by  the  war?  Are  they  not  con- 
stantly haunted  by  fears  and  suspicions?  Are  these 
the  indications  of  national  freedom  and  independ- 
ence, or  of  an  international  license  that  usurps  the 
name. 

Would  it  then,  after  all,  be  such  a  violent  break  with 
the  past  realities  (not  illusions)  if  the  nations  should 
come  to  an  agreement  whereby  each  would  surrender 
to  the  joint  exercise  of  all  that  portion  only  of  its 
so-called  independence  which  is  susceptible  of  use  to 
the  injury  of  its  sister  nations?  Would  not  its  own 
feeling  of  peaceful  security  from  the  attacks  of  others 
compensate  each  for  the  surrender  of  the  right  to  in- 
flict injustice  and  harm  on  others?  It  is  not  suggested 
that  any  part  of  its  rightful  and  just  independence 
shall  be  sacrificed  but  only  that  portion  which  would 
be  either  itself  wrongful  and  unjust,  or  which  is  sus- 
ceptible of  such  exercise  as  to  inspire  sister  nations 
with  suspicion  and  fear  of  unjust  and  oppressive  con- 
sequences. 

The  rights  each  nation  would  be  called  upon  to 
resign  would  be  the  power  to  regulate  or  control  com- 
merce between  the  component  nations;  to  acquire  the 
territory  of  other  States;  to  mistreat  their  citizens; 
to  lay  burdens  upon  imports  or  exports;  to  keep  more 
than  a  certain  proportion  of  troops  or  war  vessels; 


xxvi  INTRODUCTION 

to  make  treaties  of  alliance  or  confederation  with  other 
States;  and  to  declare  war,  except  when  invaded  or  in 
such  imminent  danger  thereof  as  not  to  admit  of 
delay. 

Since  almost  all  wars  grow  out  of  the  desire  to 
seize  international  trade  or  keep  other  nations  from 
seizing  it,  out  of  the  desire  to  acquire  territory,  or  out 
of  the  mistreatment  by  one  State  of  the  citizens  of 
another,  or  out  of  a  suspicion  that  these  things  are 
being  attempted  or  contemplated,  if  the  power  of  the 
individual  nations  to  exercise  these  functions  were  sur- 
rendered to  the  joint  action  of  all,  there  would  be  no 
need  of  larger  armies  or  navies  than  would  be  de- 
manded by  the  internal  conditions  of  each  country,  nor 
of  alliances,  nor  of  the  power  to  declare  war.  There 
would  thus  be  only  three  real  surrenders,  the  surrender 
of  the  power  to  regulate  international  commerce  to  the 
injury  of  other  nations,  of  the  power  to  acquire  their 
territory,  and  of  the  power  to  treat  unjustly  or  oppres- 
sively the  citizens  of  other  States.  This  would  surely 
seem  not  an  onerous  price  to  pay  for  national  security 
and  insurance  against  future  wars,  provided  such 
checks  are  supplied  as  would  effectually  induce  the 
international  league  to  whom  some  of  these  powers 
would  be  confided  to  exercise  them  impartially  for  the 
best  interests  of  all  the  component  nations,  freeing 
those  nations  from  all  fear  that  they  might  be  exer- 
cised to  their  destruction  or  oppression. 

Let  us  consider  briefly,  in  the  last  place,  whether 
there  is  any  other  practicable  device  than  that  just 


INTRODUCTION  xxvii 

mentioned  which  might  effectually  secure  the  nations 
against  the  unlawful,  unjust  or  tyrannical  abuse  by  sis- 
ter nations  of  the  "  political "  powers. 

No  other  restraint  suggests  itself  except  the  vague 
and  tardy  influence  of  public  opinion.  The  past  ex- 
perience of  humanity  has  not  encouraged  us  to  repose 
much  confidence  in  the  mere  power  of  opinion  to  pre- 
vent that  class  of  political  dispute  which  so  often 
leads  to  war.  Nor  is  this  surprising  when  we  re- 
member that  to  the  effective  operation  of  public  opin- 
ion two  conditions  are  essential,  knowledge  of  the 
fundamental  facts  of  the  controversy  and  time  for  the 
crystallization  of  sentiment  upon  the  merits  of  •  it. 
These  conditions,  difficult  enough  of  attainment  in  na- 
tional affairs,  are  in  most  cases  impossible  of  fulfill- 
ment in  the  more  complex  international  controver- 
sies,— at  least  until  too  late  to  avert  disastrous  conse- 
quences,— however  potent  they  might  be  in  bringing 
the  rupture  to  a  conclusion,  in  influencing  the  final 
adjustment  between  the  combatants,  or  in  compelling 
them  to  find  or  to  invent  plausible  excuses  for  breaking 
the  peace. 

Nor  can  popular  opinion  within  the  disputant  States 
themselves  be  expected  to  exert  much  of  an  inhibitive 
power.  The  people  as  a  whole  are  accustomed  to  fol- 
low their  leaders  and  know  too  little  of  the  details  of 
international  relations  to  be  able  to  judge  for  them- 
selves of  the  real  merits  of  such  controversies.  It  is 
easy  for  the  national  leaders,  if  they  are  so  disposed, 
to  give  out,  keep  back  or  distort  information  so  as  to 


xxviii  INTRODUCTION 

make  the  worse  appear  the  better  reason  and  to  mis- 
guide the  nation.  The  atmosphere  of  international 
intercourse  is  that  of  secrecy.  No  real  security  can 
be  hoped  for  from  this  quarter. 

There  remains  then  only  some  form  of  international 
organization  whereby  the  mischievous  exercise  of  these 
interstate  political  powers  shall  be  controlled  or  else 
machinery  provided  for  the  peaceful  solution  of  the 
political  disputes  sure  to  result  from  their  uncon- 
trolled exercise.  If  the  nations  choose  the  former 
alternative,  by  controlling  the  causes  of  war  they  se- 
cure themselves  against  war  itself.  If  they  adopt  the 
latter,  the  causes  of  controversy  are  left  to  flourish 
in  full  vigor,  while  the  effort  is  expended  on  the  at- 
tempt to  check  the  evil  consequences. 

So  far  as  the  surrender  of  sovereignty  and  independ- 
ence is  concerned,  there  would  seem  to  be  little  to 
choose  between  them.  An  international  league  for 
the  enforcement  of  compulsory  arbitration  or  concilia- 
tion, with  a  covenant  by  all  to  unite  in  war  or  other 
forcible  measures  against  any  nation  declining  to  en- 
gage in  either  form  of  settlement,  however  sacred  and 
dear  to  it  the  matter  involved,  can  hardly,  if  success- 
ful, be  looked  upon  as  a  conservator  of  the  sovereignty 
and  independence  of  the  nations.  True  it  would  leave 
the  nations  free  as  at  present,  to  exercise  their  po- 
litical powers  to  the  injury  and  oppression  of  their 
neighbors,  but  if  the  plan  were  successful  they  would 
be  held  to  so  strict  an  accountability  for  the  result- 
ing injuries  that  they  would  in  effect  cease  to  enjoy 


INTRODUCTION  xxix 

the  sovereign  independence  they  how  possess  to 
bully,  oppress  and  defraud  other  nations  as  they 
please. 

Such  a  league  might  prove  a  more  or  less  efficient 
safeguard  against  international  wars;  but  it  would 
certainly  not  leave  the  independence  of  the  nations  un- 
touched. 

But  it  is  submitted  that,  aside  from  the  inherent 
difficulty  of  securing  the  consent  of  the  nations  to  any 
plan  effective  to  prevent  war,  there  are  practical  ob- 
stacles in  the  way  of  the  successful  operation  of  a  plan 
of  this  nature  arising  out  of  the  difficulty  that  would 
manifest  itself  among  the  nations  of  the  league  of  se- 
curing concert  of  action  in  compelling  a  recalcitrant 
nation  to  resort  to  compulsory  arbitration  or  concilia- 
tion. How  would  each  leaguer's  proportion  of  troops, 
ships,  and  expense  be  ascertained?  Who  would  com- 
mand? How  induce  the  people  of  the  several  nations 
of  the  league  to  look  with  favor  upon  a  war  waged 
to  compel  a  sister  and  perhaps  distant  nation  to  adjudi- 
cate questions  that  to  them  will  often  appear  to  involve 
mere  abstract,  technical  matters  of  national  policy  or 
international  law,  about  which  most  of  them  would 
know  little  and  care  less?  Or  if  a  nation  be  jealous 
or  suspicious  of  the  superior  strength,  military  or  com- 
mercial, of  the  State  threatened  with  attack,  how  shall 
its  zealous  support  be  secured  of  a  concerted  action 
that  would  prevent  such  attack?  Who  would  settle 
the  terms  of  peace?  Would  not  the  situation  be 
equally  difficult  if  the  nation  called  on  to  intervene 


xxx  INTRODUCTION 

were    commercially    or    diplomatically    on    peculiarly 
friendly  terms  with  the  aggressor? 

These  are  some  of  the  reasons  (and  others  will 
appear  in  subsequent  chapters)  why  the  plea  is  made 
in  the  following  pages  that  the  league  take  the  form 
of  the  establishment  of  a  federal  international  govern- 
ment, by  which  the  nations  will  either  agree,  under 
proper  safeguards,  to  surrender  to  the  government 
of  all  jointly  their  power  to  injure  or  work  injustice 
upon  their  sister  States  or  agree  that  they  shall  not  be 
exercised  at  all.  The  powers  that  need  be  thus  sur- 
rendered are  very  few,  but  very  important  to  the  at- 
tainment of  the  end  desired.  They  may  be  briefly 
enumerated  as  follows :  ( i )  The  grant  on  the  one 
hand  to  the  league  of  the  power  to  regulate  interna- 
tional commerce  and  communication  by  special  legisla- 
tion for  the  purpose  and,  on  the  other,  the  surrender 
by  the  component  nations  of  the  right  to  tax  imports, 
exports,  or  the  instrumentalities  of  international  com- 
merce; (2)  the  right  to  acquire  any  part  of  the  terri- 
tory of  another  nation  without  the  consent  both  of  the 
latter  nation  and  of  the  international  government; 

(3)  the  right  to  treat  tyrannically  or  oppressively  the 
citizens  of  other  States  while  within  their  borders; 

(4)  the  right  to  keep  more  than  a  reasonable  propor- 
tion of  troops  and  war  vessels,  adequate  to  the  task  of 
internal  police,  while  granting  to  the  joint  government 
the  right  to  keep  sufficient  troops  and  ships  to  guaran- 
tee the  protection  of  all;  (5)  the  right  to  make  treaties 
of  alliance   and  confederation  individually  with   any 


INTRODUCTION  xxxi 

nation,  or  any  treaty  that  would  violate  the  compact 
of  union,  while  granting  to  the  joint  government  the 
power  to  make  treaties  with  any  nation,  not  a  member 
of  the  union,  concerning  matters  to  which  the  powers 
granted  to  the  joint  government  shall  extend;  and  (6) 
the  right  to  declare  or  make  war,  unless  in  case  of 
invasion  or  imminent  danger  thereof,  while  granting  to 
the  league  the  right  to  declare  war  against  States  with- 
out the  union. 

It  has  been  said  before,  but  it  may  well  be  re- 
peated,— indeed  too  much  emphasis  cannot  be  laid 
upon  the  statement, — that,  conceding  the  surrender  by 
the  nations  of  the  first  three  of  the  powers  above 
enumerated,  there  weuld  be  little  or  no  need  of  the 
exercise  of  the  last  three,  so  that  under  the  plan  pres- 
ently to  be  considered,  the  nations  would  in  reality 
only  be  called  upon  to  surrender  three  items  of  their 
present  independence,  namely:  the  right  to  control  or 
regulate  international  commerce  generally,  but  only  to 
an  extent  that  would  be  considered  by  the  joint 
judgment  of  all  as  essential  to  the  general  interest, 
(though  as  to  the  right  to  tax  or  burden  imports,  ex- 
ports, or  the  instrumentalities  of  international  com- 
merce, the  surrender  should  be  absolute)  ;  the  right  to 
acquire  the  territory  of  another  State  to  the  detriment 
of  that  State  or  to  the  detriment  of  the  joint  interests 
of  all;  and  lastly,  the  right  to  treat  unjustly  or  oppres- 
sively, according  to  certain  designated  standards,  the 
citizens  of  other  States  while  within  their  borders. 

Gone  would  be  the  dread  of  economic  bondage,  the 


xxxii  INTRODUCTION 

fear  of  territorial  conquest,  the  danger  of  injustice  to 
citizens  in  foreign  lands.  When  these  shackles  are 
struck  from  the  limbs  of  the  nations,  the  causes  of 
international  war  are  practically  swept  away,  and  with 
them  war  itself. 

But  the  nations  would  rightly  prefer  to  bear  the  ills 
they  have  rather  than  fly  to  others  they  know  not  of, 
and  unless  they  can  be  assured  that  in  the  destruction 
of  these  age-long  chains  they  do  not  find  other  and 
stronger  fetters,  they  would  be  justified  in  declining 
to  try  the  experiment.  Even  though  it  be  granted 
that  the  general  principles  above  enunciated  are  sound, 
yet  there  remains  the  great  task  of  devising  such  auto- 
matic checks  and  balances  as  will*  render  it  impossible 
that  this  joint  government  shall  encroach  upon  the  just 
liberties  of  the  component  States  or  their  people.  Due 
care  must  be  taken  that  a  majority  of  the  component 
States  shall  not  engage  in  oppressive  conduct  toward 
a  minority  or  even  toward  a  single  State;  that  a  ma- 
jority composed  of  the  small  States,  shall  not  override 
the  united  will  of  the  fewer,  but  more  influential, 
"  Great  Powers,"  and  that  the  more  influential  shall 
not  override  the  wishes  of  a  majority  composed  of  the 
smaller  States;  that  the  international  government, 
both  in  its  legislative  and  executive  departments,  be 
at  all  times  subject  to  the  joint  control  of  the  com- 
ponent States;  that  a  small  minority  on  the  one  hand 
shall  not  be  permitted  to  block  the  legitimate  will  of 
the  majority  of  the  States  in  the  ordinary  conduct  of 
business,  while  on  the  other,  in  regard  to  matters  of 


INTRODUCTION  xxxiii 

vital  importance,  a  bare  majority  of  States  shall  not  be 
permitted  complete  control;  that  the  internal  affairs 
of  a  State  be  not  interfered  with  at  all  by  other  States 
acting  jointly  or  separately;  that  a  constituent  State  do 
not  persistently  neglect  or  disregard  its  pledged  obliga- 
tions to  the  union  or  its  sister  States, — in  short,  that 
all  needful  precautions  be  taken  to  insure  an  adminis- 
tration of  the  international  government  in  the  common 
interest  of  all,  as  evidenced  by  the  free  and  untram- 
meled  voice  of  each  in  the  international  legislature. 

It  is  hoped  that  the  following  study,  while  doubtless 
imperfect  and  inadequate  in  details,  may  at  least  serve 
to  suggest  a  basic  foundation  upon  which  to  rear  an 
international  organization  which  will  remove  the  great 
subjects  already  mentioned,  the  breeders  of  interna- 
tional strife,  from  the  baneful  influence  of  secret  and 
often  sinister  diplomacy,  and  deliver  them  to  the  open 
and  public  debate  of  an  international  legislative  body, 
wherein  every  nation  will  be  fairly  represented. 

NOTE. — The  reader's  attention  is  specially  called  to  the  index- 
heading,  "  Checks  and  Balances,"  wherein  will  be  found  a  complete 
analysis  of  the  many  safeguards  against  invasions  of  national  and 
individual  independence  contained  in  the  constitution  proposed. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


INTRODUCTION 


PAGE 

ix 


Utility  of  arbitral  tribunals  in  preventing  wars. — Judicial 
and  arbitral  courts  contrasted. — Many  sorts  of  disputes  can- 
not be  settled  by  either  tribunal. — International  disputes 
classified. — Justiciable  and  political  questions  contrasted. — 
Why  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  can  deter- 
mine all  disputes  between  the  States  of  the  American 
Union. — Political  war-breeding  powers  of  States  surren- 
dered to  United  States. — No  such  surrender  by  independent 
nations. — Conceptions  of  sovereignty  illusory. — Feasibility 
of  a  federal  league  of  nations. — Federal  union  of  nations 
and  league  merely  to  enforce  peace  contrasted. — Note  to 
the  reader  touching  the  checks  and  balances  of  the  Con- 
stitution. 

CHAPTER  I 

<FEDERAL    UNIONS    PREVENT    WARS    BETWEEN  THE    COMPONENT 
STATES , 

Foundations  of  social  morality  among  men. — Social 
morality  among  the  nations. — Law  between  nations  supplied, 
and  wars  averted,  by  federal  unions. — Some  distinctions 
between  ordinary  federal  unions  and  a  federal  league  of 
independent  nations. 


CHAPTER  II 
PEACE-MAKING  ELEMENTS  OF  A  FEDERAL  UNION      .... 

The  war-checking  powers  of  a  federal  union. — The  causes 
of  war  enumerated. — National  immorality. — National  cupid- 
ity.— National  ambition. — National  pride  or  honor. — Na- 
tional prejudice  and  ignorance. — National  jealousies  and 
suspicions. — Lack  of  adequate  peaceable  modes  of  redress. 


10 


CHAPTER  III 
FEDERAL  UNION  OF  INDEPENDENT  NATIONS  PROPOSED 

XXXV 


xxxvi  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  IV 

PAGE 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  LEGISLATIVE  DEPARTMENT      ....      30 

Distribution  of  powers. — Legislative  department  of  one 
or  two  chambers? — Appointment  of  representatives — Terms 
of  office. — Sessions  of  the  International  Congress — Recesses 
and  adjournments. — Compensation  of  representatives. — 
Privileges  of  representatives. — Limited  life  of  revenue  and 
commercial  measures. — National  veto  of  international  legis- 
lation.— Power  of  impeachment  or  removal. — Other  de- 
tails of  organization. 

CHAPTER  V 
POWERS  TO  BE  CONFERRED  ON  INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS  ...      66 

Preliminary  observations. — Power  to  raise  revenue. — 
Power  to  borrow  money. — To  issue  paper  currency. — To 
coin  money. — To  punish  counterfeiting. — To  fix  standards 
of  weights  and  measures. — To  regulate  international  com- 
merce.— To  regulate  postal  and  other  international  com- 
munication.— To  provide  for  international  copyrights  and 
patent  rights. — To  constitute  inferior  international  courts. 
— To  define,  punish  and  redress  wrongs  on  the  high  seas 
and  offences  against  the  Law  of  Nations. — The  war  pow- 
ers.— The  seat  of  the  international  government. — Ancillary 
powers. — Citizenship. — Power  of  naturalization. 

CHAPTER  VI 
ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  EXECUTIVE  DEPARTMENT  .    100 

Dependence  of  the  executive  upon  the  legislative  depart- 
ment.— Selection  of  a  prime  minister. — The  nominating 
committee,  its  organization  and  functions. — Eligibility  of 
ministers. — Selection  of  subordinate  ministers. — The  number 
of  ministers. — Their  terms  of  office. — Their  compensation. — 
Distribution  of  executive  functions  among  the  ministers. 

CHAPTER  VII 
POWERS  TO  BE  CONFERRED  ON  THE  EXECUTIVE  DEPARTMENT  .       .     115 

The  pardoning  power. — The  treaty-making  power. — 
Appointment  and  removal  of  officers. — Recognition  of  am- 
bassadors and  public  ministers. — The  execution  of  inter- 
national laws,  treaties  and  judicial  decisions. — Official  com- 
missions.— Interpellations  and  interrogations. — The  sum- 
moning and  proroguing  of  the  Congress. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xxxvii 

CHAPTER  VIII 

PAGE 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  JUDICIARY  DEPARTMENT      .       .      .       .    125 

Appointment  of  international  judiciary. — Independence  of 
the  judiciary. — Inferior  international  tribunals. — The  in- 
ternational Supreme  Court. — Equality  of  national  repre- 
sentation upon  the  Supreme  Court. — Division  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  into  sections. — Appeals  from  the  sections  to 
the  Supreme  Court  as  a  whole. 

CHAPTER  IX 
JURISDICTION  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  COURTS 136 

Scope  of  the  international  judicial  power. — Interpreta- 
tion of  the  constitution,  laws  and  treaties. — Power  to  ad- 
judge laws  and  treaties  unconstitutional  and  void. — Check 
upon  the  power. — Cases  affecting  ambassadors,  public  min- 
isters and  consuls. — Offences  and  wrongs  committed  on 
the  high  seas. — The  United  Nations  a  party. — Controversies 
between  component  nations. — Controversies  between  com- 
ponent and  other  nations. — Controversies  between  nations 
not  members  of  the  league. — Cases  between  citizens  of  dif- 
ferent States. — Original  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court. 
— Its  appellate  jurisdiction. — Limitations  upon  the  inter- 
national judicial  power. — Suits  by  individuals  against  com- 
ponent nations. — Suits  against  the  sovereign,  chief  executive 
or  ministers  of  a  component  nation. 

CHAPTER  X 

LIMITATIONS  UPON  THE  POWERS  OF  THE  UNITED  NATIONS:— (I) 

POLITICAL  LIMITATIONS 156 

Preliminary  observations. — Territorial  acquisitions. — 
"  Citizenship  of  the  United  Nations." — "  Treason  against  the 
United  Nations." — Power  of  taxation. — Appropriations  of 
public  money. — Purposes  of  appropriations. — Bounties  and 
pensions. — Commercial  preferences  as  between  the  com- 
ponent nations. — Titles  of  nobility  and  privileged  orders. 
— Grants  of  titles  or  emoluments  by  other  States. 

CHAPTER  XI 

LIMITATIONS  UPON  THE  POWERS  OF  THE  UNITED  NATIONS: — (II) 

GUARANTEES  OF  CIVIL  RIGHTS  OF  THE  INDIVIDUAL    .       .168 

Prompt  discharge  from  illegal  imprisonment. — Religious 
liberty. — Freedom  of  speech  and  press. — Rights  of  assembly 
and  of  petition. — The  keeping  and  bearing  of  arms. — Quar- 
tering of  soldiers  on  the  people. — Jury  trial  in  civil  cases. 
— Power  of  eminent  domain. — Due  process  of  law. — Equal 
protection  of  the  laws. 


xxxviii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XII 

PAGE 

LIMITATIONS  UPON  THE  POWERS  OF  THE  UNITED  NATIONS:— (III) 
GUARANTEES  OF  RIGHTS  OF  INDIVIDUALS  IN  CRIMINAL 
CASES .  .  .  181 

Due  process  of  law. — Equal  protection  of  the  laws. — Bills 
of  attainder. — Ex  post  facto  laws. — General  warrants  of 
arrest  and  search. — Double  jeopardy. — Self-incrimination. — 
The  grand  jury. — Speedy  and  public  trial. — Jury  trial  in 
criminal  cases. — Other  guarantees  in  criminal  cases. 

CHAPTER  XIII 
LIMITATIONS  UPON  THE  POWERS  OF  THE  COMPONENT  NATIONS  .       .190 

General  limitations  of  a  non-political  nature.— Political 
powers  haying  no  bearing  on  war. — Treaties,  alliances  and 
confederations. — Taxation  of  international  commerce. — 
War  powers  of  component  nations. — Territorial  acquisitions 
by  component  nations. 

CHAPTER  XIV 

RELATIONS  OF  COMPONENT  NATIONS  TO  EACH  OTHER  AND  TO  THE 

UNION          212 

Protection  of  fundamental  rights  of  citizens  of  one  State 
while  in  another. — Protection  to  citizens  of  component  States 
while  in  foreign  countries. — Protection  of  component  States 
against  invasion. — Internal  dissensions  in  component  States. 
— Admission  of  new  States  to  the  league. 

CHAPTER  XV 
RESERVED  RIGHTS  OF  THE  COMPONENT  NATIONS 222 

General  reservation  of  sovereignty  and  of  all  rights  not 
surrendered. — Right  of  component  nation  to  withdraw  from 
the  league. — Rights  of  seceding  State  in  the  common  prop- 
erty of  the  league. 

CHAPTER  XVI 
SUPREMACY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  CONSTITUTION,  LAWS  AND  TREATIES    229 

The  declaration  of  supremacy. — Official  oath  to  support 
the  Constitution. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xxxix 

CHAPTER  XVII 

PAGE 

AMENDMENTS  TO  THE  CONSTITUTION 232 

General  considerations. — Proposal  of  amendments. — 
Enactment  of  amendments. — Limitations  upon  the  power  of 
amendment. 

CHAPTER  XVIII 
DISCIPLINE  OF  A  COMPONENT  NATION ,    242 

Violations  of  constitutional  obligations  by  a  component 
nation. — Modes  of  discipline  proposed. — Embargo  on  trade. 
— Expulsion  from  the  league. — Check  upon  disciplinary 
power  of  the  Congress. — Requirement  of  a  three-fourths  vote 
in  each  chamber. 

CHAPTER  XIX 
ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION 248 

Number  of  assenting  nations  required  to  establish  the 
Constitution. — Number  of  the  Great  Powers. — Method  of 
ratification  of  the  Constitution. 

APPENDIX 257 

INDEX 299 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


CHAPTER  I 

FEDERAL    UNIONS    PREVENT    WARS    BE- 
TWEEN  THE  COMPONENT  STATES 

I 

FOUNDATIONS  OF  SOCIAL  OR  Civic  MORALITY 
AMONG  MEN 

In  the  first  stages  of  every  primitive  society  there  is 
a  period  during  which  the  laws  protecting  individual 
rights  are  but  vaguely  defined  and  weakly  enforced. 
Each  man's  ability  to  hold  his  own  depends  upon  his 
strength  or  cunning  or  upon  the  alliances  he  can  form 
with  others  for  common  protection. 

But  as  the  society  becomes  more  stable  and  civilized, 
influences  begin  to  work  which  materially  improve  the 
condition  of  mankind.  A  spirit  of  co-operation  and  of 
mutual  aid  and  dependence  takes  the  place  of  the 
former  spirit  of  rapacity;  common  interests  make  men 
more  friendly;  suspicion  and  distrust  give  way  to  mu- 
tual confidence;  selfish  ambition  and  cupidity  yield 
more  or  less  to  an  appreciation  of  the  rights  of  others ; 


2  'A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

and  violence  surrenders  dominion  to  the  gentler  arts 
of  reason  and  peace. 

What  is  the  cause  of  this  great  change  in  the  gen- 
eral attitude  of  men?  It  is  the  rise  and  development 
of  LAW,  divine  and  human,  and  the  proper  enforce- 
ment of  justice  and  right.  This  marks  the  birth  of  a 
social  or  civic  morality  among  men,  unknown  to  the 
era  of  lawlessness  and  of  the  personal  application  of 
the  maxim  that  might  makes  right. 

All  individual  morality  is  based  upon  four  broad 
foundations:  The  fear  of  consequences,  the  hope  of 
reward,  hereditary  predispositions,  and  environment. 
All  these  are  directly  or  indirectly  supplied  and  built 
up  by  the  operation,  as  between  man  and  man,  of  just 
and  wise  law,  firmly  enforced  by  a  superior  power. 

So  long,  therefore,  as  we  suppose  men  born  without 
hereditary  predispositions  to  justice  and  respect 
for  the  rights  of  others;  surrounded  by  others  with 
as  little  conception  of  these  ideals  as  themselves,  and 
with  as  little  understanding  or  appreciation  of  them; 
owing  such  ease,  comfort  and  happiness  as  they  enjoy 
to  violence  and  the  unjust  disregard  of  other's  rights; 
and  strong  enough  to  be  devoid  of  much  fear  of  conse- 
quences;— we  have  a  condition  in  which  ordinary 
morality,  and  the  dictates  of  reason  and  justice,  can 
find  but  little  root. 

But  with  the  advent  of  Law,  properly  enforced,  pro- 
tecting the  weak  against  violence  and  punishing  the 
oppressor,  all  this  is  changed.  The  teachings  of  divine 
law  arouse  the  conscience,  while  the  fear  of  certain 


MORALITY  AMONG  NATIONS  3 

punishment  under  human  law  suffices  to  deter  most 
men  from  its  ruthless  violation.  The  hope  of  reward 
ceases  to  lie  in  the  violent  or  fraudulent  taking  of  the 
property  of  others,  but  finds  its  source  in  the  acquisi- 
tion of  goods  by  the  honest  labor  of  men  secure  in  the 
peaceful  possession  of  their  own,  or  in  their  desire 
to  obtain  and  to  deserve  the  good  opinion  and  plaudit 
of  their  fellows  and  the  approval  of  their  own  con- 
sciences. It  is  soon  discovered  that  these  constitute 
much  greater  rewards  than  could  be  attained  under 
the  old  system  of  lawlessness  and  license.  And  as  these 
influences  spread  amongst  men,  they  speedily  become 
reinforced  by  those  of  hereditary  predisposition  to 
just  dealings  and  peaceful  conduct,  and  of  an  environ- 
ment of  the  like  kind. 

Thus  it  is  that  the  advent  of  Law  brings  about  £ 
condition  among  men  in  every  civilized  society,  by 
reason  of  which  violence  and  private  wars  among  them 
are  rare. 

II 

SOCIAL  MORALITY  AMONG  THE  NATIONS 

There  is  a  family  or  society  of  nations,  but  its 
condition  is  closely  akin  to  that  of  the  primitive  so- 
cieties of  men,  to  which  allusion  has  been  made.  As 
yet,  the  nations,  in  their  dealings  with  each  other,  have 
by  no  means  advanced  along  the  road  of  moral  con- 
ceptions as  far  as  has  the  individual  unit  of  society. 

Nor  is  this  surprising  when  we  remember  that  the 


4  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

nations  generally  have  not  been  subjected  to  the  in- 
fluences that  make  so  strongly  for  the  development 
of  the  morality  of  the  individual. 

The  laws  governing  international  relations  have  not 
the  sanction  of  a  superior  power.  They  are  vaguely 
outlined,  and  are  obligatory  only  so  long  as  the  na- 
tions' self-interests  demand  their  recognition.  The 
only  well-recognized  law  controlling  them  in  the  past 
has  been  that  might  makes  right.  Accordingly  much 
the  same  phenomena  have  presented  themselves  in  this 
society  of  nations  as  in  that  primitive  society  of  men 
already  referred  to. 

The  strong  nation,  unafraid  of  consequences,  de- 
spoils the  weaker  of  its  territory,  its  independence,  or 
its  wealth,  and  finds  its  highest  reward  in  the  violent 
or  fraudulent  acquisition  of  the  liberty  or  property  of 
its  neighbors.  Its  environment  has  not  been  such  as 
to  improve  these  tendencies,  since  all  the  rest  of  the  so- 
ciety of  nations  would  think  and  act  like  itself  under 
the  same  circumstances.  Nor  has  there  been,  any 
influence  operating  upon  the  nations  analogous  to  the 
hereditary  predispositions  to  just  and  right  dealings, 
which  operate  so  powerfully  to  create  and  keep  alive 
individual  morality. 

Hence  in  the  society  of  nations,  as  in  that  of  primi- 
tive men,  we  find  the  same  tendencies  to  violence, 
rapacity,  cupidity,  ruthless  ambition,  suspicion,  and  dis- 
trust, constant  injustice,  constant  conflicts. 

That  the  absence  of  social  morality  among  nations 
is  due  to  the  absence  of  Law  and  a  superior  power 


EFFECT  OF  FEDERAL  UNION  5 

adequate  to  enforce  it,  is  seen  from  the  fact  that  within 
the  last  century  there  has  been  a  considerable  develop- 
ment of  it,  synchronizing  with  the  many  international 
congresses  and  conferences  that  have  from  time  to  time 
been  held  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  and  adopting 
laws  to  regulate  international  relations, — and  this,  de- 
spite the  fact  that  but  very  inadequate  and  imperfect 
instrumentalities  have  been  as  yet  created  for  the  en- 
forcement of  the  laws  made. 

Ill 

LAW  BETWEEN  NATIONS  SUPPLIED  AND  WARS 
AVERTED  BY  FEDERAL  UNIONS 

Important  and  valuable  testimony  to  the  fact  just  al- 
luded to, — that  an  international  morality,  which  will 
put  an  end  to  international  abuses  and  the  wars  result- 
ing from  them,  will  always  be  developed  in  the  pres- 
ence of  effectual  and  enforceable  international  law, — 
is  to  be  found  in  the  practically  complete  success  with 
which  the  various  federal  unions  of  the  world  have  not 
only  averted  wars  between  their  component  States,  but 
have  substituted,  in  the  place  of  the  vindictive  na- 
tional passions  that  would  soon  engender  war  between 
them  if  left  to  themselves,  a  spirit  of  co-operation  and 
friendly  emulation  for  the  common  weal  entirely  un- 
known as  between  separate  nations.  The  advent  of 
law  among  nations  is  thus  seen  to  produce  much  the 
same  effects  as  among  individuals. 


6  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

The  German  Empire,  Switzerland,  the  Dominion  of 
Canada,  the  Australian  Commonwealth,  the  Argentine 
and  Brazilian  Republics,  all  speak  a  common  language 
on  this  point. 

The  only  exception  is  the  United  States,  whose  rec- 
ord in  this  respect  has  been  dimmed  by  the  War  of 
1 86 1  between  the  States.  But  upon  due  examination 
it  will  be  found  that  this  exception  is  apparent  rather 
than  real,  since  that  war  was  due  to  an  irreconcilable, 
but  none  the  less  sincere,  difference  of  opinion  upon 
the  point  of  the  constitutional  right  of  a  State  to  secede 
from  the  Union ; — a  point  which  the  Constitution  had 
not  expressly  provided  for.  No  one  acquainted  with 
the  American  people  would  believe  that  a  war  would 
ever  have  occurred  upon  this  point  if  the  Constitution 
had  explicitly  declared  either  for  or  against  the  right 
of  secession.  That  war  therefore  cannot  justly  be 
said  to  have  resulted  on  either  side  from  a  want  of 
social  morality  or  from  lawlessness,  but  rather  from 
the  desire  of  each  party  to  the  quarrel  to  enforce  the 
law  as  each  saw  it. 

With  respect  to  the  United  States,  however,  it  can 
certainly  be  said  that,  with  the  exception  of  this  war, 
her  experience  has  been  the  same  as  that  of  all  the 
other  federal  unions.  The  component  States  have 
exercised  toward  each  other  that  courtesy,  self-restraint 
and  consideration  which  take  the  place  in  such  federa- 
tions of  the  rapacity,  greed,  ambition,  and  mutual 
jealousy  and  distrust,  characteristic  of  the  relations 
existing  between  distinct  nations. 


FEDERAL  UNIONS  CONTRASTED         7 

The  British  Empire,  too,  should  be  mentioned  in  this 
connection.  For  though  it  is  not  in  form  strictly  a 
federal  union,  it  is  actuated  in  the  government  of  its 
colonies  and  territories  by  much  the  same  principles 
that  regulate  the  relations  between  a  federal  union  and 
its  component  States,  the  principles  of  freedom  and 
independence  in  all  local  matters  and  protection 
against  invasion,  in  return  for  the  more  or  less  cen- 
tralized control  of  interests  common  to  the  whole  Em- 
pire. And  here,  once  more,  we  find  the  operation  of 
the  same  law, — the  component  States  actuated  by  good 
will  towards  each  other  and  a  desire  to  serve  the  com- 
mon good  of  all,  instead  of  a  constant  striving  for 
unfair  advantages,  with  the  corresponding  jealousies 
it  engenders. 

Is  it  not  then  a  just  and  reasonable  conclusion  that 
there  are  elements  in  every  federal  union  that  tend 
to  destroy  the  grounds  of  ordinary  international  quar- 
rel and  to  insure  peace  among  the  component  nations? 
That  such  has  been  the  result  in  the  actual  experience 
of  all  federal  unions,  with  the  qualification  mentioned 
as  to  the  United  States,  there  is  no  doubt. 

IV 

SOME  DISTINCTIONS  BETWEEN  ORDINARY  FEDERAL 
UNIONS  AND  A  FEDERAL  UNION  OF  INDEPEND- 
ENT NATIONS 

In  considering  whether  the  conclusion  just  reached 
would  apply  in  like  manner  or  degree  to  a  general 


8  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

union  of  nations,  it  is  important  to  observe  that  all 
existing  federal  unions  are  composed  of  States,  all 
of  which  have  much  the  same  institutions,  language, 
and  nationality.  It  might  be  questioned  whether  quite 
the  same  successful  results  would  follow  upon  a  federal 
union  of  nations  speaking  different  languages,  possess- 
ing different  institutions  and  racial  characteristics,  and 
accustomed  to  different  modes  of  thought. 

There  is  another  point  of  distinction  to  be  noted 
between  a  federal  international  union  and  the  federal 
national  unions  with  which  the  world  is  familiar. 
The  latter  have  always  been  designed  for  two  pur- 
poses;— first,  to  substitute,  as  between  the  component 
States,  the  co-operative  and  friendly  for  the  rapacious 
and  militaristic  spirit;  and,  second,  to  create  to  a 
greater  or  less  degree  out  of  the  component  States  a 
single  nation.  For  the  purpose  last  mentioned  it  has 
always  been  necessary  to  bind  the  States  together  by  a 
close  union,  they  surrendering  to  the  federal  govern- 
ment a  considerable  number  of  sovereign  rights  they 
might  have  exercised  as  independent  States,  even 
though  no  danger  of  war  might  result  from  the  exer- 
cise of  them.  The  federal  international  union,  on  the 
other  hand,  being  designed  mainly  to  preserve  the 
peace  between  the  component  nations,  and  to  create  a 
new  State  only  in  a  very  limited  sense,  need  not,  and 
indeed  could  not,  be  so  close  a  union  as  the  others 
nor  require  the  surrender  of  so  many  important  sov- 
ereign powers. 

In  the  case  of  an  international  federation,  these  two 


FEDERAL  UNIONS  CONTRASTED        9 

grounds  of  distinction  would  perhaps  operate  in  some 
degree  to  diminish  the  salutary  operation  of  that  law 
underlying  federal  unions,  which  makes  them  very  com- 
plete conservers  of  the  peace  between  the  component 
States;  but  it  by  no  means  follows  that  this  influence 
would  be  seriously  impaired  either  in  kind  or  degree. 
If  we  remember  that,  in  case  of  such  a  union,  the  com- 
ponent States,  through  the  federal  legislative  and  ex- 
ecutive departments,  would  be  co-operating  much  more 
constantly  than  now,  and  would  thus  come  better  to 
understand  each  other's  view  points;  that  the  war  pow- 
ers, and  others  calculated  to  cause  conflicts  between 
them  would  be  surrendered  to  the  federal  government, 
with  a  corresponding  disarmament  of  the  nations  them- 
selves; and  that  actual  disagreements  between  them 
would  be  determined  by  the  decrees  of  the  federal 
judiciary,  backed  if  need  be  by  the  influence  of  the  en- 
tire union; — there  is  little  reason  to  doubt  that  the 
causes  of  war  between  the  nations  would  be  effectually 
abolished  or  robbed  of  their  harmful  qualities,  and 
that  a  reign  of  international  law  would  be  established 
in  the  place  of  the  existing  dominion  of  a  universal 
international  license; — ushering  in  peace  and  concord 
where  now  prevail  violence  and  war. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  PEACE-MAKING  ELEMENTS  OF  A 
FEDERAL  UNION 

I 

THE  WAR-CHECKING  POWERS  OF  A  FEDERAL 

UNION 

In  the  preceding  chapter  it  has  been  pointed  out 
that  the  political  experience  of  mankind  clearly  teaches 
the  lesson  that  groups  of  independent  States  may  suc- 
cessfully avoid  war  amongst  themselves  by  entering 
into  a  federal  union;  and  that  this  is  true  even  when 
the  number  of  component  States  is  large,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  United  States,  composed  now  of  nearly  fifty 
great  commonwealths. 

Why  do  these  federal  unions  possess  this  universal 
attribute, — for  it  is  much  more  than  a  tendency, — the 
elimination  of  wars  among  its  members? 

The  answer  is  found  in  the  nature  of  a  federal  union 
and  its  inherent  qualities,  which  naturally  and  in- 
evitably destroy  the  germs  of  war  as  between  the  com- 
ponent nations,  and  without  attempting  any  direct  al- 
terations of  human  nature,  divert  the  war-breeding 
passions  of  men  into  safer  and  saner  channels. 

10 


FEDERAL  UNION  CHECKS  WAR        1 1 

What  then  are  these  fundamental  and  inherent  quali- 
ties of  the  federal  union?  If  we  turn  to  the  existing 
federations  for  an  answer  and  examine  them  to  dis- 
cover those  attributes  that  are  common  to  them  all, 
we  must  find  among  these  the  particular  principles  ne- 
cessitating this  like  effect. 

The  most  important  of  these  common  phenomena 
which  would  strike  the  attention  of  the  observer  is  the 
fact  that  all  such  unions  have  adopted  the  principle  of 
a  surrender  to  the  federal  government  of  certain  pow- 
ers, the  exercise  of  which  would  be  of  common  interest 
to  all  the  component  States,  with  a  correlative  reser- 
vation of  independence  to  those  States  in  all  matters 
of  local  concern  only. 

And  always  among  the  POWERS  SURREN- 
DERED by  the  nations  severally  we  find  the  power 
to  control  war;  the  power  to  control  commerce  between 
the  component  States  and  with  foreign  nations;  the 
power  to  impose  duties  on  goods  imported  or  exported, 
or  to  expand  their  territories  without  the  consent  of 
the  federal  government;  the  power  to  make  at  least 
certain  kinds  of  treaties;  the  power  to  keep  armaments, 
unless  subject  to  the  control  of  the  federal  government; 
and  the  power  to  determine  for  themselves  the  mode 
and  measure  of  redress  for  alleged  wrongs  committed 
by  sister  States,  such  disputes  being  made  justiciable 
by  a  tribunal  constituted  for  the  purpose,  whose  de- 
crees may  be  backed  by  the  combined  influence  of  the 
States  in  union. 

Other  powers  also,  having  no  special  relation  to  the 


12  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

preservation  of  peace  between  the  component  nations, 
are  usually  conferred  upon  the  federal  government, 
such  as  the  control  of  the  currency,  banking,  copyrights, 
and  other  national,  but  not  war-breeding,  powers,  and 
varying  in  number  and  degree  with  the  grade  of  na- 
tional strength  and  centralized  power  it  is  desired  to 
create  in  the  federal  government.  But  the  purpose 
of  granting  such  powers  as  these,  with  a  corresponding 
weakening  of  the  component  States,  is  in  the  main 
to  create  a  single  nation  of  the  composite  group,  and 
not  merely  to  prevent  war  between  the  States  con- 
cerned. 

It  is  among  the  first  class  of  powers,  therefore, 
rather  than  the  second,  we  must  look  to  find  the  reason 
for  the  fact  that  by  federation  nations  save  themselves 
from  the  horrors  of  war.  Reviewing  these  powers  as 
they  have  been  enumerated,  it  is  difficult  to  select  any 
as  not  fulfilling  an  important  part  in  the  accomplish- 
ment of  this  result. 

May  we  not  justly  conclude,  then,  that  in  the  forma- 
tion of  a  federal  union  for  the  preservation  of  peace 
among  the  component  nations,  it  would  be  unsafe,  to 
say  the  least,  to  omit  any  of  these  from  the  powers 
to  be  granted  to  the  proposed  federation?  It  may,  or 
it  may  not,  be  found  convenient  to  include  other  pow- 
ers also,  but  these  at  least  should  certainly  be  included. 


CAUSES  OF  WAR  13 

II 

THE  CAUSES  OF  WAR  ENUMERATED 

It  may  be  asked,  how  is  it  certain  that  the  surrender 
of  all  the  powers  above  mentioned  are  essential  to 
preserve  the  peace  of  nations?  Is  there  any  other  rea- 
son to  believe  so  than  the  fact  that  all  existing  fed- 
erations have  provided  for  the  surrender  of  these 
powers  on  the  part  of  the  nations  entering  into 
them? 

A  careful  analysis  of  the  causes  or  motives  that 
induce  wars  between  nations, — omitting  from  consid- 
eration civil  wars  and  wars  bona  fide  waged  for 
self-preservation  or  in  behalf  of  another  oppressed  na- 
tion (neither  of  which  could  occur  if  the  other  party 
to  the  war  were  not  unjustified  in  the  conduct  leading 
to  it) — will  show  that  all  wars  other  than  those  just 
mentioned  spring  from  one  or  more  of  the  following 
sources : 

1.  The  lack  of  a  proper  international  morality;  so 
that  nations  scarcely  hesitate  to  engage  in  conduct  to- 
wards other  nations  which  men  of  ordinary  civic  moral- 
ity would  be  ashamed  to  stoop  to  with  reference  to 
each  other; 

2.  National  cupidity,  with  reference  to  territory  or 
trade; 

3.  National  ambitions,  military  or  political; 

4.  National  pride  or  honor; 

5.  National  prejudices  and  ignorance  or  misunder- 


14  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

standing  of  the  ideals  and  characteristics  of  other  na- 
tions; 

6.  National  jealousies  and  suspicions;  and 

7.  The  absence  of  an  assured  method  of  determin- 
ing bona  fide  disputes  between  nations  otherwise  than 
by  a  resort  to  force. 

Ill 

NATIONAL  IMMORALITY 

As  to  the  first  of  these, — national  immorality,  as 
shown  in  the  existing  conditions  of  international  law- 
lessness or  license, — it  has  been  attempted  to  explain  in 
the  first  chapter  how  a  federal  union  operates  to  check 
it,  as  between  the  component  States,  substituting  a 
spirit  among  them  of  co-operation  and  friendly  emula- 
tion for  the  common  good  in  the  place  of  the  spirit 
of  disintegration  and  potential  hostility  that  normally 
prevails  between  separate  independent  nations.  Refer- 
ence to  that  explanation  will  suffice. 

IV 

NATIONAL  CUPIDITY 

National  cupidity,  or  the  undue  desire  for  na- 
tional aggrandizement  either  in  the  direction  of  terri- 
tory or  of  trade  or  both,  is  a  fruitful  source  of  inter- 
national strife. 

This  desire  for  territory  may  arise  from  the  wish  to 


CAUSES  OF  WAR  15 

exploit  its  resources  or  trade  to  the  enrichment  of  cer- 
tain classes  in  the  State,  or  from  the  wish  to  secure 
other  supposed  advantages  in  commerce,  such  as  con- 
venient shipping  ports  or  monopolies  of  trade  with 
the  people  inhabiting  or  adjacent  to  the  territory;  or 
it  may  spring  from  the  assumed  military  advantages 
to  accrue  to  the  nation  from  its  possession,  or  from 
the  supposed  political  strengthening  of  the  nation 
arising  therefrom,  such,  for  example,  as  the  chance 
it  affords  to  have  the  nation's  surplus  population 
migrate  thither,  remaining  under  the  original  flag 
and  allegiance,  rather  than  lose  all  future  benefits 
of  that  population  through  emigration  to  other 
countries. 

This  national  yearning  for  increased  territory  is 
neither  improper  nor  calculated  to  stir  up  strife  be- 
tween nations  so  long  as  it  is  confined  to  territory  not 
in  the  present  possession  of  any  other  nation.  But 
unfortunately  in  modern  times  all  the  desirable  terri- 
tory of  the  world's  surface  is  possessed  and  occupied; 
and  hence  any  present  national  desire  of  this  sort  must 
content  itself  with  the  acquisition  of  undesirable  terri- 
tory, or  else  must  look  to  the  forcible  or  fraudulent 
acquisition  of  the  territory  of  another  nation,  to  which 
the  former  has  no  right  save  that  of  predominant 
might.  The  consequence  is  that  in  proportion  to  the 
desirability  of  the  territory  upon  which  a  nation  has 
fixed  the  eyes  of  its  affection  is  the  danger  of  war  to 
obtain  it.  And  whether,  as  an  economic  or  military 
question,  the  territory  when  obtained  is  worth  the  cost 


1 6  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

of  securing  it  is  a  matter  generally  lost  sight  of  in  the 
final  outcome. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  if  component  nations  were 
to  surrender  to  a  federal  government  their  right  to 
impose  duties  on  imports  and  exports  and  other  re- 
strictions upon  international  trade  and  commerce,  and 
also  their  war  powers,  all  need,  and  the  corresponding 
desire,  for  increased  territory  would  at  once  vanish, 
and  this  cause  of  war,  as  between  such  nations,  would 
be  abolished.  This  has  been  the  experience  of  all 
existing  federal  unions  as  between  their  component 
States. 

The  same  principle  would  also  apply,  under  similar 
conditions,  to  abolish  wars  between  such  nations  result- 
ing from  national  desire  for  increase  of  trade.  By 
giving  the  control  of  the  international  commerce  of  the 
nations  concerned  to  the  combiried  nations  as  repre- 
sented in  a  properly  organized  federal  government,  as 
every  existing  federal  constitution  does,  the  temptation 
is  removed  from  the  several  nations  to  use  unfair 
and  unjust  means  to  promote  their  own  commerce  at 
the  expense  of  their  neighbors,  so  that  justice  and  right 
will  on  the  whole  prevail  in  such  regulations  rather 
than  injustice  and  greed;  and  thus  another  fruitful 
cause  of  war  has,  as  between  those  nations,  been  abol- 
ished, and  trust  and  confidence  between  them  has  to 
that  extent  replaced  suspicion  and  jealousy. 


CAUSES  OF  WAR  17 

V 

NATIONAL  AMBITION 

In  the  next  place,  national  ambition  either  for  mili- 
tary or  political  greatness  is  a  constant  source  of  ag- 
gression and  war.  These  are  indeed,  in  the  last  analy- 
sis, one  and  the  same.  For  while  it  is  possible  that 
national  political  aggrandizement  may  be  attained  by 
other  methods  than  the  military,  it  is  always  true  that 
the  ultimate  purpose  of  national  military  success  is 
a  political,  and  usually  a  territorial  or  commercial, 
aggrandizement. 

But  if  the  effect  of  a  federal  union  is  to  abolish,  as 
between  the  component  nations,  the  temptation  to  ac- 
quire territory  or  to  augment  the  national  commerce  by 
violent  or  unjust  means,  the  national  desire  for  po- 
litical predominance  is  thus  deprived  of  all  its  noxious 
consequences,  and  nothing  of  it  is  left  but  the  benefi- 
cent ambition  to  shine  in  ability  and  usefulness  to  the 
common  weal  among  the  sister  stars  of  the  same  con- 
stellation. 

VI 

NATIONAL  PRIDE  OR  HONOR 

The  same  results  follow  in  the  case  of  national 
pride  as  a  cause  of  war.  As  between  independent 
nations,  there  is  no  surer  way  of  bringing  on  \£ar  than 
to  offer  an  affront  to  national  pride  or  national  honor, 


1 8  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

because  each  nation  is  jealous  and  suspicious  of  the 
other,  and  fearful  that,  should  it  show  the  least  sign 
of  weakness  or  fear,  other  nations  are  ready  to  pounce 
upon  it,  or  at  least  ready  to  entertain  doubts  of  its 
courage  and  to  impose  unjust  and  improper  demands. 
It  is  because  of  this  quickness  to  resent  insults  or  of- 
fensive conduct  (real  or  supposed),  even  at  a  cost 
perhaps  ruinous  to  itself,  that  the  nations  are  so 
punctilious  in  their  dealings  with  each  other.  Slight 
departures  from  established  international  customs  with 
regard  to  these  matters  may  produce  serious  conse- 
quences. 

The  federal  union,  as  between  the  nations  compos- 
ing it,  supplies  the  remedy  for  this,  not  by  destroying 
national  pride,  honor,  and  patriotism,  but  by  removing 
the  necessity  for  a  prompt  resentment  of  an  affront 
offered  by  another  component  nation.  Just  as  a  man, 
living  in  a  civilized  community  and  knowing  that  the 
law  protects  him  from  unprovoked  violence,  can  af- 
ford to  overlook  an  affront  to  his  dignity  rather  than 
go  to  the  extreme  length  of  killing  the  offender  to 
avenge  it,  so  a  nation  which  is  a  member  of  such  a 
union,  aware  that  neither  the  offending  nation  nor 
others  would  be  permitted  to  use  force  against  it,  can 
afford  to  overlook  the  offense.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact 
such  affronts  would  never  be  likely  to  occur,  unless  by 
accident  or  misunderstanding,  for  all  temptation  to  of- 
fer them  would  be  lacking. 

Again,  a  people's  sense  of  national  pride  or  honor  is 
sometimes  invoked  to  support  a  war  of  aggression, 


CAUSES  OF  WAR  19 

the  real  design  being  to  secure  territory  or  trade  while 
the  people  themselves  are  led  to  believe  that  it  is  waged 
to  avenge  an  insult  or  to  preserve  the  nation's  integrity. 
Here  too  the  existence  of  a  federal  union  would  serve 
as  a  check. 

VII 

NATIONAL  PREJUDICE  AND  IGNORANCE 

Our  next  cause  of  war  arises  from  national  preju- 
dices and  ignorance  of  the  aims,  ideals,  virtues,  and 
characteristics  of  other  nations.  Not  that  this,  of  it- 
self, often  forms  a  motive  for  war,  but  it  sometimes 
powerfully  co-operates  with  other  influences  in  produc- 
ing wars, — wars  which  would  never  occur,  if  the  na- 
tions involved  understood  each  other's  motives. 

As  between  its  component  States,  a  federal  union 
presents  more  or  less  of  a  relief  from  these  national 
prejudices  and  misconceptions.  The  representatives 
of  these  nations  are  constantly  thrown  together  in  the 
conduct  of  the  federal  government,  and  the  nations 
themselves  are  continually  co-operating  in  various  ways 
under  the  common  laws  and  policies,  and  are  neces- 
sarily thrown  into  much  more  intimate  relations  than 
would  be  probable  had  they  remained  entirely  inde- 
pendent. The  freedom  of  trade,  the  absence  of  fric- 
tion in  the  mutual  intercourse  of  their  citizens,  com- 
mon interests  and  co-operation,  and  a  hundred  other 
influences  are  constantly  at  work  to  lead  thefm  to  a 
better  understanding  of  one  another. 


20  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

It  is  true  that  this  tendency, — strongly  marked  in  all 
of  the  existing  federal  unions,  composed  as  they  are  of 
States  whose  people  are  usually  of  the  same  nation- 
ality, speaking  the  same  language,  possessed  of  much 
the  same  laws  and  political  institutions, — might  not 
be  actually  so  pronounced  in  a  union  composed  of 
nations  differing  radically  in  these  respects;  but  there 
can  be  little  doubt  that  the  beneficial  effects  in  the  lat- 
ter case  would  be  proportionately  as  great,  and  prob- 
ably much  greater,  as  the  prejudices  and  misconcep- 
tions to  be  removed  would  be  so  much  the  more  ex- 
tensive. 

VIII 
NATIONAL  JEALOUSIES  AND  SUSPICIONS 

Next  in  our  enumeration  of  the  causes  of  war 
come  national  jealousies  and  suspicions.  To  es- 
tablish that  these,  perhaps  with  no  sound  basis  for 
them,  suffice  sometimes  to  cause  war,  we  need  look 
no  further  than  to  the  titanic  European  struggle.  It 
might  be  that  the  national  and  popular  suspicions  and 
jealousies  on  all  sides  that  caused  this  war  were  not 
based  on  real  facts.  That  the  convictions  and  as- 
sumptions of  the  several  nations  concerned  were  er- 
roneous is  entirely  immaterial  if  those  nations  held  and 
believed  them.  The  war  would  certainly  have  fol- 
lowed, whether  or  not  the  various  assumptions  were 
correct. 

The  immediate  causes  of  the  war  were  that  Austria 


CAUSES  OF  WAR  21 

truly  or  falsely  suspected  Serbia  of  designs  upon  her 
territory;  Russia  suspected  Austria,  despite  her  dis- 
claimer, of  ultimate  designs  upon  Serbian  sovereignty 
and  territory;  Austria  and  Germany  suspected  that 
Russia's  racial  sympathies  for  Serbia  were  a  mere  blind 
to  conceal  her  desire  for  territorial  acquisitions  or  in- 
fluence in  Austria  or  the  Balkans;  Germany  suspected 
that  France  was  encouraging  Russia  in  order  that  she 
might  seize  the  opportunity  to  recover  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine; France  suspected  that  Germany  was  stirring  up 
the  strife  because  the  present  was  the  best  time  to 
conquer  arid  weaken  France;  England  suspected  that 
Germany  would,  if  victorious,  seize  the  Belgian  and 
French  coasts  in  order  the  better  to  attack  her  at  a 
convenient  season;  while  Germany  suspected  England 
of  being  the  deus  ex  machina  who  inaugurated  the 
whole  turmoil  in  order  to  seize  the  opportunity  to 
humble  Germany,  destroy  her  naval  power,  and  thus 
secure  her  own  superiority  on  the  high  seas  and  her 
predominance  in  commerce. 

It  is  not  material  to  the  present  discussion  which, 
if  any,  of  these  suspicions  were  based  on  real  facts, 
since  the  nations  involved,  especially  the  peoples,  acted 
on  their  convictions  that  their  respective  suspicions 
were  well  founded.  What  this  stupendous  calamity 
does  prove  is,  in  the  first  place,  that  wars  may  originate 
in  international  suspicions  and  distrust,  whether  based 
on  true  or  false  premises;  and,  in  the  second,  that  if 
these  nations  had  been  united  by  an  effectual  compact 
of  federal  union,  by  virtue  of  which  they  would  have 


22  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

been  under  no  temptation  to  rob  each  other  of  territory 
or  to  extend  their  commerce  by  forcible,  fraudulent 
or  unfair  means  at  each  other's  expense,  it  would  have 
been  impossible  for  their  peoples  to  have  entertained 
these  suspicions,  and  there  would  have  been  no  war. 
Indeed,  without  this  concrete  illustration,  the  con- 
clusion is  a  necessary  one  that  if  a  federal  union  has 
the  effect,  as  between  the  component  nations,  of  abol- 
ishing all  the  other  causes  of  war  heretofore  discussed, 
it  must  also  destroy  that  which  grows  out  of  interna- 
tional jealousies  and  suspicions,  since  such  distrust  can 
only  subsist  upon  the  fear  of  unjust  and  aggressive  at- 
tack for  some  of  the  reasons  before  mentioned.  There 
are  no  others  that  have  been  revealed  in  history  except 
the  last  one  of  our  enumeration,  which  we  are  now 
briefly  to  consider. 

IX 

ABSENCE  OF  ADEQUATE  PEACEABLE  MODES  OF 
REDRESS 

The  seventh  and  last  of  the  enumerated  causes 
of  war  is  the  absence  of  any  assured  method  of  peace- 
ably and  finally  determining  bona  fide  international 
disputes. 

In  the  existing  conditions  of  international  relations, 
it  is  true,  attempts  have  been  made  to  supply  means 
of  settling  such  disputes  by  the  establishment,  through 
international  agreement,  of  the  Hague  Courts  of  Ar- 
bitration. These  have  been  quite  successful  in  a  cer- 


CAUSES  OF  WAR  23 

tain  class  of  cases, — cases  wherein  the  differences  of 
the  contending  nations  are  due  to  their  respective 
interpretations  of  disputed  facts  or  disputed  principles 
of  law,  not  involving  important  political  consequences. 
But  these  tribunals  have  proved  themselves  totally 
inadequate  to  deal  with  cases  of  such  character  that 
either  contending  nation  is  unwilling  to  surrender  the 
decision  of  the  question  out  of  its  own  hands,  or  is 
suspicious  that  the  antagonist  might  be  unwilling  to 
abide  by  the  decision  reached. 

Less  successful  attempts  have  also  been  made  by  the 
Hague  Conference  to  establish  a  real  international 
court  for  the  settlement  of  justiciable  disputes,  but 
the  plan  has  broken  down  under  the  double  obstacles 
of  inability  to  organize  the  court  upon  lines  satisfac- 
tory to  the  nations,  and  to  provide  any  properly  or- 
ganized international  force  to  execute  its  mandates. 
So  far  as  concerns  this  class  of  disputes,  it  is  mani- 
festly essential  to  establish  some  device  for  their  final 
settlement,  or  else  war,  as  the  final  arbiter,  is  not  only 
always  possible,  but  may  sometimes  become  necessary. 

No  existing  federal  union  has  found  it  a  matter 
of  very  great  difficulty  to  establish  such  a  court  and 
clothe  it  with  the  power  to  pronounce  final  decrees 
which,  if  necessary,  may  be  enforced  through  the  exer- 
cise of  the  combined  influence  of  the  States  in  union. 
The  federal  constitutions  having  already  removed  all 
the  political  causes  of  war  between  the  component 
States,  no  potential  conflicts  remain  except^those  aris- 
ing in  respect  to  matters  of  strict  legal  right,  and 


24  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

these  may  readily  be  solved  through  judicial  proceed- 
ings. 

Thus,  whether  we  view  the  success  of  federal  unions 
as  preventives  of  war  from  the  standpoint  of  human 
experience,  or,  as  has  been  attempted  in  this  chapter, 
from  the  a  'priori  standpoint  of  natural  cause  and  ef- 
fect, the  conclusion  is  the  same.  Political  science  can 
point  to  few  principles  more  firmly  established  than 
that  such  unions  prevent  wars  between  the  component 
nations, — not  through  the  application  of  actual  force 
or  the  invasion  of  the  just  and  proper  independence 
of  the  States  concerned,  but  by  substituting  interna- 
tional law  for  international  license  in  the  regulation 
of  their  conduct  towards  each  other,  thus  diverting  the 
riotous  and  tumultuous  tide  of  human  passions  into 
the  calm  and  deep-flowing  streams  of  human  reason- 
ableness and  justice.  And  all  this  may  be  accomplished 
without  the  sacrifice  of  the  real  independence,  the  wel- 
fare or  the  prosperity  of  the  nations  concerned,  but 
always,  as  experience  has  proved,  greatly  to  their 
advancement. 


CHAPTER  III 

FEDERAL  UNION  OF  INDEPENDENT 
NATIONS  PROPOSED 

A  serious  proposal  of  the  adoption  by  the  nations 
of  the  world,  or  by  the  leading  nations,  of  a  federal 
form  of  international  government  would  be  doubtless 
met  by  the  nations  themselves  with  fear,  jealousy,  sus- 
picion, doubt,  and  perhaps  ridicule.  However  it  might 
be  regarded  by  the  peoples  who  must  bear  the  burden 
of  armaments  and  war,  crowned  heads  and  ruling  pow- 
ers might  resent  the  idea  of  any  international  power 
which  could  in  any  sense  be  said  to  be  superior  to  their 
own;  and  rulers  and  peoples  alike  would  fear  that  in 
surrendering  the  necessary  powers  to  the  federal  gov- 
ernment they  might  sacrifice  the  proper  independence 
of  the  nation;  that  the  federal  government  might  be- 
come a  Frankenstein, — a  monster  of  usurped  and 
colossal  powers,  threatening  to  destroy  its  creators; 
that  other  component  nations  or  combinations  of  them 
might  obtain  control  of  this  great  machine  and  use  it 
to  their  own  aggrandizement  and  to  the  detriment  of 
the  helpless  minority;  that  the  larger  and  more  power- 
ful nations  might  combine  to  tyrannize  over  ,the  weaker, 
though  perhaps  the  more  numerous  members;  or  on 
the  other  hand  that  a  majority  of  the  weaker  nations 


26  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

might  override  the  wishes  or  threaten  the  rights  of 
the  minority  of  stronger  members. 

But  all  such  arguments  lose  much  of  their  force 
when  it  is  remembered  that  the  same  objections  have 
actually  been  made  to  the  organization  of  every  exist- 
ing federal  union,  yet  in  each  case  the  fears  were 
proved  by  actual  experience  to  have  been  without 
foundation;  in  each  case  it  has  been  found  that  the 
checks  and  balances  provided  in  the  organization  of  the 
federal  government  have  sufficed  to  avert  the  dangers 
anticipated. 

Before  the  nations  will  be  induced  to  assent  to  any 
plan  of  union,  it  must  be  shown  that  it  contains  within 
itself  such  checks  and  balances  as  will  fully  protect 
them  against  the  unjust  and  unconstitutional  aggres- 
sions of  federal  power;  the  minority  of  the  nations 
in  the  union  against  the  improper  action  of  the  ma- 
jority; the  more  numerous,  but  weaker,  nations  against 
the  acts  of  the  stronger,  and  vice  versa;  and  even  the 
reserved  rights  of  a  single  nation  when  invaded  by  the 
unanimous  aggression  of  all  the  rest.  These,  and 
many  other  safeguards  must  be  provided  in  any  plan 
that  would  prove  acceptable. 

The  difficulties  in  devising  such  a  plan  are  admit- 
tedly great,  but  in  the  light  of  experience  afforded  by 
the  constitutions  of  existing  federal  unions  and  a  care- 
ful analysis  of  existing  international  conditions,  it 
would  seem  possible  to  propose  a  plan  which  might 
at  least  serve  as  a  basis  for  discussion,  however  far 
removed  it  may  be  from  the  final  practical  form  such  a 


FEDERATION  OF  NATIONS  27 

solemn    and   important   compact   would   be    likely   to 
take. 

The  succeeding  chapters  of  this  book,  therefore, 
will  be  devoted  to  the  consideration  of  some  of  the 
very  difficult  and  delicate  problems  presented  in  the 
organization  of  a  federal  league  of  nations,  the  pow- 
ers to  be  granted  to  it  or  surrendered  by  the  nations 
concerned,  and  the  powers  to  be  reserved  by  them; 
the  proper  limitations  upon  the  powers  granted;  the 
constitutional  relations  of  the  component  nations  to 
each  other  and  to  the  Union;  the  modes  of  amending 
and  establishing  the  compact  as  an  instrument  of  gov- 
ernment; and  the  many  checks  and  balances  needful  to 
secure,  on  the  one  side,  the  effective  operation  of  the 
federal  government,  and  on  the  other,  the  just  and 
proper  independence  of  the  component  nations,  and  the 
absence  of  friction  as  between  themselves  or  as  be- 
tween them  and  the  federal  government. 

For  the  sake  of  convenience  of  discussion,  arbitrary 
terms  have  been  used  in  designating  the  union,  the 
compact,  and  the  officials  supposed  to  act  under  it. 
Thus  the  union  is  spoken  of  as  "  The  United  Na- 
tions"; the  compact  of  government,  as  the  "Consti- 
tution" of  the  United  Nations;  the  legislative  body 
as  "  the  Congress  ";  its  two  houses,  as  the  "  Senate  " 
and  the  "  House  of  Delegates,"  respectively;  the  chief 
executive  officer,  as  "  the  prime  minister  ";  the  Cabinet, 
as  the  "  Council  of  Ministers  " ;  the  highest  interna- 
tional court,  as  the  "  Supreme  Court,"  with  a  "  Chief 
Justice"  at  its  head;  and  the  constituent  units  of  the 


28  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

Union  as  "  component  nations "  or  "  component 
States." 

It  is  to  be  observed  also  that  since  this  union  of 
nations  is  designed  for  the  purpose  of  abolishing  wars 
between  them,  and  not  to  establish  a  single  new  na- 
tion, the  union  must  necessarily  be  less  close  than  are 
any  of  the  existing  federal  unions  (the  purposes  of 
which  are  to  create  single  nations  out  of  their  com- 
ponent States,  as  well  as  to  prevent  war  between  their 
members)  ;  and  especially  so  since,  in  our  case,  the 
members  would  differ  so  radically  in  language  and 
political  and  legal  institutions  and  ideals. 

For  these  and  other  reasons,  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  as  creating  the  least  centralized  and 
nationalized  of  these  unions,  has  been  selected  as  the 
starting  point  and  the  fundamental  foundation  of  our 
study,  which  will  follow  in  the  main  the  order  of  treat- 
ment laid  down  in  that  instrument,  but  with  many  im- 
portant and  substantial  additions,  omissions,  and  modi- 
fications, all  of  which  will  be  examined  as  briefly  as 
possible. 

The  tentative  Constitution  will  be  found  set  out  in 
extenso  in  the  Appendix,  together  with  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States,  in  parallel  columns,  so  that 
the  divergences  may  be  seen  at  a  glance. 

Upon  reference  to  the  Appendix  it  will  be  noted  that 
the  proposed  international  Constitution  is  divided  into 
eleven  Articles,  as  follows : 

Article  I. — The  Legislative  Department,  its  Organi- 
zation and  Powers; 


OUTLINE  OF  COMPACT  29 

Article  II. — The  Executive  Department,  its  Or- 
ganization and  Powers; 

Article  III. — The  Judiciary  Department,  its  Or- 
ganization and  Powers; 

Article  IV. — The  Limitations  upon  the  Powers  of 
the  United  Nations; 

Article  V. — The  Limitations  upon  the  Powers  of  the 
Component  Nations; 

Article  VI. — The  Relations  of  the  Component  Na- 
tions to  Each  Other,  and  to  the  Union; 

Article  VII.— The  Reserved  Rights  of  the  Com- 
ponent Nations; 

Article  VIII. — The  Supremacy  of  the  International 
Constitution,  Laws,  and  Treaties; 

Article  IX. — Amendments  to  the  Constitution. 

Article  X. — The  Discipline  of  a  Component  Nation ; 

Article  XI. — The  Establishment  of  the  Constitu- 
tion. 

It  will  conduce  to  clearness  if  the  same  general  order 
be  followed  in  the  investigation  of  the  problems  in- 
volved in  this  study. 


CHAPTER  IV 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  LEGISLATIVE 
DEPARTMENT 

I 

DISTRIBUTION  OF  POWERS 

In  devising  a  plan  for  the  organization  of  a  federal 
league  of  the  nations,  the  first  problem  that  presents 
itself  is  the  fundamental  question,  how  shall  the  pow- 
ers of  government  be  distributed.  It  would  be  quite 
a  radical  departure  from  the  previous  practice  of  the 
nations  if,  following  the  example  of  the  American  and 
other  federal  unions,  three  departments  of  govern- 
ment be  created, — the  legislative,  the  executive,  and 
the  judicial. 

And  yet  it  would  not  really  be  quite  so  radical  as  at 
first  glance  it  appears,  even  omitting  from  considera- 
tion the  established  examples  of  existing  federal  unions. 
The  germs  of  all  three  of  these  departments  may  be 
said  to  have  been  already  planted  as  between  the  in- 
dependent nations. 

In  the  Hague  Conference  we  see  in  embryo  an 
international  legislative  assembly,  though  much  ham- 
pered in  its  work  by  lack  of  organization  and  by  inter- 
so 


DISTRIBUTION  OF  POWERS  31 

national  suspicions  and  jealousies.  In  the  Hague 
Courts  we  behold  the  beginnings  of  an  international 
judiciary,  also  sadly  handicapped  by  the  lack  of  organi- 
zation and  of  an  international  executive  force  to  aid 
in  the  execution  of  its  decrees.  And  it  is  not  too  much 
to  affirm  that  the  nucleus  of  an  international  executive 
power  lies  in  the  various  bureaus  which  have  been  from 
time  to  time  established  for  the  administration  of  inter- 
national projects  and  agreements. 

It  may  at  least  be  said  that  the  establishment  of 
these  world  agencies  effectually  proves  the  need  already 
felt  for  them,  and  indicates  the  great  benefits  that 
might  result  from  their  development  upon  a  self-sus- 
taining and  self-executing  basis. 

And  if,  in  addition  to  these  considerations,  we  re- 
view the  experience  of  the  federal  unions  now  exist- 
ing, the  conclusion  seems  to  be  forced  upon  us  that, 
in  order  to  create  a  federal  government  adequate  to 
keep  the  peace  of  the  world,  it  is  essential  that  the 
limited  powers  granted  to  it  shall  include  the  legisla- 
tive and  executive,  as  well  as  the  judicial. 

It  is,  therefore,  assumed  as  a  starting  point  that  the 
proposed  Constitution  must  grant  to  this  federal  union 
of  nations  all  three  sorts  of  powers,  and  that  the  fed- 
eral government  must  be  organized  into  the  corre- 
sponding legislative,  executive,  and  judiciary  depart- 
ments. 


32  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

II 

LEGISLATIVE  DEPARTMENT  OF  ONE  OR  Two  HOUSES? 

The  international  conferences  and  congresses 
hitherto  called  have  always  been  organized  on  the 
basis  of  a  single  chamber,  in  which  each  nation  repre- 
sented would  have  an  equal  voice,  each  having  a  veto 
upon  the  acts  of  the  conference  and  bound  by  them 
only  if  it  assent  thereto.  While  some  good  results 
have  been  attained,  the  fact  remains  that  this  is  an 
impracticable  basis  upon  which  to  rest  a  truly  legisla- 
tive body  from  which  may  be  expected  that  prompt 
and  detailed  legislation  which  would  be  necessary  to 
the  operation  of  a  federal  union  of  nations.  There 
must  be  to  a  certain  extent  the  rule  of  the  majority, 
and  should  each  nation  insist  upon  the  right  to  veto 
any  and  all  measures  that  do  not  meet  with  its  ap- 
proval, no  legislation  of  importance  would  be  likely  to 
be  enacted.  The  union  would  be  doomed  to  failure 
from  the  beginning. 

But  it  does  not  follow  that  a  nation  should,  in  no 
case,  possess  the  right  of  veto  upon  the  legislation  of 
the  central  body.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  every 
reason  why  a  single  nation  or  group  of  nations  should 
be  authorized  to  exercise  this  right  in  cases  where, 
in  their  judgments,  the  federal  legislature  is  exceeding 
the  powers  conferred  upon  it  and  is  seeking  to  infringe 
the  reserved  sovereign  rights  of  the  component  nations. 
The  details  of  this  veto  power,  however,  will  be  re- 


LEGISLATURE— ORGANIZATION        33 

served  for  future  examination  at  a  more  appropriate 
place.  It  is  only  sought  here  to  point  out  that  the 
nature  of  the  legislative  power  to  be  granted  under 
the  proposed  international  Constitution  should  be  of 
a  kind  different  from  that  hitherto  exercised  in  in- 
ternational conferences  and  congresses.  In  a  federal 
union  of  nations,  in  regard  to  legislation  clearly  within 
the  powers  granted,  the  majority  must  rule.  Bearing 
in  mind  this  very  material  change  in  conditions,  we 
are  in  a  better  position  to  consider  the  problem  to 
be  investigated. 

Until  now  the  custom  of  nations  has  been  to  claim 
equal  representation  in  international  conferences  in 
virtue  of  their  equal  sovereignty.  Should  this  con- 
tinue to  be  the  rule  in  our  proposed  international  legis- 
lature, or  should  the  nations,  by  virtue  of  the  superior 
population,  influence,  or  wealth  of  some  of  them,  be 
represented  in  proportion  to  such  population  or  influ- 
ence, in  the  family  of  nations;  or  ought  there  to  be  a 
combination  of  the  two  forms  of  representation,  so  that 
both  sovereignty  and  population  (or  other  measure 
of  national  influence  and  importance)  be  taken  into 
account? 

We  must  pause  here  to  inquire  what,  for  purposes 
of  representation  in  an  international  legislature,  would 
constitute  the  best  and  most  available  measure  of  the 
relative  influence  and  importance  of  nations. 

Many  elements  enter  into  the  influence  a^State  may 
exert  in  international  affairs.  Its  population,  its  mili- 
tary or  naval  strength,  its  commerce,  domestic  and 


34  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

foreign,  and  its  resources,  the  state  of  its  arts  and 
sciences,  all  these  and  other  things  besides  may  enter 
into  the  equation,  though  those  mentioned  would  cer- 
tainly constitute  the  most  obvious  and  the  most  impor- 
tant elements. 

In  the  organization  of  an  international  government, 
the  main  purpose  of  which  is  to  do  away  with  war  and 
the  necessity  for  large  armaments,  it  would  seem  plain 
that  the  present  military  or  naval  strength  of  a  nation 
ought  to  play  no  part  in  the  question  of  the  voice  it 
should  have  in  the  management  of  the  affairs  of  com- 
mon interest  committed  to  the  international  govern- 
ment. To  make  these  a  basis  of  representation  in  the 
international  legislature  would  be  to  base  a  perma- 
nent arrangement  on  an  evanescent  quality,  for  if  the 
international  organization  were  successful,  all  very 
great  differences  in  military  or  naval  strength  would 
soon  disappear.  These  considerations  would  seem 
sufficient  to  eliminate  this  element  from  the  prob- 
lem. 

Nor,  because  of  its  extreme  indefiniteness,  does  it 
seem  possible  to  make  the  condition  of  civilization 
within  a  State,  that  is,  the  condition  of  the  arts  and 
sciences  there,  a  basis  of  representation.  Different 
nations  have  different  ideals  of  civilization,  of  art, 
literature,  music,  labor  conditions,  law,  criminology, 
trades,  and  manufactures.  Who  is  to  judge  between 
them?  Who  could  establish  a  common  standard? 
This  also,  it  would  seem  must  be  eliminated  as  a  basis 
of  representation  in  the  international  government. 


LEGISLATURE— ORGANIZATION        35 

There  remain  to  be  considered  a  nation's  commerce 
and  resources,  and  its  population,  as  practical  meas- 
ures of  its  influence  and  importance  in  international 
affairs. 

To  make  use  of  the  commerce  and  resources  of  a 
nation  rather  than  population  as  a  measure  of  its  in- 
fluence would  appear  in  the  first  place  to  be  setting  up 
wealth  above  humanity,  the  desire  for  riches  above 
human  rights  and  liberties.  This  would  not  seem  to 
be  a  sound  basis  upon  which  to  rest  any  government, 
national  or  international.  But  if  this  objection  be 
swept  aside  as  theoretical  only,  others  may  be  presented 
of  a  practical  sort.  How  is  the  commerce  of  a  coun- 
try to  be  determined?  Would  the  domestic  as  well  as 
the  foreign  commerce  of  a  State  be  taken  into  account, 
or  only  the  foreign  commerce?  Should  its  potential 
and  undeveloped  natural  resources  be  counted  as  part 
of  its  wealth,  and  if  so  how  would  their  value  be  as- 
certained? How  would  the  amount  of  the  domestic 
trade, — all  the  little  daily  transactions  in  every  part 
of  the  country, — ibe  determined?  If  foreign  trade 
alone  be  considered,  how  much  is  the  country  itself 
responsible  for,  and  how  much  is  due  to  the  enter- 
prise of  other  countries?  Is  the  country  which  ex- 
ports mainly  raw  materials,  and  imports  highly  fin- 
ished goods  on  a  par  with  the  country  which  does  the 
reverse,  even  though  the  money  value  of  the  total 
foreign  trade  of  each  be  the  same? 

Such  questions  as  these  throw  grave  suspicion  upon 
this  as  a  practicable  measure  of  a  nation's  influence  in 


36  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

world  affairs  and  of  the  voice  it  should  have  in  the 
proposed  international  government. 

Indeed,  all  things  considered,  it  seems  that  popula- 
tion is  at  once  the  most  convenient  and  the  most  prac- 
ticable measure  of  such  representation.  It  is  the  most 
convenient,  because  it  can  be  more  easily  and  more 
definitely  ascertained  than  any  other.  It  is  the  most 
practicable,  because  on  the  whole,  it  stands  in  large 
measure  collectively  for  what  each  of  the  others  repre- 
sents individually.  As  a  rule  the  total  wealth  of  a 
State  holds  some  relation  to  its  population;  so  does 
its  commerce,  domestic  and  foreign;  as  population  in- 
creases land  becomes  more  valuable;  as  commerce  in- 
creases there  is  greater  development  of  arts  and  sci- 
ences, wages  tend  to  increase,  the  standard  of  living  be- 
comes higher;  even  the  potential  military  strength  of  a 
nation  bears  a  relation  to  its  population. 

Population  therefore  would  seem  to  be  the  proper, 
indeed  the  only  feasible,  measure  of  the  influence, 
wealth,  and  importance  of  a  nation  in  international  af- 
fairs, so  that  wherever  in  the  plan  herein  discussed, 
it  becomes  necessary  to  weigh  a  nation  in  the  scale  of 
these  qualities,  population  is  taken  as  representing 
them. 

There  yet  remains,  however,  an  important  question. 
There  are  populations  and  populations.  The  popula- 
tion of  one  State,  while  as  numerous  as  that  of  an- 
other, may  in  whole  or  in  part  consist  of  backward  peo- 
ples, who  themselves  possess  but  a  dim  or  shadowy 
conception  of  civilization  as  Europe  and  America  view 


CONGRESS— ORGANIZATION  37 

it.  For  example,  the  population  of  the  British  Empire 
in  1913  amounted  to  about  396,000,000,  of  whom 
about  two-thirds  were  Hindoos;  perhaps  63,000,000 
were  Anglo-Saxons.  For  purposes  of  representation 
(according  to  population)  in  the  international  legisla- 
ture, ought  the  63,000,000  Anglo-Saxons  to  be  counted 
on  the  same  basis  as  the  remaining  333,000,000  back- 
ward peoples? 

From  the  standpoint  of  the  ideal, — at  least  the  Eu- 
ropean and  American  ideal, — the  Anglo-Saxon  popu- 
lation (in  the  case  of  the  British  Empire)  ought  to 
count  several  times  more  per  man  than  the  rest.  But 
the  practical  difficulties  in  the  way  of  measuring  the 
proportion  of  "  backward  peoples  "  within  each  State, 
as  well  as  of  measuring  the  various  degrees  of  back- 
wardness and  ascertaining  the  boundary  line  between 
those  that  are  "  backward  "  and  those  that  are  not, 
seem  to  present  insurmountable  obstacles  to  the  appli- 
cation of  any  logical  and  general  rule  for  the  estimate 
of  population  for  purposes  of  international  represen- 
tation based  upon  the  distinction  between  the  compara- 
tive "  progressiveness  "  or  "  backwardness  "  of  peo- 
ples or  races. 

With  exceptions  or  qualifications  presently  to  be 
noted,  we  would  approach  the  truth  very  nearly  if  we 
assume  that  the  white  nations  and  peoples  of  the  world 
are  progressive,  while  the  colored  peoples  .and  races 
are  in  the  main  backward.  It  would  also  be  true  that 
it  is  the  aggressiveness  and  enterprise  of  the  white  na- 
tions that  necessitate  the  organization  of  an  inter- 


38  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

national  government  to  preserve  the  peace  of  the 
world,  and  it  is  the  warfare  between  them  that  is  so 
disastrous.  The  international  organization  would  be 
primarily  an  instrumentality  of  self-government  among 
the  white  nations,  devised  to  permit  them  to  substitute 
international  freedom  and  order  in  the  place  of  the 
international  license  that  now  prevails  between  them. 
Incidentally,  the  colored  nations  and  peoples  would 
profit  by  the  exchange,  and  ought  to  be  permitted  to 
enter  into  the  organization  and  thus  secure  a  guarantee 
of  their  national  rights  and  liberties  also.  But  they 
would  in  general  have  no  right  to  expect  the  same 
representation  and  the  same  voice  in  the  affairs  of 
the  international  government  as  the  white  nations  and 
peoples  would  possess. 

At  least  one  exception,  however,  should  be  made  to 
this  general  rule.  Japan  is  one  of  the  Great  Powers, 
and  has  shown  herself  as  progressive  as  the  western 
nations  themselves.  She  ought  to  be  admitted  into  the 
international  organization  on  the  same  basis  as  the 
white  nations. 

Listing  the  Japanese,  therefore,  for  purposes  of  in- 
ternational representation  as  "  white, "  let  us  adopt  ten- 
tatively and  arbitrarily  the  proportion  of  one  to  three 
as  the  relative  values  of  "  white  "  and  "  colored  "  or 
"  mixed  "  populations  for  this  purpose,  which,  for  the 
sake  of  convenience,  we  shall  hereafter  designate  as 
the  "federal  population." 

Thus,  if  we  suppose  the  actual  population  of  the 
British  Empire  to  be  396,000,000,  of  whom  63,000,- 


CONGRESS— ORGANIZATION  39 

ooo  are  white  and  333,000,000  are  colored  or  of  mixed 
blood,  the  "  federal  population  "  would  be  arrived  at 
by  dividing  the  latter  numbers  by  three  and  adding  the 
quotient  to  the  numbers  of  the  whites  so  that  the  fed- 
eral population  of  the  British  Empire  would  amount 
to  174,000,000.  On  these  numbers,  not  on  the  396,- 
000,000  of  actual  population,  would  be  based  any 
voice  that  the  British  Empire  would  have  in  the  inter- 
national government,  so  far  as  that  voice  might  de- 
pend upon  international  influence. 

Again,  the  French  Republic,  according  to  the  figures 
of  1913,  within  all  its  territories  possessed  a  population 
of  about  92,000,000  persons,  of  whom  about  40,000,- 
ooo  are  white  and  52,000,000  are  colored.  Her  fed- 
eral population  therefore  would  be  approximately 
58,000,000. 

Similarly,  the  population  of  the  German  Empire  in 
Europe  was  in  the  same  year  65,000,000,  while  the 
population  of  its  African  possessions  was  15,000,000. 
The  federal  population  of  the  German  Empire  then 
(should  she  become  a  member  of  the  league)  would  be 
approximately  70,000,000. 

The  total  population  of  the  Russian  Empire  in  1913 
amounted  to  160,000,000,  of  whom  perhaps  30,000,- 
ooo  are  colored,  so  that  her  federal  population  would 
have  approximated  140,000,000. 

Treating  the  Japanese,  for  the  purposes  ^f  this  dis- 
cussion as  "  white,"  the  federal  population  of  the 
Japanese  Empire  in  1913  would  number  about  54,000,- 
ooo.  If  Korea,  with  15,000,000  colored  population 


40  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

be  included,  her  federal  population  would  amount  to 
59,000,000. 

Italy,  within  all  her  territories,  in  1913,  had  a  popu- 
lation of  some  32,000,000  whites  and  6,000,000  col- 
ored, so  that  her  federal  population  would  approxi- 
mate 34,000,000. 

Austria-Hungary  in  1913  possessed  a  population  of 
about  50,000,000,  all  of  whom  practically  are  white, 
so  that  the  total  numbers  and  the  federal  numbers 
would  correspond. 

The  United  States  possessed  a  population  of  some 
84,000,000  white  and  20,000,000  colored  in  1913 
(including  amongst  the  "colored"  negroes  and  in- 
habitants of  the  Philippine  Isjands  and  Hawaii). 
Their  federal  population  therefore  would  approxi- 
mate 90,000,000. 

The  Netherlands  in  1913  had  a  white  population  of 
about  7,000,000,  and  a  colored  population  in  her  col- 
onies of  some  34,000,000,  so  that  her  federal  popula- 
tion would  approximate  18,000,000. 

Portugal,  with  a  white  population  of  about  6,000,- 
ooo,  has  a  colored  population  of  some  9,000,000. 
Her  federal  numbers  would  aggregate  about  9,000,000. 

None  of  the  other  white  European  States  have  any 
colored  populations  worthy  of  consideration,  so  that 
we  may  assume  their  federal  populations  to  be  identical 
with  their  actual  populations.  In  1913  these  were  esti- 
mated approximately  as  follows: 


CONGRESS— ORGANIZATION  41 

Spain 20,000,000 

Norway 2,500,000 

Sweden   . ,.    5,500,000 

*  Belgium  .  ... 7,000,000 

Switzerland 3,750,000 

Greece 2,500,000 

Denmark  . . ......   2,700,000 

Rumania 6,000,000 

Serbia 2,500,000 

Bulgaria   4,200,000 

Montenegro 225,000 

The  Chinese  Republic,  with  its  wholly  colored  pop- 
ulation of  420,000,000,  would  be  able  to  claim  a  fed- 
eral population  of  140,000,000,  not  far  below  that  of 
Great  Britain,  about  the  same  as  that  of  Russia,  and 
more  than  twice  as  great  as  that  of  the  French  Re- 
public or  of  the  German  or  Japanese  Empires. 

It  is  difficult  to  conceive  that  the  Great  Powers  of 
the  world  would  permit  to  China  in  the  international 
councils  a  voice  greater  than  their  own.  Her  vast  size, 
population,  and  resources,  taken  in  connection  with  the 
backwardness  of  her  civilization  and  commerce,  would 
constitute  her  an  exception  to  almost  arty  rule  of 
representation  in  the  international  Congress  that  might 
be  suggested.  The  probability  is  that  she  must  be 
treated  separately,  and  admitted  to  the  pinion  upon 

*  Statistics  as  to  the  population  of  the  Belgian  Congo  are  not  at 
hand  for  1913,  but  in  1916  it  amounted  to  about  15,000,000,  which 
would  give  Belgium  a  federal  population  of  about  12,000,000. 


42  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

special  conditions  as  to  the  representation  and  influ- 
ence to  which  she  shall  be  entitled. 

Passing  to  the  States  in  America,  other  than  the 
United  States,  we  are  again  confronted  to  no  small 
extent  with  the  problem  of  colored  or  mixed  races. 
In  some  of  the  Central  and  South  American  countries, 
the  great  mass  of  the  populations  are  either  colored  or 
of  mixed  blood,  and  comparatively  few  full-blooded 
whites  are  to  be  found.  In  Haiti  and  San  Domingo 
the  people  are  practically  all  negroes.  In  Mexico, 
Brazil,  Chile,  Peru  and  other  of  these  countries  large 
portions  of  the  population  are  Indian  or  of  mixed 
race.  Statistics  are  not  at  present  available  to  show 
what  proportion  of  these  populations  are  respectively 
white  and  colored  or  mixed,  so  that  it  would  not  be  pos- 
sible to  reproduce  here  the  federal  populations  of  each 
of  these  States.  The  total  populations  in  1913  were 
estimated  as  follows: 

Brazil 20,500,000 

Mexico 15,500,000 

Argentina 7,500,000 

Colombia 4,500,000 

Peru 4,500,000 

Chile 4,250,000 

Venezuela 2,600,000 

Bolivia  . 2,270,000 

Cuba 2,050,000 

Guatemala , 1,800,000 

Salvador 1,700,000 


CONGRESS— ORGANIZATION  43 

Ecuador 1,500,000 

Haiti    1,400,000 

Uruguay 1,1 10,000 

Paraguay 635,000 

Dominican  Republic 610,000 

Nicaragua 600,000 

Honduras 550,000 

Panama   360,000 

Costa  Rica 350,000 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  resume  our  dis- 
cussion of  the  proper  organization  of  the  proposed  in- 
ternational legislature  or  Congress. 

In  view  of  the  jealousy  and  distrust  now  existing 
between  the  nations,  it  may  be  fairly  assumed  that  the 
smaller  ones  would  never,  in  the  place  of  a  conference 
whose  conclusions  would  be  binding  on  no  State  until 
ratified,  consent  to  the  creation  of  a  legislative  body, 
with  binding  power,  which  might  be  dominated  by  a 
combination  of  the  Great  Powers,  as  would  be  likely 
in  a  body  wherein  representation  would  be  based  upon 
population;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  still  less 
probable  that  the  Great  Powers  would  consent  to  a 
Union  which  might  be  dominated  by  a  majority  com- 
posed of  the  smaller  States,  as  would  be  likely  if  in 
the  international  legislative  body  the  representation 
of  all  the  States  were  equal,  in  virtue  ofr  equal  sov- 
ereignty. 

These  considerations  suffice  to  eliminate  the  possi- 
bility of  either  of  the  two  first  mentioned  forms  of 


44  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

representation  in  the  supposed  single  legislative  cham- 
ber, and  demand  either  that  the  idea  of  a  single  cham- 
ber be  abandoned  or  that  the  form  of  representation 
be  some  combination  of  sovereignty  and  population, 
that  is,  that  each  nation  be  entitled  to  a  representation 
in  the  federal  legislature  made  up  in  part  of  an  equal 
sovereignty  equally  represented,  and  in  part  of  an 
unequal  population  unequally  represented. 

For  example,  suppose  it  agreed  that  the  represen- 
tation of  the  sovereignty  of  each  State  shall  be  six 
votes  from  each  State,  and  the  representation  of  popu- 
lation shall  be  one  vote  for  each  four  millions  of  popu- 
lation or  fraction  thereof.  Belgium,  with  a  federal 
population  of  12,000,000,  would  then  be  represented 
in  the  federal  legislature  by  six  votes,  representing 
sovereignty,  and  three,  representing  population.  Ger- 
many, with  a  federal  population  of  70,000,000,  would 
have  six  votes  representing  sovereignty  and  eighteen 
representing  population.  France,  with  a  federal  popu- 
lation of  58,000,000,  would  have  six  and  fifteen  votes, 
respectively.  Italy,  with  34,000,000  (federal),  six 
and  nine  votes;  Japan,  with  59,000,000  (federal),  six 
and  fifteen  votes;  The  Netherlands,  with  18,000,000 
(federal),  six  and  five  votes;  Austria-Hungary,  with 
50,000,000,  six  and  thirteen  votes;  Norway,  with 
3,000,000,  six  and  one  votes;  Sweden,  with  6,000,000, 
six  and  two  votes;  Serbia,  with  3,000,000,  six  and  one 
votes;  Brazil,  with  perhaps  9,000,000  (federal),  six 
and  three  votes;  Argentina,  with  nearly  8,000,000 
(federal),  six  and  two  votes;  Chile,  with  3,000,000 


CONGRESS— ORGANIZATION  45 

(federal),  six  and  one  votes;  the  United  States,  with 
90,000,000  (in  federal  numbers),  six  and  twenty- 
three  votes;  Russia,  with  140,000,000  (federal),  six 
and  thirty-five  votes;  and  the  British  Empire,  with 
174,000,000  (in  federal  numbers),  six  and  forty-four 
votes. 

Thus,  Norway's  representation  would  be  increased 
seven  times  by  the  representation  of  her  equal  sov- 
ereignty; Sweden's  would  be  quadrupled;  and  Bel- 
gium's trebled;  while  Great  Britain's  or  Russia's  would 
be  increased  scarcely  at  all.  It  is  possible  that  the  na- 
tions last  mentioned  might  be  willing  to  accept  these 
or  similar  conditions,  but  it  is  hardly  conceivable  that 
proud  States  like  Germany  or  France,  occupying  inter- 
mediate positions  in  such  a  ratio  of  representation 
would  consent  on  the  one  hand  to  so  great  a  propor- 
tionate voice  in  the  conduct  of  the  common  affairs  as 
Norway's  or  Belgium's,  or  so  great  an  actual  voice  as 
the  British  Empire's. 

The  example  above  given  supposes  a  ratio  between 
sovereignty  and  population  chosen  at  random,  but 
the  apparently  insuperable  objections  to  this  ratio 
would  seem  to  apply  as  strongly  to  any  other  similar 
ratio  that  might  be  selected. 

On  the  whole  therefore  the  conclusion  must  be 
reached  that  no  plan  of  federal  government  will  ob- 
tain the  approval  of  the  nations  which  qmbraces  the 
idea  of  a  single  legislative  chamber  (with  a  qualifica- 
tion to  be  noted  later) . 

Discarding  this,  then,  we  come  next  to  the  examina- 


46  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

tion  of  the  possibility  of  a  legislative  body  composed 
of  two  chambers. 

Attention  is  at  once  arrested  by  the  fact  that  it  now 
becomes  possible  thus  to  retain,  in  part  at  least,  the 
existing  international  practice  as  to  conferences  and 
congresses,  that  is,  the  equal  representation  of  eaih 
State.  Such  representation  may  be  given  in  the  upper 
chamber  or  Senate,  while  at  the  same  time  in  the 
lower  chamber,  or  House  of  Delegates,  the  other  ele- 
ment may  be  represented, — the  element  of  national 
population  and  influence. 

Since  no  law  could  be  passed  without  the  consent  of 
both  houses,  every  law  would  have  to  receive  the 
assent  of  a  majority  of  all  the  component  nations  (in 
the  Senate)  and  also  the  assent  of  the  majority  of  the 
populous  and  influential  nations  (in  the  House  of  Dele- 
gates). A  combination  of  a  few  populous  States  might 
carry  a  measure  detrimental  to  the  majority  of  the 
States  through  the  lower  chamber,  but  it  would  be 
checked  in  the  Senate;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  ma- 
jority of  the  States,  which  might  pass  measures  in  the 
Senate  that  would  be  injurious  to  the  fewer,  but  more 
populous,  nations  would  be  halted  in  the  lower  cham- 
ber. 

Thus  by  the  adoption  of  the  bicameral  system  ad- 
vantage can  be  taken  of  the  great  principle  of  concur-, 
rent  majorities.  These  would  undoubtedly  be  the  two 
great  contending  forces  in  our  international  union, — 
population  and  influence  on  the  one  side  and  equality 
of  sovereignty,  dignity,  and  rights  on  the  other.  The 


CONGRESS— ORGANIZATION  47 

only  way  to  reconcile  them  is  to  give  each  a  veto  upon 
the  other,  which  may  be  successfully  accomplished  by 
the  creation  of  two  legislative  chambers,  the  consent 
of  both  being  necessary  for  legislation,  one  of  which 
shall  represent  by  equality  of  votes  the  equal  sov- 
ereignty of  the  nations,  and  the  other  by  votes  in  pro- 
portion to  federal  population  shall  represent  their  un- 
equal influence  and  importance  in  human  affairs. 

To  illustrate:  Let  us  suppose  that  the  equal  sov- 
ereignty of  the  nations  in  the  Senate  is  represented  by 
two  votes  from  each  State,  while  the  ratio  of  votes  to 
population  for  purposes  of  representation  in  the  House 
of  Delegates  shall  be  one  vote  for  every  four  millions 
of  federal  population,  or  a  fraction  thereof.  Refer- 
ring to  the  figures  already  given  as  to  the  federal  popu- 
lations of  some  of  the  nations,  while  in  the  lower 
chamber  Belgium,  with  its  12,000,00  of  federal  popu- 
lation, would  have  three  votes;  Germany,  with  its 
70,000,000,  eighteen  votes;  France,  with  58,000,000, 
fifteen  votes;  the  United  States,  twenty-three  votes; 
Russia,  thirty-five  votes;  and  Great  Britain,  forty-four 
votes;  yet  in  the  Senate  each  nation  would  be  equally 
represented,  and  the  consent  of  a  majority  of  the  Sen- 
ate would  be  essential  to  the  passage  of  all  legislation. 

It  is  upon  this  principle  that  the  United  States  Con- 
stitution has  organized  the  federal  legislature,  and 
the  experience  of  more  than  a  century  and  a  quarter 
proclaims  that  this  distribution  of  the  legislative  powers 
has,  in  critical  periods  of  American  history,  admirably 
fulfilled  its  purpose. 


48  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

The  proposed  federal  legislature  then,  we  shall  as- 
sume, ought  to  be  composed  of  two  chambers,  one  of 
which  should  represent  the  equal  sovereignty  of  the 
component  nations,  while  the  other  represents  their  re- 
spective populations  (in  federal  numbers).1 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  while  we  have  spoken  above  of 
two  chambers  of  the  legislature,  which  we  have  desig- 
nated respectively  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Dele- 
gates, and  while  we  have  assumed  throughout  the  crea- 
tion of  two  separate  chambers,  very  much  the  same  re- 
sults may  be  accomplished  with  a  single  chamber,  if 
it  is  provided  that  no  measure  shall  be  deemed  to  have 
been  passed  or  to  have  become  a  law,  unless  it  pass  the 
chamber  twice, — once  by  a  majority  of  all  the  States, 
voting  equally  in  virtue  of  equal  sovereignty,  and  once 
by  a  majority  of  the  votes  of  the  States,  voting  un- 
equally in  proportion  to  federal  population  (giving,  for 
example,  to  each  State,  upon  one  passage  of  the  meas- 
ure, a  voting  capacity  equal  to  one  vote  for  every 
four  millions  of  federal  population,  or  a  fraction 
thereof). 

This  would  constitute  in  effect  two  chambers,  the 
main  difference  between  the  single  chamber  thus  or- 
ganized and  two  actual  chambers,  being  that  in  the 
latter  case  there  would  be  two  separate  sets  of  dele- 
gates, while  in  the  former  the  delegates  would  be 
actually  the  same,  but  would  .possess  a  different  vot- 
ing capacity  on  each  passage  of  the  measure. 

Thus,  if  we  were  to  suppose  the  rules  now  govern- 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sees,  i,  2,  3. 


CONGRESS— ORGANIZATION  49 

ing  an  ordinary  international  conference  to  be  altered 
so  as  to  make  the  action  of  the  conference  binding 
upon  the  nations  therein  represented  and  at  the  same 
time  require  that  any  measure,  to  be  binding  upon 
them,  must  pass  the  conference  twice  by  a  majority 
of  votes,  the  votes  of  all  the  nations  upon  the  first 
passage  to  be  equal,  while  on  the  second  passage  each 
nation  shall  have  a  vote  proportionate  to  its  federal 
population,  the  conference  would  then  be  transformed 
into  just  such  a  legislative  body  as  we  are  now  dis- 
cussing. The  requirement  that  a  measure,  to  be  bind- 
ing as  a  law  upon  the  nations,  must  have  passed  the 
conference  by  a  majority  of  votes  cast  upon  these  two 
different  principles,  would  have  much  the  same  effect 
as  if  the  conference  were  itself  made  up  of  two  sepa- 
rate chambers,  organized  upon  these  same  principles. 

But  although  the  organization  of  a  single  chamber 
after  this  fashion  might  be  simpler  than  that  of  two 
legislative  houses,  yet  there  would  seem  to  be  some 
very  practical  advantages  incident  to  the  actual 
bicameral  system. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  important  for  the  success  of 
an  international  government  that  the  representatives 
of  the  different  nations  should  learn  to  know  and  un- 
derstand each  other,  as  well  as  the  conditions,  ideals, 
and  needs  prevailing  in  countries  other  than  their  own; 
and  (within  reasonable  limits)  the  larger  ^he  number 
of  these  representatives  thus  thrown  into  each  other's 
company,  the  more  widespread  would  this  broadening 
process  become. 


50  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

In  the  next  place  (again  within  reasonable  limits) 
the  larger  the  number  of  a  nation's  representatives 
present  at  such  gatherings,  the  wiser  will  be  its  gov- 
ernment's final  action  upon  questions  arising  for  set- 
tlement. 

The  mere  physical  limitations  of  space  would  stand 
in  the  way  perhaps  of  the  best  interests  of  the  nations 
in  these  particulars,  if  the  plan  of  a  single  chamber  be 
adopted. 

Another  important  practical  argument  in  behalf  of 
a  bicameral  legislature  consists  in  the  fact  that  it  would 
in  the  end  probably  save  time,  since  one  measure  might 
be  under  debate  in  one  chamber  while  another  was 
being  debated  or  voted  upon  in  the  other,  and  in  any 
event  it  would  insure  a  more  thorough  consideration 
of  each  measure  both  in  the  legislature  itself  and  by 
the  government  of  each  nation. 

Our  tentative  form  of  constitution  will  therefore 
treat  the  international  congress  as  actually  consisting 
of  two  houses  or  chambers. 

Ill 

APPOINTMENT  OF  REPRESENTATIVES — TERMS 
OF  OFFICE 

In  the  existing  federal  unions,  such  as  the  United 
States,  the  German  Empire  or  the  Australian  Com- 
monwealth, the  rule  has  been  to  provide  for  the  elec- 
tion of  the  members  of  the  lower  house  of  the  federal 
legislature  by  the  people  of  the  several  component 


CONGRESS— SELECTION— TERMS       5 1 

States,  and  for  the  selection  of  members  of  the  upper 
house  either  by  some  branch  of  the  government  of 
each  State  or  by  the  people  thereof. 

Thus  in  the  United  States  the  members  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  are  elected  by  the  people  in  the 
several  States  by  districts,  while  the  Senators  (it  was 
originally  provided)  were  chosen  by  the  legislature  in 
each  State,  but  by  Amendment  XVII  are  now  elected 
by  the  people  of  the  respective  States  acting  as  one 
electorate.  In  Germany,  the  members  of  the  Reichstag 
are  elected  by  the  people  as  in  the  United  States,  while 
the  members  of  the  Bundesrath  are  chosen  by  the  ex- 
ecutives of  the  several  component  States,  and  possess 
the  status  of  ambassadors.  In  Australia  the  States 
are  equally  represented  in  the  Senate,  but  the  members 
of  both  houses  are  elected  by  the  people,  as  now  in  the 
United  States.  In  Canada  the  Senators  are  appointed 
from  each  Province  by  the  governor-general,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  House  of  Commons  elected  by  the  people. 
In  Brazil  the  Senators  are  elected  by  the  people  of  each 
State,  as  are  the  members  of  the  House  of  Deputies. 
In  the  Argentine  Republic,  the  Senators  are  elected  by 
the  legislatures  of  the  several  Provinces,  while  the 
Deputies  are  elected  by  the  people.  In  Switzerland 
the  members  of  the  Council  of  States  (Senate)  are 
chosen  by  the  cantons,  and  the  members  of  the  National 
Council  by  the  people  in  each  canton.  In  a>ll,  the  com- 
ponent States  or  provinces  are  represented  in  the  lower 
chamber  in  proportion  to  population,  and  (except  in 
Germany)  in  the  upper  chamber  equally. 


52  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

But  in  our  federal  union  of  nations  it  would  be  ob- 
viously impracticable,  even  if  it  were  desirable,  to  adopt 
the  universal  principle  of  popular  election  of  members 
of  either  house  by  the  people  of  the  respective  States. 
Some  even  of  the  most  advanced  nations  have  terri- 
torial possessions,  the  inhabitants  of  which,  while  they 
ought  to  be  taken  into  account  for  purposes  of  repre- 
sentation, know  nothing  of  popular  government. 

On  the  other  hand,  some  governments  would  per- 
haps be  in  a  position  in  which  they  would  be  unable  to 
obtain  the  consent  of  their  people  to  the  organization 
of  such  a  federation  unless  the  nation's  delegations 
in  the  federal  legislature  might  be  made  directly  re- 
sponsive to  the  popular  will. 

A  proper  compromise  therefore  would  seem  to  be 
a  provision  that  the  delegates  in  both  chambers  be 
chosen  in  such  numbers  and  in  such  manner  as  the 
laws  of  each  component  nation  shall  direct;  and  shall 
be  subject  to  recall  at  the  pleasure  of  the  State  they 
represent,  in  accordance  with  its  laws. 

Thus  the  federal  government  would  be  placed  di- 
rectly under  the  control  of  the  component  nations, 
since  their  control  over  their  representatives  in  both 
chambers  will  be  as  plenary  and  absolute  as  each  na- 
tion by  its  own  laws  may  choose  to  make  it. 

This  principle  of  appointment  and  recall  would  also 
do  away  with  the  necessity  of  fixing  any  particular  term 
of  office  for  the  delegations  in  either  house,  the  entire 
matter  being  left  to  the  discretion  of  each  nation.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sees.  2,  3,  4. 


CONGRESS— COMPENSATION  53 

IV 

SESSIONS  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS — 
RECESSES  AND  ADJOURNMENTS 

In  the  existing  federal  unions  the  rule  is  to  require 
that  the  legislative  body  shall  meet  at  least  once  a 
year,  adjourning  when  their  business  is  completed,  and 
subject  to  be  called  in  extraordinary  session  by  the 
chief  executive  whenever  exigencies  may  demand  it. 

But  the  complexity  and  importance  of  the  mat- 
ters to  be  debated  and  determined  by  this  international 
congress,  and  the  modes  of  appointment  and  removal 
of  the  legislators,  would  seem  to  require  that  the  rule 
in  our  proposed  constitution  should  assume  rather  the 
opposite  form,  providing  that  the  Congress  remain  in 
perpetual  session,  subject  to  such  reasonable  rests  and 
recesses  as  the  two  chambers  may  agree  upon,  with 
the  right  given  to  each  chamber  independently  to  ad- 
journ for  a  limited  period  without  the  consent  of  the 
other.1 


COMPENSATION  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 

That  the  members  of  the  international  congress 
ought  to  receive  compensation  for  their  services  can- 
not admit  of  doubt.  The  important  question  is  whether 
that  compensation  should  be  fixed  and  paid  by  the 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  4,  cl.  2,  3. 


54  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

component  States  or  fixed  by  the  federal  congress  it- 
self and  paid  out  of  the  treasury  of  the  United  Na- 
tions. 

This  point  was  earnestly  and  ably  debated  in  the 
convention  that  framed  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  wise  conclusion  reached  that  a  matter 
so  vital  to  the  very  existence  of  the  federal  government 
ought  not  to  be  left  dependent  on  the  liberality  and 
good  will  of  the  component  States. 

This  principle  has  been  adopted  in  our  international 
constitution,  but  with  this  necessary  qualification: — 
That  since  the  number  of  delegates  in  the  delegations 
from  each  State  has  been  left  to  the  discretion  of  that 
State,  the  compensation  must  be  proportioned  to  the 
number  of  votes  the  delegation  is  entitled  to  cast,  not 
to  the  number  of  delegates.1 

VI 

PRIVILEGES  OF  DELEGATES 

Existing  federal  constitutions  accord  to  the  mem- 
bers of  their  legislatures  the  ordinary  parliamentary 
privileges  of  freedom  from  arrest  for  trifling  offenses 
and  freedom  of  speech  in  debate. 

These  provisions  ought  to  be  contained  in  the  inter- 
national constitution  also,  with  certain  modifications. 

Following  to  its  logical  conclusion  the  principle 
adopted,  that  the  component  nations  shall  retain  com- 
plete control  over  their  respective  delegations,  each  in 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  6,  cl.  i. 


REVENUE  AND  COMMERCE  55 

accordance  with  its  own  laws,  the  general  rule  that  a 
legislator's  remarks  and  votes  in  either  legislative 
chamber  are  privileged  communications,  from  legal  re- 
sponsibility for  which  he  is  exempt  elsewhere,  must  be 
modified  to  the  extent  that,  while  exempt  everywhere 
else,  he  is  not  to  be  exempt  from  the  consequences  of 
such  remarks  or  votes  in  the  State  he  represents,  except 
in  accordance  with  its  laws.1 

Again,  it  will  be  necessary  for  the  representatives 
of  the  component  nations  to  pass  through  other  coun- 
tries, either  members  or  not  members  of  the  union,  on 
their  way  to  and  from  the  seat  of  the  federal  govern- 
ment. There  is  no  reason  why  they  should  not  occupy 
the  same  position  and  possess  the  same  status  as  any 
other  representatives  of  their  country  on  the  way  to 
or  from  any  international  conference  or  congress. 
They  are  in  effect  ambassadors,  and  in  all  foreign  coun- 
tries ought  to  be  accorded  the  privileges  and  immuni- 
ties of  ambassadors;  and  the  international  constitution 
should  provide  that  in  the  territories  of  all  component 
nations  at  least  they  must  be  so  regarded.2 

VII 

LIMITED  LIFE  OF  REVENUE  AND  COMMERCIAL 
MEASURES 

It  is  a  principle  of  many  popular  constitutions  that 
revenue  measures  must  originate  in  the  lower  house 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  6,  cl.  2. 
8  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  6,  cl.  2. 


56  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

of  the  legislature  as  most  closely  representing  the  peo- 
ple themselves  who  elect  its  members  directly,  upon  the 
theory  that  the  people,  through  their  own  immediate 
representatives,  have  a  better  right  to  tax  themselves 
and  a  better  knowledge  of  how  and  how  much  to 
burden  themselves  than  is  likely  to  be  possessed  by 
others. 

But  when  this  principle  is  applied  to  our  interna- 
tional government,  we  are  confronted  by  the  circum- 
stance that  the  members  of  neither  house  of  our  fed- 
eral legislature  need  directly  represent  the  people  of 
any  component  State,  but  may  be  appointed  by  its 
government,  the  mode  of  their  selection  being  left  to 
the  discretion  of  each  nation.  There  is  no  reason 
therefore  why  revenue  measures  should  originate  in 
the  one  house  rather  than  the  other. 

But  there  may  be  a  danger  in  respect  to  such  meas- 
ures which  it  would  be  well  to  guard  against,  namely, 
the  chance  that  such  a  law  passed  by  a  majority  in 
both  houses  may  prove  later  to  be  unjust  and  detri- 
mental to  one  or  the  other  of  the  two  great  interests 
represented  respectively  in  the  two  houses  of  the  Con- 
gress— either  to  the  majority  of  the  States  or  to  the 
majority  of  the  populous  and  influential  States.  Were 
this  condition  recognized  before  the  passage  of  the 
law,  it  would  of  course  be  defeated  in  that  chamber  in 
which  the  interest  injured  by  it  has  control. 

But  let  us  suppose  that,  after  its  adoption,  it  is 
ascertained  that  the  measure  is  hurtful  to  one  of  these 
great  interests,  while  correspondingly  beneficial  to  the 


CONGRESS— NATIONAL  VETO          57 

other;  and  that  the  law  once  passed  cannot  be  re- 
pealed save  by  the  consent  of  both  houses.  The  injus- 
tice would  then  be  perpetuated  until  the  consent  of  both 
houses  could  be  obtained  to  the  substitution  of  a  new 
and  juster  measure.  Such  a  condition  would  tend  to 
breed  ill  will  between  the  component  nations,  and 
would  constitute  a  departure  from  the  principles  of 
justice  and  concord  on  which  our  international  union 
should  be  founded. 

The  same  principle  would  apply  in  equal  degree  to 
laws  regulating  or  controlling  international  commerce. 

It  would  seem  to  be  a  proper  check  upon  this  pos- 
sible condition  to  insert  a  constitutional  provision  to 
the  effect  that  no  revenue  law  nor  law  regulating 
international  commerce  should  have  a  life  of  more 
than  (say)  ten  years,  after  which  it  would  expire  by 
limitation,  and  a  new  measure  (or,  if  it  be  desired, 
the  same  measure)  shall  be  passed  by  both  houses  of 
the  Congress.  Thus  every  ten  years  each  of  these  two 
great  interests  would  be  given  the  opportunity  to  veto 
any  revenue  or  commercial  law  that  is  proved  to  have 
operated  disastrously  to  either.1 

VIII 

NATIONAL  VETO  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LEGISLATION 

\ 

The  organization  of  the  two  legislative  chambers, 
so  that  one  represents  the  equal  sovereignty,  and  the 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  7. 


58  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

other  the  federal  populations,  of  the  respective  com- 
ponent nations,  sufficiently  guarantees  the  fewer  more 
populous  and  influential  States  (the  Great  Powers) 
against  a  majority  of  the  less  populous,  and  vice  versa. 

We  have  now  to  consider  the  possibility  of  impos- 
ing an  adequate  check  in  behalf  of  a  single  nation  or 
a  small  group  of  nations  upon  the  legislative  action 
of  a  majority  in  both  houses, — in  other  words,  the 
grant  of  a  veto  power  to  each  component  nation  upon 
legislative  action  which  it  may  deem  seriously  inimical 
to  its  best  interests. 

It  may  be  assumed  that  the  grant  of  an  absolute  veto 
as  to  all  legislation, — even  that  most  clearly  within 
the  constitutional  powers  of  the  international  con- 
gress,— would  be  utterly  impracticable  because  it  would 
introduce  anarchy  and  chaos  into  the  legislative  delib- 
erations, and  would  effectually  prevent  any  serious  or 
valuable  legislation. 

But  it  by  no  means  follows  that  the  component  na- 
tions should  possess  no  veto  power  at  all  or  that,  in- 
dividually, they  should  have  no  guarantee  that  the  sov- 
ereign rights  reserved  by  them  and  not  granted  to  the 
international  government  shall  be  preserved  inviolate. 
Even  without  a  veto,  it  is  true,  they  would  under  our 
proposed  plan  (as  will  appear  later)  have  the  protec- 
tion afforded  by  the  power  of  the  international  courts 
to  declare  unconstitutional  and  void  an  act  of  the 
Congress  thus  infringing  their  reserved  rights;  but  a 
decree  of  the  courts  would  possess  only  a  moral  sanc- 
tion unless  reinforced  by  the  international  power, 


CONGRESS— NATIONAL  VETO          59 

and  this  would  be  under  the  control  of  the  Congress. 

Furthermore,  the  same  influences  that  would  induce 
in  the  two  houses  of  the  Congress  tyrannical  and  uncon- 
stitutional invasions  of  the  reserved  rights  of  a  single 
nation  or  a  small  group  of  nations,  would  perhaps  in 
time  make  themselves  felt  also  within  the  judicial  de- 
partment of  the  government,  which  might  thus  be  led 
to  perpetuate  the  injustice. 

It  would  be  highly  desirable  therefore,  if  practicable, 
to  devise  an  additional  check  that  might  be  used  by  a 
component  nation  against  tyrannical  and  oppressive 
exercise  by  the  international  legislature  of  usurped 
functions. 

Such  a  check  is  found  in  the  constitutional  provision 
that  a  component  nation  shall  have  the  power,  under 
reasonable  conditions  of  notice  and  time,  to  veto  a 
legislative  act  which,  in  its  judgment,  violates  the  in- 
ternational constitution  by  trespassing  upon  the  re- 
served rights  of  the  nations  forming  the  union. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  to  permit  this  veto  to  be 
absolute,  without  reference  to  the  opinions  and  inter- 
pretations of  the  constitution  held  by  perhaps  the  great 
majority  of  the  component  nations,  would  enable  a 
single  nation  or  a  few  nations  permanently  to  hold  up 
enterprises  which  might  be  of  great  international  con- 
cern. ^ 

A  fair  and  reasonable  compromise  between  these 
conflicting  policies  would  seem  to  be  found  in  allowing 
the  veto  to  each  State  under  the  conditions  above  men- 
tioned, but  permitting  it  to  be  overcome  by  such  a  vote 


6o  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

in  both  houses  of  the  Congress  as  would  suffice  to 
amend  the  constitution,  that  is  (according  to  the  plan 
proposed,  as  will  later  appear)  by  the  assent  of  three- 
fourths  of  all  the  votes  of  each  house. 

Thus  if  more  than  one-fourth  of  all  the  component 
States,  or  if  States  representing  more  than  one-fourth 
of  the  entire  federal  populations  of  all  the  States  in 
union,  are  opposed  to  any  legislative  action  threaten- 
ing the  reserved  rights  of  the  nations,  their  opposition 
to  the  measure  would  put  an  absolute  and  irretrievable 
quietus  upon  it;  but  the  opposition  of  less  than  that 
number,  or  of  a  single  nation,  would  but  serve  to  cause 
such  delay  as  would  be  allowed  by  the  constitution  be- 
fore a  veto  might  be  overriden  by  the  requisite  ma- 
jority.1 

IX 

POWER  OF  IMPEACHMENT  OR  REMOVAL 

Article  I,  Sec.  2  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  provides  that  the  House  of  Representatives 

"  shall  have  the  sole  power  of  impeachment," 
and  Article  I,  Sec.  3,  that 

"  The  Senate  shall  have  the  sole  power  to  try 
all  impeachments.  When  sitting  for  the  purpose, 
they  shall  be  on  oath  or  affirmation.  When  the 
President  of  the  United  States  is  tried,  the  Chief 
Justice  shall  preside;  and  no  person  shall  be  con- 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  8. 


CONGRESS— IMPEACHMENT,  ETC.      61 

victed  without  the  concurrence  of  two-thirds  of 
the  members  present." 

The  same  section  also  declares  that — 

"  Judgment  in  cases  of  impeachment  shall  not 
extend  further  than  to  removal  from  office,  and 
disqualification  to  hold  and  enjoy  any  office  of 
honor,  trust,  or  profit  under  the  United  States; 
but  the  party  convicted  shall  nevertheless  be  liable 
and  subject  to  indictment,  trial,  judgment,  and 
punishment,  according  to  law." 

Lastly,  Article  II,  Sec.  4,  of  the  same  instrument 
discloses  what  officials  of  the  United  States  are  subject 
to  the  process  of  impeachment.  It  provides  that— 

"  The  President,  Vice-President,  and  all  civil 
officers  of  the  United  States  shall  be  removed 
from  office  on  impeachment  for,  and  conviction 
of,  treason,  bribery,  or  other  high  crimes  and  mis- 
demeanors." 

The  phrase  "  civil  officers,"  of  course  excludes  mili- 
tary and  naval  officers  and  is  not  considered  as  em- 
bracing legislative  officers,  that  is,  the  members  of 
either  house  of  the  Congress  (provision  for  whose  ex- 
pulsion from  the  house  of  which  they  are  respectively 
members  is  elsewhere  made). 

Hence  the  officers  subject  to  impeachment  uncler  this 
clause  of  the  American  Constitution  are  the  President, 
the  Vice-President,  and  all  civil  executive  and  judicial 
officers  of  the  United  States. 

Since   under   that   Constitution   the    President    and 


62  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

Vice-President  are  elected  more  or  less  indirectly  by  the 
people  of  the  States  and  not  by  the  Congress,  and  since 
they  are  not  otherwise  responsible  to  that  body,  it 
would  seem  to  have  been  prudent  to  give  to  the  legis- 
lative body  this  check  upon  the  conduct  of  these  highest 
executive  officers.  And  since  the  inferior  executive 
officials  were  to  be  appointed  by  the  President  and 
removable  by  him,  and  not  by  the  Congress,  and  the 
judicial  officials  were  to  be  likewise  appointed  by  him 
and  to  hold  office  during  good  behavior,  it  is  plain  that 
the  check  of  impeachment  by  the  Congress  would  be 
desirable  as  to  them  too;  the  essential  principle  being 
that  Congress  ought  to  have  the  power  to  impeach 
all  those  officials  over  whose  appointment  and  removal 
it  would  have  no  other  control. 

Applying  this  principle  to  our  international  consti- 
tution, since  it  is  proposed,  as  will  appear  later,  to 
make  the  executive  arm  of  the  new  government  fully 
responsive  to  the  wishes  and  desires  of*  the  Congress 
through  ministers  responsible  to,  and  selected  and  re- 
movable by,  that  body,  there  would  seem  to  be  no  need 
of  a  process  of  impeachment  as  to  any  executive  offi- 
cers of  the  international  government. 

But  in  the  case  of  judicial  officers  the  case  would  be 
quite  different.  The  plan  proposed,  as  will  be  seen 
hereafter,  calls  for  the  appointment  of  the  international 
judiciary  by  the  executive  authority  of  the  several 
component  nations,  to  hold  office  during  good  behavior. 

It  would  be  undesirable  to  leave  with  the  component 
nations  the  right  to  remove  the  judicial  officers  ap- 


CONGRESS— IMPEACHMENT,  ETC.      63 

pointed  by  them  respectively,  since  that  would  tend 
to  subordinate  the  will  and  opinion  of  the  judge  in 
the  matter  of  the  interpretation  of  the  international 
constitution  and  laws  and  in  other  matters  in  which 
other  component  States  might  be  interested  to  the  will 
of  the  particular  State  appointing  him,  and  would 
therefore  tend  to  remove  him  from  the  strictly  judicial 
and  impartial  atmosphere  that  should  surround  him. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  would  be  equally  undesirable 
to  leave  the  international  judge,  once  appointed,  with- 
out responsibility  to,  or  check  by,  any  other  power. 
The  judge  who  is  guilty  of  extortion,  bribery,  corrup- 
tion, or  other  high  crime  or  misdemeanor  ought  to  be 
removed  from  office.  To  whom  can  this  power  be 
intrusted  more  safely  than  to  the  whole  body  of  com- 
ponent nations  sitting  in  the  two  houses  of  the  inter- 
national congress?  This  would  in  effect  require  that, 
to  remove  a  judge  of  an  international  court,  it  would 
be  necessary  to  secure  the  consent  of  a  majority  of  the 
more  populous  States  in  the  House  of  Delegates,  while 
also  securing  the  consent  of  a  majority  of  all  the  com- 
ponent States  in  the  Senate. 

As  the  component  States  themselves  are  represented 
directly  in  both  houses,  it  would  seem  needless  to  pro- 
vide that  the  proceedings  for  such  removal  originate  in 
one  of  the  houses  and  be  tried  out  in  the  other,  as  is 
required  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
(which  declares  that  the  House  of  Representatives 
shall  have  the  sole  power  of  impeachment  and  the  Sen- 
ate the  sole  power  to  try  impeachments).  Under  the 


64  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

proposed  plan,  the  proceeding  for  the  removal  of  an 
international  judge  would  be  the  same  as  the  procedure 
for  the  passage  of  a  law;  it  might  originate  in  either 
house,  and  if  passed  by  that  house,  upon  concurrence 
by  the  other,  the  removal  would  be  effected. 

Nor  is  any  reason  perceived  why  the  procedure 
should  call  for  more  than  the  ordinary  majority  of 
votes  in  each  house.  The  requirement  in  the  Ameri- 
can Constitution  of  a  majority  of  two-thirds  in  the 
Senate  to  convict  upon  impeachment  was  made  neces- 
sary because  the  President  of  the  United  States  was 
made  subject  to  the  process,  and  to  permit  him  to  be 
impeached  and  removed  from  office  by  the  vote  of  a 
bare  majority  in  either  house  would  have  destroyed  his 
independence  as  a  co-ordinate  department  of  the  gov- 
ernment and  would  have  made  his  office  the  football  of 
party  politics.  If  the  impeachment  process  had  been 
confined  to  federal  judges,  it  may  well  be  doubted 
whether  the  framers  of  that  instrument  would  have 
deemed  it  necessary  to  require  a  vote  of  two-thirds 
of  the  Senate  to  convict.  Be  that  as  it  may,  experience 
in  the  United  States  has  proved  that  under  the  im- 
peachment process  the  removal  of  a  judge  is  so  diffi- 
cult as  to  be  rarely  attempted. 

On  the  whole  it  is  believed  that  better  results  would 
be  attained  if  the  removal  of  international  judges  be 
permitted  by  the  concurrent  action  of  the  two  houses 
of  the  Congress  assented  to  by  a  majority  of  the  votes 
in  each  house.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  2,  cl.  2. 


CONGRESS— ORGANIZATION  65' 

X 

OTHER  DETAILS  OF  ORGANIZATION 

The  problems  above  examined  are  the  chief  ones  to 
be  confronted  in  the  organization  of  the  legislative 
department  of  our  international  government. 

There  are  of  course  other  details  to  be  considered, 
but  they  would  appear  to  raise  no  question  of  impor- 
tant principle  and,  in  the  suggested  form  of  the  inter- 
national constitution  appearing  in  the  Appendix,  are 
adopted  mainly  from  the  corresponding  details  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sees.  2,  3,  5. 


CHAPTER  V 

POWERS  TO  BE  CONFERRED  ON  THE 
INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS 

I 

PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS 

No  portion  of  a  compact  for  an  international  union 
can  be  of  greater  importance  than  the  selection  of  the 
powers,  especially  the  legislative  powers,  to  be  con- 
ferred upon  the  federal  government.  It  is  essential 
that  these  powers  be  as  limited  as  possible  in  order  that 
the  nations,  seeing  that  their  sovereign  powers  are 
surrendered  only  to  an  extent  necessary  to  abolish  war 
among  them,  may  the  more  readily  assent  to  the  com- 
pact. 

But  at  the  same  time  it  is  possible  that  international 
convenience  may  demand  that  a  few  other  powers  be 
also  granted  to  the  Congress,  such  as  the  power  to  con- 
trol international  coinage,  currency  and  banking,  or 
international  copyrights  and  patent  rights.  These  hav- 
ing little  or  no  bearing  on  the  causation  of  wars  be- 
tween the  component  nations,  would  have  no  place  in 
our  plan  if  we  adhere  strictly  to  the  design  merely  to 
eliminate  war  between  the  nations.  But  it  is  conceiv- 

66 


CONGRESS— POWERS  67 

able  that  international  convenience  would  be  subserved 
by  placing  these  matters  too  under  the  control  of  a 
central  legislative  body  rather  than  by  leaving  them 
as  now  to  be  regulated  by  mere  treaty  stipulations 
among  the  component  nations.  It  would  at  least  be 
worth  while  to  consider  the  wisdom  of  including  them 
among  the  powers  to  be  granted  to  the  Congress,  and 
thus  at  one  stroke  achieve  the  permanent  neutraliza- 
tion of  them. 

It  may  also  be  remarked  once  more,  as  preliminary 
to  the  discussion  of  the  many  problems  involved  in  this 
great  topic,  that  one  who  takes  the  trouble  to  compare 
the  various  existing  constitutions  of  federal  union 
will  at  once  see  that  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  approaches  much  more  nearly  the  model  we  are 
searching  for  than  any  of  the  others;  for  at  the  time 
of  its  adoption  the  American  States  regarded  them- 
selves as  independent  and  sovereign  States,  and  were 
almost  as  jealous  of  their  sovereign  rights  as  the 
proudest  European  nation  of  today. 

The  consequence  is  that  the  American  Constitution 
confers  much  more  limited  powers  upon  the  general 
government  than  do  those  of  other  federal  unions, 
and  is  correspondingly  cautious  as  to  the  powers  ^ur- 
rendered  by  the  component  States.  Yet  this  constitu- 
tion has  stood  the  test  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-five 
years  of  active  operation  and,  with  the  exception  of  the 
War  of  1 86 1  (an  explanation  of  which  has  already 
been  given)  has  effectually  prevented  the  occurrence 
of  war  between  the  States.  Indeed,  the  question  of 


68  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

secession  being  settled,  about  which  the  War  of  1861 
was  fought,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  another  war 
between  them,  so  closely  and  ever  more  closely  are 
free  trade,  common  interstate  laws,  and  the  ties  of 
business  and  social  intimacy  drawing  them  together. 

One  more  preliminary  observation  ought  to  be  made. 
It  is  a  well-established  rule  of  construction  of  the 
United  States  Constitution  that  a  power  granted  to 
the  federal  congress  is  not  exclusively  vested  in  that 
body,  but  may  be  concurrently  exercised  by  the  com- 
ponent States,  except  in  the  three  following  classes  of 
cases : 

1.  Where  it  is  expressly  stated  that  Congress  shall 
have  the  exclusive  power  to  act  in  the  matter; 

2.  Where  the  power  is  conferred  upon  the  Congress, 
and  the  States  are  prohibited  to  exercise  the  power; 

3.  Where  the  power  is  of  such  a  nature  that  it  can 
only  be  properly  exercised  under  one  uniform  rule, 
and  the  right  to  exercise  it  has  been  conferred  upon 
Congress.     In  such  case,  by  implication,  the  power  is 
presumed  to  have  been  granted  to  the  Congress  exclu- 
sively, and  the  States  cannot  exercise  it  concurrently. 

But  when  the  States  have  the  right  to  exercise  a 
power  concurrently  with  Congress,  this  means  that  they 
may  exercise  it  only  so  long  as,  and  to  the  extent  that, 
Congress  does  not  exercise  it.  For  the  Constitution, 
and  laws  of  the  United  States  are  expressly  declared  to 
be  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  and  a  State  law  con- 
flicting with  a  constitutional  law  of  Congress  is  of  no 
effect. 


CONGRESS— TAXING  POWER  69 

These  principles  are  to  be  applied  as  freely  in  the 
construction  of  our  proposed  constitution  as  in  that 
of  the  American  document, — with  one  qualification, 
namely,  that  no  opportunity  ought  to  be  permitted  to 
the  international  government  to  assume  exclusive  power 
by  implication  only,  nor  on  the  other  hand  ought  there 
to  be  under  any  circumstances  a  presumption  of  the 
surrender  of  powers  by  the  component  nations  by  im- 
plication only.  In  every  case  the  claim  of  such  a  grant 
or  such  a  surrender  ought  to  be  sustained  only  by  some 
express  provision  of  the  international  compact. 

Hence,  the  third  rule,  above  mentioned,  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  American  Constitution, — that  where 
the  power  is  of  such  a  nature  that  it  can  only  be  prop- 
erly exercised  under  one  uniform  rule,  and  the  right 
to  exercise  it  has  been  conferred  upon  Congress,  the 
power  is  presumed  to  have  been  granted  to  the  Con- 
gress exclusively,  and  the  States  cannot  exercise  it  con- 
currently,— ought  to  have  no  place  in  the  rules  adopted 
for  the  interpretation  of  the  international  compact. 

II 

POWER  TO  RAISE  REVENUE 

\ 

That  the  international  government  ought  to  be  self- 
sustaining,  with  power  to  raise  its  own  revenues  by  its 
own  tax  measures,  is  a  proposition  needing  no  argu- 
ment. If  proof  were  necessary,  it  might  be  sought 
in  the  fact  that  all  federal  unions  have  found  it  essen- 


70  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

tial  to  possess  this  power; — indeed,  without  it,  the 
union  would  not  be  a  true  government,  but  a  mere 
league  or  alliance,  dependent  upon  the  charity  or  lib- 
erality of  the  component  States  for  its  continued  ex- 
istence. 

The  constitutional  history  of  the  United  States  pre- 
sents an  actual  illustration  of  this  condition,  before  the 
establishment  of  the  present  Constitution,  and  while 
yet  the  States  were  leagued  together  under  the  Articles 
of  Confederation  which  provided  that  the  States  should 
contribute  ratably  to  the  expenses  of  the  Union.  It  was 
then  notorious  that  some  of  the  States  failed  utterly 
to  pay  their  quotas,  while  others  paid  only  part.  It 
was,  indeed,  the  weakness  of  the  union  under  this 
system  that  finally  induced  the  States  to  accede  to  the 
present  Constitution. 

Assuming  that  the  Congress  ought  to  be  granted  the 
power  to  raise  its  revenue  through  its  own  powers  of 
taxation,  the  next  branch  of  the  problem  relates  to  the 
sorts  of  tax  it  should  be  permitted  to  lay. 

In  examining  this  very  important  question,  it  is 
hardly  necessary  to  remind  the  reader  that  the  power 
of  taxation,  while  it  is  an  essential  power  of  govern- 
ment, is  perhaps  the  most  dangerous  of  all  the  pow- 
ers, and  more  liable  to  abuse  by  a  dominant  majority; 
nor  does  the  exercise  of  any  other  demand  so  inti- 
mate an  acquaintance  with  the  domestic  concerns  and 
business  affairs  of  each  small  portion  of  an  extensive 
territory.  Taxation,  especially  by  means  of  duties  on 
imports  and  exports,  that  may  make  for  great  pros- 


CONGRESS— TAXING  POWER  71 

perity  in  one  section  of  such  territory  or  in  one  class 
of  the  population  may  impoverish  another,  and  thus 
may  operate  indirectly  to  make  one  section  or  one 
class  tributary  to  another. 

In  the  organization  of  a  world  government,  in  view 
of  the  widespread  diversity  of  conditions  among  the 
several  nations,  the  ignorance  of  the  conditions  in 
each  State  on  the  part  of  others  than  its  own  repre- 
sentatives, and  perhaps  even  the  ignorance  among  those 
representatives  themselves  (remembering  that  they 
would  respectively  represent  some  millions  of  people), 
it  would  seem  the  part  of  wisdom  to  confine  the  in- 
ternational taxing  power  within  the  simplest  possible 
limits,  and  to  permit  its  application  to  those  subjects 
only  which  may  be  found  in  every  State  in  uniform 
proportion. 

The  subject  best  answering  this  description  would 
seem  to  be  land.  This  is  found  in  every  country,  and 
is  valuable  in  proportion  to  the  population  and  wealth 
of  the  country  itself,  affording  thus  an  approximate 
measure  of  the  ability  of  each  nation  to  pay  the  ex- 
pense of  a  world  government,  with  its  insurance  against 
violence  and  war. 

And  while  primarily  this  tax  upon  land  is  a  tax  upon 
the  single  class  of  landowners,  the  burden,  extending  as 
it  would  over  so  large  a  portion  of  the  earth's  surface, 
would  speedily  be  distributed  among  all  classes  of  the 
world's  population.  Nor  would  the  tax  thus  uniformly 
distributed  be  a  heavy  burden  upon  the  several  na- 
tions, when  we  consider  the  annual  savings  in  arma* 


72  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

ments  and  equipment  for  war,  not  to  mention  the  sav- 
ing of  the  expense  of  actual  warfare,  resulting  from 
the  establishment  of  such  a  government. 

It  must  also  be  remembered  that  the  suggested  gov- 
ernment would  be  one  of  strictly  limited  powers  and 
functions,  the  annual  expenditures  of  which  ought  not 
to  be  great  when  compared  with  the  benefits  to  accrue; 
and  that  the  component  nations,  through  their  abso- 
lute control  of  their  representatives  in  the  Congress  and 
their  consequent  control  of  the  expenditures  of  the 
government,  would  always  possess  the  power  to  put 
a  stop  to  any  unnecessary  extravagance. 

The  other  alternative, — that  of  granting  to  the  in- 
ternational government  the  power  to  lay  indirect  taxes 
such  as  taxes  on  production,  business,  imports,  or  ex* 
ports, — would  surrender  to  that  government  an  un- 
told power  for  harm  and  injustice,  and  would  permit 
a  majority  of  the  nations,  through  their  federal  agency, 
to  meddle  in  the  domestic  concerns  of  the  respective 
nations  in  what  might  prove  ruinous  fashion. 

The  plan  proposed  then  would  confine  the  power  of 
the  Congress  to  raise  its  revenue  to  the  taxation  of 
land  alone  at  a  uniform  rate  throughout  the  terri- 
tories of  the  component  nations. 

The  last  phase  of  the  problem  relates  to  the  proper 
limitations  upon  the  purposes  for  which  the  Congress 
may  exercise  the  power  of  taxation. 

Shall  it  be  permitted  to  raise  money  for  any  pur- 
poses that  to  it  seem  to  be  for  the  general  interna- 
tional welfare,  even  though  that  welfare  be  confined  to 


CONGRESS— TAXING  POWER  73 

improvements  and  public  enterprises  undertaken  within 
a  few  only  of  the  component  States;  or  shall  it  be 
limited  in  its  right  to  raise  money  to  those  matters, 
as  to  which  it  is  expressly  authorized  to  legislate? 

This  question  has  for  years  divided  the  people  and 
the  political  parties  of  the  United  States.  It  arises 
under  the  corresponding  clause  of  the  American  Con- 
stitution providing  that 

"  The  Congress  shall  have  power  to  lay  and 
collect  taxes,  duties,  imposts,  and  excises  [in  or- 
der] to  pay  the  debts  and  provide  for  the  com- 
mon defense  and  general  welfare  of  the  United 
States." 

One  party  has  claimed  that  this  gives  Congress  the 
power  to  raise  money  to  provide  for  anything  which 
it  may  consider  as  for  "  the  general  welfare  of  the 
United  States,"  regardless  of  whether  it  falls  within 
the  granted  powers  and  control  of  the  federal  govern- 
ment. The  other  claims  that  "  the  general  welfare  of 
the  United  States  "  has  all  been  provided  for  in  the 
powers  conferred  upon  the  federal  government;  that 
nothing  beyond  or  outside  of  those  powers  can  be 
properly  said  to  pertain  to  "the  general  welfare  of 
the  United  States";  and  that  Congress  therefore  has 
no  power  to  raise  money  for  other  purposes  than  those 
appearing  in  the  Constitution  itself. 

But  whatever  the  proper  view  of  such  a  question  in 
the  case  of  a  single  nation  like  the  United  States,  it 
would  seem  very  undesirable  to  permit  the  international 


74  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

government  to  exercise  any  such  paternal  care  over  the 
interests  of  the  component  nations,  which  are  fully 
able  to  take  care  of  themselves  and  their  own  enter- 
prises and  improvements  without  aid  from  the  rest 
of  the  world. 

The  powers  of  the  international  congress  in  this 
regard  ought  to  be  strictly  limited  to  the  raising  of 
money  for  the  sole  purpose  of  carrying  out  the  func- 
tions imposed  upon  the  federal  government  by  the 
constitution.1 

Ill 
POWER  TO  BORROW  MONEY — PAPER  CURRENCY 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  has  provided 
that  the  Congress  shall  have  power 

"  to  borrow  money  on  the  credit  of  the  United 
States." 

This  has  been  construed  to  mean  not  only  that  Con- 
gress may  from  time  to  time  authorize  the  issuance  and 
sale  of  bonds  of  the  United  States,  but  also  that  it 
may  authorize  the  issuance  of  treasury  notes  and  other 
paper  currency  as  legal  tender  in  the  payment  of  pri- 
vate debts. 

That  the  international  government  should  be  given 
the  power  to  borrow  money  on  its  own  credit  through 
the  issuance  and  sale  on  the  public  markets  of  bonds 
not  intended  as  currency  would  seem  indisputable.  Not 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  i. 


CONGRESS— MONEY  POWERS  75 

only  might  unforeseen  events  occur  that  would  render 
such  a  course  necessary  or  else  would  entail  great  em- 
barrassment to  the  government,  but  the  widespread 
distribution  of  such  bonds  among  the  component  na- 
tions would  constitute  a  conservative  influence  tending 
to  increase  its  political  stability. 

But  the  question  becomes  much  more  complex  when 
we  consider  the  express  or  implied  grant  to  the  inter- 
national government  of  the  power  to  issue  a  world-wide 
paper  currency  either  on  the  sole  credit  of  the  govern- 
ment or  through  a  bank  or  banks  instituted  by  it.  This 
is  a  matter  of  international  convenience  only,  and  has 
no  special  bearing  on  the  question  of  war  or  peace;  so 
that  the  grant  of  such  a  power  is  not  in  the  least  es- 
sential to  the  plan  of  international  federation. 

It  is  to  be  remembered  that  every  unnecessary  grant 
of  power  to  the  international  government  involves  to  a 
correlative  extent  an  actual  or  potential  surrender  of 
power  by  the  component  nations,  and  tends  to  greater 
centralization  of  power,  which,  should  it  become  too 
great,  would  defeat  the  very  purpose  of  the  union  per- 
haps by  causing  war  on  the  part  of  the  component  na- 
tions to  regain  the  liberty  and  independence  they  have 
too  rashly  surrendered.  These  observations  apply  nob 
only  to  the  particular  power  now  under  discussion  but 
to  some  others  that  are  to  be  mentioned  later. 

While  all  powers  ought  to  be  surrendered  by  the 
component  nations,  the  exercise  of  which  by  them 
would  lead,  or  tend  to  lead,  to  wars  between  them,  it 
cannot  be  fairly  said  that  the  power  to  issue  paper 


76  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

currency  is  one  of  these.  The  only  justification  of  such 
a  grant,  if  there  be  any,  would  be  found  in  the  in- 
ternational convenience  resulting  from  the  abolition  of 
the  cost  of  exchange  and  in  other  ways.  Only  experts 
in  international  finance  could  determine  how  great 
the  advantages  of  this  change  would  be,  or  properly 
weigh  its  financial  advantages  against  the  financial 
dangers  incurred;  but  the  benefits  ought  to  be  clearly 
shown  to  be  very  great  before  the  power  is  granted. 

Should  the  power  be  granted  at  all,  it  ought  to  be 
express,  not  left  to  implication  from  the  mere  power 
to  borrow  money  on  the  credit  of  the  United  Nations. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  it  is  not  intended  to  be  granted, 
care  should  be  taken  so  to  word  the  grant  of  the  power 
to  borrow  as  to  exclude  the  implication  that  it  embraces 
also  the  power  to  issue  paper  currency.1 

IV 

POWER  TO  COIN  MONEY 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  grants  to  the 
Congress  the  power 

"  to  coin  money,  and  regulate  the  value  thereof, 
and  of  foreign  coin." 

This  is  another  instance  wherein  the  question  is  pre- 
sented whether  a  power,  which  has  no  relation  to  the 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  2.  The  power  to 
issue  paper  currency  is  placed  in  brackets  as  indicative  of  the  doubt 
as  to  its  inclusion  among  the  powers  granted. 


CONGRESS— MONEY  POWERS  77 

causation  of  war  between  the  component  nations,  ought 
to  be  granted  by  them  to  the  international  government, 
merely  because  it  might  subserve  international  conven- 
ience in  commercial  dealings  or  otherwise. 

It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  while  the  mere  grant 
of  such  a  power  to  the  federal  government  would  not 
of  itself,  without  an  express  prohibition  upon  the 
States,  operate  as  a  negation  of  their  right  to  exercise 
the  same  power,  it  would  operate  to  give  the  complete 
control  of  the  subject  into  the  hands  of  the  Congress, 
who  might,  if  they  should  choose  to  do  so,  make  their 
own  exercise  of  the  power  exclusive,  and  deprive  the 
nations  of  their  concurrent  control  of  it. 

The  same  considerations  that  should  induce  caution 
in  granting  to  the  United  Nations  the  power  to  issue  pa- 
per currency  apply  in  this  case.  Unless  the  advantages 
to  international  finance  and  commerce  would  be  very 
great,  the  wisdom  of  augmenting  the  powers  of  the 
international  government  beyond  the  limits  necessary 
to  prevent  war  between  the  nations  would  admit  of 
doubt.1 


POWER  TO  PUNISH  COUNTERFEITING 

It  has  been  assumed  that  the  international  congress 
would  be  given  the  power  to  borrow  money  on  the 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  3.  The  power  to 
coin  money,  etc.,  is  placed  in  brackets,  to  indicate  the  doubt  of  the 
propriety  of  its  inclusion  among  the  powers  granted. 


78  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

credit  of  the  United  Nations  through  the  issuance  of 
bonds.  Perhaps  also  the  power  to  issue  paper  cur- 
rency and  to  coin  money  would  be  granted. 

These  grants  would  very  possibly  imply  a  power  to 
provide  for  the  punishment  of  the  counterfeiting  of 
these  securities  and  money;  but  it  would  be  wiser  to 
leave  as  little  as  possible  to  implication  and  to  grant 
the  power  expressly  to  the  Congress. 

While  the  component  nations  would  also  doubtless 
possess  the  power  to  punish  the  counterfeiting  or  ut- 
terance of  counterfeited  securities  or  currency  of  the 
United  Nations  on  the  ground  of  the  fraud  thereby 
worked  upon  their  own  citizens,  it  would  be  imprudent 
to  leave  the  prevention  and  punishment  of  these  crimes 
entirely  to  the  several  States,  which  might  punish  them 
very  differently.1 

VI 

POWER  TO  Fix  STANDARDS  OF  WEIGHTS  AND 
MEASURES 

The  remarks  made  in  connection  with  the  grant  of 
the  powers  to  issue  paper  currency  and  to  coin  money 
apply  here  also,  and  perhaps  with  even  more  force, 
since  the  benefits  likely  to  accrue  from  the  grant  of 
this  power  to  the  international  government  would  not 
be  so  great.  It  has  no  connection  with  war,  and  its 
admission  among  the  powers  granted  could  only  be 
justified  on  the  ground  of  great  international  conven- 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  4. 


REGULATION  OF  COMMERCE          79 

ience.     It  is  very  questionable  whether  it  should  be 
included.1 

VII 

POWER  TO  REGULATE  INTERNATIONAL  COMMERCE 

Much  light  will  be  thrown  upon  the  investigation  of 
this  interesting  and  important  topic  by  a  brief  review 
not  only  of  the  corresponding  clause  in  the  American 
Constitution  but  of  the  interpretation  given  it  in  the 
United  States. 

That  Constitution  declares  that  Congress  shall  have 
power 

"  to  regulate  commerce  with  foreign  nations  and 
among  the  several  States,  and  with  the  Indian 
tribes." 

This  clause  has  received  a  very  liberal  construction, 
the  constant  tendency  being  to  transfer  to  Congress  the 
almost  complete  control  of  interstate  and  foreign  com- 
merce, while  leaving  to  the  States,  respectively,  the 
absolute  control  of  all  commerce  conducted  entirely 
within  the  limits  of  each  State.  The  construction  of 
the  clause  comprehends  a  vast  field,  and  no  more  wift- 
be  attempted  here  than  to  outline  some  of  its  salient 
features. 

At  first  it  was  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  that  the  clause  only  gave  to  Congress 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  3.  This  power 
is  placed  in  brackets,  as  indicative  of  the  doubt  of  the  propriety  of  its 
inclusion  among  the  powers  granted. 


8o  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

the  power  to  pass  laws  regulating  foreign  and  inter- 
state commerce,  so  that  until  Congress  should  act 
upon  a  particular  matter  connected  with  such  com- 
merce, the  several  States  might  pass  laws  dealing  with 
it. 

But  in  more  recent  times  the  Court  has  receded  from 
this  position,  and  has  held  that  the  purpose  of  the 
clause  for  the  most  part  is  to  place  the  entire  control 
of  such  commerce  within  the  power  of  Congress,  so 
that  if  it  has  not  acted  in  respect  to  some  particular  of 
such  commerce,  it  is  an  indication  that  Congress  de- 
sires to  leave  the  matter  undisturbed  by  legal  restric- 
tions, and  the  States  are  not  to  regulate  it. 

To  this  general  rule,  however,  there  are  important 
exceptions,  of  some  of  which  persons  extensively  en- 
gaged in  interstate  commerce  loudly  complain,  prefer- 
ring the  single  regulation  of  the  Congress  or  the  ab- 
sence of  regulation  to  the  multiform  rules  of  the  sev- 
eral States. 

One  of  these  exceptions  is  to  be  found  in  the  ad- 
mitted right  of  the  respective  States  to  exercise  the 
so-called  "  police  power  "  for  the  preservation  of  the 
safety,  health,  morals,  or  order  of  the  community. 
Such  laws  are  sustained  even  when  burdensome  to  com- 
merce, if  their  design  be  not  to  restrict  or  regulate 
interstate  or  foreign  commerce,  but  bona  fide  to  execute 
the  purposes  above  mentioned  by  methods  that  are  not 
unreasonable,  such  as  quarantine  regulations. 

Another  exception  relates  to  the  regulation  of  ports, 
harbors,  and  pilots.  In  such  cases  it  is  held  that  the 


REGULATION  OF  COMMERCE          81 

several  States  may  control  until  Congress  chooses  to 
act,  since  each  State  is  in  a  better  position  to  regulate 
these  local  matters  than  Congress,  and  uniform  rules 
covering  a  great  extent  of  territory  would  not  be  likely 
to  meet  the  local  needs. 

It  is  also  important  to  observe  that  the  term  u  com- 
merce "  is  held  not  to  include  the  manufacturing,  agri- 
cultural, or  mining  production  of  goods,  but  only  mat- 
ters or  things  connected  with  their  distribution  and  the 
transportation  of  persons. 

Thus  it  includes  immigration,  and  the  control  of 
Congress  over  that  subject  is  based  upon  this  clause. 
It  also  includes  trade  in  goods  by  sale,  barter,  or  ex- 
change; the  articles  traded  in;  the  rules  of  navigation; 
the  highways  of  commerce,  such  as  harbors,  navigable 
waters,  and  interstate  lines  of  railway  or  telegraph; 
the  vehicles  of  commerce,  as  ships,  railway  trains,  and 
telegraph  lines;  and  the  persons  engaged  in  commerce 
such  as  the  engineers  and  firemen  on  railway  or  steam- 
ship lines  engaged  in  interstate  or  foreign  commerce. 
As  to  all  these  subjects  and  persons,  if  the  commerce 
be  foreign  or  interstate,  the  States  are  without  control 
and  (with  the  exception  previously  alluded  to)  can 
lay  no  taxes  or  burdens  upon  them  as  such,  and  can 
make  no  regulations  affecting  commerce  through  them, 
even  though  the  State  regulations  be  not  inconsistent 
with  acts  of  Congress. 

Such  in  brief  are  some  of  the  political  and  economic 
results  in  the  United  States  of  the  construction  placed 
upon  this  constitutional  provision. 


82  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

In  considering  whether  a  similar  power  ought  to  be 
granted  to  the  international  congress,  the  first  ques- 
tion would  be,  shall  the  Congress  be  given  any  control 
whatever  over  commerce?  If  so,  it  would  naturally 
be  confined  to  the  commerce  between  the  several  com- 
ponent nations,  and  between  them  and  nations  not 
parties  to  the  compact  of  union.  Either  of  these  would 
fall  within  the  designation  "  international  commerce." 
The  purely  domestic  commerce,  on  the  other  hand, 
would  be  left  under  the  complete  control  of  the  several 
constituent  States. 

International  jealousy  and  suspicion  would  prob- 
ably prove  obstacles  to  the  grant  of  this  power  to  the 
proposed  government,  and  doubtless  certain  precau- 
tions ought  to  be  taken  to  define  more  clearly  the  pre- 
cise limits  of  it  than  the  American  Constitution  does. 
But  that  it  would  be  wise,  and  indeed  necessary,  to 
confer  a  portion  at  least  of  this  great  power  upon 
the  international  congress  is  sufficiently  apparent,  when 
we  remember  that  perhaps  most  of  the  wars  that  have 
plagued  mankind  have  had  their  origin  in  national  de- 
sire to  promote  trade  by  devious  paths.  If,  then,  the 
chief  design  in  establishing  this  union  is  to  eliminate 
wars  between  the  component  nations,  the  compact 
would  be  irreparably  defective,  did  it  omit  to  extend 
the  international  power  to  one  of  the  principal  mo- 
tives for  war. 

Assuming,  then,  that  some  degree  of  control  over 
international  commerce  must  be  granted  to  the  Con- 
gress, the  next  question  is  as  to  the  limitations,  if 


REGULATION  OF  COMMERCE          83 

any,  which  ought  to  be  imposed  upon  the  exercise  of 
the  power.  Shall  it  be  complete  and  absolute,  as  under 
the  American  Constitution,  reserving  to  the  component 
nations  only  the  right  to  pass  inspection  or  quarantine 
laws  or  other  "  police  "  regulations,  and  the  right  to 
regulate  purely  local  matters  such  as  harbors,  pilots, 
bridges,  and  dams  across  navigable  waters?  If  not,  to 
what  extent  should  it  be  limited? 

It  is  clear  that  the  power  ought  not  to  be  extended 
so  as  to  give  the  international  congress  control  over 
the  production  as  well  as  the  distribution  of  goods, 
even  though  the  goods  be  intended  for  export.  Not 
only  would  such  an  extension  increase  enormously  the 
powers  of  the  central  government,  but  it  would  consti- 
tute a  direct  invasion  of  that  plenary  control  of  affairs 
domestic  that  each  nation  ought  to  reserve  to  itself. 

Confining  ourselves  therefore  to  the  control  of  in- 
ternational commerce  (in  contradistinction  to  produc- 
tion of  the  factory,  the  farm,  or  the  mine),  it  may  be 
observed  that  in  the  prevailing  mental  attitude  of  the 
nations  toward  one  another,  it  is  unlikely  they  could 
be  induced,  even  were  it  desirable,  to  grant  more  of 
this  power  than  would  permit  the  Congress  by  special 
and  express  legislation  to  regulate  international  com- 
merce, not  allowing,  as  in  the  United  States,  the  mere 
silence  of  the  Congress  in  respect  to  a  given  matter  to 
operate  as  an  inhibition  upon  national  action. 

Again,  since  the  Congress,  under  the  guise  of  regula- 
tions, might  easily  pass  laws  touching  international 
commerce  which  would  operate  unequally  and  unjustly 


84  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

upon  different  nations,  thus  putting  one  or  more  na- 
tions at  a  disadvantage  in  the  prosecution  of  its  trade, 
the  compact  ought  to  require  that  all  regulations  of 
such  commerce  passed  by  the  Congress  be  uniform  in 
their  operation. 

It  would  also  seem  advisable  to  provide,  as  in  the 
case  of  bills  for  raising  revenue,  that  no  law  regulat- 
ing international  commerce  shall  have  a  life  of  more 
than  (say)  ten  years,  so  that  at  the  end  of  that  period, 
if  it  is  to  survive,  it  must  once  more  run  the  gauntlet 
of  both  houses  of  the  Congress  and  of  the  divergent 
interests  represented  therein. 

So  far  from  any  nation  being  permanently  injured  in 
its  trade  relations  by  the  grant  of  this  power,  thus 
guarded,  to  the  international  government,  it  is  sub- 
mitted that  it  would  be  a  great  boon  to  international 
commerce,  which  would  prosper  as  never  before. 
While  the  respective  nations  might  still  regulate  their 
own  trade,  even  international  trade,  conflicting  and 
burdensome  as  the  regulations  might  be,  these  latter 
could  at  any  time  be  superseded  as  to  particular  mat- 
ters by  the  action  of  the  Congress,  whenever  the  con- 
flicts, restrictions,  or  other  evils  might  become  so  bur- 
densome as  to  arouse  the  majority  of  the  States  to 
action. 

"  Commerce,"  as  the  term  has  been  construed  in  the 
United  States,  includes  the  control  of  immigration, 
emigration,  and  the  migration  of  persons  from  one 
State  to  another.  But  it  can  scarcely  be  supposed,  at 
this  stage  of  international  intercourse,  that  the  several 


POSTAL— OTHER  COMMUNICATION    85 

nations  composing  an  international  union  would  consent 
to  surrender  the  control  of  these  subjects  to  the  federal 
government.  Hence  a  clause  has  been  inserted  ex- 
pressly excepting  them  from  inclusion  in  this  federal 
power.1 

VIII 

POWER  TO  REGULATE  POSTAL  AND  OTHER 
COMMUNICATION 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  grants  to 
Congress  the  power 

"  to  establish  postoffices  and  post  roads." 

As  construed  in  America,  this  has  sufficed  not  only 
to  enable  the  federal  government  to  establish  and  con- 
trol the  whole  postoffice  system  of  the  country,  includ- 
ing the  appointment  of  postmasters,  but  also  to  make 
appropriations  of  money  and  public  lands  for  the  build- 
ing of  railroads,  and  to  declare  any  road  it  may  choose, 
over  which  the  mails  may  be  carried,  a  "  post  road," 
and  on  that  account  more  or  less  subject  to  the  con- 
trol of  Congress. 

But  it  has  never  been  held  that  the  above  clause  em- 
braces telephones,  telegraphs,  cables,  or  wireless.  It 
is  confined  to  the  single  mode  of  communication  by 
post.  The  power  of  Congress  has  nevertheless  been 
extended  to  these  other  subjects  through  the  extension 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  5. 


86  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

of  the  power  to  regulate  foreign  and  interstate  com- 
merce. Thus  Congress  has  the  power  to  "  establish  " 
postoffices,  while  it  has  power  to  "  regulate  "  the  other 
modes  of  foreign  or  interstate  communication. 

International  postal,  telephonic,  telegraphic,  wire- 
less, and  cable  communications  must  be  considered  in 
certain  aspects  as  instrumentalities  of  war,  and  there- 
fore should  be  under  the  control  of  the  international 
congress. 

Indeed,  as  agencies  of  international  commerce,  it  is 
possible  that  the  clause  conferring  upon  the  Congress 
control  over  that  subject  would  suffice,  by  implication 
at  least,  as  a  grant  of  the  power  to  regulate  all  of 
these  modes  of  communication  (including  the  postal). 
And  the  many  international  conventions  touching  these 
matters  would  seem  to  indicate  that  there  is  a  real 
need  for  the  exercise  of  a  centralized  authority  over 
them. 

When,  however,  we  come  to  consider  the  extent  of 
the  power  thus  to  be  conferred,  we  are  confronted  with 
some  important  and  difficult  problems. 

To  make  the  power  complete  in  degree,  including  the 
establishment  of  post,  telegraph,  telephone,  wireless, 
and  cable  offices,  and  the  appointment  of  postmasters 
and  operators,  but  limiting  it  in  kind  to  international 
communications  only,  leaving  the  intra-national  com- 
munications, as  now,  under  the  control  of  the  respective 
nations,  would  seem  to  involve  a  divided  responsibility 
and  control  that  would  be  likely  to  have  ill  results; 
and  would  enormously  increase  the  patronage  to  be 


COPYRIGHTS— PATENT  RIGHTS       87 

bestowed  by  the  international  government.  On  the 
other  hand,  to  make  the  control  of  the  Congress  over 
these  subjects  complete  in  kind  as  well  as  in  degree, 
confounding  the  domestic  with  the  international  com- 
munications, would  produce  even  a  worse  situation, 
and  is  not  to  be  thought  of. 

But  it  would  be  possible  to  grant  to  the  Congress  the 
power  to  pass  laws  regulating  these  means  of  com- 
munications, so  far  as  they  are  international,  without 
giving  it  the  power  to  establish  or  fill  the  offices,  just 
as  the  power  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  to 
regulate  foreign  and  interstate  commerce  has  never 
been  construed  to  confer  upon  that  body  the  power 
to  establish  business  houses  and  to  fill  them  with  gov- 
ernmental employees. 

A  clause  therefore  has  been  inserted  in  our  pro- 
posed constitution  granting  to  the  Congress  the  power 
to  regulate  by  uniform  laws  these  means  of  interna- 
tional communication.1 

IX 

POWER  TO  PROVIDE  FOR  INTERNATIONAL  COPYRIGHTS 
AND  PATENT  RIGHTS 

This  is  another  of  those  powers,  the  grant  of  which 
to  the  international  congress  is  not  to  be  justified  on 
the  ground  that  it  would  especially  tend  to  prevent  mis- 
understandings or  wars  between  the  component  na- 
tions. If  to  be  justified  at  all,  it  must  be  on  the 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  6. 


88  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

ground  of  international  convenience  as  in  other  in- 
stances we  have  seen. 

It  may  be  worth  while  to  observe  that  the  corre- 
sponding clause  of  the  American  Constitution  has  been 
construed  not  to  include  the  power  to  regulate  trade- 
marks. But  under  the  clause  giving  power  to  regulate 
foreign  and  interstate  commerce,  Congress  may  regu- 
late and  protect  trade-marks  to  the  extent  that  they 
are  used  in  such  commerce,  but  not  with  respect  to 
purely  intra-state  commerce.  Doubtless,  the  same  rule 
would  be  applied  in  the  interpretation  to  be  placed 
upon  the  international  compact.1 


X 

POWER  TO  CONSTITUTE  INFERIOR  INTERNATIONAL 

COURTS 

One  of  the  powers  conferred  upon  the  Congress  of 

o    TTfii4-«»/-l    Qf'oi-^o    ic 


the  United  States  is 


"  to  constitute  tribunals  inferior  to  the  Supreme 
Court." 

And  the  third  Article  of  the  American  Constitution 
provides  that 

"  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  shall  be 
vested  in  one  Supreme  Court  and  in  such  inferior 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  7-  This  power 
is  placed  in  brackets,  to  indicate  the  doubt  of  the  propriety  of  its 
inclusion  among  the  powers  granted. 


INTERNATIONAL  COURTS  89 

courts  as  the  Congress  may  from  time  to  time  or- 
dain and  establish." 


It  will  be  noted  that  these  provisions  do  not  im- 
peratively demand  that  Congress  create  any  inferior 
federal  courts.  It  is  given  a  discretion  in  respect  to 
the  matter,  and  it  is  conceivable  that  Congress  might 
have  omitted  to  create  such  courts,  vesting  the  "  judi- 
cial power  of  the  United  States,"  in  such  cases  as  it 
might  determine,  in  the  courts  of  the  several  States. 
Indeed,  as  to  certain  classes  of  cases,  it  has  actually 
allowed  the  State  courts  to  exercise  concurrent  juris- 
diction with  the  inferior  federal  courts,  while  in  other 
cases  to  which  "  the  judicial  power  of  the  United 
States  "  extends,  the  inferior  federal  courts  are  given 
no  jurisdiction  at  all,  the  State  courts  possessing  exclu- 
sive jurisdiction  with  regard  to  them. 

It  is  seen  therefore  that  there  is  no  inherent  neces- 
sity to  constitute  any  lower  federal  courts.  Were 
there  enough  State  courts,  it  would  be  possible  to  have 
left  to  them  all  the  cases  now  tried  in  the  inferior  fed- 
eral tribunals.  In  such  event,  however,  appeals  to 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  from  the  State 
courts  would  have  been  necessary  in  a  large  number  of 
cases, — especially  in  cases  arising  under  the  Constitu- 
tion, laws,  or  treaties  of  the  United  States,  since  other- 
wise there  would  result  different  holdings  in  the  sev- 
eral States  touching  the  construction  of  those  laws 
which  ought  to  possess  a  uniform  meaning  throughout 
the  country. 


90  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

Whether  the  same  or  a  similar  power  should  be 
granted  to  the  international  congress  would  turn  upon 
the  important  point  whether  there  need  be  any  inter- 
national courts  inferior  to  the  Supreme  Court,  for  if 
they  are  to  be  created,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the 
constitution  of  them  and  their  jurisdictions  must  be 
left  to  the  international  congress.  Arguments  of 
weight  may  be  adduced  on  either  side. 

On  the  one  hand,  it  may  be  urged  that  the  establish- 
ment of  inferior  international  courts  throughout  the 
territories  of  the  component  nations  might  impose  a 
heavy  expense  on  the  federal  government,  as  well  as 
on  litigants  who  might  be  far  distant  from  the  seat  of 
the  court, — a  burden  particularly  heavy  in  criminal 
cases;  that  the  exercise  by  such  courts  of  jurisdiction 
within  the  limits  of  the  several  States  might  be  re- 
garded by  them  with  jealous  disapproval,  not  tending 
to  strengthen  the  international  government  in  their  eyes 
but  rather  to  produce  friction,  and  that,  with  the  judges 
of  each  nation  under  obligation  to  enforce  the  inter- 
national constitution  and  the  laws  and  treaties  made  in 
pursuance  thereof,  an  adequate  number  of  such  judges, 
and  appeals  from  their  decisions  to  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  Nations,  there  would  be  no  sufficient  rea- 
son for  the  establishment  of  any  inferior  international 
courts. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  might  be  argued  that  it  would 
be  impracticable,  without  a  very  considerable  increase 
of  the  number  of  courts  in  each  State,  to  expect  those 
courts  to  deal  with  the  numerous  cases  that  would  be 


INTERNATIONAL  COURTS  91 

likely  to  arise  under  the  judicial  power  of  the  United 
Nations;  that  as  the  expense  of  this  increase  ought  not 
to  be  borne  by  the  component  nations,  severally,  it 
would  be  a  difficult  matter  to  apportion  the  expense 
properly  between  the  international  and  the  national 
governments;  that  if  "  the  judicial  power  of  the  United 
Nations  "  were  left  to  be  enforced  entirely  by  the  courts 
of  the  several  nations,  there  would  often  be  grave 
danger  of  lapses  from  the  impartial  and  unprejudiced 
attitude  that  befits  a  court,  since  many  of  the  cases 
would  arise  between  citizens  of  nationalities  different 
from  that  of  the  judge,  or  in  the  form  of  criminal  pro- 
secutions by  the  United  Nations,  or  in  the  form  of  pass- 
ing upon  the  validity  of  national  acts  alleged  to  violate 
the  constitution,  laws,  or  treaties  of  the  United  Nations. 
Such  questions  would  often  compel  the  national  courts 
to  choose  between  the  national  and  the  international 
law,  between  the  rights  of  a  fellow  citizen  and  those 
of  an  alien  or  those  of  the  international  government. 
There  would  thus  perhaps  be  a  tendency  to  decide  such 
questions  in  the  interest  of  the  State  in  which  the  court 
is  sitting  rather  than  to  give  to  the  national  and  the 
international  law  each  its  true  weight. 

On  the  whole  it  would  appear  wise  to  give  to  the 
Congress  the  power  to  constitute  inferior  international 
courts  within  the  component  States,  leaving  to  that 
body  the  discretion  to  establish  them  or  not  as  it  may 
see  fit,  and  to  apportion  "  the  judicial  power  of  the 
United  Nations  "  between  them  and  the  national  courts 
as  it  may  think  best. 


92  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

But  the  grant  of  the  power  to  constitute  these  inter- 
national courts  is  entirely  distinct  from  the  mode  of 
selecting  the  judges  of  such  courts,  should  they  be 
created.  The  latter  question  properly  belongs  to  the 
organization  of  the  judiciary  department,  and  will  be 
discussed  in  that  connection.1 

XI 

POWER  TO  DEFINE  AND  PUNISH  WRONGS  ON  THE 
HIGH  SEAS,  AND  OFFENSES  AGAINST  THE  LAW  OF 
NATIONS 

At  present  all  independent  nations  exercise  the  right 
to  punish  piracies  committed  on  the  high  seas  and  of- 
fenses against  the  Law  of  Nations.  It  is,  indeed,  a 
high  sovereign  prerogative,  inasmuch  as  both  the  of- 
fenses themselves  and  the  exercise  of  the  jurisdiction 
to  punish  them  may  sometimes  involve  the  nation  in 
misunderstandings  with  other  nations,  or  even  in  war. 

No  principle  of  public  international  law  is  more 
clearly  recognized  than  that  a  nation  must  at  all  haz- 
ards protect  the  persons  of  the  ambassadors  accredited 
to  it  from  violence  or  insult,  and  a  patent  failure  to 
do  so  may  easily  lead  to  war. 

Misunderstandings  have  also  arisen  sometimes  be- 
tween nations  by  reason  of  the  attempt  of  one  to  pun- 
ish the  citizens  of  another  for  alleged  crimes  committed 
on  the  high  seas  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  any  nation. 

1  See  post,  pp.  125  et  seq.;  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill, 
Sec.  2,  cl.  i. 


CONGRESS— WAR  POWERS  93 

In  view  of  the  possibility  that  such  questions  might 
cause  trouble  not  only  as  between  the  component  na- 
tions themselves  but  as  between  them  and  nations  not 
members  of  the  union,  it  would  seem  eminently  appro- 
priate that  the  power  should  be  conferred  upon  the 
international  congress  to  define  and  punish  offenses 
committed  on  the  high  seas  and  against  the  Law  of  Na- 
tions. 

And  since  it  is  possible,  though  perhaps  not  prob- 
able, that  troubles  of  this  sort  may  also  arise  because 
of  civil  or  private  wrongs  committed  on  the  high  seas 
outside  the  actual  jurisdiction  of  any  State,  the  power 
to  define  and  redress  such  wrongs  should  likewise  be 
granted  to  the  Congress. 

Another  reason  for  conferring  this  power  upon  the 
Congress  is  that  it  is  proposed  (as  will  appear  here- 
after) to  extend  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  Na- 
tions to  all  cases  of  crimes  and  private  wrongs  (other 
than  breaches  of  contract)  arising  on  the  high  seas, 
and  the  legislative  power  of  the  United  Nations  ought 
to  be  equally  extensive.1 

XII 

THE  WAR  POWERS 

That  the  war  powers  of  the  component  nations  must 
be  substantially  surrendered  by  them  severally  and 
granted  to  the  nations  in  union  is  the  crux  and  axio- 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  9. 


94  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

matic  foundation  of  the  federation,  the  entire  purpose 
of  which  would  be  defeated  without  such  a  grant. 

It  is  not,  however,  essential  to  the  design,  nor  would 
it  be  wise,  that  the  nations  surrender  absolutely  all 
right  to  possess  and  use  armed  forces  upon  occasion. 
Domestic  insurrections  or  sudden  invasions  of  their 
territory  may  occur,  and  it  is  necessary  to  their  safety 
that  they  reserve  the  right  to  keep  certain  forces  for 
these  uses. 

The  essential  point  is  that  they  surrender  the  right  to 
keep  more  than  a  certain  small  proportion  of  the  troops 
and  ships  of  war  that  are  in  the  service  of  the  interna- 
tional government  (say  ten  per  centum)  so  that  no 
single  nation  or  small  group  even  of  the  more  power- 
ful nations,  may  easily  resist  the  international  force, 
or  be  tempted  by  the  militaristic  spirit  engendered  by 
large  armaments  to  engage  in  war  with  peaceful  neigh- 
bors either  within  or  without  the  union. 

This  surrender  of  great  powers  on  the  part  of  the 
component  nations  must  necessarily  suppose  a  corre- 
sponding guarantee  of  protection  by  the  international 
government  against  invasions  and  aggressions  of  all 
sorts  by  other  nations.  With  such  a  guarantee  no 
component  nation  would  have  need  of  great  arma- 
ments, unless  it  harbor  illegal  designs  against  its  neigh- 
bors. 

It  is  a  wise  provision  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  based  upon  English  precedent,  that  ap- 
propriations for  military  uses  shall  be  effective  only 
for  a  limited  term,  thus  making  it  necessary  at  short 


CONGRESS— SEAT  OF  GOVERNMENT      95^ 

intervals  to  refer  to  both  Houses  of  the  Congress,  rep- 
resenting different  interests,  all  matters  relating  to  the 
size  and  character  of  the  army.  It  is  even  more  de- 
sirable that  such  a  provision  be  included  in  the  in- 
ternational constitution,  since  the  interests  represented 
in  the  two  chambers  of  the  Congress  would  be  more 
divergent  than  in  the  United  States;  the  House  of 
Delegates  representing  peculiarly  the  Great  Powers, 
and  the  Senate  the  equal  rights  of  all  nations/ 

XIII 

THE  SEAT  OF  GOVERNMENT 

It  would  obviously  be  impracticable  that  the  inter- 
national government  should  have  its  capital  and  public 
buildings  in  territory  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  any 
of  the  component  nations.  An  imperium  in  imperio  of 
this  sort  would  present  many  difficult  problems.  It  is 
necessary  that  it  possess  a  situs  of  its  own,  over  which 
it  shall  have  exclusive  jurisdiction  in  every  respect,  in 
order  that  it  may  move  freely  in  its  appointed  sphere. 
It  may  readily  be  assumed  that  any  of  the  component 
nations  would  willingly  cede  to  it  such  territory  as 
might  be  needed  for  this  purpose,  the  maximum  amount 
reasonably  necessary  being  stipulated  in  the  compact 
itself. 

Upon  the  same  principle  our  proposed  government 
should  possess  similiar  jurisdiction  over  all  land  ac- 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  10-15. 


96  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

quired  by  it  in  the  several  States,  with  their  consent, 
for  purposes  of  public  buildings,  such  as  offices,  ar- 
senals, forts,  dock  yards,  etc.  If,  however,  the  prop- 
erty be  acquired  without  the  consent  of  the  States 
wherein  the  same  may  be,  there  can  be  no  ground  upon 
which  it  can  be  assumed  that  jurisdiction  has  been  ceded 
to  the  international  government,  which  must  then  be 
regarded  as  an  ordinary  proprietor  whose  land  is  sub- 
ject to  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the  State  wherein 
it  lies.1 

XIV 

ANCILLARY  POWERS 

It  would  be  an  impossible  task  to  foresee  and  enu- 
merate all  the  specific  powers  the  international  con- 
gress might  find  occasion  to  exercise  as  incidental  to 
the  great  powers  granted  to  the  federal  government. 
The  broad  limits  of  its  proper  jurisdiction  have  been 
outlined  in  the  preceding  discussion,  but  in  order  to 
the  full  and  complete  exercise  of  this  jurisdiction,  it 
will  be  often  necessary  to  exercise  subordinate  and 
ancillary  powers.  The  right  to  do  this  would  doubtless 
be  implied  upon  the  general  principle  of  law  that 
everything  is  included  in  a  grant  which  is  necessary 
to  the  proper  enjoyment  of  the  thing  granted. 

But  it  would  probably  be  safer  to  follow  the  example 
of  the  American  Constitution  in  this  respect,  and  ex- 
pressly provide  for  the  exercise  of  such  ancillary  pow- 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  16. 


CITIZENSHIP— NATURALIZATION      97 

ers  of  legislation  as  may  be  found  to  be  reasonably 
necessary  and  proper  to  execute  the  powers  expressly 
granted  to  the  Congress  or  vested  in  other  departments 
of  the  government.1 

XV 
POWER  OF  NATURALIZATION — CITIZENSHIP 

The  American  Constitution,  in  declaring  who  shall 
be  eligible  to  be  President  of  the  United  States,  or  a 
Representative  or  Senator,  recognizes  the  existence  of 
such  a  legal  status  as  that  of  "  citizen  of  the  United 
States,"  both  native  born  and  naturalized.  Moreover, 
that  Constitution  has  included  among  the  powers 
granted  to  the  Congress  that  of  establishing  "  an  uni- 
form rule  of  naturalization  " ;  and  in  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  has  declared  that 

"  All  persons  born  or  naturalized  in  the  United 
States,  and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof, 
shall  be  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the 
State  wherein  they  reside." 

Indeed,  all  the  existing  federal  unions  recognize  that 
there  may  be  a  citizenship  of  the  union  distinct  from 
citizenship  of  the  component  States;  that  all  citizens 
of  the  States  are  ipso  facto  citizens  of  the  union  and  as 
such  entitled  to  its  protection  against  the  aggressions 
of  foreign  countries  wherein  they  may  happen  to  be. 

This  is  the  logical  consequence  of  the  fact  that  one 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  17. 


98  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

of  the  chief  designs  of  all  existing  federal  constitutions 
is  to  weld  the  component  States  into  a  single  nation 
occupying  the  joint  territories  of  all  the  States,  in 
which  is  vested  the  exclusive  power  to  deal  with  other 
members  of  the  family  of  nations. 

The  framers  of  the  international  constitution  would 
be  confronted  with  the  like  question*  whether  the 
status  of  "  citizenship  of  the  United  Nations  "  shall  be 
recognized  in  law,  and  whether  the  power  of  naturali- 
zation shall  be  conferred  upon  the  Congress  of  the 
United  Nations.  While,  under  this  constitution,  as  will 
presently  appear,  the  component  nations  would  not  be 
expected  to  yield  to  the  federal  government  exclusive 
control  of  all  foreign  relations,  it  is  unquestionably 
true  that  they  must  yield  all  power  to  compel  the  re- 
dress of  international  wrongs  by  armed  force;  and  in 
return  for  this  concession,  the  federal  government  must 
guarantee  protection  to  the  citizens  of  each  component 
nation  while  in  other  countries. 

But  all  this  can  be  accomplished  without  the  assump- 
tion that  the  citizens  of  the  component  nations  are  also 
"  citizens  of  the  United  Nations."  Indeed,  the  very 
nature  of  this  proposed  international  union  is  such  as 
to  forbid  logically  and  theoretically  the  conception  of 
a  "  citizenship  "  thereof.  For  the  union  would  be  a 
mere  political  abstraction, — a  form  of  government  re- 
sulting from  a  compact  between  nations, — possessing 
no  territory  of  its  own  (except  the  seat  of  government 
and  the  land  held  by  it  for  the  purpose  of  public 
buildings).  The  concept  of  citizenship  is  based  upon 


CITIZENSHIP— NATURALIZATION    99 

the  notion  of  country  or  territory  rather  than  upon 
that  of  mere  government  or  political  combination.  It 
would  be  absurd  to  speak  of  one  as  a  citizen  of  an 
alliance  or  compact  or  government;  one  can  only  be  a 
citizen  of  a  country.  A  Frenchman  is  not  a  citizen  of 
the  republican  form  of  government  in  France;  he  is  a 
citizen  of  France. 

The  only  persons  therefore  who  may  logically  be 
termed  "  citizens  of  the  United  Nations  "  would  be 
those  who,  being  citizens  of  no  other  country,  are  born 
and  reside  permanently  in  the  seat  of  the  government 
of  the  United  Nations,  which  would  be  subject  to  their 
exclusive  jurisdiction. 

It  follows  also  that  if  there  are  to  be  no  "  citizens 
of  the  United  Nations  "  (except  in  the  very  limited 
instance  just  mentioned),  neither  should  any  power 
of  naturalization  be  conferred  upon  the  international 
government. 


CHAPTER  VI 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  EXECUTIVE 
DEPARTMENT 


DEPENDENCE  OF  THE  EXECUTIVE  UPON  THE 
LEGISLATIVE  DEPARTMENT 

In  the  examination  of  a  proper  organization  of  the 
executive  department  of  the  international  government, 
a  preliminary  question  presents  itself  whether,  fol- 
lowing our  general  model — the  American  Constitu- 
tion,— the  entire  executive  power  ought  to  be  conferred 
upon  a  single  man,  who  in  his  own  person  shall  con- 
stitute a  separate  and  co-ordinate  department  of  the 
government,  entirely  independent  of,  and  without  re- 
sponsibility to,  the  Congress,  or  whether  the  exigencies 
of  the  case  demand  another  form  of  organization. 

In  the  United  States  the  President,  who  is  vested 
with  practically  all  of  the  federal  executive  power,  is 
chosen  by  an  "  electoral  college,"  the  members  of  which 
are  selected  in  the  several  States  in  such  manner  as 
each  State  shall  provide  by  law.  The  number  of 
"  electors  "  to  which  each  State  is  entitled  equals  the 
combined  number  of  its  representatives  in  both  houses 

100 


EXECUTIVE— ORGANIZATION 

of  the  Congress.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  each  State  has 
now  enacted  that  the  electors  to  which  it  is  entitled  in 
the  electoral  college  shall  be  elected  by  the  people  of 
the  State,  who  know  in  advance  what  candidate  for  the 
presidency  the  electors,  if  chosen,  will  respectively 
vote  for.  The  candidates  themselves  are  nominated 
by  national  conventions  of  the  several  political  parties 
in  the  country. 

Thus  the  President  is  in  effect  elected  by  the  States, 
acting  through  a  vote  of  their  respective  peoples;  and 
he  is  responsible  to  them  alone  for  the  proper  exercise 
of  his  powers  as  chief  executive  during  his  term  of 
office,  which  is  four  years.  With  these  constitutional 
powers  Congress  cannot  interfere,  nor  can  they  during 
his  term  of  office  either  increase  or  diminish  his  salary, 
nor  recall  him  nor  demand  his  resignation.  The  House 
of  Representatives  may  impeach  him  for  "  treason, 
bribery,  or  other  high  crimes  and  misdemeanors,"  but 
the  impeachment  must  be  tried  by  the  Senate,  of  whom 
two-thirds  must  concur  to  secure  a  conviction.  Be- 
yond this,  he  is  entirely  independent  of  the  legislative 
department. 

This  absolute  independence  of  the  executive  carries 
with  it  the  result  that  the  government  of  the  United 
States  is  not  so  quickly  responsive  to  the  wishes  of 
the  people  as  are  some  other  forms  of  government. 
The  Lower  House  of  Congress  is  elected  every  two 
years,  the  President  every  four  years,  and  the  Senate 
every  six  years  (though  one-third  of  the  Senate 
changes  every  two  years) .  Hence  if  complete  political 


:o2  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

control  has  been  given  to  one  party  at  an  election, 
the  earliest  possible  time  wherein  the  opposite  party 
can  gain  complete  control  is  four  years  later, — 
more  probably,  six  years, — even  though  the  political 
complexion  of  the  country  has  changed  some  years 
earlier. 

This  system  has  its  advantages,  but  it  also  has  dis- 
advantages, especially  in  cases  in  which  it  might  be 
desirable  that  the  governmental  agents  do  not  commit 
their  constituents  too  far  before  they  have  had  an 
opportunity  to  be  heard  from  effectually. 

Another  consequence  of  the  system  is  that  it  often 
happens  that  the  executive  and  legislative  departments 
are  antagonistic  rather  than  of  mutual  assistance. 
While  this  possesses  the  advantage  that  harmful  meas- 
ures are  sometimes  prevented,  it  frequently  prevents 
also  action  that  would  be  beneficial,  and  diminishes 
the  power  of  the  constituents  to  fix  the  political  re- 
sponsibility where  it  properly  belongs. 

Comparing  this  with  the  English  and  other  parlia- 
mentary governments  of  European  countries,  it  is  seen 
that  they  possess  a  certain  mobility  and  capacity  for 
quick  response  to  public  opinion  that  can  scarcely  be 
said  to  exist  in  the  United  States.  This  is  chiefly  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  executive  power  in  these  European 
systems  is  responsible  direetly  to  the  legislative  de- 
partment, and  is  subject  at  any  time  to  recall  by  that 
department  through  a  vote  of  want  of  confidence  or 
otherwise.  The  executive  of  the  moment  remains  in 
power  only  so  long  as  he  retains  control  in  the  legisla- 


EXECUTIVE— ORGANIZATION        103 

tive  halls.  He  must  resign,  failing  such  control,  and 
give  way  to  others  who  may  command  the  confidence 
of  the  legislative  majority. 

Applying  these  well-known  principles  to  the  problem 
confronting  us  in  the  organization  of  an  international 
executive,  it  may  be  observed  that  the  mutual  jealousies 
and  suspicions  of  the  nations,  especially  the  Great 
Powers,  would  probably  veto  at  once  a  plan  similar  to 
that  adopted  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
whereby  the  complete  control  of  all  international  execu- 
tive functions  would  be  vested  in  one  man  for  a  fixed 
term,  without  imposing  on  him  any  responsibility  to 
the  Congress  or  to  the  component  nations. 

Particularly  would  this  result  be  likely  to  follow, 
should  it  be  made  possible  for  the  chief  executive  to 
be  a  citizen  of,  or  dominated  by,  one  of  the  Great 
Powers.  It  would  seem  probable  that  the  only  con- 
dition upon  which  the  nations  might  be  induced  to  agree 
to  such  an  organization  of  the  executive  would  be  the 
requirement  that  "  the  President "  be  always  a  citi- 
zen of  one  of  the  weaker  Powers. 

But,  as  applied  to  an  international  government,  the 
disadvantages  of  the  American  system  would  outweigh 
its  benefits.  Most  of  the  nations  would  be  accustomed 
to  a  different  and  in  many  respects  a  more  convenient 
system  in  their  own  governments,  it  would  be  difficult 
to  avoid  international  suspicions  and  jealousies,  and  it 
would  seem  peculiarly  essential  in  an  international 
government,  frequently  called  upon  to  deal  with  mat- 
ters of  great  complexity  and  importance,  that  its  or- 


104  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

ganization  be  such  as  to  respond  quickly  to  the  views 
and  sentiments  of  the  component  nations. 

Let  us  turn  then  to  the  consideration  of  the  general 
principles  underlying  the  parliamentary  systems  in 
England  and  other  European  States. 

In  broad  outline  they  call  for  a  legislative  body  of 
two  chambers,  the  more  numerous  representing,  and 
elected  by,  the  people;  the  less  numerous  usually  rep- 
resenting some  other  interest,  or  selected  otherwise 
than  by  direct  popular  vote.  The  king,  president,  or 
other  titular  chief  executive  selects  a  prime  minister 
from  the  members  of  either  legislative  chamber,  call- 
ing upon  him  to  choose  a  cabinet  of  ministers  likewise 
members  usually  of  one  or  the  other  chamber,  all  of 
whom  are  directly  responsible  to  the  legislative  cham- 
bers, and  subject  to  recall  by  them  or  one  of  them  at 
any  time.  If  the  ministers  fail  to  retain  the  support 
of  these  bodies,  especially  that  of  the  chamber  repre- 
senting the  people,  they  resign  or  are  recalled,  and 
a  new  ministry  is  created  in  the  same  manner  as 
before. 

This  bare  outline  of  the  general  European  plan  of 
organization  of  the  executive  department  of  govern- 
ment is  necessary  in  order  that  we  may  see  clearly  what 
is  needed  for  the  adoption  of  a  similar  plan  in  the  pro- 
posed international  constitution. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  our  first  Article  provides 
for  a  legislative  department,  composed  of  two  cham- 
bers. It  might  be  arranged  that  the  international  ex- 
ecutive power  shall  be  exercised  by  a  ministry  respon- 


EXECUTIVE— PRIME  MINISTER      105 

sible  to,  and  removable  by,  either  or  both  of  these 
chambers. 

We  shall  assume  therefore  for  the  purposes  of  our 
proposed  constitution  that  some  such  form  of  execu- 
tive organization  ought  to  be  adopted,  if  possible,  since 
the  existing  international  bureaus  would  be  entirely 
inadequate  both  in  existing  powers  and  in  modes  of 
organization. 

II 

SELECTION  OF  A  PRIME  MINISTER 

In  European  countries,  as  has  been  said,  the  prime 
minister  is  chosen  by  the  sovereign,  president,  or  other 
irresponsible  head  of  the  State.  But  in  our  federal 
league  there  would  be  no  such  authority,  and  it  would 
appear  unwise  to  attempt  to  create  one,  though  he 
were  clothed  with  no  other  important  power  than  to 
select  a  premier  upon  occasion.  Resort  ought  not  to 
be  had  to  such  an  expedient  if  there  be  a  feasible  way 
to  utilize  for  the  purpose  the  instrumentalities  al- 
ready created. 

It  would  appear  practicable  to  leave  this  function  of 
the  selection  of  a  prime  minister  to  the  two  chambers 
of  the  international  congress  upon  nomination  by  a 
committee  composed  of  members  of  both  chambers; 
the  prime  minister  to  select  his  subordinate  ministers, 
and  to  remove  them  at  his  pleasure;  the  prime  minister 
to  be  subject  to  recall  at  any  time  upon  resolution  to 
that  effect  passed  by  either  chamber;  and  in  case  of 


106  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

failure  to  choose  one  of  the  nominees  of  the  committee, 
or  his  resignation,  or  recall,  another  nominating  com- 
mittee to  be  selected  who  may  nominate  other  persons 
from  whom  the  Congress  may  choose  a  new  premier. 
The  plan  thus  outlined  demands  further  examination 
as  to  details. 

Ill 

THE  NOMINATING  COMMITTEE,  ITS  ORGANIZATION 
AND  FUNCTIONS 

Since,  under  the  plan  suggested,  this  committee 
would  exercise  the  function  of  the  sovereign  in  some 
European  countries,  in  nominating  the  prime  minister 
and  chief  executive  official  of  the  international  gov- 
ernment for  the  time  being,  it  is  proper  and  necessary 
that  its  organization,  powers,  and  duties  be  carefully 
worked  out. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  populous  and 
wealthy  nations  would  have  a  preponderating  influ- 
ence in  the  lower  house  of  the  Congress,  while  the  sov- 
ereignty of  each  nation  would  be  equally  represented 
in  the  Senate,  so  that  in  that  house  a  combination  of 
smaller  nations  might  predominate  over  a  less  nu- 
merous combination  of  powerful  ones. 

Hence  to  permit  a  majority  of  this  nominating  com- 
mittee to  be  chosen  by  either  house  would  tend  to  place 
the  control  of  the  executive  power  in  the  hands  of  the 
element  predominating  in  that  house.  To  avoid  this, 
the  nominating  committee  ought  to  be  composed,  in 


EXECUTIVE— PRIME  MINISTER      107 

equal  numbers,  of  the  members  of  each  house,  chosen 
respectively  by  the  houses  to  which  they  belong. 

The  result  would  be,  or  tend  to  be,  that  no  person 
would  be  nominated  for  the  office  of  prime  minister 
who  would  not  be  fairly  acceptable  at  least  to  both 
the  majority  of  the  component  nations  and  to  the  ma- 
jority of  the  Great  Powers.  But  to  make  this  result 
even  more  certain  it  ought  to  be  further  provided  that 
no  one  thus  nominated  shall  become  the  prime  minister 
unless  he  be  elected  in  each  house  by  the  majority  of 
the  votes  therein. 

In  a  matter  of  such  importance  as  the  mode  of  nomi- 
nating a  premier  and  temporary  executive  head  of  the 
international  government,  it  would  be  prudent  to  ar- 
range even  the  details  in  the  constitution,  which  should 
declare  the  number  to  constitute  the  committee,  the 
manner  of  selecting  its  members,  the  number  of  names 
to  be  presented  by  it  to  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
gress, and  the  course  to  be  pursued  in  case  no  one  of  its 
nominees  is  chosen  by  the  Congress. 

With  respect  to  the  number  to  constitute  the  com- 
mittee, the  possibility  of  the  selection  of  several  dele- 
gates from  the  same  State  suggests  the  necessity,  as  a 
safeguard  against  the  possible  evil  effects  of  this,  that 
the  committee  be  composed  of  sufficient  numbers  to 
minimize  the  importance  of  an  accident  of  this  kind. 

As  to  the  mode  in  which  each  house  shall  select 
its  members  of  the  committee,  it  is  an  interesting 
question  whether  they  ought  to  be  elected  by  ballot  in 
each  house,  appointed  by  the  presiding  officer  of  each 


io8  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

house,  or  selected  in  such  manner  in  either  house  as  its 
rules  may  provide.  Experience  in  legislative  bodies 
generally  as  to  the  conduct  of  such  matters  would 
seem  to  point  to  the  first  method  as  preferable;  but 
if  a  discretion  be  given  to  each  house  in  respect  to  the 
matter,  its  own  experience  will  in  the  end  doubtless 
teach  it  the  best  method.  The  prudent  course  would 
seem  to  be  to  permit  each  house  to  choose  its  portion 
of  this  committee  in  such  manner  as  may  be  prescribed 
by  its  rules. 

With  regard  to  the  number  of  names  to  be  presented 
by  the  committee  from  which  to  select  the  prime  min- 
ister, it  may  be  observed  that  time, — an  important  ele- 
ment in  this  matter, — would  often  be  saved,  were  the 
committee  required  to  present  more  than  one  name. 
The  number  has  been  placed  tentatively  at  three  in 
our  proposed  constitution. 

Provision  should  also  be  made  for  the  case  where 
none  of  the  three  named  by  the  committee  receives  a 
majority  of  the  votes  of  both  houses  of  the  Congress. 
A  question  is  here  presented,  whether  the  same  com- 
mittee should  then  name  a  second  list  of  three  or 
whether  that  committee  ought  to  be  discharged,  and  a 
new  one  selected  representing  a  new  group  of  States 
or  at  least  of  representatives.  The  latter  would  appear 
to  be  the  better  plan,  since  the  objections  to  the  first 
nominees  might  sometimes  be  not  so  much  personal 
to  themselves  as  due  to  the  combination  of  interests 
that  nominated  them.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  i,  cl.  3. 


EXECUTIVE— MINISTRY  109 

IV 

WHO  ELIGIBLE  TO  BE  A  MINISTER 

Following  to  its  legitimate  conclusion  the  principle 
adopted  in  the  organization  of  the  international  execu- 
tive department, — that  it  co-operate  with,  and  be  de- 
pendent upon,  the  legislature, — it  would  seem  clear 
that  the  prime  minister,  as  well  as  the  subordinate 
members  of  the  ministry,  ought  themselves  to  be  mem- 
bers of  one  or  the  other  legislative  chamber. 

To  accept  any  other  rule  would  be  to  adopt,  in  some 
measure  at  least,  the  weaknesses  of  the  American  sys- 
tem without  its  compensating  advantages.  The  execu- 
tive officials  should  occupy  seats  in  the  Congress,  sub- 
ject at  any  time  to  interrogation  by  other  members 
of  that  body  upon  the  state  of  international  affairs.1 

V 

SELECTION  OF  THE  SUBORDINATE  MINISTERS 

According  to  the  theory  already  outlined,  the  prime 
minister  would  be  the  responsible  agent  of  the  Congress 
for  the  administration  of  the  executive  affairs  of  the 
international  government,  his  responsibility  to  either 
house  being  fixed  by  the  power  to  recall  him  by  reso- 
lution. 

The  question  is  next  presented,   should  the  other 

1  See  Appendix,  Corvst'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  i,  cl.  i. 


no  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

ministers  also  be  appointed  and  removable  by  the  legis- 
lative chambers,  or  by  the  prime  minister  alone  ? 

Were  the  first  alternative  adopted,  we  would  have 
authority  and  responsibility  divided  between  the  prime 
minister  and  other  members  of  the  cabinet.  If  the 
premier  is  to  be  held  solely  responsible  for  the  entire 
conduct  of  executive  affairs,  his  should  also  be  the 
sole  authority.  Sound  principles  of  government  dic- 
tate that  the  Congress  select  the  premier  aloner  hold- 
ing him  to  a  strict  accountability  for  the  selection  of 
proper  subordinate  ministers  and  for  their  proper  per- 
formance of  the  duties  allotted  to  them.1 

VI 

THE  NUMBER  OF  MINISTERS 

In  determining  the  number  of  ministers  to  be  in  the 
cabinet,  it  would  be  desirable,  if  it  were  practicable, 
that  each  component  nation  be  represented  therein, 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  no  nation  should  be  per- 
mitted to  have  an  excess  of  representatives  in  the  min- 
istry at  one  time.  Making  due  allowance  for  the  ac- 
cident that  the  delegation  from  a  particular  State  may 
possess  more,  than  its  fair  proportion  of  able  men 
peculiarly  fitted  for  the  administration  of  international 
affairs,  a  provision  might  be  inserted  that  no  compon- 
ent nation  may  have  more  than  two  representatives 
in  the  ministry  at  one  time. 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  i,  cl.  i. 


EXECUTIVE— MINISTRY  1 1 1 

But  in  examining  the  suggestion  that  each  nation  be 
represented  in  the  administration  by  at  least  one  min- 
ister, several  practical  objections  would  at  once  present 
themselves. 

If  the  number  of  component  nations  were  large,  such 
a  provision  might  entail  the  creation  of  a  ministry 
too  unwieldy  for  the  prompt  action  that  would  fre- 
quently be  necessary.  And  it  would  often  be  difficult 
for  a  prime  minister  to  find  among  delegations  from 
particular  States,  especially  minority  States,  men  who 
would  be  in  sympathy  with  his  views  and  policies. 

In  this  matter  therefore  it  would  seem  necessary 
to  rely  upon  the  discretion  of  the  Congress,  and  to  pro- 
vide in  the  constitution  that  the  number,  as  well  as  the 
duties,  of  the  ministers  be  regulated  by  law.1 

VII 

TERMS  OF  OFFICE  OF  MINISTERS 

In  order  to  insure  the  absolute  and  prompt  respon- 
sibility of  the  prime  minister  to  the  legislature,  it  is 
essential  that  the  Congress  possess  the  power  to  recall 
or  remove  him  at  any  time.  And  when  we  remember 
the  two  elements  represented  in  the  two  chambers, 
respectively, — the  predominance  of  the  populous  States 
in  the  House  of  Delegates  and  that  of  the  greater  num- 
ber of  States  in  the  Senate, — it  would  seem  necessary 
to  go  further  and  provide  that  he  be  subject  to  recall 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  i,  cl.  x. 


ii2  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

or  removal  at  any  time  by  resolution  of  either  chamber. 

In  like  manner,  if  the  prime  minister  is  to  be  held 
responsible,  perhaps  removed,  because  of  the  acts  or 
omissions  of  the  subordinate  ministers,  he  must  be 
given  the  same  right  to  remove  them,  or  any  of  them, 
that  is  given  to  either  house  of  the  Congress  respect- 
ing himself. 

Furthermore,  since  the  whole  ministry,  the  premier 
included,  are  members  of  the  Congress  they  would  be 
one  and  all  subject  to  recall  from  the  Congress  at  any 
time  by  their  respective  home  governments,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  laws  of  the  several  nations.  Such  a  re- 
call would  of  course  terminate  their  offices  as  minis- 
ters, as  they  would  at  once  cease  to  be  members  of  the 
Congress. 

Usually  also  a  minister  might  be  counted  upon  to 
save  himself  from  actual  removal  by  a  timely  resigna- 
tion of  his  office;  and  the  resignation  of  the  prime 
minister  would  be  likely  to  carry  with  it,  ultimately  at 
least,  that  of  his  entire  ministry.1 

VIII 

COMPENSATION  OF  MINISTERS 

The  prime  minister,  as  well  as  the  other  ministers, 
ought  to  receive  not  only  the  compensation  paid  to 
other  members  of  the  Congress,  but  a  further  stipend 
in  recognition  of  the  additional  important  and  re- 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  i,  cl.  i,  2. 


EXECUTIVE— MINISTRY  1 13 

sponsible  work  they  are  called  upon  to  perform  as 
ministers. 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  prescribes 
that  the  compensation  of  the  President  shall  neither 
be  increased  nor  diminished  during  the  period  for 
which  he  shall  have  been  elected, — a  provision  neces- 
sary to  secure  the  desired  independence  of  the  execu- 
tive department  and  its  freedom  from  all  responsibility 
to  the  legislature. 

But  in  our  international  constitution  the  design  is 
just  the  reverse  of  this, — to  secure  a  full  and  complete 
responsibility  of  the  executive  to  the  legislative  depart- 
ment. Hence  it  would  be  neither  necessary  nor  in  har- 
mony with  the  general  plan  to  lay  restrictions  upon  the 
Congress  with  regard  to  the  compensation  to  be  paid 
the  ministers.1 

IX 

DISTRIBUTION  OF  EXECUTIVE  POWERS  AMONG  THE 
MINISTERS 

The  plan  already  indicated  calls  for  the  number  of 
ministers  to  be  determined  by  the  Congress.  But  it  also 
calls  for  a  sole  executive  authority  and  responsibility 
in  a  prime  minister.  Between  these  two  principles  an 
important  question  is  presented,  whether  the  Congress 
or  the  prime  minister  ought  to  be  given  the  power  to 
apportion  the  executive  functions  among  the  minis- 
ters. 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  2. 


ii4  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

The  principle  of  a  sole  responsibility  and  authority 
on  the  part  of  the  premier  in  international  administra- 
tion would  not  be  impaired  by  leaving  to  the  Congress 
the  apportionment  of  the  executive  duties  amongst  the 
ministers,  since  his  authority  over  them  is  secured 
by  his  power  to  appoint  them  and  to  remove  them  at 
pleasure. 

And  since  it  is  often  essential  to  the  success  of  legis- 
lation that  it  also  include  measures  and  instrumentali- 
ties for  its  proper  administration,  it  is  appropriate 
that  the  Congress  be  given  the  power  not  only  to  fix  the 
number  of  ministers,  but  to  assign  to  particular  minis- 
ters the  executive  functions  it  is  desirable  for  them 
severally  to  perform. 

Thus  in  legislation  touching  war  or  commerce,  the 
Congress  would  probably  desire  also  to  create  port- 
folios in  the  cabinet  for  the  proper  administration  of 
these  great  departments.  Surely  it  ought  not  to  be 
left  to  the  discretion  of  the  prime  minister  whether  or 
not  there  shall  be  such  ministers.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  i,  cl.  I. 


CHAPTER  VII 

POWERS  TO  BE  CONFERRED  ON  THE 
EXECUTIVE  DEPARTMENT 


THE  PARDONING  POWER 

This  power  is  generally  recognized  as  a  preroga- 
tive of  sovereignty  to  be  exercised  by  the  executive  de- 
partment. There  can  be  no  question  that,  so  far  as 
offenses  against  the  United  Nations  are  concerned,  the 
power  to  pardon  them,  or  remit  the  punishment  for 
them,  together  with  the  power  to  reprieve  and  com- 
mute sentence,  should  be  vested  in  the  ministry.1 


II 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

In  all  governments  the  treaty-making  power  is  justly 
regarded  as  one  of  the  highest  prerogatives  of  sov- 
ereignty, to  be  exercised  by  the  sovereign  himself, 
or  by  those  officials  constitutionally  authorized  to  ex- 
ercise it  in  his  stead. 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  3,  cl.  i. 
1  "5 


n6  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

But  in  many  even  of  the  more  advanced  nations  it  is 
admitted  to  be  more  or  less  an  irresponsible  power, — 
one  that  may  be  exercised  secretly  and  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  legislative  branches  of  the  govern- 
ment. Indeed,  the  facility  with  which  many  national 
governments  may  enter  into  these  secret  agreements 
and  understandings  with  each  other  has  been  one 
prominent  cause  of  the  mutual  suspicion  and  distrust  so 
prevalent  among  the  nations  of  the  world.  It  is 
scarcely  too  much  to  say  that  it  is  one  of  the  indirect 
causes  of  the  great  European  War. 

The  American  Constitution  has  to  a  very  consider- 
able extent  guarded  against  this  evil  by  requiring  that 
all  treaties  of  the  United  States  which  may  be  made  by 
the  President  must  be  ratified  by  two-thirds  of  the 
Senate;  and  while  the  Senate  usually  goes  into  execu- 
tive or  secret  session  for  the  discussion  of  treaties, 
this  is  merely  for  the  purpose  of  insuring  freedom  of 
debate.  The  fact  that  a  treaty  is  being  considered, 
and  the  terms  of  it,  are  not  kept  secret. 

Another  valuable  lesson  is  to  be  drawn  from  the 
requirement  of  the  American  Constitution  that  treaties 
shall  only  take  effect  when  ratified  by  two-thirds  of 
the  Senate.  When  it  is  remembered  that  this  body 
represents  the  equal  sovereignty  of  the  States,  it  will 
be  seen  that  this  constitutional  provision  to  a  consider- 
able extent  places  in  the  hands  of  the  States  them- 
selves the  treaty-making  power  of  the  Union,  the  re- 
quired two-thirds  majority  of  the  Senate  being  at  least 
sufficient  to  present  an  effective  check  on  any  attempt 


EXECUTIVE  POWERS— TREATIES     117 

to  undermine  the  reserved  rights  of  the  States  through 
the  agency  of  treaties. 

It  would  be  desirable  to  incorporate  into  our  in- 
ternational compact  a  similar  check  upon  both  of  these 
possible  evils, — secret  diplomacy  and  treaties  which 
might  affect  the  reserved  rights  of  the  nations.  Per- 
haps all  that  would  be  needful  for  this  purpose  would 
be  to  require  that  all  treaties  made  by  the  ministry 
should  receive  the  assent  of  two-thirds  of  the  votes  in 
the  international  Senate.  But  to  guard  against  the 
possibility  of  a  treaty  which  might  secure  the  assent 
of  two-thirds  of  the  Senate  and  yet  meet  with  the  dis- 
approval of  most  of  the  Great  Powers,  it  would  per- 
haps be  safer  to  add  the  requirement  that  treaties,  to 
be  valid,  shall  receive  the  assent  of  two-thirds  of  the 
votes  in  the  House  of  Delegates  also. 

There  is  still  another  limitation  that  ought  to  be 
placed  upon  the  treaty-making  power, — a  limitation 
that  does  not  clearly  appear  in  the  American  Consti- 
tution, a  doubt  as  to  the  existence  of  which  has  already 
caused  some  trouble  in  the  United  States, — that  is,  a 
provision  limiting  the  treaty-making  power  to  those 
matters,  control  of  which  has  been  surrendered  to  the 
federal  government. 

For  example,  after  limiting  the  powers  of  the  in- 
ternational congress  to  the  regulation  of  international 
commerce  only,  and  excluding  it  from  the  domain  of 
intra-national  or  domestic  commerce,  and  from  the 
right  to  regulate  immigration,  it  would  be  highly  un- 
desirable to  permit  the  ministry  and  the  Congress  by 


ii8  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

treaty  to  regulate  these  matters  that  have  been  so 
carefully  excluded  from  the  control  of  the  Congress  as 
a  legislative  body. 

The  treaty-making  power  of  the  United  Nations 
therefore  ought  to  be  confined  to  those  subjects,  the 
control  of  which  has  been  conferred  on  the  Congress 
or  other  departments  of  the  international  government, 
excluding  from  its  operation  those  subjects  reserved  to 
the  exclusive  control  of  the  several  component  nations. 

This  necessarily  supposes  that  as  to  the  latter  sub- 
jects, the  power  to  make  treaties  is  reserved  to  the 
component  nations,  respectively,  in  all  cases  wherein 
for  the  proper  regulation  of  the  matter  treaties  are 
necessary  either  between  the  component  nations  them- 
selves or  between  them  and  nations  not  members  of 
the  union.1 

Ill 

APPOINTMENT  AND  REMOVAL  OF  OFFICERS 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  provides  that 
the  President  himself  shall  be  the  commander-in-chief 
of  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the 
militia  of  the  States  when  in  the  actual  service  of  the 
United  States;  and  that  he  shall  appoint  governmental 
officials  whose  appointments  are  not  otherwise  pro- 
vided for,  subject  to  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate. 

In  our  plan  of  international  government,  all  such 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  3,  cl.  2. 


APPOINTMENTS— REMOVALS         1 19 

offices,  military,  and  civil,  would  be  filled  through  ap- 
pointments by  the  ministry.  But  it  would  seem  un- 
necessary to  insert  the  check  upon  such  appointments 
that  they  be  ratified  by  the  Senate  or  the  Congress, 
since  the  ministers  would  not,  like  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  be  independent  of  the  Congress,  but  on 
the  contrary  directly  responsible  to  it,  through  the 
power  of  recall  which  either  house  may  at  any  time 
exercise. 

But  while  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  has 
thus  given  the  President  the  power  of  appointment, 
by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  it 
has  failed  to  provide  expressly  for  the  power  of  re- 
moval from  office,  otherwise  than  by  impeachment. 

For  many  years  the  question  was  debated,  whether 
this  power  of  removal  was  vested  in  the  President 
alone  or  whether,  like  the  power  of  appointment,  it 
could  be  exercised  by  the  President  only  by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate.  This  contro- 
versy has  now  been  settled, — temporarily  at  least, — 
by  the  Act  of  Congress  of  1887,  repealing  the  act 
known  as  the  "  Tenure  of  Office  Act "  of  1867,  which 
had  in  effect  denied  to  the  President  the  power  to  re- 
move public  officers  without  the  Senate's  consent.  The 
repealing  act  of  1887  seems  practically  to  concede  that 
the  power  of  removal  in  such  cases  rests  in  the  Presi- 
dent alone. 

In  the  case  of  our  international  constitution  the 
embarrassment  is  to  a  large  extent  removed  by  the  fact 
that  it  is  not  proposed  to  submit  executive  appointments 


120  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

to  the  international  Senate  for  ratification,  and  hence 
there  would  be  no  reason  to  suppose  that  removals 
must  be  submitted  to  their  approval.  But  it  would  be 
more  prudent  to  include  specifically  the  power  of  re- 
moval with  that  of  appointment  as  vested  in  the  min- 
istry alone. 

Appointees  may  be  sufficiently  protected  against 
wholesale  and  arbitrary  removals,  as  upon  a  change  of 
ministry,  by  laws  of  the  Congress  regulating  the  civil 
service. 

There  ought,  however,  to  be  an  exception  to  this 
ministerial  power  of  appointment  in  the  case  of  clerks 
of  court  and  other  inferior  court  officers  who  may  more 
fitly  be  appointed  by  the  courts  themselves.1 

IV 

RECOGNITION  OF  AMBASSADORS  AND  PUBLIC 
MINISTERS 

The  power  to  receive  ambassadors  or  other  public 
ministers  from  foreign  States  is  one  of  the  ordinary 
executive  functions.  It  embraces  also  the  right  to 
refuse  to  receive  such  ambassadors  or  ministers,  either 
because  they  are  personae  non  gratae,  because  they  rep- 
resent a  government  not  recognized  by  the  executive 
as  a  de  facto  government,  or  for  other  reasons  that 
may  be  deemed  sufficient.  It  also  embraces  the  right 
to  dismiss  a  minister  or  demand  his  recall  for  satis- 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  3,  cl.  3. 


ENFORCEMENT  OF  LAWS  121 

factory  reasons.  All  these  are  important  functions, 
relating  as  they  do  to  the  governmental  intercourse 
with  foreign  nations. 

In  the  United  States  all  that  has  been  found  neces- 
sary in  order  to  clothe  the  President  with  these  powers 
is  the  simple  constitutional  provision  that  "  he  shall 
receive  ambassadors  and  other  public  ministers.'* 

In  our  international  constitution  a  similar  provision 
would  doubtless  suffice.1 

V 
THE  EXECUTION  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  THE  UNION 

This  is  so  obviously  the  chief  function  of  the  execu- 
tive department  of  every  government  that  it  is  scarcely 
necessary  to  do  more  than  mention  it  in  the  enumera- 
tion of  the  executive  powers  to  be  conferred  on  the 
international  government. 

Every  declaration  of  war  by  the  Congress,  every  law 
regulating  international  commerce,,  every  treaty  of  the 
United  Nations,  and  every  decision  of  an  international 
court  not  susceptible  of  enforcement  by  the  court's 
own  officials  must  be  executed  and  enforced  by  the  ex- 
ecutive arm  of  the  government;  and  every  criminal 
prosecution  must  be  conducted  by  it.2 

1  Sec  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  3,  cl.  4. 
*See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  3,  cl.  5. 


122  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

VI 
OFFICIAL  COMMISSIONS 

The  commissioning  of  officers  duly  appointed  is  an 
executive  function  which  should  of  course  pertain  to 
the  international  ministry  so  far  as  relates  to  officials 
appointed  by  them.  And  since  all  executive  officers 
are  to  be  thus  appointed,  the  power  ought  to  be  vested 
in  them  to  commission  such  officials. 

But  it  is  otherwise,  under  the  proposed  plan,  with 
respect  to  the  legislative  and  the  judicial  officers  of 
the  United  Nations,  who  are  to  be  appointed  by  the 
component  nations  themselves,  and  who  therefore 
ought  to  be  commissioned  as  the  laws  of  the  several 
nations  shall  provide.1 

VII 

INTERPELLATIONS  AND  INTERROGATIONS 

The  government  of  the  United  States,  by  reason  of 
its  constitutional  structure  and  the  total  separation  of 
the  legislative  and  executive  departments,  knows  noth- 
ing of  the  parliamentary  interpellations  and  interroga- 
tories so  often  addressed  to  the  ministerial  benches  in 
European  parliaments.  Indeed,  the  members  of  the 
American  cabinet,  that  is,  the  heads  of  departments 
appointed  by  the  President  and,  under  his  control,  in 
charge  of  the  various  executive  portfolios,  are  not  even 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art  II,  Sec.  3,  cl.  6. 


PARLIAMENTARY  INTERPELLATIONS    123 

given  seats  in  the  Congress ;  so  that  communication  be- 
tween these  high  executive  officials  and  the  lawmakers 
is  confined  to  formal  reports  or  to  official  testimony 
before  Congressional  committees. 

The  Constitution,  it  is  true,  seeks  to  supply  the  place 
of  these  interrogatories  by  providing  that  the  Presi- 
dent 

"  Shall  from  time  to  time  give  to  the  Congress 
information  of  the  state  of  the  Union,  and  recom- 
mend to  their  consideration  such  measures  as  he 
shall  judge  necessary  and  expedient." 

Accordingly,  the  President  sends  messages  from 
time  to  time  to  the  Congress,  or  appears  before  them 
in  person  and  addresses  them,  upon  these  subjects. 
But  this  is  a  formal  function,  closely  analogous  to  "  the 
address  from  the  throne  "  upon  the  opening  of  the 
British  parliament,  and  is  far  removed,  in  nature  and 
effect,  from  the  rough  and  ready  interrogatories  ad- 
dressed to  ministers  in  European  parliaments. 

Under  our  proposed  plan  of  international  govern- 
ment, the  analogy  would  be  much  closer  to  the  Eu- 
ropean than  to  the  American  system.  The  ministers 
would  themselves  be  members  of  the  Congress,  re- 
sponsible to,  and  subject  to  recall  by,  either  chamber, 
so  that  there  is  no  need  of  any  express  constitutional 
provision  for  such  interpellations,  which  would  follow 
automatically  from  the  structure  of  the  ministry. 


i24  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

VIII 
THE  SUMMONING  AND  PROROGUING  OF  THE  CONGRESS 

In  the  United  States,  the  Constitution  requires  that 
the  Congress  shall  assemble  at  least  once  a  year,  though 
its  session  does  not  usually  last  throughout  the  year. 
The  President  is  given  the  power 

"  on  extraordinary  occasions  to  convene  both 
houses,  or  either  of  them,  and  in  case  of  disagree- 
ment between  them  with  respect  to  the  time  of 
adjournment,  he  may  adjourn  them  to  such  time  as 
he  shall  think  proper." 

It  has  been  assumed  that  the  international  congress 
would  be  in  perpetual  session,  with  such  reasonable  re- 
cesses as  the  two  houses  might  agree  upon.1  This 
clause  dispenses  with  the  need  of  any  special  provision 
either  for  summoning  or  proroguing  the  Congress. 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  4,  cl.  2. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  JUDICIARY 
DEPARTMENT 

I 

APPOINTMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  JUDICIARY 

Assuming  the  necessity  for  the  creation  of  an  inter- 
national judiciary  department,  the  first  point  to  engage 
our  attention  would  be  the  proper  method  of  appoint- 
ing the  judges. 

The  American  Constitution  provides  that  the  federal 
judges  of  the  United  States  shall  be  appointed  by  the 
President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate.  This  involves  the  consequence  that  the  fed- 
eral judges  are  in  all  respects  officers  of  the  United 
States,  not  of  the  States,  severally,  wherein  they  per- 
form their  functions;  and  gives  rise  to  that  esprit  de 
corps  amongst  them  which  is  likely  to  develop  where 
men  are  conscious  that  they  are  parts  of  one  great 
organization. 

The  result  has  been  that  the  federal  courts  from  the 
beginning  have  shown  perhaps  too  great  a  tendency 
to  emphasize  and  enhance  the  powers  granted  to  the 
United  States  at  the  expense  of  the  reserved  powers  of 

125 


126  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

the  States.  Nor  are  the  judges  to  be  blamed  for  this 
tendency.  It  arises  from  a  trait  honorable  to  human 
nature,  demanding  loyal  and  faithful  guardianship  of 
the  interests  committed  to  his  keeping  by  the  agent's 
employer  or  by  the  organization  of  which  he  forms 
a  part.  It  is  then  not  to  be  wondered  at  that,  in  cases 
of  honest  doubt  whether  a  certain  power  has  been 
granted  to  the  United  States  or  has  been  reserved  to 
the  States,  the  tendency  has  been  on  the  whole  to  re- 
solve the  doubt  in  favor  of  the  powers  of  the  United 
States.  Thus,  step  by  step,  the  authority  of  the  fed- 
eral government  has  been  gradually  extended,  while 
rights  once  supposed  by  all  to  have  been  reserved  to 
the  States  have  been  correspondingly  reduced. 

From  this  experience  in  the  United  States  it  seems 
possible  to  affirm  the  general  proposition  that  a  ju- 
diciary appointed  by  federal  authority  will  demon- 
strate a  tendency  to  enlarge  the  federal  powers  by 
judicial  construction  at  the  expense  of  rights  reserved 
by  the  component  States. 

In  the  organization  of  our  proposed  union  of  nations 
the  chances  of  such  a  tendency  ought  to  be  minimized 
as  much  as  possible,  for  the  grave  danger  of  such  a 
result  would  be  a  serious  obstacle  to  its  formation. 
The  cause  producing  this  tendency,  namely,  the  ap- 
pointment of  the  judges  by  federal  authority,  would,  if 
reversed  and  the  appointments  were  made  by  the  com- 
ponent nations,  produce  more  or  less  of  an  opposite 
tendency,  constituting  an  additional  safeguard  against 
federal  usurpation  of  power. 


JUDICIARY—ORGANIZATION          127 

It  is  believed  therefore  that  prudence  would  dictate 
that  the  international  judges  of  every  degree  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  several  component  nations,  acting 
through  their  executives,  in  accordance  with  a  general 
plan  that  will  develop  as  the  discussion  proceeds. 

Practical  considerations  also,  no  less  than  the  theo- 
retical, demand  this  method  of  appointment,  for  how- 
ever familiar  a  prime  minister  might  be  with  the  ma- 
terial of  his  own  country  suitable  for  international 
judgeships,  it  could  hardly  be  supposed  that  he,  even 
with  the  aid  and  advice  of  his  council  of  ministers, 
would  be  in  a  position  to  make  the  most  suitable  ap- 
pointments from  distant  parts  of  the  world,  or  to  learn 
of  the  comparative  fitness  of  men  of  other  nationalities 
for  such  important  posts.  Certainly  these  appoint- 
ments might  most  properly  be  made  by  the  executives 
of  the  States  wherein  the  courts  are  to  sit  and  perform 
their  functions,  and  whose  agents  they  are,  in  accord- 
ance with  regulations  prescribed  by  the  laws  of  the 
several  component  States. 

Peculiarly  would  this  principle  apply  in  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  judges  of  the  international  Supreme  Court, 
upon  whom  would  rest  some  of  the  most  important 
duties  and  responsibilities  involved  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  international  government.  It  is  they 
who  must  decide  the  great  controversies  that  would 
arise  from  time  to  time  between  the  nations,  who  must 
finally  pass  upon  the  validity  of  the  various  exercises 
of  legislative  power  by  the  international  congress,  and 
who  must  adjudicate  cases  wherein  the  component  na- 


128  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

tions  shall  have  exercised  powers  alleged  to  be  in  vio- 
lation of  the  international  constitution,  laws,  and 
treaties.  Surely  here,  if  anywhere,  the  component  na- 
tions have  the  most  direct  concern  in  the  appointment 
of  the  strongest  and  most  learned  constitutional  law- 
yers and  statesmen  to  be  found  within  their  dominions.1 

II 

INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  JUDICIARY 

Although,  in  accordance  with  the  conclusion  just 
reached,  the  international  judges  ought  to  be  appointed 
by  the  executives  of  the  component  nations,  it  by  no 
means  follows  that  they  ought  to  be  paid  by  them  also. 
On  the  contrary,  it  would  seem  eminently  proper  that, 
once  appointed  by  the  respective  States,  they  should  be 
paid  an  equal  compensation  out  of  the  federal  treasury. 
Otherwise  States  paying  liberal  salaries  to  their  repre- 
sentatives on  the  bench,  and  thus  securing  their  best 
men,  might  sometimes  find  their  rights  determined  by 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  2,  cl.  i.  It  would  not 
seem  proper  that  the  international  compact  should  confer  upon  the 
executive  of  each  component  State,  acting  alone,  the  authority  to  ap- 
point the  international  judges,  since  some  of  the  nations  (for  example, 
the  United  States)  do  not  permit  the  appointment  of  their  own  national 
judges  or  ambassadors  by  their  executives  alone,  without  ratification 
by  their  Senates  or  legislative  assemblies.  Hence  while  the  proposed 
plan  calls  for  the  appointment  of  the  international  judges  by  the  ex- 
ecutive of  each  component  State,  it  also  provides  that  the  appointment 
shall  be  made  in  accordance  with  such  regulations  as  may  be  pre- 
scribed by  the  laws  of  each  State,  including  a  ratification  by  its  Senate 
or  legislative  body,  if  a  State  shall  see  fit  to  require  it. 


JUDICIARY— INFERIOR  COURTS      129 

the  judicial  representatives  of  other  nations  more  nig- 
gardly in  their  allowances,  who  would  be  of  inferior 
ability,  learning,  or  character. 

There  ought  also  to  be  a  prohibition  upon  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  compensation  of  any  judge  during  his  term 
of  office.  This  is  an  obvious  and  necessary  check  upon 
the  undue  influence  that  might  otherwise  be  brought  to 
bear  upon  the  judiciary  by  the  legislative  department. 

As  a  further  means  of  securing  the  independence  of 
the  judiciary,  our  constitution  ought  to  contain  the  pro- 
vision that  they  shall  hold  office  during  good  behavior, 
subject  to  removal  only  by  the  action  of  the  Congress, 
for  bribery  or  other  misfeasance.1 

Ill 

INFERIOR  INTERNATIONAL  TRIBUNALS 

In  dealing  with  the  powers  to  be  conferred  on  the 
international  congress,  and  more  particularly  with  the 
grant  to  the  Congress  of  the  power  "  to  constitute  in- 
ternational courts  inferior  to  the  Supreme  Court,"  the 
conclusion  was  reached  that  this  power  ought  to  be 
granted.  But  in  the  same  connection  it  was  pointed 
out  that  the  Congress  might  not  need  to  exercise  it, 
since  possibly  the  courts  of  the  several  nations  might  be 
deemed  adequate  to  determine  all  the  controversies 
likely  to  arise  in  inferior  tribunals  under  the  constitu- 
tion, laws,  and  treaties  of  the  United  Nations. 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.f  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  2,  cl.  i. 


130  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

Assuming,  however,  that  it  may  be  found  necessary 
to  create  these  international  courts,  the  organization  of 
them  in  detail  must  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  Con- 
gress.1 

IV 

THE  INTERNATIONAL  SUPREME  COURT 

It  has  already  been  indicated,  both  on  theoretical 
and  practical  grounds,  that  it  would  be  desirable  that 
the  international  judges  be  appointed  by  the  executives 
of  the  component  nations.  But  in  the  case  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  this  would  be  impracticable  unless  each 
nation  be  given  at  least  one  representative  upon  that 
court. 

/.    Equality  of  National  Representation  Upon 
the  Court 

The  first  important  question  is  whether  this  repre- 
sentation on  the  Supreme  Court  should  be  equal  for 
all  the  component  nations,  or  whether  each  should  be 
represented  in  proportion  to  importance  and  influence, 
as  measured  by  population  or  otherwise. 

When  it  is  remembered  that  the  court  is  established 
for  the  adjudication  of  national  rights  wherein  all  the 
nations  are  equal;  that  the  questions  it  is  to  decide 
ought  not  to  be  determined  by  the  weight  of  influence 
and  wealth,  but  by  the  weight  of  justice  and  reason 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sees,  i,  2. 


SUPREME  COURT— EQUALITY        131 

only,  in  which  respects  the  component  nations  are 
equal;  that  the  custom  of  nations  in  arbitration  pro- 
ceedings has  been  to  submit  their  disputes  to  tribunals 
consisting  of  an  equal  number  of  representatives  of 
the  contending  nations  (regardless  of  their  respective 
influence  and  populations),  with  an  impartial  umpire; 
that  the  judges  of  the  court  would  not  be  partisans 
chosen  for  the  purpose  of  advocating  and  establishing 
certain  claims,  but  impartial  judges,  independent  of 
outside  influence,  and  sworn  to  hold  the  scales  of  jus- 
tice evenly  balanced  between  the  federal  government 
and  the  component  nations,  and  between  the  litigants 
before  it,  whether  nations  or  individuals;  that  in  every 
contest  between  two  of  the  nations  or  between  the 
federal  government  and  a  nation  or  its  citizens,  each  of 
the  nations,  though  not  an  actual  party  to  the  litiga- 
tion, would  be  deeply  interested  in  the  precedents  set 
by  the  decision;  and  that  in  cases  involving  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  international  constitution,  laws,  and 
treaties,  or  the  constitutionality  of  laws  or  treaties  of 
the  component  nations,  every  nation  would  have  an 
interest  in  the  decision  almost  equal  to  that  of  the  liti- 
gants themselves; — when  all  these  points  are  consid- 
ered, it  would  seem  eminently  proper  to  adopt  the  prin- 
ciple that  each  component  nation  be  equally  represented 
upon  the  Supreme  Court. 

To  the  objection  that  a  representation  of  one  judge 
from  each  nation  would  make  the  court  too  large  and 
unwieldy,  it  may  be  replied,  that  with  the  addition  of 
each  new  nation  to  the  union,  the  work  of  the  court 


132  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

would  be  increased  to  an  amount  that  would  surely 
demand  the  labors  of  one  additional  judge,  and  that 
even  should  every  nation  in  the  world  join  the  union, 
there  would  be  ample  work  for  the  forty  or  forty-five 
judges  of  the  court  to  perform,  divided  into  sections 
as  they  would  be  according  to  the  plan  presently  to  be 
suggested. 

The  real  danger  would  be  not  that  one  representa- 
tive on  the  court  from  each  component  nation  would 
make  the  court  too  large,  but  that  the  number  of  com- 
ponent States  might  not  be  great  enough  to  enable  a 
court  composed  of  only  one  such  representative  of  each 
nation  properly  to  perform  its  functions. 

The  essential  principle  is  that  all  the  States  con- 
cerned be  equally  represented  upon  the  court. 
Whether  this  be  accomplished  through  the  medium  of 
one  or  two  or  more  representatives  of  each  nation  is 
a  detail  depending  upon  the  number  of  the  component 
nations,  and  ought  to  be  left  within  the  discretion  of 
the  Congress.1 

2.    Division  of  the  Court  into  Sections 

The  Supreme  Court  would  be  called  upon  to  decide 
three  classes  of  cases  enumerated,  in  the  order  of 
their  dignity,  as  follows :  ( i )  disputes  between  nations ; 
(2)  civil  cases  involving  the  interpretation  of  the  in- 
ternational constitution,  laws,  or  treaties,  the  constitu- 
tionality of  the  laws  or  treaties  of  the  United  Nations, 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  3,  cl.  i. 


SUPREME  COURT— SECTIONS         133 

or  the  constitutionality  or  validity  of  the  laws  and 
treaties  of  the  component  nations;  and  (3)  criminal 
cases  involving  similar  questions. 

It  would  seem  proper,  therefore,  to  divide  the  court, 
as  nearly  as  may  be,  into  three  equal  sections; — the 
first  section  to  try  cases  of  the  first  order,  and  the 
second  and  third  to  try  cases  arising  under  the  second 
and  third  of  the  above  heads,  respectively.  The  judges 
first  to  compose  the  several  sections  might  be  deter- 
mined at  the  initial  meeting  of  the  court  by  the  draw- 
ing of  lots. 

A  second  drawing  of  lots  might  determine  the  rela- 
tive rank  each  judge  would  occupy  in  his  section,  the 
first  in  position  being  the  presiding  judge  of  his  section, 
with  the  next  in  rank  as  his  successor,  the  presiding 
judge  in  each  section  to  be  promoted  to  the  last  place 
in  the  section  immediately  above,  in  case  of  a  vacancy 
in  that  section;  and  upon  every  vacancy,  each  judge 
holding  rank  below  the  vacant  position  to  advance  one 
degree.  The  presiding  judge  of  the  first  section  would 
be  the  chief  justice  of  the  Supreme  Court. 

Upon  the  occurrence  of  a  vacancy  in  the  representa- 
tion of  any  component  nation,  the  new  appointee  of 
that  nation  would  begin  at  the  lowest  rank  in  the  third 
section. 

To  illustrate :  If  the  chief  justice  die,  the  judge  in  the 
first  section  who  is  second  in  rank  would  at  once  be- 
come chief  justice;  the  third  in  position  would  become 
second;  and  so  on  until  the  last  position  in  that  section 
is  reached,  which  would  thus  be  left  vacant.^  This 


134  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

vacancy  would  be  filled  by  the  promotion  of  the  pre- 
siding judge  of  the  second  section.  Thereupon  the 
second  judge  of  the  second  section  would  become  the 
presiding  judge  of  that  section,  the  third  in  position 
would  become  second,  and  so  on  until  the  last  position 
of  that  section  is  reached,  which  would  be  vacant. 
This  vacancy  would  be  filled  by  the  promotion  thereto 
of  the  presiding  judge  of  the  third  section,  whose  posi- 
tion in  turn  would  be  taken  by  the  second  judge  of  the 
third  section,  and  so  on  until,  each  of  the  remaining 
judges  moving  up  one  degree,  the  last  position  of  the 
third  section  is  left  vacant.  This  would  be  filled  by 
the  new  appointee  of  the  State,  the  death  of  whose 
former  representative  (the  former  chief  justice,  we 
have  supposed)  inaugurated  the  series  of  vacancies. 

Thus  no  nation  would  be  preferred  over  another, 
and  the  representatives  of  each  would  have  an  equal 
chance  to  interpret  the  international  constitution,  laws, 
and  treaties,  and  to  decide  cases  in  the  various  forms  in 
which  they  may  arise  in  the  several  sections.  Expe- 
rience and  length  of  service  would  be  the  sole  measures 
of  the  official  rank  of  the  representatives  of  the  several 
nations.1 

5.    Appeals  from  the  Sections  to  the  Supreme  Court 
as  a  Whole 

There  would  arise  two  classes  of  cases  wher.ein  the 
final  decision  of  the  questions  involved  ought  not  to  be 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  3,  cl.  2,  4,  5. 


SUPREME  COURT— SECTIONS         135 

left  to  the  particular  sections,  but  should  be  determined 
by  the  court  as  a  whole,  all  the  sections  sitting  to- 
gether, in  order  to  avoid  a  confusion  that  would  other- 
wise result. 

The  first  case  is  that  of  uncertainty  whether  the  par- 
ticular cause  falls  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  section 
to  which  it  has  been  brought  by  the  parties  appealing. 
If  the  point  be  raised  before  the  section  that  the  case 
ought  to  go  to  another  section,  either  party  dissatisfied 
with  the  decision  upon  this  preliminary  question  ought 
to  be  allowed  to  appeal  to  the  court  as  a  whole  to  de- 
termine the  proper  section  in  which  to  try  the  case. 

The  second  instance  is  where  the  several  sections, 
in  adjudicating  the  cases  of  different  sorts  brought  be- 
fore them,  respectively,  have  rendered  conflicting  de- 
cisions interpreting  the  same  provisions  of  the  inter- 
national constitution,  laws,  or  treaties,  or  passing  upon 
the  constitutionality  or  validity  of  the  laws  or  treaties 
of  the  United  Nations  or  the  component  States.  Great 
confusion  would  result,  if  no  means  of  ultimately  recon- 
ciling these  conflicting  decisions  were  provided.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  3,  cl.  3. 


CHAPTER  IX 

JURISDICTION   OF  THE   INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS 

I 

SCOPE  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  JUDICIAL  POWER 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  point  out  that  it  is  as  es- 
sential to  grant  judicial,  as  legislative  and  executive, 
powers  to  the  international  government,  or  to  remind 
the  reader  how  important  is  the  careful  selection  of 
those  powers,  so  that  the  federal  government,  while  on 
the  one  hand  clothed  with  all  the  authority  needful  to 
the  successful  performance  of  its  functions,  shall  not 
on  the  other  be  in  a  position  to  invade  the  proper  pro- 
vince of  the  several  component  nations. 

We  shall  begin  the  study  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
international  courts  with  a  brief  examination  of  the 
subjects  to  which  it  would  seem  that  the  judicial  power 
of  the  United  Nations  ought  to  be  extended. 

/.    Interpretation  of  the  Constitution,  Laws,  and 
Treaties 

No  argument  will  be  needed  to  convince  the  thought- 
ful reader  that  it  is  essential  to  place  in  judicial  hands 

136 


JUDICIAL  POWER  137 

the  power  of  authoritative  interpretation  of  the  inter- 
national constitution,  laws,  and  treaties,  whenever  such 
interpretation  becomes  necessary  to  the  decision  of  a 
question  suitable  for  judicial  cognizance.  The  rights 
of  litigants,  both  civil  and  criminal,  would  often  turn 
upon  the  proper  construction  of  these  instruments. 

To  leave  them  entirely  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
courts  of  the  component  nations  would  be  to  invite 
confusion  and  variety  of  interpretation.  The  interna- 
tional constitution  or  an  act  of  the  Congress  or  a  treaty 
of  the  United  Nations  might  then  mean  one  thing  in  one 
State  and  a  very  different  thing  in  another,  with  no 
power  in  any  single  court  or  system  of  courts  to 
straighten  out  the  tangle. 

Again,  if  the  proposed  international  constitution  is 
to  protect  the  citizens  of  one  component  nation  against 
the  improper  acts  of  another  State  wherein  such  citi- 
zens may  be,  as  is  later  suggested,  the  best  and  safest 
mode  of  protection  would  be  to  give  such  citizens  the 
opportunity  to  have  their  rights  determined  by  some 
tribunal  more  likely  to  be  impartial  than  the  courts 
of  the  nation  complained  of. 

For  these  and  other  reasons  not  needful  to  mention, 
it  would  be  imperative  that  our  international  compact 
provide  that  the  judicial  power  of  the  proposed  govern- 
ment shall  extend  to  controversies  arising  under  the 
constitution,  laws,  and  treaties  of  the  United  Nations.1 

1  Sec  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  See.  4,  cl.  i. 


i3B  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

2.    Power  to  Adjudge  Laws  and  Treaties 
Unconstitutional  and  Void 

In  the  adjudication  of  the  legal  and  constitutional 
rights  of  litigants,  it  would  often  be  necessary  for  the 
court  having  jurisdiction  of  the  case  to  compare  a 
law  of  the  Congress  or  a  federal  treaty  with  the  consti- 
tution, or  a  law  or  treaty  of  a  component  nation  with 
the  international  constitution  or  the  laws  or  treaties 
made  in  pursuance  thereof  touching  the  same  subject, 
and  it  might  sometimes  happen  that  such  examination 
would  reveal  the  particular  law  or  treaty  to  be  in 
contravention  of  a  higher  law. 

In  such  an  event,  what  should  be  the  measure  of  the 
court's  duty?  Is  it  to  accept  the  particular  law  or 
treaty  as  furnishing  the  rule  for  its  guidance,  on  the 
presumption  that  the  legislature  or  treaty-making 
power  has  investigated  the  constitutionality  of  its  work, 
and  act  upon  the  theory  that  they,  and  not  the  court, 
are  the  proper  arbiters  of  that  question?  This  is  the 
rule  generally  adopted  in  European  countries,  even 
those  possessing  written  constitutions. 

Or  ought  the  principle  to  be,  as  in  the  United  States, 
that  the  judiciary,  as  a  co-ordinate  department  of  the 
government,  is  under  the  duty  to  determine  the  proper 
law  to  be  applied  to  the  case  before  it;  and  that  as 
between  the  constitution,  which  is  the  higher  law,  and 
the  inconsistent  law  or  treaty  of  the  United  Nations, 
which  is  the  subordinate, — or  as  between  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  United  Nations  or  the  laws  or  treaties  of 


JUDICIAL  POWER  139 

the  union  made  in  pursuance  thereof  and  the  inconsist- 
ent law  or  treaty  of  a  component  nation, — it  must  en- 
force the  higher,  and  refuse  to  recognize  the  subordi- 
nate as  a  valid  act? 

This  principle,  as  it  is  theoretically  applied  in  the 
United  States,  forbids  the  court  to  take  this  radical 
step  if  there  is  any  doubt  of  the  constitutionality  of  the 
act,  upon  the  theory  that  the  legislature  is  a  co-ordinate 
branch  of  the  government,  and  must  be  supposed  to 
have  at  heart  the  preservation  of  the  constitution,  and 
that  it  would  never  have  passed  the  law  had  it  not  been 
satisfied  of  its  constitutionality.  But  this  theoretical 
attitude  has  in  large  measure  been  neutralized  by  the 
practical  fact  that  in  many  of  its  most  important 
decisions  upon  constitutional  questions  the  Supreme 
Court  has  been  nearly  equally  divided,  and  has  de- 
clared laws  unconstitutional  by  bare  majorities  of 
the  court.  If  there  were  ever  to  be  a  doubt  as  to 
the  unconstitutionality  of  a  law,  this  would  seem 
to  be  the  case  where  it  is  most  certainly  proved  to 
exist. 

No  attempt  will  be  made  here  to  give  the  argu- 
ments for  or  against  the  European  and  American 
theories,  respectively,  on  this  point.  Suffice  it  to  say 
that  it  is  believed  on  the  whole  that  the  peculiar  na- 
ture of  our  proposed  federation  would  make  accept- 
able to  the  nations  another  check  upon  the  powers  of 
the  international  congress  and  treaty-making  power, 
such  as  would  be  contained  in  the  judicial  power  to 
adjudge  their  acts  unconstitutional  and  void.  And  if, 


140  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

by  granting  this  judicial  power,  each  nation  may  secure 
itself  and  its  citizens  against  similar  unconstitutional 
laws  and  treaties  made  by  its  sister  nations,  it  ought 
to  be  willing,  in  its  turn,  to  permit  its  own  laws  and 
treaties  to  be  examined  in  the  same  way  and  with  the 
same  authority. 

Hence,  in  our  proposed  constitution,  it  is  assumed 
that  the  nations  would  consent  to  grant  to  the  judiciary 
department  the  power,  in  cases  where  such  a  course 
would  be  necessary,  to  declare  unconstitutional  and 
void  any  law  or  -treaty  of  the  United  Nations  which 
clearly  violates  any  provision  of  the  international 
constitution,  or  any  law  or  treaty  of  a  component 
nation  in  contravention  of  the  constitution  or  of 
the  constitutional  laws  or  treaties  of  the  United 
Nations. 

But,  profiting  by  the  experience  in  the  United  States 
above  referred  to,  a  proviso  should  be  added  that 
when  such  a  case  is  before  the  Supreme  Court,  it  shall 
not  pronounce  any  law  or  treaty  unconstitutional  and 
void  unless  three-fourths  of  the  judges  agree  to  it. 
The  majority  of  three-fourths  is  selected,  because  it  is 
that  majority  of  the  two  houses  of  the  Congress  that 
would  be  necessary  in  order  to  change  the  constitution, 
or  override  the  court's  decision.  It  should  take  as 
large  a  majority  of  the  court  to  override  the  decision 
by  the  Congress  that  its  action  is  constitutional,  as  it 
would  of  the  Congress  to  override  the  decision  of  the 
court  and  amend  the  constitution.  In  the  one  case 
the  component  nations  are  acting  through  the  judicial, 


JUDICIAL  POWER  141 

in  the  other  through  the  legislative,  organ  of  the  in- 
ternational body.1 

5.    Check  Upon  the  Judicial  Power  to  Declare  Laws 
Unconstitutional 

As  the  principle  is  applied  in  the  United  States,  no 
check  is  found  upon  the  power  of  the  Supreme  Court 
to  declare  a  law  unconstitutional  and  void  save  in  the 
power  to  amend  the  Constitution,  and  thus  override, 
as  it  were,  the  court's  decision.  Indeed,  the  constitu- 
tional history  of  the  United  States,  reveals  at  least  one 
case  wherein  this  very  consequence  followed.  In  the 
great  case  of  Chisholm  v.  Georgia  the  Supreme  Court 
decided  that  under  the  Constitution  a  private  citizen 
of  one  State  might  sue  another  State  in  the  federal 
courts.  No  sooner  was  the  decision  announced  than 
a  great  outcry  arose  throughout  the  country  against 
such  an  interpretation  of  the  Constitution,  and  the 
decision  was  speedily  followed  by  the  adoption  of  the 
Eleventh  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  declaring  that 

"  The  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  shall 
not  be  construed  to  extend  to  any  suit  in  law  or 
equity,  commenced  or  prosecuted  against  one  of 
the  United  States  by  citizens  of  another  State,  or 
by  citizens  or  subjects  of  any  foreign  State." 

But  under  the  American  Constitution  it  is  exceed- 
ingly difficult  to  obtain  amendments,  so  that  the  evil 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  4,  cl.  i. 


H2  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

must  be  a  very  pronounced  one  before  it  is  likely  to  be 
remedied  in  this  manner. 

Under  our  international  constitution,  as  herein  pro- 
posed, amendments  may  be  had  by  a  three-fourths  vote 
in  each  house  of  the  Congress.  If  therefore  the  Su- 
preme Court  should  at  any  time  declare  an  act  of  the 
Congress  unconstitutional,  and  that  opinion  is  dis- 
sented from  by  a  sufficient  number  of  the  component 
nations,  it  would  be  a  comparatively  easy  matter  to 
secure  an  amendment  to  the  constitution  that  would 
correct  the  error  made  by  the  court.  To  this  end  the 
assent  of  at  least  three-fourths  of  the  States,  as  repre- 
sented in  each  house  of  the  Congress,  must  be  secured. 

4.    Cases   Affecting  Ambassadors,   Public  Ministers, 
and  Consuls 

Under  existing  international  conditions  so  great  is 
the  danger  of  ill  feeling,  or  even  war,  resulting  from 
an  affront  offered  to  the  public  representative  of  an- 
other nation,  that  it  is  manifestly  proper  that  the  ju- 
dicial power  of  the  international  government  be  ex- 
tended to  all  cases  affecting  them.  Otherwise  it  would 
be  easily  possible  for  the  union  to  become  involved  in 
war  or  at  least  in  trouble  with  nations  not  members 
of  it  by  reason  of  the  improper  or  illegal  determination 
of  a  case  affecting  such  representatives  by  a  court  of 
one  of  the  component  nations. 

For  somewhat  similar  reasons  this  power  should  be 
extended  also  to  cases  affecting  ambassadors,  public 


JUDICIAL  POWER  143 

ministers,  and  consuls  accredited  to  any  of  the  com- 
ponent nations  by  other  nations,  whether  members  or 
not  members  of  the  union.  Since  (as  we  have  sup- 
posed) the  war  power  has  been  surrendered  by  the 
members  of  the  union  and  granted  by  them  to  the  in- 
ternational government,  it  devolves  upon  the  latter 
to  see  that,  as  between  the  component  nations,  their 
ambassadors  are  not  subjected  to  affront  or  injury, 
and  that,  as  between  these  and  nations  not  members 
of  the  union,  the  peace  of  all  be  not  jeopardized  by 
the  misconduct  or  bad  management  of  one  of  their 
own  number.  These  results  may  be  best  accomplished 
by  extending  to  all  such  cases  the  international  judicial 
power.1 

5.    Offenses  and  Wrongs  Committed  on  the  High  Seas 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  extends  the 
federal  judicial  power,  inter  alia, 

"  to  all  cases  of  admiralty  and  maritime  juris- 
diction." 

The  jurisdiction  of  the  English  admiralty  courts,  to 
which  this  clause  refers,  was  threefold  (exclusive  of 
the  jurisdiction  of  prize  cases  in  time  of  war  under 
the  rules  of  international  law).  This  threefold  juris- 
diction consisted  of  the  powers  following: 

i.  To  try  and  sentence  persons  accused  of  crimes 
committed  on  the  high  seas  or  on  navigable  waters 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  4,  cl.  2. 


144  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

wherein  the  tide  ebbs  and  flows,  if  not  within  the  body 
of  any  county; 

2.  To  try  all  cases  of  "  maritime  torts,"  that  is, 
private  wrongs  (other  than  breaches  of  contract)  aris- 
ing upon  the  high  seas  or  upon  tidal  waters,  whether 
or  not  within  the  body  of  a  county; 

3.  To  try  cases  of  "  maritime  contracts,"  that  is, 
contracts  wherever  made,  if  concerning  maritime  af- 
fairs. 

In  the  United  States  an  Act  of  Congress  has  pro- 
vided that  jurisdiction  of  crimes  in  admiralty  shall  ex- 
tend to  crimes  committed  on  the  high  seas  or  on  navi- 
gable waters  not  within  the  body  of  any  State;  leaving 
crimes  committed  within  a  State,  though  on  navigable 
waters,  to  be  punished  by  the  State  courts. 

With  respect  to  "  maritime  torts,"  it  has  been  de- 
cided in  the  United  States  that  the  admiralty  jurisdic- 
tion is  even  more  extensive  than  in  England,  because 
of  the  greatness  of  the  American  rivers,  many  of  which 
are  readily  navigable  far  above  tide  water.  Hence  the 
rule  has  been  established  that  the  admiralty  has  juris- 
diction of  torts  committed  on  the  high  seas  or  on  any 
waters  navigable  in  fact  by  ships  that  may  be  used  in 
commerce,  regardless  of  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tide. 

The  third  subject  of  admiralty  jurisdiction  remains 
in  the  United  States,  as  in  England,  dependent  upon  the 
nature  of  the  contract,  not  upon  the  locality. 

The  question  now  presents  itself  whether  the  judicial 
power  of  the  United  Nations  ought  to  be  extended  to 
these  cases  and,  if  so,  within  what  limits. 


JUDICIAL  POWER  145 

Following  the  general  principle  that  matters  of  local 
concern  shall  be  left  entirely  to  the  regulation  of  the 
component  nations,  and  only  matters  of  common  in- 
terest, the  regulation  of  which  by  the  several  com- 
ponent nations  might  engender  misunderstandings  or 
ill  will,  shall  be  given  into  the  control  of  the  interna- 
tional government,  it  would  result  that  at  least  those 
parts  of  the  admiralty  jurisdiction  above  described, 
which  involve  the  occurrence  of  events  upon  navigable 
waters  within  the  territorial  boundaries  of  a  particular 
nation,  should  remain  as  now  subject  to  the  exclusive 
jurisdiction  of  that  nation. 

The  application  of  this  principle  would  eliminate 
from  international  cognizance  all  crimes  and  torts 
committed  on  navigable  waters  within  the  limits  of  any 
nation,  and  all  cases  of  maritime  contract,  while  it 
would  extend  that  cognizance  to  offenses  and  torts  (or 
private  wrongs  other  than  breaches  of  contract)  com- 
mitted on  the  high  seas.1 

6.    The  United  Nations  a  Party 

Controversies  would  often  arise  to  which  the  United 
Nations  would  be  party, — such  as  prosecutions  of  in- 
dividuals for  violations  of  the  laws  of  the  union,  suits 
by  the  United  Nations  against  component  nations  or 
other  proceedings  wherein  they  might  be  complainants. 
To  all  such  cases  the  international  judicial  power  ought 
certainly  to  be  extended. 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  4,  cl.  3. 


146  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

It  would  seem  equally  clear,  if  the  principle  of  the 
judicial  settlement  of  international  disputes  is  to  pre- 
vail, that  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  Nations 
ought  to  extend  to  all  suits  against  the  United  Nations 
in  which  component  nations  or  nations  not  members  of 
the  union  are  the  complainants. 

But  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  the  interna- 
tional courts  should  be  given  jurisdiction  of  suits  insti- 
tuted against  the  United  Nations  by  private  individuals. 
Here  is  to  be  applied  that  principle  of  government 
demanding  that  no  sovereign  be  sued  even  in  his 
own  courts  without  his  consent.  In  such  cases,  there- 
fore, while  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  Nations 
should  be  extended  to  such  cases,  it  must  be  left  to  the 
discretion  of  the  Congress  to  determine  whether,  and  to 
what  extent,  the  power  shall  be  exercised.1 

7.    Controversies  Between  Component  Nations 

There  is  no  need  to  tarry  upon  the  grant  of  this 
power.  It  is  obviously  essential  that  the  international 
judicial  power  extend  to  cases  of  this  sort,  if  the  chief 
purpose  of  the  union  is  to  be  carried  out, — the  avoid- 
ance of  war  between  the  component  nations.2 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  4,  cl.  4. 

2  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  4,  cl.  5. 


JUDICIAL  POWER  147 

8.    Controversies  Between  Component  and  Other 
Nations 

The  same  reasons  that  necessitate  the  extension  of 
the  international  judicial  power  to  controversies  be- 
tween the  component  nations  themselves  would  demand 
its  further  extension  to  controversies  between  com- 
ponent nations  on  the  one  side  and  nations  not  mem- 
bers of  the  union  on  the  other.1 


9.    Controversies  Between  Nations  Not  Members  of 
the  Union 

All  existing  federations  have  provided  for  the  exten- 
sion of  their  judicial  power  to  controversies  between 
their  component  States,  or  between  those  States  and 
foreign  nations.  But  they  have  all  stopped  at  that 
point.  Not  one  has  undertaken,  in  an  altruistic  spirit 
and  in  the  interest  of  general  peace,  to  place  its  courts 
at  the  disposal  of  two  or  more  nations  not  within 
the  union  for  the  judicial  settlement  of  their  disputes. 
Indeed,  in  the  case  of  an  ordinary  federation,  such 
a  proposal  would  appear  preposterous  and  ridic- 
ulous. 

But  in  the  case  of  a  federal  union  such  as  we  are 
examining,  established,  if  it  is  to  exist  at  all,  by  the 
most  powerful  nations  of  the  world,  for  the  very  pur- 
pose of  keeping  the  peace  between  them,  which  might 
be  jeopardized  by  a  local  war  in  a  distant  part  of  the 
1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  4,  cl.  6. 


i4«  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

earth,  it  is  at  least  debatable  whether  the  international 
constitution  should  not  offer  the  services  of  its  Su- 
preme Court  for  the  judicial  settlement  of  disputes 
between  nations  not  members  of  the  union,  thus  giv- 
ing them  the  benefit  of  an  impartial  court  already  or- 
ganized and  accustomed  to  hear  such  causes,  whose 
arbitrament  might  prove  an  acceptable  substitute 
for  that  of  a  war  the  final  outcome  of  which  upon 
the  peace  of  the  component  nations  no  man  might 
foresee. 

If,  however,  such  a  provision  were  inserted,  care 
ought  to  be  taken  to  declare  expressly  that  the  sub- 
mission by  outside  nations  of  their  controversies  to 
the  international  courts  shall  furnish  no  reason  or 
excuse  for  the  use  of  the  international  force  to  execute 
the  courts'  decree.  That  must  be  left  to  the  honor  of 
the  nations  concerned,  or  else  the  entire  purpose  of- 
the  clause  is  defeated.1 

JO.    Controversies  Between  Citizens  of  Different 
States 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  extends  the 
judicial  power  of  the  Union  to  cases  arising  between 
citizens  of  different  States  or  between  citizens  of  a 
State  and  aliens. 

The  power  was  extended  to  these  cases  upon  the 
theory  that  the  courts  of  a  particular  State  would  not 
be  so  likely  as  would  the  federal  courts  to  adjudge 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  4,  cl.  7. 


JUDICIAL  POWER  149 

impartially  the  rights  of  its  own  citizens  when  weighed 
against  those  of  aliens  or  the  citizens  of  other  States. 
But  Congress  has  never  adopted  this  theory  to  the 
extent  of  making  the  federal  jurisdiction  exclusive  of 
the  State  courts  in  such  cases.  Under  the  Act  of  Con- 
gress, if  the  amount  in  controversy  exceeds  $3,000,  the 
suit  may  be  brought  in,  or  removed  to,  the  federal 
court,  but  it  may  also  be  tried  in  the  State  court  if 
neither  party  objects.  If  the  amount  involved  be  less 
than  $3,000,  the  federal  courts  are  given  no  jurisdic- 
tion at  all. 

This  last  condition  is  in  itself  an  admission  by  Con- 
gress that  there  is  nothing  to  fear  from  the  injustice, 
prejudice,  or  partiality  of  the  State  courts  in  cases 
of  this  character.  And  experience  in  the  United  States 
points  to  the  same  conclusion.  In  the  vast  number  of 
such  controversies  that  have  not  involved  $3,000,  and 
have  therefore  been  left  entirely  to  the  disposal  of  the 
State  courts,  their  decisions  have  been  as  satisfactory  to 
the  litigants,  whether  citizens  or  aliens,  as  the  deci- 
sions of  the  federal  courts  have  been.  There  has  been 
little  evidence  of  the  local  partiality  and  prejudice, 
the  fear  of  which  led  to  the  extension  of  the  federal 
judicial  power  to  those  cases. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  possession  of  this  jurisdiction 
(where  the  amount  is  more  than  $3,000)  has  enor- 
mously augmented  the  business  of  the  federal  courts  in 
the  United  States;  and,  more  serious  still,  has  given 
those  courts  increased  opportunity,  sometimes  availed 
of,  to  advance  the  power  and  prestige  of  the  federal 


1 50  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

government  at  the  expense  of  the  powers  reserved  to 
the  States. 

In  the  international  constitution,1  as  will  appear 
later,  the  rights  of  aliens  or  of  citizens  of  one  com- 
ponent State,  while  in  another,  are  adequately  secured 
against  invasion,  and  whenever  a  suit  involves  the  law 
of  a  component  nation  alleged  to  violate  these  rights, 
it  would  constitute  "  a  controversy  arising  under  the 
constitution  of  the  United  Nations,"  to  which  the  inter- 
national judicial  power  would  extend.  It  would  seem 
unnecessary  and  unwise  to  extend  it  further  to  contro- 
versies between  citizens  of  different  States  or  aliens, 
merely  because  the  parties  are  of  different  nationali- 
ties, where  no  unfair  or  prejudicial  governmental  ac- 
tion has  been  alleged. 

For  these  reasons  it  is  believed  that  the  international 
judicial  power  ought  not  to  extend  to  any  litigation 
between  private  parties,  except  in  cases  arising  under 
the  constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  Nations  or 
under  treaties  made  by  their  authority  or  by  authority 
of  the  several  component  nations. 

II 

ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

By  u  original "  jurisdiction  is  meant  that  the  court 
has  jurisdiction  to  try  the  case  immediately  and  in  the 
first  instance,  without  the  previous  institution  of  any 
1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  VI,  Sec.  i. 


SUPREME  COURT— JURISDICTION    151 

suit  in  an  inferior  court.  The  term  is  used  in  contra- 
distinction to  "  appellate  "  jurisdiction,  which  supposes 
a  suit  first  instituted  in  a  lower  court,  and  then  brought 
to  the  higher  court  upon  appeal. 

Our  exemplar,  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
upon  this  point  has  provided  as  follows : 


"  In  all  cases  affecting  ambassadors,  other  pub- 
lic ministers  and  consuls,  and  those  in  which  a 
State  shall  be  party,  the  Supreme  Court  shall  have 
original  jurisdiction.  In  all  other  cases  before 
mentioned  the  Supreme  Court  shall  have  appellate 
jurisdiction  both  as  to  law  and  fact,  with  such 
exceptions  and  under  such  regulations  as  the  Con- 
gress shall  make." 


In  the  United  States  it  is  settled  that  the  original 
jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court,  having  been  con- 
ferred by  the  Constitution  itself,  can  neither  be  en- 
larged nor  diminished  by  the  action  of  Congress.  But 
while  the  Constitution  has  given  the  court  original 
jurisdiction  in  the  cases  mentioned,  it  has  not  declared 
that  jurisdiction  to  be  also  exclusive;  and  hence  it  is 
competent  for  Congress  to  enact  that  suits  of  this  kind 
may  be  originally  instituted  in  a  lower  court  as  well 
as  in  the  Supreme  Court. 

The  reasons  for  granting  the  court  original  jurisdic- 
tion in  these  cases  is  quite  apparent.  Reference  has 
already  been  made  to  the  jealousy  with  which  nations 
are  accustomed  to  regard  the  treatment  of  their  diplo- 
matic representatives  abroad.  Their  relations  to  the 


152  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

people  around  them  are  to  a  great  extent  regulated  by 
the  Law  of  Nations,  and  they  are  not  ordinarily  sub- 
ject to  local  jurisdiction.  It  is  not  only  essential  that, 
as  between  the  federal  government  and  the  component 
States,  the  protection  of  these  foreign  representatives 
should  belong  to  the  former,  but  in  the  exercise  of  the 
judicial  power  of  the  federal  government  in  cases  af- 
fecting them  it  is  important  that  such  cases  may  be  at 
once  instituted  in  the  highest  and  most  responsible 
federal  court  rather  than  drag  through  the  tedious 
processes  of  the  lower  courts,  reaching  the  Supreme 
Court  only  on  appeal. 

Analogous  reasons  led  to  the  inclusion  within  this 
original  jurisdiction  of  controversies  "  in  which  a  State 
shall  be  party."  Not  only  the  dignity  of  the  State, 
but  the  prevention  of  tedious  and  exasperating  delays 
and  other  grounds  for  the  development  of  ill-will  be- 
tween the  States,  dictated  that  such  controversies  be 
instituted  originally  and  in  the  first  instance  in  the  Su- 
preme Court. 

In  the  case  of  the  international  constitution  these 
reasons  would  be  no  less  effectual  than  in  the  Ameri- 
can Constitution.  No  less  in  the  former  than  in  the 
latter  case  would  the  necessity  arise  to  avoid  or 
promptly  redress  affronts  to  ambassadors  or  ministers 
accredited  to  the  United  Nations  or  to  any  component 
nation,  and  to  consult  the  dignity  and  convenience  of 
the  component  or  other  nations  litigating  their  rights 
in  the  international  courts.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  5,  cl.  i. 


JUDICIAL  POWER— LIMITATIONS     153 
III 

APPELLATE  JURISDICTION  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

Unlike  the  Supreme  Court's  "  original "  jurisdiction, 
it  is  neither  necessary  nor  desirable  that  its  "  appel- 
late "  jurisdiction  be  fixed  in  the  international  consti- 
tution. It  ought  to  be  left  entirely  to  the  discretion  of 
the  Congress. 

The  constitution,  following  its  American  prototype, 
should  do  no  more  than  provide  that  the  court  shall 
possess  such  appellate  jurisdiction  from  inferior  in- 
ternational courts,  and  from  the  courts  of  the  compo- 
nent nations  when  exercising  the  judicial  power  of  the 
United  Nations,  both  as  to  law  and  fact,  as  the  Con- 
gress shall  think  proper.1 

IV 

LIMITATIONS  UPON  THE  INTERNATIONAL  JUDICIAL 

POWER 

Before  concluding  our  examination  of  the  judicial 
power  that  ought  to  be  conferred  on  the  international 
government,  it  is  necessary  to  call  the  reader's  atten- 
tion to  several  important  limitations  that  should  be  im- 
posed upon  the  exercise  of  it. 

1See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  5,  cl.  2. 


154  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

/.   Suits  by  Individuals  Against  Component  Nations 

Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  governmental 
principle  that  no  sovereign  State  may  be  sued  without 
its  own  consent.  Nations  might  be  willing  to  surrender 
to  an  international  federal  government  the  judicial 
power  to  determine  controversies  between  themselves 
and  other  nations  as  a  means  of  avoiding  war,  and  yet 
may  properly  refuse  to  yield  to  a  quasi-alien  author- 
ity the  power  to  determine  suits  instituted  against  them 
by  private  individuals  without  their  assent.  To  permit 
this  would  be  to  impair  their  dignity  as  sovereigns 
without  adequate  reason. 

But  this  principle  would  not  apply  to  appeals  taken 
to  the  Supreme  Court  from  inferior  courts  in  suits, 
civil  or  criminal,  instituted  originally  by  a  component 
nation  against  an  individual,  where  the  decision  in  the 
lower  court  has  been  against  the  individual  (he  being 
accordingly  the  appellant  and  the  nation  the  appellee) 
and  the  individual's  rights  or  immunities  under  the 
international  constitution,  laws,  or  treaties  are  in- 
volved. 

Hence  there  ought  to  be  a  provision  in  our  constitu- 
tion to  the  effect  that  the  judicial  power  of  the  United 
Nations  shall  not  be  construed  to  extend  to  any  original 
suit  brought  by  a  private  person  against  a  component 
nation.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  6. 


JUDICIAL  POWER— LIMITATIONS    155 

2.    Suits  Against  the  Sovereign,  Chief  Executive,  or 
Ministers  of  a  Component  Nation 

It  is  certain  that  no  nation  would  give  its  assent  to 
a  compact  which  did  not  clearly  provide  against  the 
possibility  of  any  action  of  the  international  federal 
government  whereby  its  sovereign,  president,  or  other 
chief  executive,  or  the  members  of  its  ministry,  could 
be  brought  before  the  international  courts  on  charges 
of  the  violation  of  the  federal  laws  or  treaties.  No 
nation  would  put  itself  in  a  position  where  such  af- 
fronts to  its  sovereignty  and  dignity  would  be  pos- 
sible, or  where  such  foreign  influences  could  be  brought 
to  bear  upon  its  governmental  policies. 

There  must  be  inserted  therefore  in  the  proposed 
constitution  still  another  limitation  upon  the  inter- 
national judicial  power  to  the  effect  that  it  shall  not 
extend  to  any  personal  proceeding  against  the  sov- 
ereign, chief  executive,  or  any  member  of  the  ministry 
of  any  component  nation.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  6. 


CHAPTER  X 

LIMITATIONS  UPON  THE  POWERS  OF  THE 

UNITED  NATIONS— (I)   POLITICAL 

LIMITATIONS 

I 

PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS 

As  preliminary  to  an  examination  of  the  limitations 
that  ought  to  be  imposed  upon  the  international  govern- 
ment, it  is  proper  to  observe  that  the  corresponding 
limitations  upon  the  federal  government  of  the  United 
States,  contained  in  the  American  Constitution,  so 
completely  and  so  effectually  cover  the  ground, — es- 
pecially in  respect  to  the  guarantees  and  protection  they 
afford  to  the  rights  of  the  individual  against  the  en- 
croachments of  the  government  in  the  exercise  of  its 
granted  powers, — that  they  need  but  few  modifications 
or  additions  to  suit  them  to  our  purposes. 

It  may  also  be  observed  that  so  far  as  concerns  the 
guarantees  of  the  individual's  civil  rights,  and  the  pro- 
tection afforded  him  in  criminal  prosecutions,  by  the 
international  constitution,  no  nation  would  be  likely 
to  raise  serious  objection  to  its  adoption  on  account  of 
their  presence,  since  the  tendency  and  effect  of  all  of 

156 


NO  TERRITORIAL  ACQUISITIONS     157 

them  would  be  to  protect  the  citizens  of  each  nation 
from  unjust,  oppressive,  or  tyrannical  action  on  the 
part  of  the  international  government  alone,  and 
would  not  in  the  slightest  degree  affect  the  exercise 
of  their  customary  rights  by  the  governments  of 
the  several  component  nations  within  their  own 
limits. 

The  limitations  to  be  considered  may  be  best  classi- 
fied under  three  heads :  ( i )  Limitations  of  a  political 
nature;  (2)  Guarantees  of  the  individual's  civil  rights, 
and  (3)  Guarantees  of  the  individual's  rights  in  crim- 
inal cases.  The  present  chapter  will  be  devoted  to 
the  political  limitations  upon  the  powers  of  the  inter- 
national government. 

II 

TERRITORIAL  ACQUISITIONS 

Inasmuch  as  the  national  craving  for  territorial  ex- 
pansion is  one  of  the  most  pronounced  causes  of  war,  it 
would  be  anomalous  to  establish  a  federal  union  of 
nations  with  the  purpose  of  preserving  the  peace  of 
the  world,  and  yet  grant  to  that  international  govern- 
ment the  power  to  acquire  territory,  thus  inviting  the 
control  of  it  by  the  very  passions  and  temptations,  an 
escape  from  which  is  the  reason  for  its  establish- 
ment. 

Yet  this  government  must  be  given  the  power  to 
declare  and  wage  war  if  necessary  with  nations  not 
members  of  the  union ;  and  this  cannot  be  accomplished 


i58  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

without  invading  and  occupying,  temporarily  at  least, 
the  territory  of  the  enemy.  Sometimes  also  the  funda- 
mental cause  of  the  war  may  lie  in  the  fact  that  terri- 
tory thus  occupied  has  been  in  the  possession  of  the 
wrong  nation  from  the  racial,  political,  geographical, 
or  religious  point  of  view,  so  that  to  insure  future 
peace  it  may  become  necessary  to  unite  the  conquered 
territory  to  some  other  nation  better  fitted  in  these  re- 
spects to  govern  it;  or  it  may  be  found  advisable  to  es- 
tablish it  as  an  independent  State. 

But  whether  such  occupied  territory  be  returned 
after  the  war  to  the  nation  from  which  it  has  been 
taken,  or  be  surrendered  to  one  or  more  of  the  com- 
ponent nations  or  to  a  nation  not  a  member  of  the 
union,  or  be  raised  to  the  dignity  of  an  independent 
State,  in  no  event  ought  the  principle  to  be  admitted 
that  the  international  government  itself  shall  retain 
control  of  the  territory. 

Moreover,  the  possibility  of  the  surrender  of  such 
conquered  territory  to  one  or  more  of  the  component 
nations  after  a  war,  unless  carefully  safeguarded,  might 
itself  tend  to  encourage  war  in  two  ways : — either,  first, 
by  inciting  some  of  the  component  nations  to  try  to 
involve  the  international  government  in  war,  with  the 
hope  that  they  themselves  may  ultimately  obtain  some 
of  the  conquered  territory;  or,  second,  by  arousing 
jealousies  and  suspicions  among  the  component  nations 
in  the  division  of  the  spoils. 

It  is  possible  to  avoid  both  of  these  dangers  by  pro- 
viding that  in  all  cases  the  conquered  territory  shall 


LIMITED  CITIZENSHIP  159 

be  restored  to  the  nation  from  which  it  has  during  the 
war  been  taken,  unless  a  certain  large  majority  of  the 
nations,  as  represented  in  each  house  of  the  Congress, 
shall  agree  in  assigning  it  to  one  or  more  of  themselves, 
or  to  a  nation  not  a  member  of  the  union,  or  in  erect- 
ing it  into  an  independent  State.  It  may  be  safely 
assumed  that  should  three-fourths  of  the  Congress  (the 
majority  needed  to  amend  the  constitution)  be  re- 
quired to  agree  upon  one  of  these  destinations,  the 
temptation  would  be  lacking  to  particular  nations  to 
bring  on  war  for  the  possession  of  such  territory,  and 
should  the  allotment  thereof  to  a  component  nation  be- 
come an  accomplished  fact,  it  would  then  leave  behind 
it  no  serious  sting  of  distrust  or  jealousy.1 

Ill 

"  CITIZENSHIP  OF  THE  UNITED  NATIONS  " 

In  dealing  with  the  powers  to  be  granted  to  the  in- 
ternational congress,  the  power  to  make  rules  touch- 
ing naturalization  was  considered,  and  the  conclusion 
reached  that  the  power  ought  to  be  denied  because 
theoretically  and  practically  it  would  be  unwise  to 
recognize  the  existence  of  such  a  legal  status  as  that 
of  a  "  citizenship  of  the  United  Nations."  It  is  un- 
necessary to  repeat  that  discussion. 

Indeed,  so  far  should  the  constitution  be  from  recog- 
nizing such  a  status  that  it  ought  expressly  to  disclaim 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  i. 


160  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

the  existence  of  it,  except  in  the  case  of  persons  born  or 
permanently  resident  in  the  seat  of  government.1 

IV 
"  TREASON  AGAINST  THE  UNITED  NATIONS  " 

A  corollary  of  the  proposition  just  presented, — that 
there  is  no  such  general  legal  conception  as  that  of 
"  citizenship  of  the  United  Nations," — is  that  there 
could  be  no  such  general  crime  as  "  treason  against  the 
United  Nations,"  for  treason  is  peculiarly  a  crime 
growing  out  of  and  connected  with  the  relation  of  citi- 
zenship. 

No  citizen  of  a  component  nation  would  owe  alle- 
giance to  the  government  of  the  United  Nations  except 
by  and  through  the  adhesion  of  his  nation  to  that  gov- 
ernment which  becomes  part  of  his  national  govern- 
ment by  virtue  of  that  adhesion.  His  levying  of  war 
against  the  international  government,  or  his  attempt 
to  subvert  it,  would  be  treason  against  his  national 
government  and  punishable  by  it.2 

V 

POWER  OF  TAXATION 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  first  power  granted 
to  the  international  congress  in  our  proposed  constitu- 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  2. 

2  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  3. 


TAXING  POWER  LIMITED  161 

tion  is  that  of  laying  and  collecting  taxes  upon  land 
for  purposes  of  revenue.1 

In  our  examination  of  that  grant  of  power,  it  was 
pointed  out  that  the  extension  of  the  taxing  power  to 
the  laying  of  duties  on  imports  or  exports,  or  upon 
business,  trade  or  occupations  of  any  kind,  would 
place  a  most  dangerous  power  in  the  hands  of  the  in- 
ternational government,  in  case  a  majority  of  the  com- 
ponent nations  were  disposed  to  use  it  to  the  injury  of 
a  minority; — a  power,  the  exercise  of  which  might 
cause  suspicion  and  ill  feeling  between  the  nations 
instead  of  the  confidence  and  good  will  it  is  desirable 
to  cultivate.  There  is  no  easier  way  to  enact  prefer- 
ential legislation  in  favor  of  particular  classes  or  sec- 
tions than  through  the  exercise  of  the  taxing  power, 
especially  through  tariff  and  excise  laws. 

The  express  grant  to  the  Congress  of  the  power  to 
tax  land,  accompanied  by  silence  with  respect  to  other 
forms  of  taxation,  in  the  case  of  a  government  of 
enumerated  powers  like  the  one  we  are  considering, 
might  very  possibly  carry  a  sufficient  implication  that 
other  forms  of  taxation  are  inadmissible.  But  in  a 
matter  of  such  first  rate  importance,  it  would  be  impru- 
dent to  leave  the  question  to  be  determined  by  implica- 
tions.2 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  i. 
3  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  4. 


1 62  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

VI 
APPROPRIATIONS  OF  PUBLIC  MONEY 

The  next  of  these  political  limitations  upon  the 
powers  of  the  international  government,  suggested  by 
considerations  of  ordinary  business  and  governmental 
precaution,  is  to  the  effect  that  no  money  be  drawn  from 
the  treasury  but  in  consequence  of  appropriations  made 
by  law;  and  that  statements  of  all  public  receipts  and 
expenditures  be  published  from  time  to  time.1 

VII 

PURPOSES  OF  APPROPRIATIONS — BOUNTIES  AND 
PENSIONS 

In  dealing  with  the  purposes  for  which  the  inter- 
national congress  should  be  permitted  to  raise  revenue 
by  taxation  upon  land,  the  conclusion  was  reached  that 
the  constitution  ought  clearly  to  provide  that  it  be  con- 
fined to  those  purposes  for  which  the  union  is  to  be 
formed. 

The  same  principle,  of  course,  should  apply  to  the 
appropriations  of  the  public  money  after  it  has  been 
raised  by  taxation;  and  it  is  so  provided  in  the  clause 
of  our  tentative  constitution  referred  to  below.2 

Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  necessity  of 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  5. 

2  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  6. 


LIMITED  CONTROL  OP  COMMERCE    163 

depriving  the  Congress  of  the  power  unduly  to  dis- 
criminate for  or  against  the  trade  and  occupations  of 
particular  nations  through  tariff  or  excise  legislation. 
But  this  would  be  of  little  use,  if  the  Congress  be  al- 
lowed to  reverse  the  process,  and  by  bounty  legislation 
encourage  unduly  the  trade  of  particular  nations.  It 
is  as  necessary  to  prohibit  the  Congress  to  legislate  for 
or  against  trade  in  this  form  as  under  the  guise  of  tax- 
ation. 

But  there  is  one  sort  of  bounty  legislation  not  sub- 
ject to  these  objections,  namely,  laws  providing  for 
pensions  to  superannuated  or  disabled  public  servants, 
civil  and  military.  The  power  to  legislate  on  this  sub- 
ject should  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  Congress.1 
/ 

VIII 

COMMERCIAL  PREFERENCES  AS  BETWEEN  THE 
COMPONENT  NATIONS 

It  has  before  been  pointed  out  that  in  order  to  ac- 
complish the  end  aimed  at  by  our  international  com- 
pact,— the  preservation  of  peace  between  the  compo- 
nent nations, — it  is  essential  that  the  power  to  regu- 
late international  commerce  be  granted  to  the  federal 
government,  and  accordingly  this  is  one  of  the  powers 
granted  to  the  Congress  in  our  constitution. 

But  instead  of  preserving  peace,  it  would  hasten  war 
between  the  nations  if  it  were  possible  for  a  combina- 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  6. 


1 64  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

tion  of  them,  by  obtaining  control  in  both  houses  of 
the  Congress,  to  use  that  power  for  the  purpose  of  dis- 
criminating in  commercial  regulations  in  favor  of  their 
own  trade  and  against  that  of  the  minority.  It  is  as 
necessary  to  the  peace  of  the  nations  to  guard  against 
such  preferential  legislation  as  it  is,  in  the  first  in- 
stance, to  grant  to  the  Congress  the  power  to  regulate 
such  commerce. 

The  most  usual  instrumentalities  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  this  sort  of  preferential  legislation  are  the  gov- 
ernmental powers  to  impose  taxes, — especially  import 
and  excise  duties, — and  to  grant  bounties.  These  pow- 
ers, as  we  have  just  seen,  have  been  denied  absolutely 
to  the  international  government  by  our  proposed  con- 
stitution. 

It  remains  to  impose  such  direct  limitations  upon 
the  power  to  regulate  international  commerce  as  may 
in  like  manner  prevent  serious  discriminations  for  or 
against  particular  nations  by  means  of  the  exercise  of 
it.  With  the  powers  to  tax  trade  and  grant  bounties 
eliminated,  it  would  seem  that  the  principal  other  meth- 
ods whereby  the  international  government  might  effect 
discriminations  of  this  sort  would  be  by  means  of 
regulations  giving  preferences  to  the  ports  or  trading 
centers,  to  the  ships  or  other  vehicles  of  commerce,  to 
the  navigable  waters  or  other  highways  of  commerce, 
or  to  the  persons  engaged  in  international  commerce,  be- 
longing to  one  nation  over  those  belonging  to  another. 

For  example,  by  harbor,  pilotage,  or  lighthouse 
regulations  it  might  be  possible  to  discriminate  in  favor 


NO  TITLES  OF  NOBILITY  165 

of  or  against  the  ports  and  trading  centers  of  a  particu- 
lar nation;  by  clearance  regulations,  by  laws  regulating 
the  wages  or  qualifications  of  seamen  engaged  in  in- 
ternational commerce,  or  by  laws  regulating  the  con- 
struction or  equipment  of  ships  or  railroad  cars,  real 
advantages  or  disadvantages  may  be  created  with  re- 
spect to  the  trade  of  particular  nations;  and  the  same 
result  might  be  accomplished  by  the  appropriations  of 
money  for  the  deepening  of  the  navigable  waters  or 
improvement  of  commercial  routes  in  one  or  a  few 
countries,  while  denying  such  advantages  to  others. 

Of  course  absolute  equality  in  the  operation  of  com- 
mercial regulations  is  not  to  be  expected,  and  the  mere 
fact  that  a  law  does  not  operate  everywhere  with  en- 
tire equality  and  uniformity  is  no  reason  for  declaring 
it  preferential. 

But  this  is  not  to  say  that  a  regulation  of  commerce, 
the  very  design  and  purpose  of  which  is  to  create  pref- 
erences, may  be  justly  supported  as  constitutional;  and 
glaring  inequalities  and  lack  of  uniformity  in  its  opera- 
tion may  well  be  taken  as  indications  that  the  law  is 
designed  to  be  a  preferential  regulation.1 

IX 

TITLES  OF  NOBILITY  AND  PRIVILEGED  ORDERS 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  our  proposed  government 
is  one  of  enumerated  powers,  among  which  has  not 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  7. 


1 66  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

been  included  the  power  to  grant  titles  of  nobility  or 
establish  privileged  orders,  it  might  perhaps  be  re- 
garded as  unnecessary  expressly  to  negative  the  exist- 
ence of  such  a  power. 

That  the  power  ought  not  to  be  granted  to  the  in- 
ternational government  is  very  evident.  Not  only 
would  it  be  of  no  assistance  in  furthering  the  purpose 
of  the  union, — the  prevention  of  war  between  the 
component  nations, — but  it  would  have  the  opposite 
tendency  of  exciting  discord  and  jealousies  amongst 
them.  Indeed,  the  existence  of  such  a  power  might  of 
itself  suffice  to  prevent  some  republics  from  joining 
the  union.  It  might  even  have  a  like  effect  upon  some 
monarchies  which  might  fear  the  establishment  of  or- 
ders superior  to  their  own. 

Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  the  proposed  gov- 
ernment, while  some  of  its  component  States  would  be 
monarchies,  would  yet  itself  be  in  essence  republican 
in  form,  a  republic  of  nations, — so  that  the  creation  of 
such  orders  would  be  inconsistent  as  well  as  inappro- 
priate. 

It  would  appear  the  safer  course  not  to  trust  to  the 
presumption,  arising  from  the  absence  of  a  grant,  that 
the  power  does  not  exist,  but  expressly  to  deny  its  ex- 
istence.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  8. 


TITLES  OF  OTHER  STATES          167 
X 

GRANTS  OF  TITLES  OR  EMOLUMENTS  BY  OTHER 
STATES 

Another  precautionary  limitation  upon  the  powers 
of  the  officials  of  the  international  government,  upon 
which  comment  seems  needless,  appears  in  our  pro- 
posed constitution  in  the  following  form : 

"  No  person,  while  holding  any  office  of  profit 
or  trust  under  the  United  Nations,  shall,  without 
the  consent  of  the  Congress,  accept  of  any  present, 
emolument,  office,  or  title  of  any  kind  whatever 
from  any  king,  ruler,  or  State."  1 
1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  9. 


CHAPTER  XI 

LIMITATIONS  UPON  THE  POWERS  OF  THE 
UNITED  NATIONS— (II)  GUARANTEES 
OF  THE  CIVIL  RIGHTS  OF  THE  INDI- 
VIDUAL 

I 

PROMPT  DISCHARGE  FROM  ILLEGAL  IMPRISONMENT 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  declares  that 

"  The  privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus 
shall  not  be  suspended,  unless  when  in  cases  of  re- 
bellion or  invasion  the  public  safety  may  require 
it." 

The  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  a  technical  remedy  for 
the  violation  of  the  constitutional  right  of  the  indi- 
vidual to  personal  liberty,  and  is  well  known  to  the 
English  and  American  law.  It  is  a  proceeding  whereby 
a  person  confined  may  have  an  immediate  judicial  in- 
quiry into  the  legality  of  his  imprisonment,  and  if  it 
be  found  illegal,  he  is  entitled  to  an  order  of  the  court 
that  he  be  at  once  released.  Upon  this  writ  there  can 
usually  be  no  investigation  of  the  justice  of  the  im- 
prisonment, that  is,  of  the  prisoner's  guilt  or  innocence 

168 


GUARANTEES— CIVIL  RIGHTS        169 

of  the  offense  charged,  but  only  of  the  legality  of  the 
confinement. 

This  right  is  recognized  also  in  other  than  English- 
speaking  nations,  but  not  under  the  technical  designa- 
tion of  the  right  to  a  habeas  corpus,  and  in  some  coun- 
tries it  is  not  recognized  at  all. 

Not  even  the  last  mentioned  nations,  however,  could 
have  any  just  ground  of  objection  to  our  proposed  con- 
stitution, should  it  contain  a  clause  guaranteeing  this 
right  to  its  citizens  as  against  illegal  arrests  made  by 
the  government  of  the  United  Nations.  The  clause 
would  in  no  way  operate  to  limit  the  powers  of  any 
national  government. 

But  the  non-existence  of  such  a  right  in  some  tcoun- 
tries  and  the  designation  of  it  by  different  names  in 
others,  demands  that  the  privilege  be  defined  in  the 
international  constitution  as  well  as  secured  thereby.1 

In  defining  it,  our  constitution  would  limit  its  appli- 
cation to  illegal  imprisonments  occuring  under  or  by 
authority  of  the  international  government,  real,  or  pre- 
tended, or  contrary  to  the  international  laws  or  treaties, 
or  because  of  the  alleged  exercise  of  a  right  or  omis- 
sion of  a  duty  claimed  to  exist  under  the  constitution, 
laws,  or  treaties  of  the  United  Nations,  or  contrary  to 
the  Law  of  Nations.  It  is  not  to  be  extended  to  illegal 
imprisonments  of  other  sorts. 

Having  defined  the  right,  it  may  be  secured  in  much 
the  same  words  as  those  of  the  American  Constitution.2 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  2,  cl.  i. 

2  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  2,  cl.  i. 


170  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

II 

RELIGIOUS  LIBERTY 

It  is  needless  to  argue  the  importance  of  a  clause 
limiting  the  power  of  the  international  government  to 
infringe  in  any  way  the  religious  liberty  of  the  individ- 
ual. 

In  this,  as  in  many  of  these  guarantees,  the  proposed 
constitution  has  followed  in  the  main  the  language  of 
the  corresponding  provisions  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  which  in  a  period  of  more  than  a  cen- 
tury have  proved  entirely  effectual  to  safeguard  these 
rights  against  governmental  invasion.1 

Ill 

FREEDOM  OF  SPEECH  AND  OF  THE  PRESS 

The  nations  differ  widely  in  their  conceptions  of  the 
extent  to  which  freedom  of  speech,  oral  or  written, 
may  justly  be  accorded  to  individuals.  In  some  coun- 
tries the  censorship  of  writings,  in  advance  of  publica- 
tion, is  a  recognized,  right  of  the  government,  and  the 
publication  of  matter  reflecting  upon  the  rulers  may 
be  punished  as  Use  majeste.  In  others,  as  in  England 
and  the  United  States,  except  in  times  of  war,  censor- 
ship in  advance  of  publication  is  unknown;  criticism 
of  officials  or  candidates  for  office,  if  bona  fide  and 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  2,  cl.  2. 


GUARANTEES— FREEDOM  OF  SPEECH    171 

not  malicious,  are  privileged  communications  and  go 
unpunished,  even  though  untrue;  and  the  speaker, 
writer,  or  publisher  is  in  no  case  punishable  otherwise 
than  under  the  common  law. 

Hence,  should  our  proposed  constitution  merely  pro- 
hibit any  law  abridging  freedom  of  speech  and  of  the 
press,  the  question  would  at  once  present  itself  as  to 
what  is  meant  by  these  phrases.  They  would  mean 
one  thing  in  one  country  and  a  different  thing  else- 
where. It  is  necessary  therefore  to  define  them. 

One  mode  of  defining  them  would  be  to  adopt  arbi- 
trarily the  legal  principles,  prevalent  in  a  single  country 
touching  the  subject,  and  use  those  as  the  standard 
of  freedom  in  these  respects.  But  if  a  low  standard 
were  adopted  this  would  certainly  be  unsatisfactory  in 
those  countries  possessing  higher  standards  of  such 
freedom;  and  if  a  high  standard  were  adopted,  it  would 
be  likely  to  cause  trouble  in  those  countries  wherein 
lower  standards  are  enforced. 

Perhaps  at  once  the  most  natural  and  the  most  satis- 
factory standard  of  freedom  of  speech  for  the  inter- 
national constitution  is  to  be  found  in  accepting  for 
each  separate  nation  the  standard  it  recognizes  in  its 
own  dealings  with  its  citizens. 

Hence,  the  limitation,  as  it  appears  in  our  pro- 
posed constitution,  is  in  effect  that  no  law  shall  be 
passed  by  the  Congress  abridging  freedom  of  speech 
or  of  the  press  in  any  of  the  component  States  to  a 
greater  extent  than  as  the  laws  of  each  State  permit.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  2.  cl.  3. 


172  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

IV 

RIGHTS  OF  ASSEMBLY  AND  PETITION 

Two  civil  rights  that  ought  to  be  protected  from  in- 
fringement by  the  international  government, — what- 
ever the  view  any  particular  national  government  may 
take  of  them, — are  the  rights  of  the  people,  first,  peace- 
ably to  assemble  for  any  lawful  purpose,  whether  re- 
ligious, charitable,  educational,  social,  or  political,  pro- 
vided only  that  the  assembly  be  peaceable  and  not  dis- 
orderly or  calculated  to  excite  disorders,  and,  second, 
to  petition  the  international  government  in  a  proper 
and  respectful  manner  for  a  redress  of  such  grievances 
as  they  may  have  experienced. 

The  exercise  of  these  rights  should  forever  be  placed 
beyond  the  power  of  the  international  government  to 
prohibit  or  punish.1 

V 
THE  KEEPING  AND  BEARING  OF  ARMS 

While,  under  the  plan  proposed,  the  war  powers  are 
to  be  conferred  upon  the  international  government,  it 
is  also  proposed  that  the  component  States  shall  retain 
a  certain  proportion  of  regular  armed  forces,  and  in 
addition  such  militia  as  they  may  severally  see  fit  to 
employ.  On  this  account,  if  on  no  other,  it  would  be 
proper  to  insert  in  our  constitution  a  limitation  upon 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  2,  cl.  4. 


QUARTERING  OF  SOLDIERS          173 

the  power  of  the  international  government  to  prohibit 
the  keeping  and  bearing  of  military  arms. 

But  the  limitation  is  as  important  when  applied  to 
the  people  generally  as  when  applied  to  the  armed 
forces  and  militia.  While  the  international  constitu- 
tion must  not  attempt  to  control  the  component  na- 
tions in  their  respective  attitudes  to  their  own  people 
in  this  matter,  it  ought  carefully  to  provide  that  the 
international  government  at  least  be  permitted  to  take 
no  step  which  would  deprive  the  people  of  any  State 
of  such  rights  as  their  State  may  give  them  to  keep  and 
carry  arms,  learn  the  use  of  them,  and  be  prepared  to 
employ  them  when  necessary  to  defend  their  liberties 
against  unjust  attacks. 

The  component  States  and  their  people,  in  entering 
the  international  union  and  surrendering  in  large  meas- 
ure their  own  war  powers,  would  do  so  to  preserve  an 
honorable  peace,  not  to  become  the  helpless  and  sub- 
servient victims  of  the  agency  they  have  created.1 

VI 

QUARTERING  OF  SOLDIERS  ON  THE  PEOPLE 

Past  experience  has  taught  that  governments  may 
sorely  oppress  their  people  through  an  unequal  dis- 
tribution of  governmental  burdens,  whether  in  the 
form  of  taxation,  of  laws  lacking  uniformity,  or  other- 
wise. 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  2,  cl.  5. 


174  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

One  way  in  which  this  has  sometimes  been  done  is 
by  quartering  soldiers  upon  the  homes  of  the  people, 
thus  not  only  imposing  unequal  burdens,  but  very  se- 
riously impairing  and  interfering  with  the  privacy  and 
freedom  of  the  home. 

In  times  of  peace  the  international  government 
ought  to  be  prohibited  to  do  this  altogether,  and  in  time 
of  war  except  in  the  mode  prescribed  by  law.1 

VII 

JURY  TRIAL  IN  CIVIL  CASES 

The  Seventh  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  declares  that 

"  In  suits  at  common  law  where  the  value  in 
controversy  shall  exceed  twenty  dollars,  the  right 
of  trial  by  jury  shall  be  preserved;  and  no  fact 
tried  by  a  jury  shall  be  otherwise  examined  in  any 
court  of  the  United  States  than  according  to  the 
rules  of  the  common  law." 

This  suggests  the  question  whether  a  similar  provi- 
sion ought  to  be  contained  in  the  proposed  international 
constitution. 

The  jury  system,  while  adopted  from  the  English 
common  law  into  the  jurisprudence  of  many  of  the  most 
advanced  nations  for  service  in  criminal  cases,  has  not 
been  widely  adopted  as  it  applies  to  civil  suits.  This 
fact  is  some  evidence  at  least  that  the  jury  system,  as 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  2,  cl.  6. 


GUARANTEES— EMINENT   DOMAIN    175 

applied  in  civil  cases  in  England  and  America,  is  not 
suited  to  the  needs  or  habits  of  many  of  the  other  na- 
tions. Nor  indeed  does  it  go  entirely  unchallenged  in 
America  itself,  for  there  is  a  growing  sentiment  among 
American  lawyers  and  jurists  that  in  civil  cases  conclu- 
sions as  to  disputed  facts  are  more  satisfactory  when 
reached  by  the  judge  than  by  the  jury. 

These  considerations  point  to  the  total  exclusion  of 
this  clause  from  the  list  of  limitations  upon  the  powers 
of  the  international  government,  leaving  the  Congress 
free  to  adopt  such  system  as  it  may  deem  best  for  the 
determination  of  facts  in  civil  cases  litigated  in  the 
international  courts. 

VIII 
POWER  OF  EMINENT  DOMAIN 

It  is  universally  recognized  that  every  man  holds  his 
property  subject  to  the  public  needs  of  the  State,  which 
has  the  power  to  demand  it  of  him  for  the  public  use 
and  benefit. 

But  to  require  him  to  surrender  it  for  the  public  use 
would  be  to  impose  upon  him  an  unequal  burden,  unless 
it  were  equalized  by  paying  him  a  just  compensation 
for  his  loss  out  of  the  proceeds  of  taxes  levied  ratably 
upon  all  members  of  the  community.  And  to  take  the 
property  of  one  for  the  mere  private  use  of  another 
cannot  be  justified  upon  any  sound  principle.  It  would 
be  mere  confiscation, — a  taking  of  his  property  "  with- 
out due  process  of  law," 


176  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

The  American  Constitution  has  recognized  this  prin- 
ciple, and  has  imposed  a  limitation  upon  the  powers  of 
the  federal  government  by  a  provision  that 

"  private  property  shall  not  be  taken  for  public 
use  without  just  compensation." 

In  the  United  States  this  has  been  construed  to 
mean  that  the  owner  of  property  which  has  been 
physically  and  corporeally  taken  or  invaded  by  the 
government  for  the  public  use  must  be  adequately  com- 
pensated; but  it  does  not  apply  to  those  mere  inci- 
dental damages  to  property  rights  that  result  from 
the  progress  and  growth  of  communities,  or  from  the 
enactment  of  legislation  restricting  business,  trades, 
occupations,  or  a  person's  use  of  his  own  property, 
within  reasonable  limits.  These  may  create  restric- 
tions upon  the  legitimate  uses  the  owner  may  make  of 
his  own,  but  they  do  not  take  the  property  from 
him,  and  therefore  are  held  not  to  fall  within  the 
requirement  that  just  compensation  must  be  made 
him. 

Indeed,  no  general  law  can  well  be  passed  that  would 
not  injuriously  affect  someone  in  his  business  or  prop- 
erty rights.  For  such  losses  the  government  ought  not 
to  be  required  to  make  compensation.  Thus,  by  the 
enactment  of  a  law  reducing  the  tariff  rates  upon  cer- 
tain goods  or  prohibiting  the  manufacture  or  sale  of 
intoxicating  liquors,  the  State  does  not  actually  take 
anyone's  property  from  him  for  public  use,  and  cannot 


GUARANTEES— DUE  PROCESS         177 

be  required  to  pay  for  the  losses  incidental  to  the  execu- 
tion of  the  new  regulations. 

A  similar  provision,  similarly  construed,  would  not 
come  amiss  in  our  tentative  constitution.1 

IX 

DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW 

It  is  a  principle  of  justice,  written  in  indelible  char- 
acters upon  the  human  heart,  that  no  man  shall  be 
condemned  unheard  and  without  a  proper  and  rea- 
sonable opportunity  to  defend  himself  before  an  ap- 
propriate impartial  tribunal  and  upon  regular  and 
orderly  proceedings.  Any  other  procedure  is  mere  an- 
archy and  the  execution  of  the  tyrannical  and  lawless 
will  of  the  mob,  whether  or  not  accomplished  under 
the  forms  of  law. 

This  principle  is  expressed  in  English  and  American 
law  by  the  phrase  "  due  process  of  law "  or  "  the 
law  of  the  land,"  and  in  other  countries  is  recognized 
under  other  names. 

It  would  be  as  illegal  for  government,  in  any  of  its 
departments, — legislative,  executive,  or  judicial, — to 
attempt  to  deprive  a  person  of  his  rights  without  "  due 
process  of  law  "  as  for  a  mob  or  a  private  person  to 
attempt  it;  and  the  fact  that  the  attempt  is  clothed 
in  the  attire  of  a  legislative  or  executive  act  or  a  judicial 
mandate  does  not  make  it  any  the  less  inherently  il- 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art  IV,  Sec.  2,  cl.  7. 


178  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

legal,  if  suitable  opportunity  be  not  given  the  victim 
to  defend  himself  or  his  property  in  a  regular  and  or- 
derly procedure. 

Thus  it  would  be  as  illegal,  under  this  principle,  for 
the  legislature  to  declare  by  law  that  A's  property  shall 
be  taken  from  him  and  given  to  B  for  his  private  use, 
or  that  A  is  a  criminal  whose  life  is  forfeited,  as  it 
would  be  if  these  things  were  done  by  a  mere  party  of 
rioters;  and  the  same  is  true  of  the  judgment  of  a 
court  wherein  the  defendant  has  never  appeared  or 
been  notified  of  the  existence  of  the  complaint  against 
him,  or  of  a  court  which  has  no  legal  jurisdiction  to 
adjudge  the  question  at  issue.  If  these  may  be  justi- 
fied, then  so  may  lynch  law. 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  has  aptly 
and  tersely  expressed  this  limitation  upon  the  federal 
power  by  providing  that  no  person 

"  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property 
without  due  process  of  law." 

It  should  be  observed  that  the  term  "  liberty"  as 
construed  in  the  United  States,  embraces  far  more 
than  the  mere  freedom  from  physical  confinement.  It 
extends  also  to  freedom  of  contract,  freedom  of  occu- 
pation and  employment,  and  freedom  in  the  use  of  all 
those  faculties  that  contribute  to  human  happiness,  con- 
tent, and  comfort. 

And  the  term  "  property  "  applies  to  vested  rights 
in  subjects  of  ownership,  not  to  mere  contingent  or 
expectant  rights  such  as  the  expectancy  a  sole  child 


GUARANTEES— EQUAL  PROTECTION     179 

may  have  that  he  will  receive  all  his  father's  property 
at  the  latter's  death. 

In  the  proposed  international  constitution,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  phrase  suitable  to  convey  this  idea  common 
to  all  the  nations,  it  would  perhaps  be  unwise  to  use 
the  technical  phrase  of  the  English  and  American  law. 
It  thus  becomes  necessary,  in  the  place  of  the  term 
"  due  process  of  law,"  to  use  language  that  will  de- 
scribe the  principle  as  tersely  as  possible.1 

X 

EQUAL  PROTECTION  OF  THE  LAWS 

The  governmental  power  to  pass  discriminatory  and 
preferential  legislation,  as  has  been  indicated  in  sev- 
eral connections,  is  often  a  source  of  grievous  injustice 
and  oppression  whether  it  be  aimed  at  the  component 
States  of  a  federal  union  or  at  the  persons  subject  to 
the  governmental  regulations. 

Instances  have  already  appeared  in  which  our  pro- 
posed international  constitution  has  prohibited  the  fed- 
eral government  to  enact  legislation  that  might  discrim- 
inate in  favor  of  or  against  certain  of  the  component 
nations. 

It  ought  equally  to  be  prohibited  to  use  the  inter- 
national power  in  such  manner  as  to  discriminate  un- 
reasonably in  favor  of  or  against  particular  persons 
or  classes.  Hence  a  clause  has  been  inserted  in  our 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  2,  cl.  8. 


i8o  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

constitution  providing  that  no  person  shall  be  denied 
by  the  United  Nations  "  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws," — a  phrase  which  is  found  in  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  to  the  American  Constitution. 

As  construed  in  the  United  States,  this  does  not  mean 
that  governmental  action  shall  be  absolutely  uniform 
in  its  application  to  all  persons.  It  permits  classifi- 
cations of  persons  upon  reasonable  lines,  and  author- 
izes the  application  of  different  legislation  to  the  dif- 
ferent classes.  But  the  classifications  must  not  be 
purely  arbitrary  or  based  upon  grounds  for  which  no 
sound  reason  can  be  given.  Subject  to  these  limita- 
tions, the  classifications  may  be  as  minute  as  the  legis- 
lature may  choose  to  make  them. 

When,  however,  the  classifications  have  once  been 
made,  it  would  be  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  to  single  out  individuals  of  the  class,  and  make 
laws  applicable  to  them  which  would  not  apply  to  other 
members  of  the  same  class  who  cannot  be  differentiated 
from  the  former  upon  any  line  that  would  justify  the 
difference  in  the  laws  applicable  to  them,  respectively.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  2,  cl.  8. 


CHAPTER  XII 

LIMITATIONS  UPON  THE  POWERS  OF  THE 
UNITED  NATIONS— (III)  GUARANTEES 
OF  INDIVIDUAL  RIGHTS  IN  CRIMINAL 
CASES 

I 

DUE  PROCESS  OF  LAW — EQUAL  PROTECTION  OF 
THE  LAWS 

The  two  limitations  last  examined  in  the  preceding 
chapter  apply  equally  to  guarantee  one's  rights  in  civil 
and  in  criminal  cases,  and  belong  as  much  to  this  as  to 
the  preceding  chapter. 

There  is  no  need  to  repeat  the  discussion,  and  they 
will  be  passed  over. 

II 

BILLS  OF  ATTAINDER — Ex  POST  FACTO  LAWS 

Our  model,  the  American  Constitution,  provides  as 
a  limitation  upon  the  federal  powers  that 

"  no  bill  of  attainder  or  ex  post  facto  law  shall  be 
passed." 

These  two  phrases  are  technical  terms  of  the  Eng- 
lish and  American  law,  and  not  only  demand  some  ex- 

181 


182  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

planation,  but  also  necessitate  the  use  of  periphrasis 
in  the  wording  of  the  corresponding  limitation  in  our 
international  constitution,  since  the  terms  would  be  un- 
known in  other  countries,  though  the  principles  them- 
selves might  be  recognized. 

A  bill  of  attainder  is  a  legislative  (instead  of  a  ju- 
dicial) adjudication  of  the  criminal  guilt  of  a  per- 
son and  a  legislative  sentence  of  the  person  convicted 
to  execution,  imprisonment,  fine,  or  other  punish- 
ment. 

An  ex  post  facto  law,  as  defined  in  America,  is  a 
law  which  makes  an  act  punishable  criminally  to  a 
greater  extent  than  when  committed,  or  which  alters 
the  rules  of  evidence  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  ac- 
cused, so  as  to  require  less  or  different  evidence  to 
convict  him.  It  applies  only  to  crimes,  and  not  to 
civil  rights,  remedies  or  procedure. 

These  two  provisions  afford  very  important  safe- 
guards to  the  personal  security  of  the  individual 
against  governmental  oppression,  and  ought  not  to  fail 
of  insertion  in  the  list  of  limitations  upon  the  powers 
of  the  international  government.1 

Ill 

GENERAL  WARRANTS  OF  ARREST  AND  SEARCH 

Still  another  limitation  imposed  by  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  upon  the  federal  power  is  found 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  i. 


GUARANTEES— GENERAL  WARRANTS    183 

in  the  Fourth  Amendment  to  that  instrument,  as  fol- 
lows: 

:t  The  right  of  the  people  to  be  secure  in  their 
persons,  houses,  papers,  and  effects  against  un- 
reasonable searches  and  seizures  shall  not  be  vio- 
lated, and  no  warrants  shall  issue  but  upon  prob- 
able cause,  supported  by  oath  or  affirmation,  and 
particularly  describing  the  place  to  be  searched 
and  the  persons  or  things  to  be  seized." 

Thus  has  been  imbedded  in  the  fundamental  law 
of  the  United  States  that  great  principle  of  liberty  ex- 
pressed in  the  phrase,  "  One's  house  is  one's  castle," 
and  which  Lord  Chatham  so  eloquently  proclaimed  in 
his  speech  on  General  Warrants,  in  the  famous  pas- 
sage : 

'  The  poorest  man  may  in  his  cottage  bid  de- 
fiance to  all  the  forces  of  the  crown.  It  may  be 
frail;  its  roof  may  shake;  the  wind  may  blow 
through  it;  the  storm  may  enter;  the  rain  may 
enter.  But  the  king  of  England  may  not  enter. 
All  his  force  dares  not  cross  the  threshold  of  the 
ruined  tenement." 

Whatever  the  domestic  laws  of  the  several  States 
with  respect  to  such  matters,  no  nation  in  joining  the 
proposed  union  could  have  other  than  a  feeling  of  relief 
that  the  international  government  would  be  prohibited 
to  exercise  such  arbitrary  powers  within  its  borders.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  2. 


1 84  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

IV 
DOUBLE  JEOPARDY 

Another  limitation  upon  the  powers  of  the  federal 
government  of  the  United  States  is  found  in  the  con- 
stitutional provision  that  no  person  shall 

"  be  subject  for  the  same  offense  to  be  twice  put 
in  jeopardy  of  life  or  limb." 

This  is  the  English  and  American  legal  expression 
of  a  principle  of  justice  that  probably  prevails  in  one 
form  or  another  in  every  civilized  country,  that  is,  that 
an  accused  person,  having  once  been  tried  for  an  of- 
fense and  either  acquitted,  or  convicted  and  punished, 
shall  not  be  subject  to  another  trial  for  that  particular 
offense. 

This  is  a  principle  which  should  certainly  be  applied 
in  all  prosecutions  by  the  international  government  for 
violations  of  its  laws. 

But  in  its  technical  application  in  the  United  States, 
the  rule  has  sometimes  been  carried  further  than  strict 
justice  demands;  for  it  is  held  that  a  person  has  been 
in  jeopardy  as  soon  as  his  trial  commences,  that  is,  as 
soon  as  the  jury  has  been  sworn  and  charged  with  his 
deliverance,  and  that  therefore  the  right  to  try  him 
again  ceases,  however  guilty  he  may  be,  whether  a  ver- 
dict is  reached  or  not,  unless  the  trial  is  terminated  by 
some  inevitable  necessity,  such  as  the  illness  or  death 
of  the  judge  or  a  juror,  or  a  divided  jury,  or  unless 


GUARANTEES— SELF-INCRIMINATION    1 85 

the  prisoner  himself  asks  or  consents  that  he  be  placed 
again  on  trial  (as  he  might  do  if  he  were  convicted  and 
desires  a  new  trial). 

Some  of  these  technicalities  and  refinements  would 
perhaps  be  unknown  in  other  countries,  nor  do  they 
appear  specially  called  for  by  the  general  principles 
of  justice. 

It  would  therefore  seem  preferable  to  depart  in 
this  respect  from  the  precise  language  of  the  American 
Constitution,  while  yet  recognizing  the  principle.1 

V 

SELF-INCRIMINATION 

That  no  one  should  be  required  to  give  evidence  that 
would  tend  to  convict  him  of  a  criminal  offense  has 
.long  been  a  deep-rooted  principle  of  English  and  Amer- 
ican law;  but  in  its  completeness  at  least,  it  can  hardly 
be  said  to  prevail  generally  or  even  usually  in  other 
systems  of  law. 

The  question  then  is  presented  whether  this  should 
be  included  as  one  of  the  limitations  upon  the  powers 
of  the  international  government  for  the  protection  of 
the  individual. 

The  insertion  of  it  would  probably  be  strongly  urged 
by  the  English-speaking  nations,  whose  people  are  ac- 
customed to  regard  it  as  a  fundamental  personal  right; 
and  no  other  nation  would  be  likely  to  object  seriously 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  3. 


1 86  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

to  its  insertion,  since  the  prohibition  would  decrease 
the  chances  of  the  oppression  of  its  own  citizens  by  the 
international  government.1 

VI 
THE  GRAND  JURY 

The  Fifth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  declares  that 

"  No  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  capi- 
tal or  otherwise  infamous  crime  unless  upon  a  pre- 
sentment or  indictment  of  a  grand  jury,  except  in 
cases  arising  in  the  land  or  naval  forces,  or  in  the 
militia  when  in  actual  service  in  time  of  war  or 
public  danger." 

The  institution  of  the  grand  jury,  the  function  of 
which  is  not  to  try  the  guilt  of  the  accused  but  only  to 
determine  whether  the  evidence  against  him  is  suffi- 
cient to  justify  his  trial,  is  well  known  in  England  and 
the  United  States;  but  it  is  unknown  in  most  of  the 
countries  of  the  world,  in  many  of  which  other  methods 
just  as  efficient  are  used  to  prevent  frivolous  or  mali- 
cious accusations  of  crime. 

It  would  seem  prudent  therefore  to  leave  this  mat- 
ter to  the  discretion  of  the  Congress. 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  3. 


GUARANTEES— JURY  TRIAL          187 
VII 

SPEEDY  AND  PUBLIC  TRIAL  IN  CRIMINAL  CASES 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  comment  upon  the  impor- 
tance of  a  constitutional  guarantee  of  a  speedy  and 
public  trial  to  one  accused  of  crime. 

In  the  absence  of  such  guarantee,  not  only  may  an 
accused  person  be  left  to  languish  indefinitely  in  prison 
awaiting  a  trial  that  does  not  come,  and  thus  in  effect 
be  punished  for  an  alleged  crime  without  a  trial,  but 
he  might  be  tried  secretly  and  convicted  by  an  inimical 
or  corrupt  tribunal,  regardless  of  the  evidence  of  his 
innocence  or  by  a  procedure  which,  if  public,  would  not 
be  tolerated  by  general  opinion.1 

VIII 

JURY  TRIAL  IN  CRIMINAL  CASES 

The  Sixth  Amendment  to  the  United  States  Consti- 
tution provides  that  in  criminal  cases  the  trial  shall 
be 

"  by  an  impartial  jury  of  the  State  and  district 
wherein  the  crime  shall  have  been  committed, 
which  district  shall  have  been  previously  ascer- 
tained by  law." 

This  clause  is  construed  as  demanding,  in  all  crim- 
inal prosecutions  instituted  by  the  United  States,  that 
1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  4. 


1 88  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  prisoner  shall  be  deter- 
mined, in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  the  English 
common  law,  by  an  impartial  jury  of  twelve  men 
(neither  more  nor  less),  whose  unanimous  verdict, 
after  hearing  the  legal  evidence  adduced,  shall  be  neces- 
sary to  convict  or  acquit.  If  any  juror  dissents  from 
the  verdict  of  his  fellows,  there  is  a  mistrial,  and  the 
prisoner  may  be  tried  again  by  another  jury;  but  if  all 
the  jurors  agree  that  he  is  innocent  or  that  no  sufficient 
evidence  of  his  guilt  has  been  adduced,  the  verdict  is 
"  not  guilty,"  and  he  cannot  be  again  tried  for  that 
offense. 

The  jury  system  in  criminal  cases,  at  one  time  con- 
fined to  English-speaking  nations,  has  now  been 
adopted  with  more  or  less  modification  in  many  of  the 
European  countries  and  elsewhere,  and  may  be  said 
to  have  fully  proved  its  usefulness  in  those  cases. 

From  the  standpoint  of  a  constitutional  protection  to 
the  accused,  its  advantage  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  tempers 
the  severity  of  the  abstract  law  and  the  possible  malice 
of  prosecutors  and  government  officials  with  the  public 
opinion  of  the  community  as  represented  by  the  jury. 

It  is  not  essential,  however,  for  these  results  that 
the  jury  should,  as  in  England  and  in  the  United  States, 
consist  of  twelve  men,  or  that  they  should  be  unanimous 
in  their  verdict. 

While  it  would  seem  wise  to  insert  in  the  proposed 
constitution  a  requirement  of  trial  by  jury  in  criminal 
cases  prosecuted  before  the  international  courts,  such 
matters  as  the  number  of  the  jurors  and  the  majority 


OTHER  GUARANTEES  189 

necessary  to  find  a  verdict  might  well  be  left  to  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  Congress.1 

IX 
OTHER  GUARANTEES  IN  CRIMINAL  CASES 

Every  sentiment  of  justice  and  fairness  demands  that 
an  accused  person  should  be  informed  of  the  nature 
and  cause  of  the  accusation  against  him;  that  he  be 
confronted  with  his  accusers  and  the  witnesses  against 
him,  with  the  right  to  cross-examine  them  and  elicit  the 
truth;  that  for  the  purposes  of  his  defense  he  be  placed 
upon  an  equal  plane  with  his  powerful  antagonist,  the 
government,  and  be  given  the  right  to  obtain  the  com- 
pulsory attendance  of  witnesses  in  his  favor;  that  he  be 
not  denied  the  aid  and  comfort  of  legal  counsel  in 
his  defense;  and  that  he  be  allowed  his  freedom  while 
awaiting  trial  for  a  crime  not  too  serious,  upon 
giving  bail  or  proper  security  that  he  will  appear  to 
answer  the  charge  at  the  time  and  place  appointed 
for  the  trial. 

As  in  the  other  cases  heretofore  considered,  no  na- 
tion would  be  likely  to  object  to  the  imposition  of  these 
limitations  upon  the  international  government,  since 
they  would  all  constitute  valuable  safeguards  of  life 
and  liberty  to  its  own  citizens  against  possible  tyran- 
nical encroachments  of  the  federal  government.2 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,.  Art.  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  4. 
3  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  5. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

LIMITATIONS  UPON  THE  POWERS  OF  THE 
COMPONENT  NATIONS 

I 

GENERAL  LIMITATIONS  OF  A  NON-POLITICAL  NATURE 

As  preliminary  to  an  examination  of  the  limitations 
which  must  be  imposed  upon  the  powers  of  the  com- 
ponent nations  in  order  to  the  success  of  an  interna- 
tional union,  it  is  proper  to  observe  that,  in  a  looser 
confederation  of  the  kind  here  proposed,  the  fewer 
these  limitations  are,  consistent  with  a  suitable  degree 
of  power  in  the  international  government,  the  safer  the 
constituent  nations  and  the  greater  the  probability 
that  they  may  assent  to  the  experiment.  The  burden 
then  is  on  him  who  maintains  the  necessity  of  a  par- 
ticular limitation  of  this  sort  to  show  that  the  success 
of  the  union  would  be  jeopardized  by  the  failure  of  the 
component  States  to  surrender  all  right  to  exercise  the 
given  power.  This  should  be  the  one  and  only  test  of 
the  propriety  of  the  limitation. 

The  reader  must  also  remember  that  a  mere  grant 
of  power  to  the  international  government  does  not 

190 


LIMITATIONS  ON  COMPONENT  STATES  191 

necessarily  imply  the  exclusion  of  the  component  States 
from  the  exercise  of  the  same  power.  In  order  that 
the  States  be  thus  excluded,  it  is  necessary  either  that 
they  be  actually  prohibited  by  the  compact  to  exercise 
it,  or  else  that  the  international  government  shall  have 
been  granted  the  power  and  shall  have  already  occu- 
pied the  field,  so  that  an  exercise  of  the  same  power 
by  the  several  States  would  be  inconsistent  with  the 
superior  right  of  the  international  government  to  regu- 
late the  matter. 

Our  model,  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
contains  a  considerable  number  of  limitations  upon 
the  powers  of  the  States,  only  some  of  which,  however, 
were  imposed  by  the  framers  of  the  original  Consti- 
tution. These  are  set  forth  in  the  tenth  section  of  the 
first  Article  of  that  instrument.  They  were  augmented 
by  certain  others  to  be  found  in  the  Thirteenth,  Four- 
teenth, and  Fifteenth  Amendments  passed  as  a  con- 
sequence of  the  great  conflict  of  1861  between  the 
States. 

Some  of  the  limitations  thus  imposed  upon  the 
State  powers  relate  to  the  internal  and  domestic  insti- 
tutions, policies,  and  affairs  of  the  States,  or  their  rela- 
tions to  their  own  citizens  as  well  as  to  other  persons, 
tending  in  their  operation  to  consolidate  the  States 
and  their  people  into  a  single  nation,  but  having  little 
or  no  bearing  upon  that  other  great  purpose  of  a  fed- 
eral union,  and  the  chief  purpose  of  the  union  we  are 
considering, — the  elimination  of  war  between  the  com- 
ponent nations.  To  the  extent  that  they  do  not  aid 


192  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

this  chief  design  of  our  international  compact,  they 
ought  to  be  eliminated  from  the  discussion. 

Thus  the  Thirteenth  Amendment  abolishes  slavery 
within  the  United  States  and  all  places  subject  to  their 
jurisdiction.  It  is  obvious  that  this  provision  deals 
with  an  institution  of  an  internal  or  domestic  charac- 
ter which,  while  now  obsolete  in  the  most  progressive 
countries,  still  prevails  in  one  form  or  another  in  some 
countries  less  advanced.  And  though  the  majority  of 
the  nations  would  doubtless  welcome  the  abolition  of 
such  institutions  throughout  the  world,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  this  is  one  of  those  internal  reforms 
that  of  itself  has  no  bearing  upon  war  or  peace, 
and  hence  should  theoretically  have  no  place  among 
the  powers  to  be  surrendered  by  the  component 
nations. 

But  with  respect  to  the  slave  trade,  so  far  as  it 
might  be  carried  on  between  the  component  nations  a 
different  result  would  follow  because  of  the  grant  to 
the  Congress  of  the  power  to  regulate  international 
commerce.  True,  the  Congress  is  forbidden  under  this 
clause  to  meddle  with  "  immigration,  emigration,  or  the 
migration  of  citizens  of  a  component  State  from  one 
such  State  to  another."  Slaves,  however,  would  not 
be  citizens  of  a  State,  though  resident  therein,  but,  as 
mere  articles  of  merchandise,  would  fall  within  the 
power  of  the  Congress  to  control  international  com- 
merce. That  body  therefore  might  constitutionally  en- 
act laws  making  international  traffic  in  slaves  illegal 
as  between  the  component  nations  or  as  between  them 


LIMITATIONS  ON  COMPONENT  STATES  193 

and  nations  not  members  of  the  union.  Such  laws,  how- 
ever, could  not  properly  be  extended  into  the  borders 
of  a  component  State,  and  made  to  apply  either  to 
the  domestic  institution  of  slavery  or  peonage  existing 
there  or  to  the  domestic  traffic  in  slaves.  Such  matters 
must  be  left,  as  they  now  are,  subject  to  the  exclusive 
control  of  the  several  States. 

The  success  of  an  international  union  such  as  we  are 
considering  will  depend  upon  the  absolute  observance 
of  the  principle  that  the  proposed  government  shall 
possess  no  power  to  interfere  in  the  local  and  domestic 
concerns  of  any  nation  except  to  the  extent  necessary 
to  prevent  war  (or  possibly  in  those  cases  wherein 
the  general  convenience  of  all  nations  would  be  greatly 
subserved  by  the  exercise  of  a  central  authority,  as  per- 
haps in  case  of  international  coinage,  currency,  copy- 
right, etc.). 

Again,  some  of  the  limitations  imposed  upon  the 
States  by  the  American  Constitution  have  for  their 
object  the  protection  of  individuals  against  the  pos- 
sibility of  aggression  by  the  States.  This  is  true 
even  of  a  few  of  the  limitations  contained  in  the 
original  Constitution,  and  is  eminently  true  of  those 
contained  in  the  Fourteenth  and  Fifteenth  Amend- 
ments. 

Thus  in  Article  I,  Sec.  10,  cl.  i,  the  original  Consti- 
tution provides  that  no  State 

"  shall  pass  any  bill  of  attainder,  ex  post  facto 
law,  or  law  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts, 
or  grant  any  title  of  nobility." 


194  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

The  Fourteenth  Amendment  declares  that 

"  All  persons  born  or  naturalized  in  the  United 
States  and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof  are 
citizens  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  State 
wherein  they  reside. 

"  No  State  shall  make  or  enforce  any  law  that 
shall  abridge  the  privileges  or  immunities  of  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States;  nor  shall  any  State 
deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty,  or  property 
without  due  process  of  law;  nor  deny  to  any  per- 
son within  its  jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws." 

And  the  Fifteenth  Amendment  provides  that 

"  The  right  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  to 
vote  shall  not  be  denied  or  abridged  by  the  United 
States  or  by  any  State  on  account  of  race,  color, 
or  previous  condition  of  servitude." 

With  respect  to  all  these  limitations  upon  the  powers 
of  the  States,  the  general  observation  may  be  made 
that  they  are  not  imposed  upon  those  broad  political 
powers  (the  exercise  of  which  by  the  States  might 
imperil  the  union's  existence  or  interfere  with  its  proper 
functions)  such  as  the  power  to  make  treaties  or 
to  levy  duties  on  imports  or  to  declare  war.  They 
constitute  limitations  upon  the  power  of  the  States 
to  deal  with  individuals  within  their  boundaries  which, 
however  essential  in  a  constitution,  one  of  the  prime 
purposes  of  which  is  to  create  of  the  composite  States 
a  single  nation — would  be  inappropriate  in  a  constitu- 
tion creating  a  looser  confederation  between  independ- 


LIMITATIONS  ON  COMPONENT  STATES  195 

ent  nations,  the  main  design  of  which  is  the  suppression 
of  wars  between  them. 

It  may  also  be  remarked  that  the  experience  of  the 
United  States  proves  that  certain  of  these  clauses, — 
notably  those  prohibiting  the  States  to  pass  laws  im- 
pairing the  obligation  of  contracts,  to  deprive  any  per- 
son of  life,  liberty,  or  property  without  due  process 
of  law,  or  to  deny  to  any  person  within  their  jurisdic- 
tion the  equal  protection  of  the  laws, — have  furnished 
perhaps  more  grounds  of  litigation  in  the  federal  courts 
than  any  other  clauses  in  the  constitution;  and  have 
thus  afforded  greater  opportunities  to  the  federal  au- 
thorities to  interfere  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  the  sev- 
eral States,  and  to  expand  the  power  and  influence 
of  the  federal  government  at  the  expense  of  the  sov- 
ereignty and  reserved  powers  of  the  States.  It  is  open 
to  doubt  whether  a  strong  tendency  in  this  direction  is 
desirable  even  in  the  United  States;  it  is  very  certain 
that  it  would  be  disastrous  in  the  international  federa- 
tion. 

All  of  these  constitute  reasons  why  these  limitations 
upon  the  powers  of  the  component  nations  should  be 
omitted  from  our  compact,  and  the  several  nations  be 
left  free  as  at  present  to  deal  with  their  own  citizens 
within  their  borders  as  their  own  constitutions,  laws 
and  customs  shall  dictate.  But  it  by  no  means  follows 
that  such  limitations  as  we  are  discussing  should  not  be 
imposed  upon  them  with  respect  to  their  treatment  of 
the  citizens  of  other  States. 

On  the  contrary,  when  it  is  remembered  that  each 


196  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

component  nation  will  have  surrendered  its  rights  to 
use  force  against  its  sister  nations,  it  is  no  more  than 
fair  and  just,  and  indeed  it  would  be  necessary,  that 
each  nation  in  return  should  have  a  guarantee  through 
the  international  constitution,  to  be  enforced  by  the 
courts  both  national  and  international,  that  its  citizens 
when  in  other  States  shall  be  treated  with  proper  con- 
sideration; that  their  lives  and  liberty  shall  not  be  en- 
dangered by  bills  of  attainder  or  ex  post  facto  laws,  or 
taken  from  them  without  due  process  of  law;  and  that 
their  property  rights  shall  not  be  taken  without  like 
process,  or  by  the  enactment  of  laws  impairing  the  ob- 
ligation of  contracts  and  the  like. 

This  point,  however,  belongs  more  appropriately 
under  another  head,  and  will  be  examined  again  when 
we  come  to  consider  the  relations  of  the  component  na- 
tions to  each  other  in  a  subsequent  chapter. 

II 

POLITICAL  POWERS  HAVING  No  BEARING  ON  WAR 

In  the  previous  investigation  of  the  powers  to  be 
granted  to  the  international  congress,  the  conclusion 
was  tentatively  reached  that  possibly  international  con- 
venience would  be  so  greatly  subserved  by  a  grant  to 
the  Congress  of  the  powers  to  coin  money,  issue  cur- 
rency, regulate  copyrights  and  patent  rights  of  an 
international  character,  and  fix  standards  of  weights 
and  measures  for  purposes  of  international  trade,  as 


TREATIES  BY  COMPONENT  STATES    197 

to  demand  their  inclusion  amongst  the  powers  granted, 
despite  the  fact  that  it  would  constitute  a  departure 
from  the  principle  that  only  such  powers  ought  to  be 
granted  as  would  aid  in  the  suppression  of  war  be- 
tween the  component  nations. 

It  is  now  to  be  observed  that  even  should  these  pow- 
ers, or  some  of  them,  be  granted  to  the  Congress,  this 
would  not  involve  the  necessity  of  the  surrender  by  the 
nations  of  the  concurrent  powers  to  control  and  regu- 
late them,  provided  their  regulations  be  not  incon- 
sistent with  those  made  by  the  Congress.  It  would  seem 
eminently  unwise  to  impose  a  total  prohibition  upon  the 
States  to  exercise  these  powers. 

Ill 

TREATIES,  ALLIANCES,  AND  CONFEDERATIONS 

We  next  turn  to  those  powers,  essentially  of  a  po- 
litical character,  the  exercise  of  which  by  the  compo- 
nent nations  would  jeopardize  the  existence  or  func- 
tions of  the  international  government.  Here  again 
the  subject  may  be  best  developed  by  reference  to  the 
limitations  imposed  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  upon  the  exercise  of  such  political  powers  by 
the  American  States. 

With  respect  to  the  treaty-making  power  the  Ameri- 
can Constitution  provides  that 

"  No  State  shall  enter  into  any  treaty,  alliance, 
or  confederation." 


198  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

That  the  word  "  treaty,"  as  here  used,  means  treaty 
of  a  political  character  is  shown  by  the  further  provi- 
sion that 

"  No  State  shall,  without  the  consent  of  Con- 
gress, enter  into  any  agreement  or  compact  with 
another  State  or  with  a  foreign  power." 

It  thus  appears  that  a  State  is  absolutely  prohibited 
to  enter  into  any  "  treaty,  alliance,  or  confederation," 
with  or  without  the  consent  of  Congress,  while  it  is 
permitted,  with  such  consent,  to  enter  into  "  agreements 
and  compacts  "  other  than  those  just  mentioned. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  discern  the  purpose  of  these  limi- 
tations. The  Constitution  had  elsewhere  bestowed  the 
entire  treaty-making  power  upon  the  federal  govern- 
ment, as  representing  with  respect  to  foreign  relations 
a  single  nation.  Had  the  States  been  permitted  to 
make  treaties  with  foreign  countries,  great  embarrass- 
ments might  result  to  the  federal  and  State  govern- 
ments alike,  whose  treaty  obligations  might  conflict. 
And  should  these  State  treaties  take  the  form  of  al- 
liances or  confederations  with  foreign  countries,  the 
conflict  of  duties  might  be  even  sharper  and  graver. 

On  the  other  hand,  since  it  was  the  aim  of  the  Con- 
stitution to  grant  to  the  United  States  the  general  con- 
trol of  interstate  relations,  the  making  of  treaties, 
alliances,  or  confederations  between  the  several  States 
would  be  ineffectual,  save  as  instrumentalities  of  dis- 
union; and  if,  by  reason  of  omissions  in  the  Constitu- 
tion, a  question  should  arise  between  the  States  or  with 


TREATIES  BY  COMPONENT  STATES    199 

foreign  countries  for  the  settlement  of  which  some 
agreement  between  them  might  become  necessary,  this 
was  provided  for  by  the  recognition  of  their  power 
to  enter  into  such  agreement  with  the  consent  of  Con- 
gress. There  have  not  been  many  instances,  however, 
wherein  there  has  been  need  to  invoke  the  power, 
agreements  for  the  settlement  of  boundary  disputes 
between  the  States  constituting  the  most  important  ex- 
amples. 

In  considering  whether  such  a  limitation  ought  to  be 
inserted  in  our  international  constitution  and,  if  so, 
the  scope  of  it,  we  must  remember  that  the  conditions 
are  not  the  same  that  confronted  the  American  States 
when  they  established  their  Constitution. 

They  proposed  to  create  to  a  certain  extent  a  new 
nation  amongst  nations,  whereas  it  is  proposed  here 
merely  to  create  a  political  corporation  or  combination 
of  nations  possessing  certain  delegated  powers,  but 
not  itself  a  nation;  the  international  government  being 
nothing  more  than  the  agent  of  the  combined  nations, 
with  powers  not  inherent,  but  only  emanations  of  the 
joint  sovereignty  of  the  nations  which  have  created 
it  through  their  compact. 

It  was  necessary  to  grant  to  the  United  States, 
viewed  as  one  nation,  the  exclusive  power  to  deal  with 
other  nations  on  equal  terms,  and  hence  it  was  needful 
to  give  them  a  complete  and  plenary  treaty-making 
power.  This  involved  in  turn  the  necessity  of  denying 
to  the  States  all  power  to  make  treaties,  alliances,  or 
confederations. 


200  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

The  international  union,  however,  would  be  of  nar- 
rower scope,  so  far  as  its  powers  are  concerned.  It 
must  be  recognized  that  some  nations  might  not  be- 
come members  of  it,  and  as  to  these  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  confer  upon  the  international  government  a  cer- 
tain treaty-making  power  commensurate  with  its  war 
powers,  its  control  of  international  commerce  and  com- 
munication and  the  other  powers  granted  to  it. 

But  to  go  beyond  this,  and  grant  to  it  the  complete 
and  plenary  power  to  make  treaties  of  all  sorts  with 
nations  not  members  of  the  union,  would  necessarily 
involve  a  total  surrender  by  the  component  nations  of 
the  treaty-making  power  even  in  respect  to  matters 
over  which  the  international  government  would  have, 
and  ought  to  have,  no  control.  Moreover,  if  the 
United  Nations  were  given  this  general  treaty-making 
power,  these  treaties  must  be  regarded  as  laws  of  a 
dignity  superior  to  the  laws  and  policies  of  the  sev- 
eral nations,  thus  involving  a  surrender  of  internal  sov- 
ereignty which  few  nations  would  consent  to  make,  and 
which,  it  is  believed,  would  be  unnecessary. 

It  would  seem  sufficient  to  grant  to  the  international 
government  the  exclusive  power  to  make  all  treaties 
with  nations  not  members  of  the  union  which  are 
proper  and  necessary  to  carry  out  the  powers  granted 
it,  making  it  plenary  and  complete  so  far  as  relates  to 
those  powers. 

On  the  other  hand,  while  the  component  nations,  like 
the  American  States,  ought  to  surrender  absolutely  the 
right  to  enter  into  alliances  and  confederations  with 


TAXATION  OF  COMMERCE  BY  STATES  201 

other  nations  and  into  treaties  dealing  with  subjects 
committed  to  the  control  of  the  international  govern- 
ment, there  would  seem  to  be  no  good  reason  why  they 
should  not  retain  the  power  to  enter  into  treaties  of 
other  sorts,  provided  the  consent  of  the  Congress  be 
first  obtained,  and  provided  that  it  be  made  essential 
to  the  validity  of  treaties  between  component  nations 
and  those  not  members  of  the  union  that  they  contain 
provisions  for  the  peaceable  settlement  of  all  disputes 
arising  under  them.  The  latter  proviso  would  be  un- 
necessary in  case  of  treaties  between  two  or  more  com- 
ponent nations  because  the  constitution  itself  provides 
for  the  settlement  of  all  disputes  between  them  by  the 
international  courts.1 

IV 
TAXATION  OF  INTERNATIONAL  COMMERCE 

The  student  of  history  needs  no  reminder  that  per- 
haps most  of  the  modern  wars  that  have  devastated  the 
world  have  had  their  roots  in  the  desire  to  extend  the 
commerce  of  one  nation  at  the  unfair  expense  of  others; 
and  the  student  of  politics  will  readily  recognize  that 
one  of  the  favorite  instrumentalities  of  this  extension, 
and  therefore  one  of  the  great  destroyers  of  good  will 
and  harmony,  as  well  as  one  of  the  great  breeders  of 
distrust  and  jealousy,  between  nations  is  to  be  found  in 
tariff  legislation  and  other  forms  of  the  taxation  of 
international  commerce. 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art  V,  Sec.  i. 


202  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

It  is  a  prime  essential  to  any  union  formed  for  the 
purpose  of  creating  and  preserving  mutual  concord 
among  its  component  nations,  that  there  should  be 
freedom  of  trade  among  them.  This  principle  has  been 
recognized  in  the  constitution  of  every  federal  union 
thus  far  created,  and  is  supported  by  every  considera- 
tion of  theory  as  well  as  of  practical  experience.1 

The  same  general  principle  has  been  applied  in  the 
previous  pages  of  this  study  to  the  international  gov- 
ernment itself  not  only  by  the  grant  to  that  govern- 
ment of  the  control  of  international  commerce,  but 
also  by  the  restriction  of  it  to  a  single  form  of  taxa- 

1  If  the  British  Empire  be  adduced  as  an  instance  to  the  contrary, 
it  may  be  replied  that,  while  it  is  true  the  British  Colonies  and 
Dominions  have  possessed  and  exercised  the  right  to  levy  tariff  duties 
even  on  imports  from  the  British  Isles,  yet  none  of  those  colonies  are 
in  the  position  of  being  forced  to  receive  or  send  imported  or  exported 
goods  through  the  ports  and  custom  houses  of  independent  colonies  or 
foreign  countries,  dependent  upon  their  good  will  for  the  conduct  of 
their  trade. 

Where  such  possibilities  have  existed,  as  in  the  case  of  the  interior 
colonies  or  provinces  of  Canada,  they  have  been  met  by  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  federal  constitution  and  the  adoption,  as  between  the 
colonies  concerned,  of  absolute  free  trade. 

Hence  nowhere  in  the  world  is  there  important  British  territory 
without  free  access  to  the  sea  or  dependent  upon  any  outside  authority 
for  the  security  of  its  commerce,  while  other  countries  like  Russia, 
Poland,  Hungary,  Serbia,  and  Rumania  have  sunk  more  or  less  into 
economic  bondage  because  of  the  want  of  such  access. 

Nor  is  it  only  for  this  reason  that  freedom  of  trade  would  seem 
to  be  necessary  between  the  component  States  of  a  federal  government 
Jealousy  and  ill-will  are  sooner  or  later  the  certain  fruits  of  restric- 
tions imposed  by  one  sister  State  upon  the  trade  of  another.  Even 
in  the  favorable  position  occupied  by  the  British  Empire,  as  just 
pointed  out,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  there  have  been  heard  from  time 
to  time  significant  notes  of  discord  resulting  from  the  imposition  of 
tariffs  as  between  its  parts. 


TAXATION  OF  COMMERCE  BY  STATES  203 

tion, — that  upon  land.  The  grant  to  the  federal  gov- 
ernment of  the  power  to  regulate  international  com- 
merce, as  a  preventive  of  discord  between  the  compo- 
nent nations,  would  be  idle  and  useless,  if  it  were  not 
accompanied  by  a  corresponding  surrender  on  the  part 
of  the  nations  of  the  right  to  burden  and  restrict  it 
through  the  exercise  of  the  taxing  power.  By  the  exer- 
cise of  such  power  one  nation  having  an  extensive 
seaboard  might  hold  at  its  mercy  a  neighboring  nation 
with  little  or  none. 

But  it  may  be  asked,  How  then  shall  the  nations  se- 
cure the  revenues  adequate  for  their  purposes,  if  they 
cannot  levy  duties  on  imports  ? 

One  sufficient  reply  would  be  to  point  to  England  as 
having  secured  revenue  sufficient  for  the  conduct  of  her 
great  empire  not  only  without  a  tariff  (except  on  a  few 
luxuries)  but  at  the  same  time  under  the  burden  of  hav- 
ing to  meet  in  her  commerce  the  high  tariffs  of  other 
nations.  Yet  she  has  survived  and  prospered  exceed- 
ingly. 

Or  we  might  point  to  the  component  States  of  any  of 
the  existing  federal  unions  to  establish  the  fact  that  the 
right  to  tax  imports  is  not  essential  to  the  existence 
or  prosperity  of  a  State.  Indeed,  the  wider  the  extent 
of  territory  occupied  by  a  federal  union,  and  the 
greater  the  scope  of  the  freedom  of  trade  among  its 
component  States,  the  greater  is  this  prosperity,  other 
things  being  equal. 

Again,  to  meet  this  question,  it  may  be  observed  that 
in  most  countries  the  revenues  from  the  tariffs  do  not 


204  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

more  than  suffice  to  pay  the  great  expenditures  for  the 
armaments  which  the  constant  dread  of  war  makes 
necessary.  Let  each  nation  set  off  against  the  loss 
of  revenue  through  its  surrender  of  the  right  to  levy 
duties  on  imports  or  exports  the  gain  in  the  saving  of 
armaments  no  longer  needed,  and  the  balance  in  most 
cases  w'ould  be  on  the  credit  side  of  the  account. 

Furthermore,  one  must  not  overlook  the  great  finan- 
cial gain  to  the  people  of  each  State  because  of  econ- 
omies of  expenditure  that  would  be  forced  upon 
governments  dependent  for  their  revenue  upon  pay- 
ments of  taxes  directly  by  the  people. 

The  proposition  would  doubtless  be  antagonized  by 
the  privileged  classes  in  every  State,  whose  business  is 
protected  by  the  high  tariffs,  and  many  prophecies 
and  threats  of  dire  disaster  would  be  heard.  It  would 
be  argued  that  freedom  of  trade  would  be  followed 
by  the  gravitation  of  manufactures  to  the  point  of 
cheapest  production,  and  that  thus  each  country  would 
become  less  independent  and  self-sufficient.  In  reply  it 
may  be  said  that  it  is  now  considered  desirable  that  a 
country  produce  all  it  needs  chiefly  because  of  the  pos- 
sibilities of  war  in  cutting  off  its  supplies  from  other 
countries.  Once  eliminate  the  chance  of  war,  and  the 
question  would  soon  solve  itself,  and  trade  would  fol- 
low the  freer  lines  of  least  resistance. 

It  must  also  be  remembered  that  all  such  arguments 
have  been  pressed  with  great  vigor  against  the  estab- 
lishment of  every  federal  union  now  extant,  from  the 
United  States  of  America  to  the  German  Empire;  yet 


TAXATION  OF  COMMERCE  BY  STATES  205 

as  between  the  component  States  of  each  union  the  free- 
dom of  trade  established  has  never  resulted  disas- 
trously to  the  States  concerned,  but  on  the  contrary 
has  given  an  augmented  impetus  to  their  industrial 
development. 

There  is  another  way,  besides  the  laying  of  duties 
on  imports  and  exports,  wherein  the  component  na- 
tions, if  unrestricted,  might  impose  taxes  upon  inter- 
national commerce,  that  is,  by  laying  duties  on  vessels 
or  other  vehicles  of  such  commerce  in  proportion  to 
their  carrying  capacity,  not  in  proportion  merely  to 
their  value  as  property.  Through  tonnage  taxes  of 
this  description  it  would  be  possible  for  a  component 
nation,  if  so  disposed,  to  lay  very  considerable  bur- 
dens upon  international  commerce  or  to  pass  preferen- 
tial legislation  in  favor  of  or  against  the  commerce  of 
particular  nations.  This  sort  of  legislation  also  ought 
to  be  prohibited  by  the  international  compact. 

These  do  not  exhaust  the  means  that  might  be  used 
by  a  nation  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  its  own  com- 
merce at  the  unfair  expense  of  other  nations,  but  they 
would  constitute  the  most  usual  means.  Should  others 
develop  from  time  to  time,  exercises  of  the  power 
granted  to  the  Congress  to  regulate  international  com- 
merce by  uniform  laws  would  suffice  to  put  an  end  to 
such  evil  practices.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  V,  Sec.  2. 


206  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

V 
THE  WAR  POWERS  OF  THE  COMPONENT  NATIONS 

It  has  already  been  indicated  that  the  success  of  an 
international  union  such  as  is  here  contemplated  would 
be  hopeless  without  a  surrender  by  the  component  na- 
tions of  the  principal  part  of  their  war  powers.  Nor 
would  it  suffice  for  this  purpose  merely  to  grant  to  the 
federal  government  the  power  to  keep  troops  and  bat- 
tleships and  to  declare  war.  There  must  also  be  an 
actual  surrender  by  the  component  nations  of  a  large 
portion  of  these  powers. 

But  it  can  hardly  be  supposed  that  the  nations,  ac- 
customed as  they  are  to  rely  upon  their  own  strong 
arms  to  enforce  their  rights  and  defend  themselves 
against  aggression,  would  consent  to  yield  themselves 
bound  hand  and  foot  to  the  mercies  of  a  federal  gov- 
ernment wherein  other  nations  would  have  as  great  a 
voice  as  themselves,  or  even  greater. 

It  is  necessary,  and  indeed  eminently  desirable,  that 
they  should  not  surrender  their  right  to  organize  and 
train  militia,  or  citizen  soldiery,  not  only  because  mili- 
tary force  of  this  kind  will  sometimes  be  needed  to 
quell  internal  disorders,  but  because  it  is  possible  that 
a  nation  may  be  called  upon  to  repel  attacks  upon  it 
from  without,  or  even  from  within,  the  union;  and 
while  the  federal  government  would  be  bound  to  aid  a 
component  nation  against  such  attacks,  its  aid  could 
be  given  only  after  an  appreciable  interval  during 


WAR  POWERS  OF  STATES  207 

which  the  State  ought  not  to  be  left  without  means  of 
defense. 

The  real  issue  is  not  whether  the  component  nations 
should  reserve  the  right  to  organize  and  train  militia, 
but  whether  they  ought  not  also  to  reserve  the  right  to 
keep  a  certain  proportion  of  trained  troops  and  ships 
of  war. 

The  American  Constitution  forbids  the  States  in 
time  of  peace  to  keep  troops  (other  than  militia)  or 
war  vessels.  But  there  is  one  very  important  difference 
between  the  present  conditions  in  which  the  nations  find 
themselves  and  those  confronting  the  American  States 
when  they  formed  their  Constitution.  Then  none  of 
the  States  had  been  accustomed  to  act  independently 
as  sovereign  nations,  waging  war  and  making  peace, 
or  entering  into  international  relations  with  foreign 
States;  and  none  of  them  possessed  either  standing 
armies  or  ships  of  war.  Thus  they  were  not  called 
upon  to  resign  costly  and  much  prized  possessions,  as 
would  be  many  of  the  nations  of  today  were  they 
asked  to  enter  an  int'ernational  union  upon  the  condi- 
tion that  they  at  once  surrender  their  armies  and 
navies.  International  distrust  and  jealousy  would 
doubtless  forbid  any  sudden  holocaust  of  arma- 
ments. 

Not  only  then  would  it  seem  essential  to  provide  in 
our  international  constitution  for  some  plan  of  gradual 
disarmament  of  the  component  nations,  but  it  is  im- 
probable that  they  would  consent  to  any  compact  which 
would  not  permit  them  to  keep  a  certain  proportion  of 


208  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

regular  troops  and  war  vessels,  say,  ten  per  centum  of 
the  number  kept  by  the  United  Nations. 

These  would  serve  as  a  nucleus  for  a  regular  army 
and  navy,  should  a  State  find  it  needful  to  defend  itself 
against  unjust  aggression,  and  yet  would  not  suffice 
to  encourage  aggression  on  its  part,  especially  towards 
another  component  nation  aided  in  its  work  of  self- 
defense  not  only  by  the  tenfold  regular  forces  of  the 
union  itself,  but  also  by  the  forces  of  the  majority  of 
the  States  composing  the  union.1 

But  even  yet  the  component  nations  might  not  regard 
themselves  as  absolutely  secured  by  these  provisions, 
since  it  would  be  possible  that  the  international  govern- 
ment, lulled  into  inaction  or  neglect  by  a  sense  of 
false  security,  might  not  itself  keep  a  sufficient  force  of 
troops  or  ships  of  war  to  justify  the  nations  with  great 
territories  and  large  subject  or  backward  populations 
in  regarding  ten  per  centum  of  such  force  as  sufficient 
to  preserve  internal  order  and  peace  within  their  limits. 

Under  the  ten  per  centum  rule  the  international 
government  must  keep  an  army  of  one  million  men  in 
order  that  a  component  nation  might  possess  one  of 
one  hundred  thousand.  An  army  of  one  hundred  thou- 
sand would  hardly  suffice  to  police  adequately  the  great 
territories  of  the  Russian  or  British  Empires,  or  even 
the  United  States. 

But  it  is  very  doubtful  if  the  international  govern- 
ment, especially  if  it  were  to  embrace  among  its  mem- 
bers most  or  all  of  the  Great  Powers,  would  keep  an 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  V,  Sec.  3,  cl.  i,  2. 


ACQUISITIONS  BY  STATES  209 

army  of  a  million  men.  More  probably  it  would  reduce 
the  number  by  half  or  perhaps  more.  A  correspond- 
ing compulsory  reduction  on  the  ten  per  centum  basis 
of  the  domestic  armies  of  the  component  nations  might 
in  some  cases  reduce  their  forces  below  the  safety 
point  in  the  control  of  their  internal  affairs, 

It  would  seem  prudent  therefore  to  name  a  minimum 
below  which  no  nation  might  be  compelled  to  reduce 
its  armies  or  navies.  The  minimum  of  troops  ought 
to  be  expressed  in  terms  of  percentage  of  population 
since  the  main  purpose  of  the  domestic  armies  of  each 
State  would  be  to  preserve  peace  and  order  among  its 
population,  while  the  minimum  of  ships  of  war  ought 
to  be  expressed  in  terms  of  percentage  of  the  merchant 
marine  tonnage  of  each  nation,  since  the  main  function 
of  the  naval  force  of  each  State  would  be  to  safeguard 
its  ocean  carried  commerce. 

The  minimum  percentage  of  troops  has  tentatively 
been  placed  at  one-tenth  of  one  per  centum  of  the  popu- 

(lation  in  each  State,  and  the  minimum  percentage  of 
ships  of  war  of  each  nation  at  a  tonnage  of  one  per 
centum  of  the  tonnage  of  its  merchant  marine.1 


VI 

TERRITORIAL  ACQUISITIONS  BY  COMPONENT  NATIONS 

With  freedom  of  trade  established  between  the  com- 
ponent nations,  with  the  surrender  by  them  of  the  right 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  V,  Sec.  3,  cl.  3. 


210  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

to  impose  burdensome  taxes  or  other  restrictions  upon 
international  commerce,  and  with  the  passing  of  the 
need  for  great  armies,  navies,  military  bases  and  coal- 
ing stations,  many  of  the  reasons  for  the  national  desire 
to  acquire  territory  would  also  disappear. 

But  if  we  would  abolish  war  it  is  necessary  to  re- 
move all  temptations  to  acquire  territory  at  the  expense 
of  other  nations.  Occasionally  the  acquisition  is  actu- 
ated by  a  blind  and  unintelligent  desire  for  increased 
possessions,  there  being  no  particular  national  design 
in  view.  Mere  pride  of  possession  is  the  ruling  motive. 
Much  more  usually,  however,  there  is  a  definite  purpose 
in  such  territorial  acquisitions.  This  motive  is  one  of 
three : — either  national  sympathy  with  the  people  occu- 
pying the  territory,  resulting  in  a  desire  to  make  them 
independent  or  in  a  mutual  desire  to  blend  into  a 
single  nation;  or  the  wish  to  expand  the  national  com- 
merce by  unfair  or  forcible  means;  or  to  secure  by 
like  means  military  or  political  advantages.  Of  these 
only  the  first  mentioned  is  ever  justifiable,  and  that  is 
often  used  as  a  cloak  to  conceal  one  of  the  others. 
Without  one  or  the  other  of  these  motives  there  would 
be  little  or  no  temptation  to  any  State  to  acquire  the 
territory  of  another. 

It  ought,  then,  to  be  the  aim  of  our  international 
constitution  so  to  limit  the  powers  of  the  component 
nations  in  this  matter  as  to  eliminate  the  temptations 
to  the  unjust  and  forcible  acquisition  of  a  neighbor's 
territory. 

A  long  step  in  this  direction  will  have  been  taken 


ACQUISITIONS  BY  STATES  211 

when  the  component  nations  agree  to  surrender  their 
control  of,  and  their  right  to  burden,  international  com- 
merce; and  another,  when  they  give  up  their  general 
war  powers.  But  the  surrender  of  these  does  not 
exclude  all  possibility  of  an  acquisition  of  territory  in 
war  or  in  peace  that  may  cause  the  old  fires  of  jealousy 
and  suspicion  to  break  out  afresh  among  them. 

There  ought  therefore  to  be  additional  limitations 
prohibiting  them  to  acquire  territory  belonging  to  an- 
other nation  except,  first,  in  time  of  pease,  with  the 
consent  of  the  nations  concerned,  and,  second,  in  time 
of  peace  or  war,  only  with  the  consent  of  such  a  ma- 
jority of  the  international  congress  as  may  suffice  to 
convince  all  the  component  nations  that  there  can  be 
no  ulterior  harmful  design  lurking  behind  the  acquisi- 
tion. That  majority  has  been  placed  tentatively  at 
three-fourths  of  the  members  of  each  house  of  the 
Congress,  upon  the  theory  that  such  an  alteration  of  the 
territorial  boundaries  of  a  component  State  may  consti- 
tute as  important  a  change  in  the  relative  status  of  the 
nations  as  would  the  passage  of  a  constitutional  amend- 
ment, and  should  therefore  require  the  assent  of  the 
same  majority  of  the  nations  represented  in  the  Con- 
gress.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  V,  Sec.  4. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

RELATIONS  OF  COMPONENT  NATIONS  TO 
EACH  OTHER  AND  TO  THE  UNION 

We  are  next  to  examine  the  provisions  to  be  inserted 
in  the  proposed  constitution  with  reference  to  the  rela- 
tions between  the  component  nations  themselves  on 
the  one  side  and  between  them  and  the  union  on  the 
other. 

The  right  of  the  nations  to  make  treaties  with  one 
another  touching  all  matters  not  surrendered  to  the  con- 
trol of  the  international  government  has  been  already 
considered,  and  the  conclusion  reached  that  this  power, 
so  limited,  should  be  reserved  by  them.  Thus,  such 
matters  as  the  extradition  of  criminals,  or  the  personal 
or  civil  rights  of  the  citizens  of  one  State  in  another, 
might  always  be  adequately  provided  for  by  treaty 
between  the  respective  nations,  as  their  wishes  or  policy 
might  dictate. 

The  topic  now  to  be  discussed  relates  to  matters 
more  fundamental  and  far-reaching. 

I 

PROTECTION  OF  THE  FUNDAMENTAL  RIGHTS  OF  THE 
CITIZENS  OF  ONE  STATE  WHILE  IN  ANOTHER 

Reference  has  just  been  made  to  the  fact  that  by 
treaty  one  nation  within  or  without  the  union  may  se- 

212 


CITIZENS  OF  ONE  STATE  IN  ANOTHER  213 

cure  to  its  citizens  in  any  component  State  such  personal 
or  civil  rights  as  may  be  agreed  upon. 

But  there  are  certain  fundamental  rights  of  which 
the  citizens  of  a  State^  even  in  the  absence  of  treaty, 
could  not  be  deprived  by  a  component  nation  without 
the  gravest  danger  of  resulting  discord  and  retaliation, 
leading  direct  to  disunion  or  to  war. 

The  violation  of  such  rights  is  always  caused  by 
intentional  or  unintentional  acts  of  gross  injustice  to 
the  citizens  of  other  States,  and  can  never  be  justified 
by  any  proper  view  of  necessary  public  policy.  The 
component  nations  ought  to  find  no  difficulty  in  sur- 
rendering the  right  to  enact  such  unjust  laws  or  to 
commit  such  acts  against  citizens  of  another  State, 
whatever  attitude  they  may  assume  with  respect  to  the 
sort  of  treatment  they  have  the  right  to  accord  to  their 
own  citizens. 

Thus  if  a  nation,  by  means  of  legislative  convictions 
of  crime  (bills  of  attainder) ,  or  the  enactment  of  retro- 
active laws  punishing  crime  (ex  post  facto  laws),  or 
laws  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts,  all  of  which 
are  oppressive  and  unjustifiable,  should  deprive  the 
citizen  of  another  State  of  his  life,  liberty,  or  property, 
such  action  would  at  once  give  rise  to  serious  grounds 
of  complaint  on  the  part  of  the  State  whose  citizen  has 
been  so  treated,  and  would  lead  to  grave  dissensions, 
if  nothing  worse.  How  much  better  to  check  such  ten- 
dencies in  their  inception  by  prohibiting  the  sort  of  ac- 
tion that  would  give  cause  for  the  complaint,  and  to 
allow  the  foreigner  thus  threatened  the  opportunity  of 


2i4  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

testing  the  validity  of  the  law,  if  necessary,  in  the  in- 
ternational courts.  Such  a  course  would  give  the  ag- 
grieved party  a  sure  judicial  investigation  of  the 
grounds  of  his  complaint  and  an  impartial  judicial 
remedy  against  such  invasions  of  his  rights,  so  that 
his  own  country  would  be  relieved  of  all  responsibility 
for  the  enforcement  or  recognition  of  his  claims. 

The  same  result  would  follow,  were  a  like  judicial  in- 
quiry and  remedy  afforded,  if  needed,  by  the  interna- 
tional courts  in  cases  wherein  a  component  nation  is  al- 
leged to  have  attempted  unjustly  to  deprive  a  citizen  of 
another  State  (within  or  without  the  union)  by  legisla- 
tive, executive,  or  judicial  action  of  his  life,  liberty,  or 
property  without  giving  him  opportunity  to  be  heard 
in  his  own  defense,  or  where  it  is  alleged  to  have  been 
guilty  of  unjust  discriminations  against  such  foreigner 
with  regard  to  his  personal  or  property  rights;  or 
where  it  is  alleged  that  the  treaty  rights  of  the  for- 
eigner have  been  violated. 

The  component  nations,  whatever  their  jealousy  of 
an  inquiry  into  the  customary  treatment  of  their  own 
citizens,  ought  to  be  willing  to  unite  in  a  compact  pro- 
hibiting them  to  engage  in  such  conduct  towards  the 
citizens  of  other  countries.  And  this  being  done,  the 
Congress  should  see  to  it  that,  in  case  of  alleged  viola- 
tions of  these  provisions,  the  complaining  party  be 
given  the  right  to  have  the  validity  of  the  law,  or  other 
governmental  act  complained  of,  investigated  and  ad- 
judged by  the  international  courts.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  VI,  Sec.  i. 


CITIZENS  IN  FOREIGN  STATES       215 
II 

PROTECTION  AFFORDED  BY  THE  UNITED  NATIONS  TO 

CITIZENS  OF  COMPONENT  STATES  WHILE  IN 

FOREIGN  COUNTRIES 

The  clause  just  examined  would  adequately  protect 
the  citizens  of  a  State  (either  a  member  or  not  a 
member  of  the  union)  while  in  another  State  which  is 
a  member  of  the  union.  But  it  would  have  no  appli- 
cation to  instances  of  oppressive  conduct  by  a  State 
not  a  member  of  the  union  towards  citizens  of  compo- 
nent States  who  might  be  within  its  limits. 

All  existing  federal  unions,  as  has  been  indicated 
more  than  once,  have  been  formed  with  the  design  not 
only  to  avert  war  between  its  members,  but  to  create  in 
many  respects  one  single  new  nation,  with  the  rights 
and  privileges  of  a  distinct  member  of  the  family  of 
nations;  and  to  that  end  the  individual  States  compos- 
ing the  union  have  invariably  surrendered  their  right 
to  deal  with  foreign  countries  except  through  the  union 
itself.  This  creation  of  a  single  nation  possessing  the 
right  to  engage  in  international  relations  and  in  war, 
involves  the  consequence  that  each  citizen  of  a  compo- 
nent State  shall  also  be  a  citizen  of  the  union,  and  as 
such  shall  look  to  the  federal  government,  not  to  his 
State  government,  for  that  protection  when  abroad 
that  each  nation  is  bound  to  afford  to  its  citizens. 

But  with  respect  to  our  international  union  the 
conditions  are  materially  different.  It  is  not  the  intent 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

in  this  case  to  create  a  new  State  except  in  a  very 
limited  sense  and  for  very  limited  purposes;  nor  is  it 
proposed  that  the  component  nations  surrender  their 
right,  save  to  a  limited  extent,  to  enter  into  relations 
with  other  nations.  The  international  union  would 
be  a  purely  political  conception,  would  possess  no  ter- 
ritory of  its  own  (except  the  seat  of  government)  and 
would  have  no  citizens  of  its  own  (except  citizens  of 
the  seat  of  government) .  If,  however,  the  component 
nations  shall  have  surrendered  their  war  powers,  the 
relinquishment  implies  a  guarantee  that  the  interna- 
tional government  will  take  upon  itself  the  duty  of 
granting  that  protection  in  foreign  countries  to  the 
citizens  of  each  nation  which,  by  reason  of  such  sur- 
render, the  nation  itself  can  no  longer  give. 

While  this  responsibility  of  the  federal  government 
would  perhaps  be  implied  from  the  context  of  the  pro- 
posed constitution,  the  matter  is  of  too  great  impor- 
tance to  be  left  to  implication;  a  guarantee  should  be 
expressly  inserted  to  the  effect  that  the  international 
government  shall  protect  the  citizens  of  each  compo- 
nent nation,  when  in  foreign  countries,  in  all  such 
rights  and  privileges  as  they  may  there  claim  under  the 
Law  of  Nations  or  under  particular  treaties.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  VI,  Sec.  2. 


INTERNAL  DISSENSIONS  217 

III 

PROTECTION  OF  COMPONENT  NATIONS  AGAINST 
INVASION 

It  is  evident  that  a  guarantee  that  the  international 
government  will  protect  each  component  nation  against 
the  hostile  invasion  of  its  territories  is  a  condition  sine 
qua  non  to  the  surrender  by  the  nations  of  their  war 
pow,ers,  indeed  the  condition  of  the  establishment  of 
the  union.  No  existing  federal  constitution  is  without 
such  a  guarantee.1 

IV 
INTERNAL  DISSENSIONS  IN  COMPONENT  STATES 

The  American  Constitution  guarantees  that  the 
United  States  will  afford  protection  to  the  several 
States  not  only  against  invasion,  but  also  against  do- 
mestic violence  on  application  of  the  State  authorities. 

To  a  proper  understanding  of  the  conditions  under 
which  this  clause  was  inserted  in  the  American  Consti- 
tution, it  must  be  remembered  that  the  several  States 
had  surrendered  all  their  war  powers  (except  the 
keeping  of  militia),  that  the  State  governments  were 
all  republican  in  character,  and  that  the  Constitution 
had  guaranteed  that  they  should  ever  so  remain.  The 
State  governments  being  already  entirely  in  the  hands 
of  the  people,  internal  dissensions  and  armed  resistance 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  VI,  Sec.  3. 


218  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

to  authority  could  never  assume  the  form  of  a  strug- 
gle by  the  people  against  an  oppressive  or  tyrannical 
government  for  political  freedom,  but  would  always 
represent  the  efforts  of  a  factious  minority  to  over- 
come by  force  of  arms  the  will  of  the  majority. 

There  would  be  no  reason  in  principle  therefore  why 
the  majority,  as  represented  by  their  chosen  legislatures 
or  executives,  should  not  call  to  their  aid  the  forces  of 
the  United  States,  in  the  absence  of  a  sufficient  militia 
force  to  quell  the  disturbances, — especially  since  by 
reason  of  the  lack  of  such  aid  the  factious  minority 
might  obtain  control,  and  thus  the  republican  and  popu- 
lar character  of  the  State  government  be  overthrown, 
contrary  to  the  express  guarantee  of  the  Constitution. 

But  a  far  different  situation  confronts  the  nations  in 
the  establishment  of  our  international  union.  Each  of 
them  has  its  own  form  of  government;  some  monarchi- 
cal, some  republican,  some  federal;  some  under  popular 
control,  some  with  governments  more  or  less  arbitrary. 

Should  internal  dissensions  occur, — and  especially 
should  they  advance  so  far  that  several  governments 
are  established  within  a  State,  each  claiming  to  be 
the  de  facto  government  and  each  calling  upon  the 
international  government  for  aid  in  suppressing  the 
other, — questions  of  great  delicacy  would  arise, 
fraught  with  danger  to  the  entire  union,  according 
as  the  sympathies  of  the  component  nations  would  be 
severally  extended  to  the  one  or  the  other  party. 

If,  in  a  particular  State,  the  civil  war  would  take 
the  form  of  an  uprising  of  the  people  against  an  arbi- 


INTERNAL  DISSENSIONS  219 

trary  government,  those  component  nations  possessing 
republican  forms  of  government  and  popular  institu- 
tions would  vigorously  object  to  the  use  of  the  forces 
of  the  United  Nations  for  the  purpose  of  suppressing 
the  political  aspirations  of  the  people  in  the  distracted 
State,  while  those  possessing  monarchical  institutions 
might  be  no  less  vigorous  in  their  demand  for  the  sup- 
pression of  such  popular  aspirations. 

Such  conditions  would  make  for  a  rapid  and  luxu- 
riant growth  of  discord  and  jealousy  among  the  com- 
ponent nations,  if  not  for  a  speedy  disintegration  of  the 
union  itself.  Yet  they  would  seem  to  be  sooner  or 
later  the  certain  consequences  of  any  guarantee  on 
the  part  of  the  international  government  to  render  aid 
to  the  governments  of  the  several  component  nations 
in  quelling  domestic  disturbances. 

If  we  are  to  consider  the  preservation  and  continued 
usefulness  of  the  union,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
it  ought  to  leave  such  domestic  dissensions  severely 
alone,  and  that  both  the  international  government  and 
the  governments  of  the  other  component  nations  ought 
to  preserve  an  attitude  of  strict  neutrality  between  the 
contending  factions  until  the  contest  is  settled  by  the 
final  overthrow  of  one  or  the  other  party  or  by  the 
establishment  of  part  of  the  original  territory  as  a  new 
and  independent  State. 

In  the  meanwhile,  however,  as  both  parties  obviously 
cannot  be  represented  in  the  international  congress  or 
appoint  judges  to  the  international  courts,  and  as  it 
would  be  eminently  undesirable  for  the  reasons  above 


220  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

mentioned  that  the  international  government  be  given  a 
discretion  as  to  which  faction  it  may  recognize  as  the 
lawful  government,  the  constitution  ought  to  provide 
for  the  continued  recognition  of  the  original  govern- 
ment, so  far  as  relates  to  the  national  rights  and  func- 
tions under  the  international  compact,  until  such  gov- 
ernment is  completely  overthrown  and  a  new  one  sub- 
stituted therefor,  in  which  event  the  latter  should  at 
once  become  entitled  to  enjoy  such  rights  and  functions. 

These  are  merely  applications  to  political  conditions 
of  the  two  equitajble  maxims,  "  first  in  time,  first  in 
right,"  and  "  as  between  equal  equities  the  legal  title 
shall  prevail."  They  preserve  the  strict  attitude  of 
neutrality  that  should  be  assumed  by  the  international 
government  and  by  the  other  component  nations,  and 
neither  faction  would  have  any  just  cause  of  complaint. 
Thus  only  can  the  union  be  secured  against  the  disin- 
tegrating forces  that  would  lurk  in  the  internal  dis- 
sensions that  may  be  expected  to  arise  from  time  to 
time  within  the  several  States. 

Should  such  a  civil  war  as  we  have  supposed  result 
in  the  dismemberment  of  the  State,  so  that  the  original 
government  would  continue  to  control  part  of  it  while 
the  remainder  is  erected  into  a  new  and  independent 
State,  the  latter  would  of  course  at  once  drop  out  of 
the  union,  and  could  only  be  admitted  thereto  on  the 
same  terms  as  other  outside  nations, — terms  to  be 
presently  examined.  But  that  portion  of  the  State  left 
under  its  original  government  would  remain  in  the 
union,  though,  since  its  population  would  be  reduced 


ADMISSION  OF  NEW  STATES         221 

by  the  dismemberment,  it  would  become  necessary  to 
readjust  its  proportion  of  representation  in  the  House 
of  Delegates.1 

V 

ADMISSION  OF  NEW  STATES  INTO  THE  UNION 

The  international  union  once  organized,  the  admis- 
sion of  new  States  to  it  from  time  to  time  might  some- 
times present  important  questions  to  the  consideration 
of  the  component  nations,  for  it  would  be  possible 
that  the  admission  of  a  particular  State  might,  under 
certain  circumstances,  be  distasteful  to  some  of  the 
nations  concerned,  might  be  more  likely  to  create  dis- 
cord than  harmony  among  them,  and  hence  might  be 
more  apt  to  weaken  than  to  strengthen  the  union. 

The  admission  of  a  new  State  might  materially 
alter  the  existing  relations  of  every  nation  in  the 
union, — as  much  as  would  many  an  amendment  to 
the  constitution, — and,  if  capable  of  accomplishment 
by  the  consent  of  a  bare  majority  of  the  component 
States  through  their  representatives  in  the  Congress,  it 
might  easily  do  the  cause  of  peace  more  harm  than 
good. 

It  would  appear  to  be  reasonable  to  demand  for  such 
admission  the  consent  of  the  same  number  of  compo- 
nent nations  as  would  be  required  to  pass  an  amend- 
ment to  the  constitution  itself,  that  is,  three-fourths  of 
each  house  of  the  Congress.2 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  VI,  Sec.  4. 

2  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  VI,  Sec.  5. 


CHAPTER  XV 

RESERVED  RIGHTS  OF  THE  COMPONENT 
NATIONS 


GENERAL  RESERVATION  OF  ALL  POWERS  NOT 
SURRENDERED 

While  it  might  readily  be  implied  from  the  general 
tenor  of  our  supposed  international  compact,  and  from 
the  fact  that  the  proposed  federal  government  is  one 
of  enumerated  powers  only,  that  the  component  na- 
tions have  reserved  all  powers  not  granted  to  that 
government  nor  prohibited  by  it  to  the  nations  them- 
selves, yet,  as  in  other  cases  of  important  rights,  it 
would  be  unwise  to  leave  the  matter  to  conjecture  and 
implication. 

A  clause  is  therefore  inserted  expressly  declaring 
that  the  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  Nations  by 
the  constitution,  nor  prohibited  by  it  to  the  component 
nations,  as  well  as  the  sovereignty  and  independence  of 
the  latter,  are  reserved  to  those  nations,  respectively.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  VII,  Sec.  i. 


222 


RIGHT  OF  SECESSION  223^ 

II 

RIGHT  OF  A  COMPONENT  NATION  TO  WITHDRAW 
FROM  THE  UNION 

Here  we  are  confronted  with  a  difficult  problem,  the 
importance  of  which  will  be  realized  when  it  is  recalled 
that  this  is  the  identical  question  over  which  the  great 
American  War  of  1861  was  fought. 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  had  not  ex- 
pressly determined  in  one  way  or  the  other  the  right 
of  a  State  to  secede  from  the  Union  after  it  had  once 
acceded  to  the  Constitution. 

Without  undertaking  to  discuss  the  merits  of  that 
great  controversy,  suffice  it  to  remind  the  reader  that 
certain  of  the  Southern  States,  convinced  that  their  re- 
served rights  and  liberties  were  endangered,  exercised 
what  they  believed  to  be  their  constitutional  right  to 
secede  and  establish  a  new  union  of  their  own.  This 
right  the  Northern  and  Western  States,  which  consti- 
tuted the  majority  of  the  States  and  controlled  the 
federal  government,  declined  to  recognize.  In  the 
absence  of  any  clause  in  the  Constitution  providing 
expressly  for  the  case,  the  difference  of  opinion  with 
respect  to  the  proper  interpretation  of  that  instrument 
led  directly  to  the  war. 

The  one  lesson  to  be  learned  from  this  chapter  of 
American  history  is  that,  whatever  other  provisions  the 
nations  may  make  in  contemplation  of  an  international 
union,  they  ought  not  to  leave  this  point  ambiguous  or 


224  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

undetermined.  Their  league  or  compact  must  declare 
either  for  or  against  a  reservation  of  the  right  of  the 
several  States  to  secede. 

Should  this  declaration  be  opposed  to  a  right  of  se- 
cession, it  would  be  difficult  to  secure  the  assent  of 
any  nation  to  surrender  irrevocably  some  of  its  high 
sovereign  rights  merely  for  the  sake  of  an  untried 
experiment,  which  might  possibly  operate  injuriously 
to  the  liberties  of  some  at  least  of  the  nations  con- 
cerned, however  carefully  those  liberties  may  have  been 
safeguarded.  Experience  alone  can  disclose  the  ulti- 
mate success  or  failure  of  so  grand  an  experiment. 

Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  if  secession  were  for- 
bidden and  yet  a  nation  or  a  combination  of  nations 
were  resolved  to  withdraw  despite  their  agreements, 
nothing  but  force  could  restrain  them;  but  the  use  of 
force  is  the  very  thing  the  union  would  be  established 
to  prevent.  A  union  formed  to  eliminate  war,  yet  held 
together  permanently  only  by  force,  would  savor 
strongly  of  absurdity. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  right  be  reserved  to  each 
nation  to  withdraw  at  will,  there  would  be  grave  danger 
of  the  total  failure  of  the  experiment  and  the  speedy 
dissolution  of  the  union,  due  to  the  unwillingness  of  the 
several  nations  to  make  concessions  of  their  own  selfish 
interests  for  the  common  good  of  all.  This  danger 
would  be  likely  to  arise  especially  in  the  earlier  years 
of  the  new  government's  existence,  before  the  nations 
had  begun  to  realize  fully  its  advantages,  or  before 
they  had  rid  themselves  of  their  old  attitudes  of  mutual 


RIGHT  OF  SECESSION  225 

suspicion  and  jealousy  and  had  substituted  therefor  the 
spirit  of  good  will  and  concord  that  would  follow  upon 
continued  co-operation  and  the  successful  results  of 
their  joint  labors. 

A  just  and  proper  compromise  between  these  ex- 
tremes would  seem  to  be  to  reserve  to  each  component 
nation  the  right  to  withdraw  from  the  union  after 
(say)  twenty-five  years  from  the  date  of  its  accession. 

This,  coupled  with  the  checks  afforded  by  the  power 
of  a  State  to  veto  the  legislation  of  the  Congress,  the 
power  of  the  international  Supreme  Court  to  pass  upon 
the  constitutionality  of  such  legislation,  the  division 
of  power  between  the  two  houses  of  the  Congress  rep- 
resenting respectively  the  equal  rights  and  the  unequal 
populations  of  the  component  States,  and  the  limited 
scope  of  the  powers  conferred  upon  the  international 
government,  would  seem  to  constitute  sufficient  guaran- 
tees of  the  reserved  rights  of  the  component  nations. 

At  the  same  time  such  a  provision  would  obviate 
the  danger  of  the  hasty  or  passionate  withdrawal  of  a 
State  from  the  union  merely  upon  vague  suspicion  of 
unjust  aggression  on  the  part  of  sister  nations, — a 
course  which  might  result  in  a  speedy  destruction  of 
the  entire  edifice. 

After  a  nation  has  been  a  member  of  the  union  for 
twenty-five  years  a  new  generation  will  have  come  upon 
the  scene,  better  able  to  weigh  the  relative  advantages 
and  disadvantages  of  the  union,  and  having  forgotten 
the  political  rancors  that  might  be  engendered  by  the 
enactment  of  the  first  measures  of  general  relief.  The 


226  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

second  or  a  succeeding  generation  of  citizenship  in 
each  State  would  be  in  a  better  position  to  determine 
whether  the  blessings  of  the  union  would  not  outweigh 
its  burdens. 

Even  during  the  first  twenty-five  years  the  fact  that 
any  nation  at  the  end  of  that  period  would  have  the 
right  peaceably  to  withdraw  if  its  interests  were  not 
being  protected  by  the  union  would  operate  as  a  con- 
servative influence  and  a  useful  restraint  upon  harsh  or 
unjust  legislation.  The  spirit  of  compromise  and  con- 
sideration for  the  rights  of  all  in  the  conduct  of  the 
international  government  would  take  the  place  of  the 
obstinate  disregard  of  the  majority  for  the  minority 
of  the  nations  that  would  be  more  likely  to  characterize 
the  government  if  the  component  nations  were  without 
the  right  to  secede. 

But  a  nation  proposing  to  secede  from  the  union 
ought  to  be  required  to  give  due  notice  (say  for  one 
year)  to  the  Congress  of  its  intention.  Not  only  would 
the  nation  itself  thus  pay  a  proper  and  decent  respect 
to  comity  and  to  the  rights  of  the  union  and  the  other 
component  nations,  which  might  suffer  by  the  hasty 
execution  of  such  a  purpose,  but  it  would  give  time  for 
sober  reflection  on  all  sides  and  an  opportunity  for 
each  by  mutual  concessions  so  to  modify  the  general 
conditions  as  to  make  it  possible  for  the  seceding  State 
to  reconsider  its  decision.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  VII,  Sec.  2,  cl.  i. 


RIGHT  OF  SECESSION  227 

III 

RIGHTS  OF  SECEDING  STATE  IN  THE  COMMON 
PROPERTY  OF  THE  UNION 

One  more  question  remains  to  be  discussed  in  this 
connection.  That  question  relates  to  the  respective 
rights  of  seceding  and  non-seceding  States  in  the  com- 
mon property  of  the  union,  such  as  the  ships  of  war,  the 
money  in  the  treasury,  the  forts,  arsenals,  public  build- 
ings, and  other  improvements  belonging  to  the  federal 
government,  the  benefits  of  much  of  which  would  be 
lost  by  a  seceding  State,  though  paid  for  by  it  in  pro- 
portion to  its  wealth. 

Should  the  seceding  nation  be  entitled  to  its  propor- 
tionate share  of  the  common  property  in  kind  or  in 
money  commutation  therefor,  and  if  'so  how  should 
that  proportion  be  ascertained?  Or  ought  the  rule  to 
be  that  a  nation  entering  the  union  does  so  upon  condi- 
tion that  it  shall  lay  no  claim  to  the  common  property 
(outside  the  limits  of  its  own  territory)  in  case  it 
should  later  determine  to  withdraw? 

There  can  be  scant  room  to  doubt  that  the  juster 
is  also  the  wiser  course.  To  proclaim  that  a  seceding 
nation  shall  not  be  entitled  to  any  share  of  the  partner- 
ship property  acquired  by  joint  expenditure  of  treas- 
ure and  labor,  except  such  as  may  happen  to  be  located 
within  its  own  boundaries,  would  probably  repel  many 
a  nation  that  might  otherwise  join  the  union,  and 
would  be  likely  to  inspire  the  seceding  nation  or  nations 


228  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

with  sentiments  of  ill  will  and  resentment  that  might 
forebode  evil  to  the  general  peace. 

True,  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  fair  adjustment 
of  the  respective  rights  would  often  be  great,  but  the 
value  of  the  share  of  a  seceding  nation  in  the  common 
property,  after  deducting  its  share  of  the  common 
debts  and  the  value  of  forts,  arsenals,  and  other  public 
buildings  erected  by  the  federal  government  within  its 
territory,  may  be  determined,  approximately  at  least, 
upon  equitable  principles  by  the  Supreme  Court,  whose 
decision  would  doubtless  constitute  the  most  satisfac- 
tory mode  of  disposing  of  the  matter.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  VII,  Sec.  2,  cl.  2. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

SUPREMACY  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL 

CONSTITUTION,  LAWS,  AND 

TREATIES 

I 

THE  DECLARATION  OF  SUPREMACY 

Although  it  is  proposed  to  grant  to  the  interna- 
tional government  only  very  limited  powers,  it  is  yet 
essential  that  so  far  as  its  powers  do  extend,  its  exer- 
cise of  them  should  be  of  an  authority  paramount  to 
a  conflicting  exercise  of  similar  powers  by  the  several 
component  nations.  Otherwise  there  would  follow 
anarchy,  confusion  and  possibly  the  very  evils  the  fed- 
eral government  would  be  organized  to  avert. 

So  manifest  is  this  conclusion  that  it  might  almost  be 
left  with  safety  to  be  implied  from  the  nature  and  con- 
text of  the  constitution.  But  in  a  matter  of  such  pro- 
found importance  it  would  be  imprudent  to  leave  to 
mere  implication  what  may  be  readily  and  clearly  ex- 
pressed in  few  words. 

This  principle  of  supremacy  would  apply  not  only 
to  the  international  constitution  itself,  but  to  all  the 
laws  and  treaties  made  by  the  international  govern- 

229 


230  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

ment  in  pursuance  of  that  constitution.  But  it  would 
have  no  application  to  such  of  the  laws  or  treaties 
of  the  international  government  as  might  be  in  viola- 
tion of  that  instrument;  they  would  be  mere  exercises 
of  usurped  powers,  void  and  of  no  effect. 

It  must  follow  therefore  that  in  any  matter  of  judi- 
cial'cognizance  arising  within  any  component  State  or 
in  the  seat  of  the  government,  it  would  be  the  duty 
of  any  judge,  whether  of  a  national  or  an  international 
court,  in  choosing  between  conflicting  national  and  in- 
ternational laws  or  treaties  as  controlling  the  case  be- 
fore him,  to  select  and  enforce  that  law  which  his 
own  country  has  itself  in  the  most  solemn  manner  pos- 
sible declared  to  be  supreme  within  its  borders, — the 
constitution  of  the  United  Nations,  and  the  laws  and 
treaties  of  the  international  government  made  in  pur- 
suance thereof.1 

II 

OFFICIAL  OATH  TO  SUPPORT  THE   CONSTITUTION 

It  would  of  course  be  proper  and  necessary  that  all 
officials  of  the  international  government  be  required  to 
make  oath  or  affirmation  that  they  will  support  the 
international  constitution. 

But  it  is  necessary  to  go  further  than  this.  In  order 
that  the  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  officers  of 
the  several  component  nations  may  feel  and  realize  at 
all  times  the  obligation  resting  upon  them  also  to  rec- 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  VIII,  Sec.  i. 


OFFICIAL  OATH  231 

ognize  and  uphold  the  international  compact  as  the  su- 
preme law  and  as  part  of  their  own  constitution  and 
laws,  it  would  be  right  and  proper  to  require  of  them, 
upon  their  assumption  of  office,  an  oath  or  affirmation 
that  they  will  support  the  constitution  of  the  United  Na- 
tions.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  VIII,  Sec.  2. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

AMENDMENTS    TO    THE    CONSTITUTION 

I 

GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS 

That  no  plan  of  government  devised  by  the  wit  of 
man  can  escape  the  need  of  amendment  from  time  to 
time,  as  defects  in  its  organization  or  powers  develop, 
is  too  plain  for  argument;  and  prudence  dictates  that 
any  plan  proposed  should  contain  a  prearranged 
method  of  amending  it.  Especially  would  this  be 
true  in  case  of  an  experiment  in  government  on  a  scale 
so  vast  as  that  here  contemplated. 

Much  might  be  said  for  the  proposition  that  no 
power  of  amendment  should  be  given  save  by  the  unani- 
mous consent  of  all  the  component  nations.  So  far 
as  the  original  compact  is  concerned,  the  nations  would 
know  exactly  what  they  are  assenting  to,  and  it  might 
be  plausibly  argued  that  the  same  principle  ought  to 
apply  to  the  subsequent  insertion  of  new  matter  into 
the  constitution  by  means  of  amendments. 

But  when  we  consider  the  experimental  nature  of  the 
compact,  and  that  experience  may  prove  that  too  much, 
as  well  as  too  little,  power  has  been  surrendered  by  the 

23* 


AMENDMENTS  233 

component  nations, — when  we  recall  the  extreme  diffi- 
culty of  securing  unanimous  assent  to  the  adoption  of 
any  measures,  especially  of  such  complex  character 
as  would  be  here  involved, — and  when  we  consider 
that  a  requirement  of  the  assent  of  a  large  majority 
of  the  nations  to  any  amendment  would  be  nearly  as 
secure  a  guarantee  that  the  reserved  sovereign  rights 
of  each  will  be  protected  against  invasion,  while  yet 
making  it  more  possible  to  secure  desirable  amend- 
ments,— it  would  seem  the  more  prudent  part  to  make 
provision  for  amendments  through  the  assent  of  less 
than  the  entire  membership  of  the  union,  but  neverthe- 
less requiring  the  consent  of  so  large  a  majority  as  in 
effect  to  protect  the  minority  against  changes  adopted 
merely  for  the  political  advantage  of  the  majority. 

Much  the  same  problem  presented  itself  to  the  fram- 
ers  of  the  American  Constitution,  who  solved  it  by 
requiring  the  assent  of  three-fourths  of  the  States  for 
the  adoption  of  an  amendment.  In  actual  practice  in 
the  United  States  this  requirement  has  been  found  to 
work  well.  It  has  prevented  from  time  to  time  the 
passage  of  many  ill-considered  and  unwise  amend- 
ments urged  by  zealous  reformers,  and  yet  has  admit- 
ted of  sufficient  freedom  to  permit  the  enactment  of 
seventeen  amendments  within  the  period  of  one  hun- 
dred and  thirty-five  years. 

Twelve  of  these  received  the  assent  of  the  requisite 
majority  of  the  States  within  the  first  twenty-five  years 
of  our  constitutional  history;  indeed,  the  enactment 
of  the  first  ten  practically  constituted  the  condition  upon 


234  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

which  many  of  the  States  ratified  the  Constitution. 
The  Thirteenth,  Fourteenth,  and  Fifteenth  were  passed 
in  consequence  of  the  War  of  1861 ;  and  within  the  last 
few  years  the  Sixteenth  and  Seventeenth  have  been  en- 
acted. 

It  is  not  too  much  to  claim  that  the  American  system 
of  constitutional  amendment  has  well  fulfilled  its  func- 
tions of  making  possible  such  changes  in  the  Constitu- 
tion as  are  desirable  and  earnestly  desired  by  the 
States. 

It  may  also  be  remarked  that,  with  the  exception  of 
the  three  u  war  amendments  "  which  were  passed  un- 
der abnormal  and  peculiar  circumstances,  the  almost 
universal  tendency  of  the  amendments  has  been  to  cur- 
tail the  powers  of  the  federal  government,  not  to  dimin- 
ish the  powers  of  the  States.  Most  of  the  curtailment 
of  the  latter  powers  that  has  occurred  has  been  effected 
through  construction  of  the  Constitution  by  the  judicial 
and  executive  departments  of  the  federal  government, 
not  by  actual  constitutional  amendment. 

Experience  in  the  United  States  therefore  would 
seem  to  teach  the  lesson  that  members  of  our  inter- 
national union  would  have  more  to  fear,  so  far  as  con- 
cerns the  protection  of  their  reserved  rights,  from 
the  departmental  constructions  of  the  proposed  consti- 
tution than  from  any  actual  amendments  receiving  the 
assent  of  a  large  majority  of  the  component  nations. 

But  even  the  dangers  arising  from  departmental 
constructions,  usages  and  practices  have  been  met  in 
the  proposed  international  compact  by  checks  and  bal- 


AMENDMENTS  235 

ances  unknown  to  the  American  Constitution,  which 
would  suffice,  if  not  to  eliminate,  at  least  to  disarm 
them  of  most  of  their  power  to  hurt. 

Thus  the  members  of  the  international  congress  are 
made  the  direct  agents  and  servants  of  their  respective 
nations,  appointed  as  they  see  fit  and  subject  to  recall 
by  them  at  their  pleasure ;  each  component  nation  may 
veto  any  law  of  the  Congress  on  the  ground  that  it  im- 
pairs the  reserved  rights  of  the  nations,  in  which  case 
the  law  can  be  passed  only  by  the  assent  of  such  a 
majority  in  each  house  of  the  Congress  as  would  suf- 
fice to  amend  the  constitution;  each  State,  after  twenty- 
five  years  of  membership,  has  the  right  to  withdraw  in 
peace  from  the  union;  the  executive  department  is  en- 
tirely responsible  to  the  Congress,  and  subject  to  recall 
at  the  will  of  either  house,  the  members  of  which  in 
turn  are  made  sensitively  responsive  to  the  wishes 
of  their  respective  nations;  the  international  judges  are 
to  be  appointed  by  the  executive  heads  of  the  several 
nations,  not  by  the  authority  of  the  United  Nations; 
and  a  three-fourths  majority  of  the  Supreme  Court 
or  of  any  section  thereof  is  required  to  declare  any 
legislation  or  treaty  of  a  component  nation  violative 
of  the  international  constitution  or  laws. 

These  governmental  checks  and  balances  appear  to 
be  sufficient  guarantees  that  the  reserved  rights  of  the 
component  nations  cannot  be  seriously  affected  by  de- 
partmental constructions;  while  actual  experience  in 
the  United  States,  no  less  than  theoretical  considera- 
tions, would  attest  that  little  danger  to  the  reserved 


236  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

powers  is  likely  to  arise  from  actual  amendments  for 
the  passage  of  which  the  assent  of  a  sufficiently  large 
majority  of  the  component  nations  is  required.  The 
three-fourths  majority  of  the  States  demanded  for  this 
purpose  by  the  American  Constitution  has  worked 
admirably  in  practice,  and  the  nations  could  scarcely 
do  better  than  follow  this  example.1 

II 

PROPOSAL  OF  AMENDMENTS 

.  The  clause  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
dealing  with  the  modes  of  proposing  amendments, 
reads  as  follows: 

"  The  Congress,  whenever  two-thirds  of  both 
houses  shall  deem  it  necessary,  shall  propose 
amendments  to  this  Constitution,  or,  on  the  ap- 
plication of  the  legislatures  of  two-thirds  of  the 
several  States,  shall  call  a  convention  [of  the 
States]  for  proposing  amendments." 

It  will  be  seen  that  this  clause  provides  for  two 
methods  of  proposing  amendments  ( I )  by  a  two-thirds 
vote  of  both  houses  of  the  Congress;  (2)  by  a  conven- 
tion of  the  States,  upon  the  application  of  the  legisla- 
tures of  two-thirds  of  the  States.  In  practice  no 
amendment  has  ever  been  proposed  by  the  second 
method. 

Under  our  international  constitution,  with  its  organi- 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IX. 


AMENDMENTS  237 

zation  of  the  Congress  composed  of  members  appointed 
and  removable  by  the  several  States  at  their  pleasure, 
these  two  methods  would  become  practically  identical, 
since  two-thirds  of  the  component  nations  might  at 
any  time  instruct  their  delegates  in  both  houses  of  the 
Congress  to  propose  or  support  a  given  amendment. 

That  a  two-thirds  majority  in  each  house  of  the 
Congress,  rather  than  a  bare  majority,  ought  to  be  re- 
quired for  this  purpose  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  if  a 
two-thirds  majority  of  the  component  nations  cannot 
be  secured  for  the  proposal  of  an  amendment,  it  would 
be  idle  and  useless  to  attempt  to  obtain  a  three-fourths 
majority  for  its  final  passage. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  possibility  of  the  later  conver- 
sion of  some  of  the  nations  to  the  amendment  would 
dictate  that  the  majority  required  for  the  proposal  of 
it  be  not  so  large  as  that  demanded  for  its  ultimate 
enactment.1 

Ill 

ENACTMENT  OF  AMENDMENTS 

After  providing  for  the  two  methods  of  proposing 
amendments,  as  above  described,  the  American  Consti- 
tution declares  that  when  an  amendment  has  been  duly 
proposed,  it  shall 

"  be  valid  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  as  part  of 
this  Constitution,  when  ratified  by  the  legislatures 
of  three-fourths  of  the  several  States,  or  by  con- 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IX,  Sec.  i. 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

ventions  [of  the  people]  in  three-fourths  thereof, 
as  the  one  or  the  other  mode  of  ratification  may 
be  proposed  by  the  Congress." 

The  American  States  being  republican  in  form  and 
the  ultimate  sovereignty  resting  in  the  people  thereof,. 
it  is  eminently  proper  that  such  fundamental  legislation 
as  would  be  comprised  in  an  amendment  to  the  federal 
Constitution  should  receive,  as  essential  to  its  validity, 
the  assent  of  the  people  themselves  in  each  State,  either 
through  their  chosen  representatives  in  the  respective 
State  legislatures,  or  through  their  still  more  specially 
chosen  representatives  in  conventions  of  the  people 
held  in  each  State  and  called  for  the  purpose. 

To  have  left  the  enactment  of  an  amendment  to 
Congress  would  not  have  been  in  the  least  consistent 
either  in  theory  or  practice  with  the  real  foundation 
upon  which  the  American  Constitution  rests, — the  free 
consent  of  the  people  of  the  several  States. 

But  in  the  case  of  our  international  compact  the  cir- 
cumstances are  very  different.  The  constitution  of  the 
United  Nations  would  not  necessarily  rest  upon  the  con- 
sent of  the  people  of  the  several  nations  or  their  repre- 
sentatives,— whether  it  would  or  not  in  case  of  a  par- 
ticular nation  would  depend  on  the  form  of  its  own 
constitution.  Theoretically  in  each  case,  since  the 
constitution  would  be  an  international  compact  or 
treaty,  its  validity  would  depend  upon  the  valid  exer- 
cise of  the  constitutional  treaty-making  power  by  the 
government  of  each  component  nation;  or  if  the  treaty- 
making  power  has  not  the  constitutional  right  to  make 


AMENDMENTS  239 

such  a  treaty,  then  by  an  appeal  to  the  constitution- 
making  power. 

In  our  case  therefore  it  would  be  impracticable  to 
insert  a  clause  such  as  that  in  the  American  Constitu- 
tion providing  that  amendments  receive  the  assent  of 
the  people  of  the  several  component  nations.  Indeed 
it  would  be  needless  to  refer  the  matter  formally  to 
the  component  nations  at  all,  the  assent  of  their  repre- 
sentatives in  the  Congress  (who  would  be  entirely  sub- 
ject to  the  will  of  their  governments)  being  a  sufficient 
guarantee  of  the  assent  of  each  nation  to  the  proposed 
amendment. 

But  a  certain  period  of  notice  ought  to  be  required 
after  the  proposal  of  an  amendment  by  the  Congress 
before  its  final  passage  by  that  body,  so  that  ample 
time  may  be  given  the  several  national  govern- 
ments to  determine  the  position  they  ought  to  take  with 
respect  to  it,  or,  if  the  national  constitution  so  re- 
quires, to  obtain  the  desires  of  their  people  on  the  sub- 
ject. 

For  instance,  if  the  United  States  were  one  of  the 
component  nations,  no  amendment  to  the  international 
constitution  could  probably  be  assented  to  by  it  with- 
out some  corresponding  amendment  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  to  which  the  assent  of  three- 
fourths  of  the  States  would  be  necessary.  It  would 
take  several  years  to  obtain  this  assent  if  it  were  ob- 
tained at  all. 

While  therefore  a  three-fourths  vote  of  each  house 
of  the  Congress  would  suffice  to  enact  an  amendment 


240  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

to  the  international  constitution,  it  would  also  be  im- 
portant to  provide  that  no  vote  upon  the  passage  of  an 
amendment  be  taken  in  either  house  of  the  Congress 
until  a  reasonable  time  (say,  four  years)  after  the 
formal  proposal  of  it.  This  would  give  the  several 
national  governments  adequate  opportunity  to  con- 
sider the  subject  in  all  its  bearings  and  would  also 
answer  the  requirements  of  nations  situated  like  the 
United  States  whose  governments  are  responsive  to 
the  will  of  the  people.1 

IV 

LIMITATIONS  UPON  THE  POWER  OF  AMENDMENT 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  declares  that 
no  State  shall  by  any  amendment  be  deprived  of  its 
equal  suffrage  in  the  Senate.  The  reason  for  this  limi- 
tation is  obvious.  It  was  inserted  in  order  to  prevent 
the  passage  of  any  amendment  which  would  destroy 
the  constitutional  balance  between  the  smaller  and  the 
larger  States  through  the  equality  of  representation 
in  the  Senate. 

Without  question  our  international  constitution 
ought  to  contain  a  similar  limitation,  since  the  balance 
of  the  equal  representation  of  sovereignty  in  the  upper 
house  against  the  unequal  representation  according  to 
population  in  the  lower  is  one  of  the  fundamental 
conditions  of  the  union. 

But  this  is  not  the  only  basic  condition  of  the  com- 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IX,  Sees,  i,  2. 


AMENDMENT— LIMITATIONS        241 

pact  as  proposed.  Others  are  the  right  of  the  more 
populous  States  to  be  represented  in  the  lower  house 
of  the  Congress  in  proportion  to  federal  population; 
the  right  of  each  component  nation  to  veto  the  legis- 
lation of  the  Congress  which  it  believes  subversive  of 
the  reserved  rights  of  the  nations;  the  right  of  a  na- 
tion to  withdraw  from  the  union  after  a  designated 
term  of  membership;  the  right  of  each  nation  to  its 
equal  representation  upon  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  Nations ;  and  the  exemption  of  the  sovereign  or 
chief  executive  of  each  nation  from  the  operation  of  the 
judicial  power  of  the  United  Nations. 

These  are  all  fundamental  conditions  of  our  inter- 
national compact,  without  the  existence  and  guaranteed 
continuance  of  which  no  nation  would  probably  be  will- 
ing to  assent  to  it.  An  express  provision  therefore 
should  be  inserted  to  the  effect  that  no  amendment  shall 
be  passed  which  shall  affect  them,  except  by  unanimous 
consent.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IX,  Sec.  2. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 
DISCIPLINE  OF  A  COMPONENT  NATION 


VIOLATIONS  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  OBLIGATIONS  BY  A 
COMPONENT  NATION 

The  checks  and  balances  already  suggested  for  our 
proposed  constitution  would  seem  sufficient  to  prevent 
the  international  government  itself  from  violating  the 
compact  by  unjustifiable  encroachments  upon  the  re- 
served powers  of  the  component  nations. 

That  each  nation  would  possess  a  right  of  qualified 
veto  upon  international  legislation,  would  have  an 
equal  voice  upon  the  Supreme  Court, — the  final  inter- 
preter of  the  international  constitution,  laws,  and 
treaties, — and  in  the  last  resort  would  have  the  right 
to  withdraw  in  peace  from  the  union,  would  appear  to 
constitute  sufficient  safeguards  against  any  permanent 
violations  on  the  part  of  the  international  government 
or  any  majority  of  its  sister  nations  of  the  obligations 
towards  it  imposed  upon  them  by  the  constitution. 

On  the  other  hand,  however,  while  our  plan  as  thus 
far  developed  has  imposed  upon  each  component  na- 
tion certain  obligations  and  duties  toward  the  interna- 

242 


DISCIPLINE  OF  COMPONENT  STATE    243 

tional  government  as  a  whole  and  toward  its  sister  na- 
tions, no  check  has  as  yet  been  suggested  whereby,  if  a 
component  nation  radically  or  persistently  violates 
these  obligations,  pressure  may  be  brought  to  bear 
upon  it  to  compel  it  to  observe  them. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  suppose  a  component  State  so 
indifferent  to  its  duties  as  to  fail  to  send  delegations 
to  the  Congress  or  to  fail  to  appoint  its  delegates  to  the 
Supreme  Court  or  to  other  international  courts  within 
its  boundaries,  thus  embarrassing  the  operations  and 
functions  of  the  international  government.  No  com- 
ponent nation  would  be  likely  to  act  thus,  since  it  would 
thereby  merely  lose  its  voice  and  influence  in  interna- 
tional affairs  while  yet,  so  long  as  it  might  remain  in 
the  union,  it  would  be  bound  by  the  laws  and  decisions 
passed.  Should  a  nation  ever  reach  such  a  stage  of 
indifference  it  would  be  far  more  likely  to  withdraw 
at  once  from  the  union,  as  it  would  have  the  right  to 
do. 

The  cases  chiefly  to  be  guarded  against  would  be 
those  wherein  a  nation,  while  willing  and  anxious  in 
general  to  avail  itself  of  the  advantages  of  the  union, 
would  yet  be  slow  and  unwilling  to  pay  the  price  in 
cheerfully  and  loyally  yielding  to  the  constitutional 
wishes  of  the  majority  of  its  fellows. 

Suppose  for  example  a  component  nation  to  refuse  to 
give  up  an  excessive  proportion  of  armed  troops  or 
ships  of  war,  paying  no  regard  to  the  action  of  the 
Congress  in  that  regard;  or  to  decline  to  obey  an  ad- 
verse judgment  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  a  suit  insti- 


244  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

tuted  against  it  by  a  sister  State;  or  to  refuse  to  recog- 
nize within  its  limits  those  privileges  and  immunities 
of  the  citizens  of  its  sister  States  guaranteed  by  the 
constitution;  or  to  insist  upon  levying  tariff  duties  on 
goods  imported  into  its  borders  from  other  States  in 
violation  of  the  constitution  or  enforcing  within  its 
limits  other  laws  declared  by  the  Supreme  Court  to 
be  violative  of  the  constitution;  or  to  insist  upon 
waging  war  against  other  States,  either  members  or 
not  members  of  the  union,  or  persistently  threatening 
to  do  so  or  deliberately  engaging  in  conduct  that  would 
provoke  another  State  to  make  war  upon  it;  or,  in  case 
of  a  civil  war  within  the  boundaries  of  a  sister  State,  to 
insist,  contrary  to  its  constitutional  duty,  upon  interfer- 
ing in  the  contest  and  giving  aid  and  comfort  to  one 
side  or  the  other;  or  to  acquire  unconstitutionally  terri- 
tory which  it  refuses  to  surrender. 

The  presence  of  such  a  disturbing  influence,  if  per- 
manent, instead  of  strengthening  our  union,  would 
merely  weaken  it,  converting  it  from  an  institution  es- 
tablished to  insure  peace  into  a  breeder  of  discord 
and  violence. 

Of  course  it  would  be  possible  for  the  other  nations 
composing  the  union  to  use  force  under  such  circum- 
stances and  by  war,  if  necessary,  to  compel  the  recalci- 
trant State  to  observe  its  constitutional  obligations. 
But  to  adopt  such  a  remedy  would  be  a  direct  contra- 
diction of  the  fundamental  principle  upon  which  our 
union  would  be  founded, — the  preservation  of  peace. 

Assuming  that  the  disturbing  element  would  desire 


METHODS  OF  DISCIPLINE  245 

to  remain  in  the  union  and  enjoy  its  advantages  (for 
otherwise  it  would  substitute,  in  the  place  of  disturbing 
the  peace  of  the  union,  the  simpler  and  more  satisfac- 
tory procedure  of  withdrawing  therefrom),  it  is  pos- 
sible to  conceive  of  more  consistent  and  law  abiding 
remedies  than  the  use  of  violence,  and  yet  equally  effica- 
cious. 

II 

MODES  OF  DISCIPLINE  SUGGESTED 

Two  methods  of  disciplining  a  recalcitrant  member 
of  the  union  suggest  themselves,  one  economic  in  char- 
acter, and  the  other  political. 

In  the  first  place,  the  Congress  may  be  authorized 
to  declare  an  embargo  upon  part  or  all  of  the  trade 
carried  on  between  the  offending  nation  and  the  other 
component  nations  of  the  union,  to  remain  in  force  so 
long  as  in  the  judgment  of  the  Congress  might  be  neces- 
sary. 

Such  a  measure  would  of  course  impose  some  degree 
of  hardship  upon  the  innocent  States  whose  trade  would 
thus  be  affected,  but  the  burden  would,  theoretically 
at  least,  fall  upon  all  alike  since  the  embargo  would 
apply  alike  to  all,  and  even  though  unevenly  distri- 
buted, the  loss  and  inconvenience  to  none  could  be 
greater  than  the  use  of  force  and  war  as  a  remedy, 
since  the  very  first  measure  in  case  of  war  would  be 
the  cessation  of  all  trade  with  the  offending  State. 

The  Congress  might  not  in  some  cases  find  it  neces- 


246  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

sary  to  lay  an  embargo  upon  all  of  the  trade  between 
the  several  States;  the  disciplinary  measure  might 
prove  successful  when  applied  to  only  a  portion  of  it. 
And  the  Congress  ought  probably  to  be  given  a  discre- 
tion in  this  respect.  But  whether  the  embargo  be  laid 
on  some  or  all  of  the  trade,  so  much  of  the  trade 
as  is  prohibited  ought  to  be  prohibited  to  all  the  States 
alike.  If  State  A  is  the  offender  and  States  B  and  C 
are  two  of  the  component  nations,  the  Congress  ought 
not  to  be  permitted  to  prohibit  all  trade  between  A  and 
B  in  certain  articles,  while  allowing  C  to  trade  with  A 
in  the  same  articles. 

In  the  second  place,  if  the  application  of  the  em- 
bargo prove  insufficient  to  deter  the  offending  State, 
the  Congress  ought  to  be  authorized  to  take  the  further 
step  of  expelling  the  offender  from  the  union  alto- 
gether. Indeed  cases  might  be  imagined  in  which  it 
might  be  best  to  adopt  this  course  in  the  first  instance 
without  waiting  to  apply  the  milder  remedy  of  the  em- 
bargo. On  the  whole  it  would  appear  to  be  wise  to 
leave  with  the  Congress  a  discretion  as  to  which  remedy 
shall  be  applied. 

But  upon  the  expulsion  of  a  State,  it  would  be  fair 
and  just  and  tend  toward  future  peace  to  treat  the 
State  thus  expelled,  so  far  as  its  rights  in  the  common 
property  are  concerned,  in  the  same  manner  as  a  State 
which  voluntarily  secedes  is  treated,  that  is,  to  restore 
to  it  such  territory  (outside  the  seat  of  government)  as 
it  may  have  ceded  to  the  union,  and  upon  an  accounting 
of  the  common  assets  and  liabilities  before  the  Su- 


CHECK  ON  POWER  TO  DISCIPLINE    247 

preme  Court,  to  turn  over  to  it  such  balance  as  may 
prove  to  be  due.1 

Ill 

CHECK  UPON  DISCIPLINARY  POWER  OF  THE 
CONGRESS 

Even  though  it  be  conceded  that  the  Congress  ought 
to  possess  the  disciplinary  powers  mentioned,  yet  we 
might  well  hesitate  to  place  so  dangerous  a  power  in 
the  hands  of  a  bare  majority  of  either  house.  The 
power  might  easily  be  diverted  into  an  engine  of  op- 
pression and  a  means  of  obtaining  trade  advantages  at 
the  expense  of  a  powerful  competing  rival. 

It  would  seem  therefore  to  be  a  proper  precaution 
to  demand  that  such  action  may  be  taken  by  the  Con- 
gress only  with  the  assent  of  a  very  considerable  ma- 
jority of  the  votes  in  each  house. 

Since  such  disciplinary  action  is  in  a  sense  extra- 
constitutional  and  (if  it  should  result  in  the  expulsion 
of  a  component  nation)  would  really  effect  an  essen- 
tial change  in  the  constitution  of  the  government,  if 
not  in  "  the  constitution,"  and  since  it  has  been  pro- 
vided that  no  nation  shall  be  permitted  to  become  a 
member  of  the  union  except  upon  a  three-fourths  vote 
in  each  house,  it  would  seem  appropriate  to  fix  the 
same  majority  as  necessary  to  pass  either  of  the  dis- 
ciplinary measures  suggested.2 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  X,  Sees,  i,  2,  4. 

2  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  X,  Sec.  3. 


CHAPTER  XIX 
ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION 


NUMBER  OF  ASSENTING  NATIONS  NECESSARY  TO 
ESTABLISH  THE  CONSTITUTION 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  required  for  its 
establishment  the  assent  of  nine,  that  is,  three-fourths, 
of  the  thirteen  then  existing  States,  the  same  proportion 
required  for  the  valid  enactment  of  an  amendment. 

The  conditions  confronting  the  framers  of  the  great 
American  document  differed  radically  from  those 
which  the  nations  of  the  world  are  facing  today. 

During  some  ten  years  previous  to  the  adoption  of 
the  American  Constitution,  the  thirteen  States  had 
been  united  politically  under  a  league  or  alliance  known 
as  "  the  Articles  of  Confederation  and  Perpetual 
Union,"  which  had  definitely  proved  itself  a  failure  as 
an  instrument  of  government,  but  which  nevertheless 
had  united  the  States  by  a  common  bond.  Those  Ar- 
ticles expressly  declared  that  no  amendments  thereto 
or  changes  therein  should  be  effected  without  the  unani- 
mous consent  of  all  the  States.  Changes  had  become 
absolutely  essential,  but  it  was  feared  with  reason  that 

248 


CONSTITUTION  ESTABLISHED        249 

unanimous  consent  could  not  be  obtained  to  make  them. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  was  believed  that  unless  the  as- 
sent of  more  than  a  bare  majority  of  the  States  was 
obtained,  it  would  not  only  be  dangerous  to  break  up 
the  existing  union,  but  the  success  of  the  new  one  would 
be  in  peril.  Hence  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  fixed 
upon  the  proportion  of  three-fourths  of  the  States  as 
being  sufficient  to  insure  its  probable  success. 

In  the  case  of  our  international  constitution,  However, 
the  component  nations  have  never  been  in  union,  save 
through  temporary  alliances  between  certain  of  them; 
and  they  are  by  no  means  so  nearly  on  the  same  footing 
of  equality  as  to  wealth,  population,  or  political  or  mili- 
tary strength,  as  were  the  American  States  at  the  adop- 
tion of  their  Constitution. 

The  questions, — which  are  the  nations,  and  how 
many,  whose  assent  ought  to  be  regarded  as  necessary 
to  the  practical  success  of  the  union, — are  questions  of 
practical  statesmanship,  which  must  be  left  to  the  deci- 
sion of  our  supposed  conference  of  nations  called  to 
discuss  the  feasibility  of  some  such  plan  of  union  as 
that  advocated  in  these  pages. 

But  for  the  sake  of  placing  a  complete  scheme  before 
the  reader,  it  is  suggested  that  no  such  union  could 
meet  with  success  if  it  do  not  include  at  least  five  of 
the  eight  existing  "  Great  Powers,"  that  is,  Austria- 
Hungary,  France,  Germany,  Great  Britain,  Italy, 
Japan,  Russia,  and  the  United  States.  Without  these, 
or  a  majority  of  them,  the  union  would  be  of  little 
service  in  preventing  wars,  and  other  nations  would  be 


250  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

apt,  and  indeed  ought,  to  decline  to  surrender  impor- 
tant sovereign  rights  in  the  creation  of  a  federal  gov- 
ernment which  would  be  unable  to  guarantee  peace  to 
them  or  the  rest  of  the  world. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  accession  of  these  nations,  or 
a  majority  of  them,  would  secure  also  the  assent  of 
many  others,  since  they  would  find  within  the  union  a 
protection  against  unjust  aggressions  they  could  not 
hope  to  find  outside.  Wars  between  nations,  if  not 
eliminated  altogether,  would  be  then  reduced  to  a 
minimum,  and  the  burdens  of  war  taxes,  armaments, 
national  ill  will,  and  human  woe  greatly  alleviated. 

Since  there  are  eight  of  the  "  Great  Powers,"  and 
the  assent  of  five  of  these  would  suffice  to  insure  the 
success  of  the  union  and  to  induce  other  nations  to 
join  it,  the  number  of  nations  whose  assent  would  be 
sufficient  to  establish  the  constitution  between  them 
has  been  tentatively  fixed  at  eight,  of  which  at  least 
five  must  belong  to  the  group  of  "  Great  Powers."  1 

II 

METHOD  OF  RATIFICATION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  provided 
that 

"  The  ratification  of  the  conventions  [of  the 
people]  of  nine  States  shall  be  sufficient  for  the 
establishment  of  this  Constitution  between  the 
States  so  ratifying  the  same." 

1  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  XI,  Sec.  i. 


CONSTITUTION  ESTABLISHED        251 

In  the  political  vocabulary  of  the  United  States,  the 
term,  "  conventions  of  nine  States,"  signifies  that  in 
each  State  there  be  called  by  the  proper  governmental 
authority  a  "  convention  of  the  people,"  the  number 
of  members  of  which,  as  well  as  their  distribution  and 
apportionment  among  the  people  and  the  rules  govern- 
ing their  selection  by  the  people,  would  be  previ- 
ously determined  by  law.  The  membership  would 
usually  consist  of  several  hundred,  elected  by  the 
people,  one  member  to  so  many  thousands  of  con- 
stituents. 

In  the  American  political  theory,  in  the  absence 
of  a  requirement  that  its  work  be  submitted  by  a 
referendum  to  a  vote  of  the  people,  the  "  convention 
of  the  people  "  is  clothed  with  the  ultimate  sovereignty 
of  the  State  and  its  people,  and  is  superior  to  the  ordi- 
nary legislative  assembly  which  possesses  merely  a  de- 
rivative or  secondary  sovereignty,  or  certain  govern- 
mental powers. 

Hence  when  the  American  Constitution  provided 
for  its  own  ratification  by  "  conventions  "  in  the  sev- 
eral States,  it  was  building  its  authority  upon  the 
strongest  and  deepest  foundations  known  to  American 
political  science, — the  ultimate  sovereign  will  of  the 
people  of  the  several  States.  The  document  thus  con- 
stituted the  most  solemn  of  all  treaties, — a  treaty  not 
made  through  the  ordinary  or  u  derivative "  sov- 
ereignty of  the  States  as  represented  in  their  ordinary 
governmental  action,  but  made  by  the  "  ultimate  "  sov- 
ereign will  of  the  people  themselves,  rising  supreme 


252  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

over  the  "  derivative  "  sovereignty  or  mere  govern- 
mental agencies. 

But  amid  few  of  the  nations  of  the  world  do  these 
political  theories  of  the  United  States  prevail.  In 
Great  Britain,  for  example,  the  theory  is  that  the  "  ulti- 
mate "  sovereignty  rests  not  in  the  people  as  such,  but 
in  the  Parliament,  the  most  powerful  and  influential 
branch  of  which  is  the  House  of  Commons,  composed 
of  representatives  of  the  people.  And  in  still  other 
countries  the  theory  is  that  the  "  ultimate  "  sovereignty 
is  vested  in  the  person  of  the  sovereign. 

It  cannot  be  supposed  therefore  that  our  interna- 
tional compact  could  be  made  to  depend  upon  actual 
ratification  by  the  people  of  the  several  nations  acced- 
ing to  it,  even  though  this  were  the  strongest  founda- 
tion on  which  to  rest  it. 

It  would  nevertheless  be  desirable,  if  possible,  to 
place  the  status  of  this  solemn  compact, — partaking, 
as  it  does,  of  the  nature  of  a  fundamental  law  involv- 
ing profound  changes  in  the  existing  constitution  of 
each  component  State, — upon  a  distinctly  higher  plane 
than  that  occupied  by  ordinary  treaties.  Hence  it  be- 
comes necessary  to  seek  out  the  foundation  for  it  that 
would  be  recognized  by  all  nations  in  common  as  the 
strongest  and  deepest. 

It  must  of  course  be  assented  to  by  the  constitutional 
treaty-making  power  of  each  nation  (after  such 
changes  in  its  existing  constitution  as  might  be  rendered 
needful  by  the  adoption  of  this  international  compact)  ; 
but  its  binding  and  supreme  obligation  ought  to  be 


CONSTITUTION  ESTABLISHED        253 

recognized  and  emphasized  by  making  it  a  condition 
of  ratification  that,  besides  the  assent  of  the  ordinary 
treaty-making  power  of  each  component  nation,  the 
sovereign  or  chief  executive  of  each  shall  solemnly 
pledge  in  writing  the  honor  of  his  nation  as  well  as 
of  himself  and  his  successors  to  the  faithful  and  hon- 
est observance  of  the  compact  in  all  its  parts  so  long 
as  the  nation  remains  in  the  union,  leaving  all  dis- 
putes to  be  settled  peaceably  in  the  modes  indicated 
therein. 

If  it  be  argued  that  such  a  pledge  is  implied  in  the 
making  of  every  treaty,  and  that  it  would  add  nothing 
to  the  sanctity  of  this  compact,  it  may  be  replied  that 
while  this  is  true  in  theory  and  viewing  treaties  from 
a  high  moral  plane  unaffected  by  pressing  personal  or 
public  interests,  it  is  also  true  that  in  practice  national 
governments  have  frequently  violated  treaties  most 
flagrantly  when  they  have  conflicted  with  supposed  na- 
tional interests,  and  have  not  regarded  either  their  own 
or  their  nation's  honor  as  sullied  thereby.  The  mere 
implication  of  the  pledge  has  proved  insufficient  to 
deter  in  many  cases. 

But  may  it  not  reasonably  be  supposed  that  an  ex- 
press and  solemn  pledge  of  the  honor  of  the  nation 
and  its  rulers  would  prove  a.  very  considerable  obstacle 
and  stumbling  block  to  the  violation  of  this  compact, 
not  only  because  of  its  peculiar  nature  and  the  special 
sanctity  thrown  around  it,  but  also  because,  even  should 
the  rulers  themselves  see  a  supposed  national  profit 
in  violating  it,  the  people  feeling  their  own  honor  pub- 


254  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

licly  pledged,  would  be  more  likely  to  condemn  and 
oppose  the  violation?  It  would  thus  cease  to  be  a 
mere  governmental  agreement  and  would  become  a  na- 
tional one  in  the  fullest  sense.1 

1  See  Appendix,  Consf  n  U.  N.,  Art.  XI,  Sec.  2. 


APPENDIX 

CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

AND 
TENTATIVE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  UNITED  NATIONS 

IN 

PARALLEL  COLUMNS 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION. 

We  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  in  order  to  form  a  more 
perfect  Union,  establish  justice, 
insure  domestic  tranquillity,  pro- 
vide for  the  common  defense, 
promote  the  general  welfare,  and 
secure  the  blessings  of  liberty  to 
ourselves  and  our  posterity,  do 
ordain  and  establish  this  Consti- 
tution for  the  United  States  of 
America. 

ARTICLE  I 

Section  i.  All  legislative  pow- 
ers herein  granted  shall  be  vested 
in  a  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  which  shall  consist  of  a 
Senate  and  House  of  Representa- 
tives. 


Section  2.  The  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives shall  be  composed  of 
members  chosen  every  second 
year  by  the  people  of  the  several 
States,  and  the  electors  in  each 
State  shall  have  the  qualifications 
requisite  for  electors  of  the  most 
numerous  branch  of  the  State 
legislature. 

Representatives  and  direct  taxes 
shall  be  apportioned  among  the 
several  States  which  may  be  in- 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 


ARTICLE  I 

LEGISLATIVE  DEPARTMENT,  ITS  OR- 
GANIZATION AND  POWERS 

Section  i.  All  legislative  pow- 
ers herein  granted  shall  be  vested 
in  a  Congress  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, which  shall  consist  of  a 
Senate  and  House  of  Delegates. 
[Ante,  pp.  32  et  seq.] 

Section  2.  i.  The  House  of 
Delegates  shall  be  composed  of 
delegations  representing  the  sev- 
eral component  nations,  chosen 
as  the  laws  of  each  nation  shall 
direct. 

[Ante,  pp.  50  et  seq.] 


2.  Each  nation  shall  be  repre- 
sented in  the  House  of  Delegates 
by  votes  in  proportion  to  the  pop- 


257 


258 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

eluded  within  this  Union,  accord- 
ing to  their  respective  numbers, 
which  shall  be  determined  by 
adding  to  the  whole  number  of 
free  persons,  including  those 
bound  to  service  for  a  term  of 
years,  and  excluding  Indians  not 
taxed,  three-fifths  of  all  other 
persons.  [Now  modified  by 
Amendment  XIV,  Sec.  2.]  The 
actual  enumeration  shall  be  made 
within  three  years  after  the  first 
meeting  of  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States,  and  within  every 
subsequent  term  of  ten  years,  in 
such  manner  as  they  shall  by  law 
direct.  The  number  of  Represen- 
tatives shall  not  exceed  one  for 
every  thirty  thousand,  but  each 
State  shall  have  at  least  one  Rep- 
resentative, and  until  such  enu- 
meration shall  be  made,  the  State 
of  New  Hampshire  shall  be  en- 
titled to  choose  three,  Massachu- 
setts eight,  Rhode  Island  and 
Providence  Plantations  one,  Con- 
necticut five,  New  York  six,  New 
Jersey  four,  Pennsylvania  eight, 
Delaware  one,  Maryland  six,  Vir- 
ginia ten,  North  Carolina  five, 
South  Carolina  five,  and  Georgia 
three. 


The  House  of  Representatives 
shall  choose  their  speaker  and 
other  officers;  and  shall  have  the 
sole  power  of  impeachment. 

[The  President,  Vice-President, 
and  all  civil  officers  of  the  United 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

ulation  of  all  its  territories,  which 
shall  be  determined  by  adding  to 
the  whole  number  of  white  per- 
sons one-third  of  all  other  per- 
sons:— provided  that  persons  of 
full  Japanese  blood  shall,  for  the 
purposes  of  this  section,  be 
counted  as  white  persons.  The 
actual  enumeration  shall  be  made 
within  five  years  after  the  first 
meeting  of  the  Congress  of  the 
United  Nations,  and  within  every 
subsequent  term  of  ten  years,  in 
such  manner  as  they  shall  by  law 
direct.  The  number  of  votes  to 
which  each  nation  shall  be  en- 
titled in  the  House  of  Delegates 
shall  not  exceed  one  for  every 
four  millions  of  population,  or 
fraction  thereof  in  excess  of  fifty 
per  centum,  estimated  in  the 
manner  before  mentioned,  but 
each  nation  shall  have  at  least 
one  vote.  Until  such  enumera- 
tion shall  be  made,  each  na- 
tion shall  be  entitled  to  votes  on 
the  basis  mentioned,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  last  official  census 
taken  by  such  nation  prior  to  its 
ratification  of  this  constitution. 
Each  delegation  shall  cast  the 
votes  of  its  nation  as  a  whole  or 
in  such  other  manner  as  the  na- 
tion may  by  its  laws  direct. 

[Ante,    pp.   33    et   seq.] 
3.    The     House     of    Delegates 
shall    choose    its    presiding    and 
other  officers. 


APPENDIX 


0.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

States  shall  be  removed  from  of- 
fice on  impeachment  for,  and  con- 
viction of,  treason,  bribery,  or 
other  high  crimes  and  misde- 
meanors.— Article  II,  Sec.  4.] 

Section  3.  The  Senate  of  the 
United  States  shall  be  composed 
of  two  Senators  from  each  State 
elected  by  the  people  thereof  for 
six  years;  and  each  Senator  shall 
have  one  vote. 


The  electors  in  each  State  shall 
have  the  qualifications  requisite 
for  electors  of  the  most  nu- 
merous branch  of  the  State  legis- 
lature. [Amendment  XVII.] 

Immediately  after  they  shall 
be  assembled  in  consequence  of 
the  first  election,  they  shall  be  di- 
vided as  equally  as  may  be  into 
three  classes.  The  seats  of  the 
Senators  of  the  first  class  shall  be 
vacated  at  the  expiration  of  the 
second  year,  of  the  second  class  at 
the  expiration  of  the  fourth  year, 
and  of  the  third  class  at  the  ex- 
piration of  the  sixth  year,  so  that 
one-third  may  be  chosen  every 
second  year.  .  .  . 

The  Vice-President  of  the 
United  States  shall  be  President 
of  the  Senate,  but  shall  have  no 
vote  unless  they  be  equally  di- 
vided. 

The  Senate  shall  choose  their 
other  officers;  and  also  a  Presi- 
dent pro  tcmpore,  in  the  absence 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 
[See  Article  III,  Sec.  2,  cl.  2.] 


Section  3.  i.  The  Senate  of  the 
United  Nations  shall  be  composed 
of  delegations  from  each  compo- 
nent nation  chosen  as  the  laws  of 
each  nation  shall  direct.  Each 
delegation  shall  have  two  votes, 
which  shall  be  cast  as  a  whole  or 
in  such  other  manner  as  each  na- 
tion may  by  its  laws  direct. 
[Ante,  pp.  46  et  seq.] 


2.   The  Senate  shall  choose  its 
presiding  and  other  officers. 


260 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

of  the  Vice-President,  or  when  he 
shall  exercise  the  office  of  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States. 

The  Senate  shall  have  the  sole 
power  to  try  all  impeachments. 
When  sitting  for  the  purpose, 
they  shall  be  on  oath  or  affirma- 
tion. When  the  President  of  the 
United  States  is  tried,  the  Chief 
Justice  shall  preside;  and  no  per- 
son shall  be  convicted  without 
the  concurrence  of  two-thirds  of 
the  members  present. 

Judgment  in  cases  of  impeach- 
ment shall  not  extend  further 
than  to  removal  from  office,  and 
disqualification  to  hold  and  en- 
joy any  office  of  honor,  trust  or 
profit  under  the  United  States; 
but  the  party  convicted  shall 
nevertheless  be  liable  and  sub- 
ject to  indictment,  trial,  judgment, 
and  punishment,  according  to 
law. 

[For  terms  of  office  of  Repre- 
sentatives, see  Article  I,  Sec.  2, 
cl.  I,  and  of  Senators,  see  Article 
If  Sec.  3,  cl.  i;  Amendment 
XFIL] 

[For  eligibility  of  representa- 
tives, see  Article  I,  Sec.  2,  cl.  2, 
and  of  Senators,  see  Article  I, 
Sec.  3,  cl.  3.] 


[When  vacancies  shall  happen 
in  the  representation  (i.e.,  in  the 
lower  House,  and  now,  by  the 
Seventeenth  Amendment  in  the 
Senate  also)  from  any  State,  the 
executive  authority  thereof  shall 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 


[See  ante,  pp.  60  et  seq.] 


Section  4.  i.  The  terms  of  of- 
fice and  the  number  of  the  mem- 
bers, of  the  delegations  in  each 
house  shall  be  at  the  will  of  the 
respective  nations  they  represent, 
as  directed  by  its  laws.  Each  na- 
tion shall  also  regulate  by  its 
own  laws  the  eligibility  of  its 
delegates  in  either  house  and  the 
recall  of  each  or  all  of  them. 
[Ante,  pp.  50  et  seq.] 


APPENDIX 


261 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

issue  writs  of  election  to  fill  such 
vacancies. — Article  I,  Sec.  2,  cl. 
4;  Sec.  3,  cl.  2;  Amendment 
XVIL] 

[The  Congress  shall  assemble 
at  least  once  in  every  year,  and 
such  meeting  shall  be  on  the  first 
Monday  in  December,  unless  they 
shall  by  law  appoint  a  different 
day.— Article  I,  Sec.  4,  cl.  2.] 

[Neither  House,  during  the  ses- 
sion of  Congress,  shall,  without 
the  consent  of  the  other,  adjourn 
for  more  than  three  days,  nor  to 
any  other  place  than  that  in 
which  the  two  houses  shall  be  sit- 
ting.— Article  I,  Sec.  5,  cl.  4.] 

Section  5.  Each  House  shall  be 
the  judge  of  the  elections,  returns, 
and  qualifications  of  its  own 
members;  and  a  majority  of  each 
shall  constitute  a  quorum  to  do 
business;  but  a  small  number 
may  adjourn  from  day  to  day, 
and  may  be  authorized  to  compel 
the  attendance  of  absent  mem- 
bers, in  such  manner  and  under 
such  penalties  as  each  House  may 
provide. 

Each  House  may  determine  the 
rules  of  its  proceedings,  punish  its 
members  for  disorderly  behavior, 
and,  with  the  concurrence  of  two- 
thirds,  expel  a  member. 


Each  House  shall  keep  a  jour- 
nal of  its  proceedings,  and  from 
time  to  time  publish  the  same,  ex- 
cepting such  parts  as  may  require 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 


2.  The  Congress  shall  remain 
in    perpetual    session,    subject    to 
such    recess,    not    exceeding    four 
months  at  one  time,   as  the  two 
houses   shall    from   time   to   time 
agree  upon. 

[Ante,    p.    53.] 

3.  Neither    house    shall,    with- 
out the  consent  of  the  other,  ad- 
journ  for   more   than   one   week, 
nor  to  any  other  place  than  that 
in  which  the  two  houses  shall  be 
sitting. 

[Ante,  p.  53.] 

Section  5.  i.  A 'majority  of  the 
votes  in  each  house  shall  consti- 
tute a  quorum  to  do  business;  but 
a  smaller  number  may  adjourn 
from  day  to  day. 


2.  Each  house  may  determine 
the  rules  of  its  proceedings,  pun- 
ish  delegates   for   disorderly   be- 
havior, and,  with  the  concurrence 
of  two-thirds  of  the  votes,  expel  a 
delegate. 

[Ante,   p.  65.] 

3.  Each    house    shall    keep    a 
journal    of    its    proceedings,    and 
from    time    to    time    publish    the 
same   in   such   language   or    Ian- 


262 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

secrecy;  and  the  yeas  and  nays 
of  the  members  of  either  House 
on  any  question  shall,  at  the  de- 
sire of  one-fifth  of  those  present, 
be  entered  on  the  journal. 


Section  6.  The  Senators  and 
Representatives  shall  receive  a 
compensation  for  their  services  to 
be  ascertained  by  law,  and  paid 
out  of  the  treasury  of  the  United 
States. 


They  shall  in  all  cases,  except 
treason,  felony,  and  breach  of  the 
peace,  be  privileged  from  arrest 
during  their  attendance  at  the  ses- 
sion of  their  respective  Houses, 
and  in  going  to  and  returning 
from  the  same ;  and  for  any 
speech  or  debate  in  either  House, 
they  shall  not  be  questioned  in 
any  other  place. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

guages  as  the  Congress  may  by 
law  direct,  excepting  such  parts 
as  may  require  secrecy;  and  the 
votes  of  the  delegations  in  either 
house  on  every  question  (save  on 
a  question  of  adjournment)  shall 
be  entered  on  the  journal,  unless 
the  Congress  shall  by  law  other- 
wise direct. 

[Ante,   p.   65.] 

Section  6.  i.  The  delegations 
in  either  house  shall  receive,  in 
proportion  to  the  number  of  votes 
each  delegation  is  entitled  to  cast, 
compensation  for  their  services  to 
be  ascertained  by  law,  and  paid 
out  of  the  treasury  of  the  United 
Nations. 

[Ante,  pp.  53  et  seq.] 

2.  The  members  of  each  dele- 
gation shall  have  the  privileges 
and  immunities  of  ambassadors  to 
a  foreign  State,  while  passing 
through  the  territories  of  other 
component  nations.  They  shall  in 
all  cases,  except  felony  and 
breach  of  the  peace,  be  privileged 
from  arrest  during  their  attend- 
ance at  the  session  of  their  re- 
spective houses,  and  in  going  to 
and  returning  from  the  same; 
and  for  any  speech  or  debate  in 
either  house,  they  shall  not  be 
questioned  in  any  other  place 
than  the  State  they  respectively 
represent,  in  accordance  with  its 
laws. 

[Ante,  pp.   54,   55-] 


No  Senator  or  Representative 
shall,  during  the  time  for  which 
he  was  elected,  be  appointed  to 


APPENDIX 


263 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

any  civil  office  under  the  author- 
ity of  the  United  States,  which 
shall  have  been  created,  or  the 
emoluments  whereof  shall  have 
been  increased,  during  such  time; 
and  no  person  holding  any. office 
under  the  United  States  shall  be 
a  member  of  either  House  during 
his  continuance  in  office. 

Section  7.  All  bills  for  raising 
revenue  shall  originate  in  the 
House  of  Representatives ;  but  the 
Senate  may  propose  or  concur 
with  amendments  as  on  other 
bills. 

Every  bill  which  shall  have 
passed  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives and  the  Senate,  shall,  be- 
fore it  becomes  a  law,  be  pre- 
sented to  the  President  of  the 
United  States.  If  he  approve  he 
shall  sign  it,  but  if  not  he  shall 
return  it,  with  his  objections,  to 
that  House  in  which  it  shall  have 
originated,  who  shall  enter  the 
objections  at  large  on  their  jour- 
nal, and  proceed  to  reconsider  it. 
If  after  such  reconsideration  two- 
thirds  of  that  House  shall  agree 
to  pass  the  bill,  it  shall  be  sent, 
together  with  the  objections,  to 
the  other  House,  by  which  it  shall 
likewise  be  reconsidered,  and  if 
approved  by  two-thirds  of  that 
House,  it  shall  become  a  law. 
But  in  all  such  cases  the  votes  of 
both  Houses  shall  be  determined 
by  yeas  and  nays,  and  the  names 
of  the  persons  voting  for  and 
against  the  bill  shall  be  entered 
on  the  journal  of  each  House  re- 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 


Section  7.  No  law  for  raising 
revenue  or  for  the  regulation  of 
commerce  shall  continue  in  force 
for  a  longer  term  than  ten  years 
from  its  passage. 

[Ante,   pp.    55   et   seq.] 

Section  8.  i.  In  order  that  any 
measure  proposed  in  either  house 
shall  be  binding  on  the  com- 
ponent nations,  it  shall  first 
have  passed  each  house  by  a  ma- 
jority of  the  votes  present.  But 
if  any  component  nation  shall  en- 
tertain a  doubt  as  to  the  constitu- 
tionality of  a  measure  thus  passed 
on  the  ground  that  it  impairs  the 
reserved  powers  of  the  compo- 
nent nations,  such  nation,  through 
its  delegation  in  each  house,  may, 
within  thirty  days  after  it  has 
been  so  passed,  give  notice  to  the 
Congress  that  it  is  deliberating 
whether  it  shall  veto  the  measure. 
If,  within  the  time  mentioned,  no 
nation  shall  have  given  such  no- 
tice, or  if,  within  one  year  from 
such  passage,  the  nation  or  na- 
tions giving  such  notice  shall  not 
have  vetoed  it  by  a  statement  to 
that  effect  entered  on  the  journal 
of  each  house,  the  measure  shall 
become  binding. 


264 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

spectively.  If  any  bill  shall  not 
be  returned  by  the  President 
within  ten  days  (Sundays  ex- 
cepted)  after  it  shall  have  been 
presented  to  him,  the  same  shall 
be  a  law,  in  like  manner  as  if  he 
had  signed  it,  unless  the  Congress 
by  their  adjournment  prevent  its 
return,  in  which  case  it  shall  not 
be  a  law. 


Every  order,  resolution,  or  vote 
to  which  the  concurrence  of  the 
Senate  and  House  of  Representa- 
tives may  be  necessary  (except  on 
a  question  of  adjournment)  shall 
be  presented  to  the  President  of 
the  United  States;  and  before  the 
same  shall  take  effect,  shall  be 
approved  by  him,  or  being  dis- 
approved by  him,  shall  be  re- 
passed  by  two-thirds  of  the  Sen- 
ate and  House  of  Representatives, 
according  to  the  rules  and  limi- 
tations prescribed  in  the  case  of  a 
bill. 

Section  8.  The  Congress  shall 
have  power 

To  lay  and  collect  taxes,  duties, 
imposts,  and  excises,  to  pay  the 
debts  and  provide  for  the  com- 
mon defense  and  general  welfare 
of  the  United  States;  but  all 
duties,  imposts  and  excises  shall 
be  uniform  throughout  the  United 
States; 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

2.  If,  after  such  notice  and 
within  one  year  from  such  pas- 
sage, a  nation  shall  veto  the 
measure  on  the  ground  mentioned, 
it  may  be  voted  on  again  in  each 
house  and  if  three-fourths  of  all 
the  votes  of  each  house  shall 
be  cast  therefor,  it  shall  be- 
come binding,  notwithstanding  the 
veto;  if  not,  it  shall  not  be  bind- 
ing. Periods  of  Congressional 
recess  shall  not  be  estimated  in 
the  thirty  days  or  in  the  year 
herein  referred  to. 

[Ante,  pp.  57  et  seq.] 


Section  9.  The  Congress  shall 
have  power 

i.  To  lay  and  collect  taxes 
upon  land,  in  order  to  pay  the 
debts  of  the  United  Nations,  pro- 
vide for  their  common  defense, 
and  execute  the  powers  herein 
granted  to  them.  All  taxes  upon 
land  shall  be  uniform  throughout 
the  territories  of  the  several  com- 
ponent nations; 

[Ante,  pp.  69  et  seq.] 


APPENDIX 


265 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

To     borrow     money     on 
credit  of  the  United  States; 


the 


To  coin  money,  regulate  the 
value  thereof  and  of  foreign  coin, 
and  fix  the  standard  of  weights 
and  measures; 

To  provide  for  the  punishment 
of  counterfeiting  the  securities 
and  current  coin  of  the  United 
States ; 

To  regulate  commerce  with 
foreign  nations,  and  among  the 
several  States,  and  with  the  In- 
dian tribes; 

[The  migration  or  importation 
of  such  persons  as  any  of  the 
States  now  existing  shall  think 
proper  to  admit,  shall  not  be  pro- 
hibited by  the  Congress  prior  to 
the  year  1808,  but  a  tax  or  duty 
may  be  imposed  on  such  importa- 
tion, not  exceeding  ten  dollars  for 
each  person. — Article  I,  Sec.  9, 
cl.  i.] 

To  establish  an  uniform  rule 
of  naturalization  and  uniform 
laws  on  the  subject  of  bankrupt- 
cies throughout  the  United  States ; 

To  establish  post  offices  and 
post  roads; 


To  promote  the  progress  of  sci- 
ence, and  useful  arts,  by  securing 
for  limited  times  to  authors  and 
inventors  the  exclusive  right  to 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

2.  To  borrow  money  on  the 
credit  of  the  United  Nations, 
through  the  issuance  of  bonds 
[and  to  provide  by  law  for  the 
issuance  of  paper  currency]  ; 
[Ante,  pp.  74  et  seq.] 

[3.  To  coin  money,  regulate  the 
value  thereof  and  of  foreign  coin, 
and  fix  the  standard  of  weights 
and  measures] ; 

[Ante,   pp.  76,   78.] 

4.  To  provide  for  the  punish- 
ment of  counterfeiting  the  securi- 
ties,   [coin   and   paper   currency] 
of  the  United  Nations; 

[Ante,  pp.  77,  78.] 

5.  To     regulate     international 
commerce  by  uniform  laws;   but 
nothing  herein  shall  be  construed 
to  give  to  the  Congress  the  power 
to  regulate  immigration,  emigra- 
tion, or  the  migration  of  persons 
to  or  from  a  component  State ; 

[Ante,  pp.   79   et  seq.] 


[See  ante,  pp.  97  et  seq.,  159 
et  seq.] 

[See  Article  IV,  Sec.  I,  cl.  2] 

6.  To  regulate  international 
postal  and  other  communication 
by  uniform  laws; 

[Ante,  pp.  85  et  seq.] 
[7.    To    provide    for    interna- 
tional     copyrights      and      patent 
rights] ; 

[Ante,  pp.  87,  88.] 


266 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

their  respective  writings  and  dis- 
coveries; 

To  constitute  tribunals  inferior 
to  the  Supreme  Court; 

To  define  and  punish  piracies 

and    felonies    committed  on    the 

high    seas,    and    offenses  against 
the  Law  of  Nations; 


To  declare  war,  grant  letters  of 
marque  and  reprisal,  and  make 
rules  concerning  captures  on  land 
and  water; 

To  raise  and  support  armies, 
but  no  appropriation  of  money  to 
that  use  shall  be  for  a  longer 
term  than  two  years; 

To  provide  and  maintain  a 
navy; 

To  make  rules  for  the  govern- 
ment and  regulation  of  the  land 
and  naval  forces; 


To  provide  for  calling  forth 
the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of 
the  Union,  suppress  insurrections, 
and  repel  invasions; 


To  provide  for  organizing, 
arming,  and  disciplining  the  mili- 
tia, and  for  governing  such  part 
of  them  as  may  be  employed  in 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 


8.  To  constitute  tribunals  infe- 
rior to  the  Supreme  Court; 

[Ante,   pp.   88   et   seq.] 

9.  To  define   and   provide   for 
the  punishment  and  redress  of  of- 
fenses and  private  wrongs  (other 
than  breaches  of  contract)    com- 
mitted on  the  high  seas,  and  of- 
fenses   against   the   Law   of   Na- 
tions; 

[Ante,  pp.   92,  93.] 

10.  To  declare  war,  and  make 
rules  concerning  captures  on  land 
and  water; 

[Ante,  pp.  93  et  seq.] 

11.  To  raise  and  support  arm- 
ies;    but     no     appropriation     of 
money  to  that  use  shall  be  for  a 
longer  term  than  two  years; 

12.  To  provide  and  maintain  a 
navy. 

13.  To  make  rules  for  the  gov- 
ernment   and    regulation    of    the 
land    and    naval    forces    of    the 
United   Nations; 

[Ante,  pp.  93  et  seq.] 

14.  To     provide     for     calling 
forth  the    armed   forces    (includ- 
ing  the   militia)    of   the    several 
component  nations,  in  order  to  ex- 
ecute the  laws  of  the  union,  sup- 
press   insurrections     against    the 
government    of    the    United    Na- 
tions, and  repel  invasions; 

15.  To  provide  for  governing 
such  part  of  the  armed  forces  of 
the  component  nations  as  may  be 
employed   in   the   service   of   the 


APPENDIX 


267 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

the  service  of  the  United  States, 
reserving  to  the  States,  respec- 
tively, the  appointment  of  the  of- 
ficers, and  the  authority  of  train- 
ing the  militia  according  to  the 
discipline  prescribed  by  Congress; 
To  exercise  exclusive  legisla- 
tion in  all  cases  whatsoever,  over 
such  district  (not  exceeding  ten 
miles  square)  as  may,  by  cession 
of  particular  States  and  the  ac- 
ceptance of  Congress,  become  the 
seat  of  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  and  to  exercise  like 
authority  over  all  places  pur- 
chased by  the  consent  of  the  leg- 
islature of  the  State  in  which  the 
same  shall  be  for  the  erection  of 
forts,  magazines,  arsenals,  dock 
yards,  and  other  needful  build- 
ings; 

To  make  all  laws  which  shall 
be  necessary  and  proper  for  car- 
rying into  execution  the  foregoing 
powers,  and  all  other  powers 
vested  by  this  Constitution  in  the 
government  of  the  United  States, 
or  in  any  department  or  officer 
thereof. 


ARTICLE  II 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

United  Nations,   reserving  to  the 
nations,  respectively,  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  officers  and  the   au- 
thority of  training  the  forces; 
[Ante,  pp.  93  et  seq.] 

1 6.  To  exercise  exclusive  legis- 
lation   in    all    cases    whatsoever, 
over  such  district   (not  exceeding 
fifty    square    miles)     as    may,    by 
cession  of  particular  nations  and 
the    acceptance   of   the    Congress, 
become   the    seat   of   the   govern- 
ment of  the  United  Nations,  and 
to  exercise  like  authority  over  all 
places   purchased   by  the   consent 
of  the   State   in   which   the   same 
shall     be,     for    the     erection     of 
forts,    magazines,    arsenals,    dock 
yards,    and   other   needful    build- 
ings;   and 

[Ante,  pp.  95,  96.] 

17.  To   make    all    laws   which 
shall  be  reasonably  necessary  and 
proper  for  carrying  into  execution 
the    foregoing    powers,    and    all 
other  powers  vested  by  this  con- 
stitution in  the  government  of  the 
United  Nations,  or  in  any  depart- 
ment or  officer  thereof. 

[Ante,  pp.  96,  97.] 

ARTICLE  II 


EXECUTIVE  DEPARTMENT,  ITS  OR- 
GANIZATION AND  POWERS 


Section  i.  The  executive  power 
shall  be  vested  in  a  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America. 


Section  i.  i.  The  executive 
power  of  the  United  Nations 
shall  be  vested  in  a  Council  of 
Ministers,  composed  of  members 


268 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


He  shall  hold  his  office  during 
the  term  of  four  years,  and,  to- 
gether with  the  Vice-President, 
chosen  for  the  same  term,  be 
elected,  as  follows: 


Each  State  shall  appoint  in 
such  manner  as  the  legislature 
thereof  may  direct,  a  number  of 
electors,  equal  to  the  whole  num- 
ber of  Senators  and  Representa- 
tives to  which  the  State  may  be 
entitled  in  the  Congress,  but  no 
Senator  or  Representative,  or  per- 
son holding  an  office  of  trust  or 
profit  under  tLe  United  States, 
shall  be  appointed  an  elector. 

[The  electors  shall  meet  in 
their  respective  States,  and  vote 
by  ballot  for  President  and  Vice- 
President,  one  of  whom,  at  least, 
shall  not  be  an  inhabitant  of  the 
same  State  with  themselves;  they 
shall  name  in  their  ballots  the 
person  voted  for  as  President,  and 
in  distinct  ballots  the  person 
voted  for  as  Vice-President,  and 
they  shall  make  distinct  lists  of 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

of  the  Congress,  and  consisting  of 
a  prime  minister  and  such  others, 
appointed  by  him  and  removable 
at  his  pleasure,  as  the  Congress 
shall  by  law  direct,  provided  that 
not  more  than  two  of  the  council 
shall  be  of  the  same  nation. 
[Ante,  pp.  zoo  et  seq.] 

2.  The    prime    minister    shall 
hold  his  office  until  he  be  recalled 
by  a  resolution  passed  by  a  ma- 
jority of  all  the  votes  of  either 
house  of  the  Congress,  unless  the 
position  fall  vacant  by  his  death, 
resignation,    or    recall    from    the 
Congress,  by  the  nation  he  repre- 
sents.   He  shall  be  chosen  as  fol- 
lows: 

[Ante,  pp.  in,  H2.] 

3.  A     nominating     committee, 
composed   of  eight   Senators    and 
eight  Delegates,  elected  by  their 
respective    houses    in    accordance 
with  the  rules  of  each  house,  who 
shall  choose  their  own  chairman 
and     prescribe     the     times     and 
places    of    their    own    meetings, 
shall     nominate    to    each    house 
three    members   of    the    Congress 
for  the  office  of  prime  minister. 
Upon  the  receipt  of  such  nomina- 
tions,   each   house   shall    vote   by 
ballot  upon  the  nominees  accord- 
ing to  the  rules  prescribed  by  the 
Congress.  If  none  of  those  named 
shall    receive    a    majority   of   all 
the  votes  in  each  house,  another 
committee  shall  be  elected  as  be- 
fore,   who    shall    nominate    three 
other   members   of  the   Congress. 
These  shall  be  voted  for  in  like 


APPENDIX 


269 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

all  persons  voted  for  as  Presi- 
dent, and  of  all  persons  voted  for 
as  Vice-President,  and  of  the 
number  of  votes  for  each,  which 
lists  they  shall  sign  and  certify, 
and  transmit  sealed  to  the  seat  of 
government  of  the  United  States, 
directed  to  the  President  of  the 
Senate;  the  President  of  the  Sen- 
ate shall,  in  presence  of  the  Sen- 
ate and  House  of  Representatives, 
open  all  the  certificates  and  the 
votes  shall  then  be  counted ;  the 
person  having  the  greatest  num- 
ber of  votes  for  President  shall 
be  the  President,  if  such  number 
be  a  majority  of  the  whole  num- 
ber of  electors  appointed ;  and  if 
no  person  have  such  majority, 
then  from  the  persons  having 
the  highest  number  not  exceeding 
three  on  the  list  of  those  voted  for 
as  President,  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives shall  choose  immedi- 
ately, by  ballot,  the  President. 
But  in  choosing  the  President,  the 
votes  shall  be  taken  by  States,  the 
representative  from  each  State 
having  one  vote;  a  quorum  for 
this  purpose  shall  consist  of  a 
member  or  members  from  two- 
thirds  of  the  States,  and  a  ma- 
jority of  all  the  States  shall  be 
necessary  to  a  choice.  And  if  the 
House  of  Representatives  shall 
not  choose  a  President  whenever 
the  right  of  choice  shall  devolve 
upon  them  before  the  fourth  day 
of  March,  next  following,  then 
the  Vice-President  shall  act  as 
President,  as  in  the  case  of  the 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

manner  and  upon  like  conditions 
as  the  previous  nominees,  and  so 
on  until  a  prime  minister  be 
chosen  by  a  majority  of  all  the 
votes  of  both  houses  of  the  Con- 
gress. 

[Ante,  pp.  106  et  seq.] 


270  APPENDIX 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

death  or  other  constitutional  dis- 
ability of  the  President.  The  per- 
son having  the  greatest  number  of 
votes  as  Vice-President  shall  be 
the  Vice-President,  if  such  num- 
ber be  a  majority  of  the  whole 
number  of  electors  appointed,  and 
if  no  person  have  a  majority,  then 
from  the  two  highest  numbers  on 
the  list,  the  Senate  shall  choose 
the  Vice-President;  a  quorum  for 
the  purpose  shall  consist  of  two- 
thirds  of  the  whole  number  of 
Senators,  and  a  majority  of  the 
whole  number  shall  be  necessary 
to  a  choice.  But  no  person  con- 
stitutionally ineligible  to  the  of- 
fice of  President  shall  be  eligible 
to  that  of  Vice-President  of  the 
United  States. — Amendment  XII.] 

The  Congress  may  determine 
the  time  of  choosing  the  electors 
and  the  day  on  which  they  shall 
give  their  votes,  which  day  shall 
be  the  same  throughout  the 
United  States. 

No  person  except  a  natural 
born  citizen,  or  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  at  the  time  of  the 
adoption  of  this  Constitution, 
shall  be  eligible  to  ,the  office  of 
President;  neither  shall  any  per- 
son be  eligible  to  that  office  who 
shall  not  have  attained  to  the  age 
of  thirty-five  years,  and  been 
fourteen  years  a  resident  within 
the  United  States. 

In  case  of  the  removal  of  the 
President  from  office,  or  of  his 
death,  resignation,  or  inability  to 
discharge  the  powers  and  duties 


APPENDIX 


271 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

of  the  said  office,  the  same  shall 
devolve  on  the  Vice-President^ 
and  the  Congress  may  by  law 
provide  for  the  case  of  removal, 
death,  resignation,  or  inability, 
both  of  the  President  and  Vice- 
President,  declaring  what  officer 
shall  then  act  as  President,  and 
such  officer  shall  act  accordingly, 
until  the  disability  be  removed,  or 
a  President  shall  be  elected. 

The  President  shall,  at  stated 
times,  receive  for  his  services,  a 
compensation,  which  shall  neither 
be  increased  nor  diminished  dur- 
ing the  period  for  which  he  shall 
have  been  elected,  and  he  shall 
not  receive  within  that  period 
any  other  emolument  from  the 
United  States  or  any  of  them. 


Before  he  enter  on  the  execu- 
tion of  his  office,  he  shall  take  the 
following  oath  or  affirmation:  "I 
do  solemnly  swear  (or  affirm) 
that  I  will  faithfully  execute  the 
office  of  President  of  the  United 
States,  and  will  to  the  best  of  my 
ability,  preserve,  protect,  and  de- 
fend the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States." 

Section  2.  The  President  shall 
be  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
army  and  navy  of  the  United 
States,  and  of  the  militia  of  the 
several  States,  when  called  into 
the  actual  service  of  the  United 
States;  he  may  require  the  opin- 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 


Section  2.  The  prime  minister 
and  the  subordinate  ministers 
shall  receive  from  the  treasury  of 
the  United  Nations  such  compen- 
sation, in  addition  to  that  to 
which  they  may  be  entitled  as 
members  of  their  respective  dele- 
gations, as  shall  be  prescribed  by 
law;  nor  shall  they  receive  dur- 
ing the  period  of  their  ministry 
any  other  emolument  from  the 
United  Nations  or  any  of  them. 
[Ante,  pp.  112,  113.] 


[See  Article  VIII,  Sec.  2.] 


Section  3.  The  prime  minister, 
acting  through  the  council  or  the 
appropriate  minister,  as  the  law 
shall  direct,  shall 

[See   ante,   pp.   114   et  seq.] 


272 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

ion  in  writing  of  the  principal  of- 
ficer in  each  of  the  executive  de- 
partments, upon  any  subject  re- 
lating to  the  duties  of  their  re- 
spective offices,  and  he  shall  have 
power  to  grant  reprieves  and 
pardons  for  offenses  against  the 
United  States,  except  in  cases  of 
impeachment; 

He  shall  have  power,  by  and 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate,  to  make  treaties,  pro- 
vided two-thirds  of  the  Senators 
present  concur,  and  he  shall 
nominate,  and  by  and  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate, 
shall  appoint  ambassadors,  other 
public  ministers,  and  consuls, 
judges  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and 
all  other  officers  of  the  United 
States,  whose  appointments  are 
not  herein  otherwise  provided  for, 
and  which  shall  be  established  by 
law;  but  the  Congress  may  by 
law  vest  the  appointment  of  such 
inferior  officers,  as  they  think 
proper  in  the  President  alone,  in 
the  courts  of  law,  or  in  the  heads 
of  departments. 

The  President  shall  have 
power  to  fill  up  all  vacancies 
that  may  happen  during  the  re- 
cess of  the  Senate,  by  granting 
commissions  which  shall  expire  at 
the  end  of  their  next  session. 

Section  3.  He  shall  from  time 
to  time  give  to  the  Congress  in- 
formation of  the  state  of  the 
union,  and  recommend  to  their 
consideration  such  measures  as 
he  shall  judge  necessary  and  ex- 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

i.  Grant  reprieves,  commuta- 
tions of  sentence  and  pardons  for 
offenses  against  the  United  Na- 
tions; 

[Ante,  p.   115.] 


2.  Make   treaties  with  nations 
not  members  of  this  union,  by  and 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Congress,    concerning    matters    to 
which    the    constitutional    powers 
of     the     United     Nations     shall 
extend,    provided    two-thirds    of 
the  votes  present   in   each   house 
concur. 

[Ante,  pp.   115  et  seq.] 

3.  Appoint    and    remove,    sub- 
ject   to    such    regulations    of    the 
civil,  military,  and  naval  service 
as    may    be    prescribed    by    law, 
ambassadors  and  all  other  execu- 
tive   officers    of    the    United    Na- 
tions,    whose     appointments     are 
not    herein    otherwise     provided 
for,    and    which    shall    be    estab- 
lished by  law;  but  the  Congress 
may    by    law    vest    the    appoint- 
ment of  inferior  court  officers  in 
the  courts  of  law; 

[Ante,  pp.  ii 8  et  seq.] 


[See  ante,  pp.  122,  123.] 


APPENDIX 


273 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

pedient;  he  may,  on  extraordi- 
nary occasions,  convene  both 
Houses,  or  either  of  them,  and  in 
case  of  disagreement  between 
them  with  respect  to  the  time  of 
adjournment,  he  may  adjourn 
them  to  such  time  as  he  shall 
think  proper ; 

He   shall   receive   ambassadors 
and  other  public  ministers; 

He    shall    take    care    that    the 
laws  be  faithfully  executed; 

And   shall   commission   all  the 
officers  of  the  United  States. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 


Section  4.  The  President,  Vice- 
President,  and  all  civil  officers  of 
the  United  States,  shall  be  re- 
moved from  office  on  impeach- 
ment for,  and  conviction  of,  trea- 
son, bribery,  or  other  high  crimes 
and  misdemeanors. 

ARTICLE  III 


Section  i.  The  judicial  power 
of  the  United  States  shall  be 
vested  in  one  Supreme  Court,  and 
in  such  inferior  courts  as  the  Con- 
gress may  from  time  to  time  or- 
dain and  establish. 


4.  Receive     ambassadors     and 
other  public  ministers; 

[Ante,  pp.  120,   121.] 

5.  Execute     and     enforce     the 
laws  of  the  United   Nations; 

[Ante,  p.   121.] 

6.  Commission    all    the    execu- 
tive   officers   of   the   United    Na- 
tions; but  the  judicial  and  legis- 
lative officers  of  the  United  Na- 
tions   shall    be    commissioned    as 
the   laws  of  the   States   appoint- 
ing them  shall   direct. 

[Ante,  p.  122.] 


[See  Article  HI,  Sec.  2,  cl  2. 


ARTICLE  III 

JUDICIARY  DEPARTMENT,   ITS   OR- 
GANIZATION AND  POWERS 

Section  i.  The  judicial  power 
of  the  United  Nations  shall  be 
vested  in  one  Supreme  Court, 
and  in  such  courts  of  the  com- 
ponent nations  or  in  such  infe- 
rior international  courts  as  the 


274 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


The  judges,  both  of  the  Su- 
preme and  inferior  courts  shall 
hold  their  offices  during  good  be- 
havior; and  shall,  at  stated  times, 
receive  for  their  services,  a  com- 
pensation which  shall  not  be  di- 
minished during  their  continu- 
ance in  office. 


[See  Article  U,  Sec. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

Congress   may  provide  or  estab- 
lish. 

[Ante,  pp.  88  et  seq.,  129  et 
seq.] 

Section  2.  i.  The  judges,  bcth 
of  the  Supreme  and  inferior  in- 
ternational courts,  shall  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  executive  author- 
ity of  the  State  they  respectively 
represent,  or  wherein  they  are 
respectively  to  perform  their  ju- 
dicial functions,  in  such  manner 
as  shall  be  prescribed  by  the  laws 
of  each  State;  shall  hold  their 
offices  during  good  behavior;  and 
shall,  at  stated  times,  receive 
from  the  treasury  of  the  United 
Nations  for  their  services  a  com- 
pensation which  shall  not  be  di- 
minished during  their  continu- 
ance in  office. 

[Ante,  pp.  125   et  seq.] 

2.  A  judge,  either  of  the  Su- 
preme or  an  inferior  international 
court,  may  be  removed  from  ofr 
fice  by  the  Congress  for  extortion, 
bribery,  corruption,  or  other  high 
crime  or  misdemeanor. 

[Ante,   pp.   62   et  seq.] 

Section  3.  i.  The  Supreme 
Court  shall  consist  of  such  equal 
number  of  representatives  from 
each  of  the  component  nations  as 
the  Congress  shall  by  law  deter- 
mine. 

[Ante,  pp.   130  et  seq.] 

2.  Immediately  after  they 
shall  be  assembled  in  conse- 
quence of  the  first  appointments, 
they  shall  be  divided  by  lot  as 
equally  as  may  be  into  three  sec- 


APPENDIX  275 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

tions.  The  first  section  shall  hear 
and  finally  determine  all  contro- 
versies properly  coming  before 
the  court,  which  shall  affect  am- 
bassadors, other  public  ministers, 
or  consuls  accredited  to  the 
United  Nations  or  to  any  of  them; 
or  which  shall  arise  between  com- 
ponent nations,  or  between  the 
United  Nations  and  one  or  more 
nations,  either  members  or  not 
members  of  this  union ;  or  between 
one  or  more  of  the  component 
nations  and  nations  not  members 
of  this  union;  or  between  nations 
not  members  of  this  union.  The 
second  section  shall  hear  and  fi- 
nally determine  all  civil  cases, 
properly  coming  before  the  court, 
wherein  private  persons  are  liti- 
gant on  one  or  both  sides.  The 
third  section  shall  hear  and 
finally  determine  all  criminal 
cases  properly  coming  before  the 
court. 

[Ante,  pp.  132  et  seq.] 
3.  If  a  party  to  the  litigation  is 
dissatisfied  with  the  decision  of 
any  section  that  the  case  is  or  is 
not  triable  therein,  he  may  ap- 
peal from  such  decision  to  the 
entire  Supreme  Court,  all  the  sec- 
tions sitting  together;  and  a  like 
appeal  shall  lie  in  case  of  con- 
flicting decisions  of  several  sec- 
tions upon  questions  involving 
the  interpretation  of  this  consti- 
tution, or  of  the  laws  or  treaties 
of  the  United  Nations,  or  of  the 
treaties  of  the  several  component 
nations  made  or  which  shall  be 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


Section  2.   The  judicial  power 
shall  extend 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

made  with  each  other  or  with  na- 
tions not  members  of  this  union. 
[Ante,   pp.   134  et   seq.] 

4.  Immediately    after   the   first 
division    of    the    Supreme    Court 
into  sections,  the  judges  in  each 
section  shall  draw  lots  for  their 
respective    positions   or   order   of 
official     seniority     therein.      The 
judge  drawing  the  first  place  in 
his  section  shall  be  the  presiding 
judge   thereof   until    removed   by 
death,   resignation,   action  of  the 
Congress,     or     promotion     to     a 
higher  section,  in  which  case  his 
place  shall  be  taken  by  the  judge 
next  in  order  of  official  seniority. 
The  presiding  judge  of  the  first 
section  shall  be  the  chief  justice 
of  the  Supreme  Court. 

[Ante,  pp.   133,   134.] 

5.  When   a  vacancy  occurs  in 
any  section,  all  judges  in  that  sec- 
tion holding  positions  below  the 
vacant   place   shall    advance   one 
degree  in  official  seniority,  leav- 
ing the  last  position  in  such  sec- 
tion   vacant,    which    vacancy,    in 
case    of    the    first    two    sections, 
shall    be   filled    by   promotion   of 
the  presiding  judge  of  the  section 
next  below;   and,  in  case  of  the 
third  section,  by  the  appointment 
of  another  judge  by  the  executive 
authority  of  that  nation  the  loss 
of    whose    representative    on    the 
court    inaugurated    the    series    of 
vacancies. 

[Ante,  pp.   133,   134.] 
Section  4.    The  judicial   power 
of     the     United     Nations     shall 
extend 


APPENDIX 


277 


•    U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

To  all  cases,  in  law  and  equity, 
arising  under  this  Constitution, 
the  laws  of  the  United  States, 
and  treaties  m&de  or  which  shall 
be  made  under  their  authority; 


To  all  cases  affecting  ambas- 
sadors, other  public  ministers, 
and  consuls; 


To  all  cases  of  admiralty  and 
maritime  jurisdiction; 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

i.  To  all  cases  arising  under 
this  constitution,  or  under  the 
laws  or  treaties  of  the  United 
Nations,  or  under  treaties  made 
or  which  shall  be  made  by  the  re- 
spective component  nations.  In 
any  justiciable  case  arising  under 
this  clause,  when  such  a  course  is 
necessary  to  a  proper  decision, 
the  court  having  jurisdiction  of 
the  case,  shall  for  the  purposes  of 
its  decision,  disregard  as  uncon- 
stitutional any  law  or  treaty  of 
the  United  Nations  which  violates 
this  constitution,  and  shall  in  like 
manner  disregard  any  law  or 
treaty  of  a  component  nation 
which  violates  this  constitution  or 
the  laws  or  treaties  of  the  United 
Nations  which  shall  be  made  in 
pursuance  thereof.  Provided,  that 
neither  the  Supreme  Court  nor 
any  section  thereof  shall  thus  dis- 
regard any  law  or  treaty  unless 
three-fourths  of  the  judges  com- 
prising the  court  or  section  shall 
have  so  determined,  but  shall  en- 
force the  same. 

[Ante,  pp.   136   et  seq.] 

2.  To   all   cases   affecting   am- 
bassadors, other  public  ministers 
and    consuls    accredited    to    the 
United    Nations    or    to    any    of 
them; 

[Ante,  pp.  142,  143-] 

3.  To  all  cases  of  offenses  and 
private      wrongs      (other      than 
breaches  of  contract)    committed 
on  the  high  seas; 

[Ante,  pp.  143  et  seq.] 


278 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

To  controversies  to  which  the 
United   States   shall   be   a   party; 


To  controversies  between  two 
or  more  States;  between  a  State 
and  citizens  of  another  State;  be- 
tween citizens  of  different  States; 
between  citizens  of  the  same 
State  claiming  lands  under  grants 
of  different  States;  and  between 
a  State,  or  the  citizens  thereof, 
and  foreign  States,  citizens  or 
subjects. 


In  all  cases  affecting  ambassa- 
dors, other  public  ministers,  and 
consuls,  and  those  in  which  a 
State  shall  be  party,  the  Supreme 
Court  shall  have  original  juris- 
diction. 


In  all  the  other  cases  before 
mentioned,  the  Supreme  Court 
shall  have  appellate  jurisdiction, 
both  as  to  law  and  fact,  with  such 
exceptions,  and  under  such  regu- 
lations as  the  Congress  shall 
make. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

4.  To    controversies    to    which 
the    United    Nations    shall    be    a 
party; 

[Ante,  pp.  145,  I46.] 

5.  To     controversies     between 
two  or  more  component  nations; 

[Ante,  p.  146.] 

[See  ante,  pp.  147  et  seq.] 

6.  To     controversies     between 
component    nations    and    nations 
not  members  of  this  union;   and 

[Ante,  p.  147.] 

7.  To     controversies     between 
two  or  more  nations  not  members 
of  this   union,   but  consenting  to 
the  exercise  of  such  jurisdiction, 
provided,  that  no  department  of 
the  government  of  the  United  Na- 
tions shall  undertake  to  enforce  a 
decision  rendered  in  such  circum- 
stances. 

[Ante,  pp.  147,  148.] 
Section  5.  i.  In  all  cases  af- 
fecting ambassadors,  other  public 
ministers,  and  consuls  accredited 
to  the  United  Nations,  or  to  any 
of  them,  and  those  in  which  any 
nation  shall  be  party,  the  Su- 
preme Court  shall  have  original 
jurisdiction. 

[Ante,  pp.  150  et  seq.] 
2.  In  all  the  other  cases  be- 
fore mentioned  the  Supreme  Court 
shall  have  appellate  jurisdiction, 
both  as  to  law  and  fact,  upon  ap- 
peal from  inferior  international 
courts,  and  from  the  courts  of  the 
component  nations  when  exercis- 
ing the  judicial  power  of  the 


APPENDIX 


279 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


The  trial  of  all  crimes,  except 
in  cases  of  impeachment,  shall  be 
by  jury;  and  such  trial  shall  be 
held  in  the  State  where  the  said 
crimes  shall  have  been  commit- 
ted; but  when  not  committed 
within  any  State,  the  trial  shall 
be  at  such  place  or  places  as  the 
Congress  may  by  law  have  di- 
rected. 

Section  3.  Treason  against  the 
United  States  shall  consist  only  in 
levying  war  against  them,  or  in 
adhering  to  their  enemies,  giving 
them  aid  and  comfort.  No  person 
shall  be  convicted  of  treason  un- 
less on  the  testimony  of  two  wit- 
nesses to  the  same  overt  act,  or 
on  confession  in  open  court. 

The  Congress  shall  have  power 
to  declare  the  punishment  of  trea- 
son, but  no  attainder  of  treason 
shall  work  corruption  of  blood  or 
forfeiture  except  during  the  life 
of  the  person  attainted. 

[The  judicial  power  of  the 
United  States  shall  not  be  con- 
strued to  extend  to  any  suit  at 
law  or  equity  commenced  or 
prosecuted  against  one  of  the 
United  States  by  citizens  of  an- 
other State,  or  by  citizens  of  sub- 
jects of  any  foreign  State. — 
Amendment  XL] 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

United  Nations,  with  such  excep- 
tions and  under  such  regulations 
as  the  Congress  shall  make. 
[Ante,  p.  153.] 


[See  Article  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl  4. 


[See  Article  IV,  Sec.   I,  cl.  3.] 


Section  6.  The  judicial  power 
of  the  United  Nations  shall  not 
extend  to  any  original  suit  insti- 
tuted by  private  persons  against 
a  component  nation;  nor  to  any 
personal  proceeding  against  the 
sovereign,  chief  executive,  or  any 
member  of  the  ministry  or  cabinet 
of  a  component  nation. 

[Ante,  pp.  154,  155.] 


280 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


The  Congress  shall  have  power 
to  dispose  of  and  make  all  need- 
ful rules  and  regulations  respect- 
ing the  territory  or  other  prop- 
erty belonging  to  the  United 
States.— Article  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  2. 


[All  persons  born  or  natural- 
ized in  the  United  States,  and 
subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof, 
are  citizens  of  the  United  States 
and  of  the  State  wherein  they 
reside. — Amendment  XIV,  Sec.  i. 

The  Congress  shall  have  power 
to  establish  an  uniform  rule  of 
naturalization. — Article  I,  Sec.  8, 
cl.  4. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE  IV 

LIMITATIONS  UPON  THE  POWERS  OF 
THE  UNITED  NATIONS 

Section  i.  i.  No  territory  other 
than  that  referred  to  in  the  six- 
teenth clause  of  the  ninth  section 
of  the  first  Article  of  this  consti- 
tution shall  be  acquired  in  any 
manner  by  the  United  Nations  in 
time  of  peace ;  nor  in  war,  except 
through  temporary  military  occu- 
pation, to  be  returned  at  the  end 
of  the  war  to  the  nation  from 
which  it  shall  have  been  taken, 
unless  the  Congress,  three-fourths 
of  all  the  votes  of  each  house 
concurring,  shall  decide  that  the 
general  peace  will  be  subserved 
by  granting  the  occupied  terri- 
tory to  one  or  more  of  the  com- 
ponent nations,  or  to  a  nation 
not  a  member  of  this  union,  or  by 
making  of  it  an  independent 
State. 

[Ante,  pp.  157  et  seq.] 

2.  No  such  status  as  "  citizen- 
ship of  the  United  Nations  "  shall 
be  recognized,   except  in  case  of 
persons  born   in  the   seat  of  the 
government    of    the    United    Na- 
tions, who  have  never  been  citi- 
zens of  any  State,  or  citizens  of 
a    component    State    permanently 
domiciled  in  such  district  at  the 
time  of  the  cession  thereof  to  the 
United  Nations. 

[Ante,  pp.  97  et  seq.,  159  et 
seq.] 

3.  No  such  crime  as  "treason 


APPENDIX 


281 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 
[See  Article  HI,  Sec.  3.] 


No  capitation,  or  other  direct, 
tax  shall  be  laid,  unless  in  pro- 
portion to  the  census  or  enumera- 
tion hereinbefore  directed  to  be 
taken.  No  tax  or  duty  shall  be 
laid  on  articles  exported  from  any 
State.— Article  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  4,  5. 

No  money  shall  be  drawn  from 
the  treasury,  but  in  consequence 
of  appropriations  made  by  law; 
and  a  regular  statement  and  ac- 
count of  receipts  and  expendi- 
tures of  all  public  money  shall  be 
published  from  time  to  time. — 
Article  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  7. 


No  preference  shall  be  given 
by  any  regulation  of  commerce 
or  revenue  to  the  ports  of  one 
State  over  those  of  another,  nor 
shall  vessels  bound  to,  or  from, 
one  State  be  obliged  to  enter, 
clear,  or  pay  duties  in  another. — 
Article  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  6. 

No  title  of  nobility  shall  be 
granted  by  the  United  States.— 
Article-I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  8. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

against  the  United  Nations"  shall 
be  recognized. 

[Ante,  p.  1 60.] 

4.    No   tax   of   any   description 
shall  be  laid  by  the  United  Na- 
tions, other  than  taxes  upon  land. 
[Ante,  pp.  1 60,   161.] 


5.  No  money  shall  be  drawn 
from  the  treasury  of  the  United 
Nations  but  in  consequence  of  ap- 
propriations made  by  law;  and  a 
regular  statement  and  account  of 
receipts   and   expenditures  of   all 
public  money  shall  be  published 
from  time  to  time. 

[Ante,  p.  162.] 

6.  No   appropriation  of  public 
money  shall  be  made  for  purposes 
other  than  those  provided  for  in 
this  constitution;  nor  for  bounties 
or    subsidies   other    than    reason- 
able   pensions    for    aged    or    in- 
capacitated public  servants  of  the 
United  Nations. 

[Ante,  pp.   162,   163.] 

7.  No  preference  shall  be  given 
by  the  United  Nations  to  the  ports 
or  trading  centers,  to  the  ships  or 
other    vehicles    of    commerce,    to 
the  persons  engaged  therein,  or  to 
the  highways  of  commerce  of  one 
component   nation   over   those   of 
another. 

[Ante,  pp.   163   et  seq.] 

8.  No  title  or  order  of  nobility 
or  of  privilege  shall   be  granted 
or  created  by  the  United  Nations. 

[Ante,  pp.  165,  166.] 


282 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

And  no  person  holding  any  of- 
fice of  profit  or  trust  under  them 
shall,  without  the  consent  of  the 
Congress,  accept  of  any  present, 
emolument,  office,  or  title,  of  any 
kind  whatever,  from  any  king, 
prince,  or  foreign  State. — Article 
I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  8. 

The  privilege  of  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  shall  not  be  sus- 
pended, unless  when  in  case  of 
rebellion  or  invasion  the  public 
safety  may  require  it. — Article  I, 
Sec.  9,  cl.  2. 


Congress  shall  make  no  law  re- 
specting an  establishment  of  reli- 
gion or  prohibiting  the  free  exer- 
cise thereof. — Amendment  I. 

No  religious  test  shall  ever  be 
required  as  a  qualification  to  any 
office  or  public  trust  under  the 
United  States—Article  VI. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

9.  No  person  while  holding 
any  office  of  profit  or  trust  under 
the  United  Nations,  shall,  without 
the  consent  of  the  Congress,  ac- 
cept of  any  present,  emolument, 
office,  or  title,  of  any  kind,  what- 
ever, from  any  king,  ruler,  or 
State. 

[Ante,  p.  167.] 

Section  2.  i.  It  is  the  right  of 
any  person  imprisoned  under  or 
by  color  of  the  authority  of  the 
United  Nations,  or  contrary  to  the 
laws  or  treaties  thereof,  or  be- 
cause of  the  alleged  exercise  of 
a  right,  or  omission  or  violation 
of  a  duty,  claimed  to  exist  under 
the  constitution,  laws,  or  treaties 
of  the  United  Nations,  or  under 
a  treaty  of  a  component  nation  or 
under  the  Law  of  Nations,  to  ap- 
ply immediately  to  any  court  au- 
thorized by  the  Congress  to  in- 
quire of  and  determine  the  legal- 
ity of  the  imprisonment,  and  to 
secure  a  prompt  discharge  if  the 
imprisonment  be  illegal.  This 
right  shall  never  be  suspended  by 
the  Congress  unless  when,  in 
case  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the 
public  safety  may  require  it. 
[Ante,  pp.  168,  169.] 

2.  The  Congress  shall  make  no 
law  respecting  an  establishment 
of  religion  or  prohibiting  the  free 
exercise  thereof,  or  requiring  any 
religious  test  as  a  qualification  to 
any  office  or  public  trust  under 
the  United  Nations,  or  imposing 
civil  disabilities  upon  any  person 
because  of  his  religious  belief; 
[Ante,  p.  170.] 


APPENDIX 


283 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

[Congress  shall  make  no  law] 
abridging  the  freedom  of  speech 
and  of  the  press. — Amendment  I. 

[Congress  shall  make  no  law] 
abridging  the  right  of  the  people 
peaceably  to  assemble,  and  t6  pe- 
tition the  government  for  a  re- 
dress of  grievances.  —  Amend- 
ment I. 


A  well  regulated  militia,  being 
necessary  to  the  security  of  a  free 
State,  the  right  of  the  people  to 
keep  and  bear  arms  shall  not  be 
infringed. — Amendment  II. 

No  soldier  shall,  in  time  of 
peace,  be  quartered  in  any  house 
without  the  consent  of  the  owner, 
nor  in  time  of  war,  but  in  a  man- 
ner to  be  prescribed  by  law. — 
Amendment  III. 


Nor  shall  private  property  be 
taken  for  public  use  without  just 
compensation. — Amendment  V. 


No  person  shall  be  deprived  of 
life,  liberty,  or  property,  without 
due  process  of  law. — Amend- 
ment V. 


No  bill  of  attainder  or  ex  post 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

3.  Nor  any  law  abridging  the 
freedom    of    speech    and    of    the 
press  in  any  component  State  to  a 
greater  extent  than  is  customary 
by  law  or  usage  in  such  State ; 

[Ante,  pp.  170,  171.] 

4.  Nor  any  law  abridging  the 
right  of  the  people  peaceably  to 
assemble,  and  to  petition  the  gov- 
ernment for  a  redress  of  griev- 
ances. 

[Ante,  p.  172.] 

5.  The    United    Nations    shall 
not  infringe  the  right  of  the  peo- 
ple to  keep   and  bear  arms. 

[Ante,  pp.  172,  173.] 

6.  No  soldier  shall,  in  time  of 
peace,  be  quartered  by  the  United 
Nations  in  any  house  without  the 
consent  of  the  owner,  nor  in  time 
of  war,  but  in   a  manner  to  be 
prescribed  by  law. 

[Ante,  pp.  173,  i?4-] 

7.  No    person's    private    prop- 
erty shall  be  taken  by  or  under 
authority   of   the   United   Nations 
for  public  use  without  just  com- 
pensation. 

[Ante,  pp.  175  et  seq.] 

8.  No  person  shall  be  deprived 
by  the  United  Nations  of  life,  lib- 
erty,  or   property,  but   after   due 
opportunity  to  be  heard  in  a  reg- 
ular,   orderly,    and    appropriate 
proceeding;    nor    be    denied    by 
them  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws. 

[Ante,  pp.  177  et  seq.] 
Section  3.    i.    No  law  convict- 


284 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

facto  law  shall  be  passed. — Ar- 
ticle I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  3. 


The  right  of  the  people  to  be 
secure  in  their  persons,  houses, 
papers,  and  effects,  against  un- 
reasonable searches  and  seizures 
shall  not  be  violated,  and  no  war- 
rants shall  issue,  but  upon  prob- 
able cause,  supported  by  oath  or 
affirmation,  and  particularly  de- 
scribing the  place  to  be  searched 
and  the  persons  or  things  to  be 
seized. — Amendment  IV. 

No  person  shall  be  held  to  an- 
swer for  a  capital  or  otherwise 
infamous  crime,  unless  on  a  pre- 
sentment or  indictment  of  a  grand 
jury,  except  in  cases  arising  in  the 
land  or  naval  forces,  or  in  the 
militia,  when  in  actual  service  in 
time  of  war  or  public  danger,  nor 
shall  any  person  be  subject  for 
the  same  offense  to  be  twice  put 
in  jeopardy  of  life  or  limb;  nor 
shall  be  compelled  in  any  crim- 
inal case  to  be  a  witness  against 
himself. — Amendment  V. 

In  all  criminal  prosecutions, 
the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right 
to  a  speedy  and  public  trial,  by 
an  impartial  jury  of  the  State  and 
district  wherein  the  crime  shall 
have  been  committed,  which  dis- 
trict shall  have  been  previously 
ascertained  by  law. — Amend- 
ment VI. 

The  trial  of  all  crimes,  except 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

ing  and   punishing   a   person  for 
alleged  offenses,  nor  any  ex  post 
facto  law  punishing  crime,  shall 
be  passed  by  the  Congress. 
[Ante,  pp.   181,  182.] 

2.  The  right  of  the  people  to 
be  secure  in  their  persons,  houses, 
papers,    and    effects,    against    un- 
reasonable searches  and  seizures 
shall     not    be    violated    by    the 
United  Nations,  and  no  warrants 
of  arrest  or  of  search  shall  issue 
but  upon  probable  cause,  supported 
by  oath  or  affirmation,   and  par- 
ticularly describing  the  place  to 
be   searched   and   the   persons  or 
things  to  be  seized. 

[Ante,  pp.  182,  183.] 

3.  No     person,     acquitted     of 
crime  or  punished  therefor,  shall 
be  punished  again  by  the  United 
Nations  for  the  same  offense;  nor 
shall  any  person  be  compelled  by 
them  in  any  criminal  case  to  be  a 
witness  against  himself. 


[Ante,  pp.  184,  185.] 

4.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions 
by  the  United  Nations,  the  ac- 
cused shall  enjoy  the  right  to  a 
speedy  and  public  trial  by  an  im- 
partial jury  of  the  State  and  dis- 
trict wherein  the  crime  shall  have 
been  committed,  which  district 
shall  have  been  previously  ascer- 
tained by  law,  but  where  not 
committed  within  any  State,  the 


APPENDIX 


285 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

in  cases  of  impeachment,  shall  be 
by  jury;  and  such  trial  shall  be 
held  in  the  State  where  the  said 
crime  shall  have  been  committed; 
but  when  not  committed  within 
any  State,  the  trial  shall  be  at 
such  place  or  places  as  the  Con- 
gress may  by  law  have  directed. 
—Article  III,  Sec.  2,  cl.  3. 

In  suits  at  common  law,  where 
the  value  in  controversy  shall  ex- 
ceed twenty  dollars,  the  right  of 
trial  by  jury  shall  be  preserved, 
and  no  fact  tried  by  a  jury  shall 
be  otherwise  re-examined  in  any 
court  of  the  United  States,  than 
according  to  the  rules  of  the  com- 
mon law. — Amendment  VII. 

[In  all  criminal  prosecutions, 
the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right] 
to  be  informed  of  the  nature  and 
cause  of  the  accusation;  to  be 
confronted  with  the  witnesses 
against  him;  to  have  compulsory 
process  for  obtaining  witnesses  in 
his  favor;  and  to  have  the  assist- 
ance of  counsel  for  his  defense. — 
Amendment  VI. 

Excessive  bail  shall  not  be  re- 
quired, nor  excessive  fines  im- 
posed, nor  cruel  and  unusual  pun- 
ishments inflicted.  —  Amendment 
VIII. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

trial  shall  be  at  such  place  or 
places  as  the  Congress  shall  by 
law  have  directed.  The  number 
of  jurors,  and  the  majority  of 
them  necessary  to  find  a  verdict, 
shall  be  prescribed  by  law. 
[Ante,  pp.  187  et  seq.] 


[See  ante,  pp.  174,  175.] 


5.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions, 
by  the  United  Nations,  the  ac- 
cused shall  enjoy  the  right  to  be 
informed  of  the  nature  and  cause 
of  the  accusation;  to  be  con- 
fronted with  the  witnesses  against 
him;  to  have  compulsory  process 
for  obtaining  witnesses  in  his  fa- 
vor; to  have  the  assistance  of 
counsel  for  his  defense;  and, 
under  such  conditions  as  may  be 
prescribed  by  law,  to  be  admitted 
to  bail.  Excessive  bail  shall  not 
be  required,  nor  excessive  fines 
imposed,  nor  cruel  and  unusual 
punishments  inflicted. 

[Ante,  p.  189.] 


286 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


No  State  shall  enter  into  any 
treaty,  alliance,  or  confederation. 
— Article  I,  Sec.  10,  cl.  i. 

No  State  shall,  without  the  con- 
sent of  Congress  .  .  .  enter  into 
any  agreement  or  compact  with 
another  State  or  with  a  foreign 
power. — Article  I,  Sec.  10,  cl.  3. 


No  State  shall  lay  any  duty  of 
tonnage.— Article  I,  Sec.  10,  cl.  3. 

No  State  shall,  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  Congress,  lay  any  im- 
posts or  duties  on  imports  or  ex- 
ports, except  what  may  be  abso- 
lutely necessary  for  executing  its 
inspection  laws,  and  the  net  pro- 
duce of  all  duties  and  imposts 
laid  by  any  State  on  imports  or 
exports,  shall  be  for  the  use  of 
the  treasury  of  the  United  States; 
and  all  such  laws  shall  be  subject 
to  the  revision  and  control  of  the 
Congress. — Article  I,  Sec.  10, 
cl.  2. 


No  State  shall,  without  the  con- 
sent of  Congress.  .  .  .  keep  troops 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE  V 

LIMITATIONS    UPON    THE    POWERS 
OF  THE  COMPONENT  NATIONS 

Section  i.  No  component  na- 
tion shall  enter  into  any  treaty 
concerning  matters  subject  to  the 
control  of  the  United  Nations,  or 
into  any  alliance  or  confedera- 
tion; nor,  without  the  consent  of 
the  Congress,  into  any  other 
treaty,  agreement  or  compact  with 
any  other  nation.  All  treaties 
made  by  a  component  nation 
with  nations  not  members  of  this 
union  shall  contain  provision  for 
the  peaceable  settlement  of  all 
disputes  arising  therefrom. 
[Ante,  pp.  197  et  seq.] 

Section  2.  No  component  na- 
tion shall,  without  the  consent  of 
the  Congress,  lay  any  tax  upon 
the  carrying  capacity  of  any  ship 
or  other  vehicle  of  international 
commerce,  or  on  any  person  be- 
cause engaged  therein;  or  any 
imposts  or  duties  on  imports  or 
exports,  except  what  may  be  abso- 
lutely necessary  for  executing  its 
inspection  laws,  and  the  net  pro- 
duce of  all  duties  and  imposts 
laid  by  any  nation  on  imports  or 
exports  shall  be  for  the  use  of 
the  treasury  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, and  all  such  laws  shall  be 
subject  to  the  revision  and  con- 
trol of  the  Congress. 

[Ante,  pp.  201   et  seq.] 

Section  3.  i.  No  component 
nation  shall,  without  the  consent 


APPENDIX 


287 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

or  ships  of  war  in  time  of  peace 
...  or  engage  in  war,  unless 
actually  invaded,  or  in  such  im- 
minent danger  as  will  not  admit 
of  delay. — Article  I,  Sec.  10,  cl.  3. 


No  State  shall  grant  letters  of 
marque  and  reprisal,  coin  money, 
emit  bills  of  credit,  make  any- 
thing but  gold  and  silver  coin  a 
tender  in  payment  of  debts,  pass 
any  bill  of  attainder,  ex  post  facto 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

of  the  Congress,  in  time  of  peace, 
keep  troops  (exclusive  of  militia) 
or  ships  of  war  in  excess  of  ten 
per  centum  of  the  number  of 
troops  and  war  vessels  kept  by 
the  United  Nations;  or  engage  in 
war  with  other  nations,  unless 
actually  invaded  or  in  such  im- 
minent danger  as  will  not  admit 
of  delay. 

[Ante,  pp.  205  et  seq.] 

2.  Nothing  herein  shall  be  con- 
strued to  prohibit  a  nation,  which 
is   keeping   such   troops   or   ships 
when  it  enters  this  union,  to  effect 
a  gradual  reduction  of  its  forces 
according  to  a  general  plan  to  be 
determined  by  the  Congress,  until 
the  ten  per  centum  before  men- 
tioned be  attained. 

[Ante,  pp.  205   et  seq.] 

3.  In  no  event  shall  a  compo- 
nent nation  be  required  to  reduce 
the  number  of  its  troops  below  a 
minimum  of  one-tenth  of  one  per 
centum  of  the  population  of   all 
its  territories,    estimated    as   pro- 
vided in  the  second  clause  of  the 
second  section  of  the  first  Article 
of  this  constitution;  nor  the  ton- 
nage of  its  ships  of  war  below  a 
minimum  of  one  per  centum  of 
the  tonnage  of  its  merchant  ma- 
rine. 

[Ante,  pp.  208,  209.] 


[See  Article  VI,  Sec.  /.] 


288 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

law,  or  law  impairing  the  obli- 
gation of  contracts,  or  grant  any 
title  of  nobility. — Article  I,  Sec. 
10,  cl.  i. 

No  State  shall  make  or  enforce 
any  law  which  shall  abridge  the 
privileges  or  immunities  of  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States;  nor 
shall  any  State  deprive  any  per- 
son of  life,  liberty,  or  property 
without  due  process  of  law;  nor 
deny  to  any  person  within  its 
jurisdiction  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws. — Amendment  XIV. 

The  right  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States  to  vote  shall  not  be 
denied  or  abridged  by  the  United 
States  or  by  any  State  on  account 
of  race,  color,  or  previous  condi- 
tion of  servitude. — Amendment 
XV. 

Neither  slavery  nor  involun- 
tary servitude,  except  as  a  pun- 
ishment for  crime,  whereof  the 
party  shall  have  been  duly  con- 
victed, shall  exist  within  the 
United  States,  or  any  place  sub- 
j  e  c  t  to  their  jurisdiction. — 
Amendment  XIII. 

No  new  State  shall  be  formed 
or  erected  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  any  other  State;  nor  any  State 
be  formed  by  the  junction  of  two 
or  more  States  or  parts  of  States, 
without  the  consent  of  the  legisla- 
tures of  the  States  concerned  as 
well  as  of  the  Congress. — Article 
IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  i. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 


[See  Article  VI,  Sec.  /.] 


[See  ante,  pp.  192  et  seq.] 


Section  4.  No  component  na- 
tion shall,  without  the  consent  of 
the  Congress  (  three-fourths  of  all 
the  votes  of  both  houses  concur- 
ring) and  of  the  nations  directly 
concerned,  acquire  in  time  of 
peace  any  sovereignty,  control,  or 
jurisdiction  over  the  territory  of 
another  nation,  whether  or  not  it 


APPENDIX 


289 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


Full  faith  and  credit  shall  be 
given  in  each  State  to  the  public 
acts,  records,  and  judicial  pro- 
ceedings of  every  other  State. 
And  the  Congress  may  by  general 
laws  prescribe  the  manner  in 
which  such  acts,  records,  and  pro- 
ceedings shall  be  proved,  and  the 
effect  thereof. — Article  IV,  Sec.  i. 

The  citizens  of  each  State  shall 
be  entitled  to  all  privileges  and 
immunities  of  citizens  in  the  sev- 
eral States. — Article  IV,  Sec.  2. 

No  State  shall  pass  any  bill  of 
attainder,  ex  post  facto  law,  or 
law  impairing  the  obligation  of 
contracts. — Article  I,  Sec.  10,  cl.  i. 

No  State  shall  make  or  enforce 
any  law  which  shall  abridge  the 
privileges  or  immunities  of  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States;  nor 
shall  any  State  deprive  any  per- 
son of  life,  liberty,  or  property 
without  due  process  of  law;  nor 
deny  to  any  person  within  its 
jurisdiction  the  equal  protection 
of  the  laws. — Amendment  XIV. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

be  a  member  of  this  union,  nor  in 
time  of  war,  or  as  a  consequence 
thereof,  but  as  provided  in  the 
first  clause  of  the  first  section  of 
the  fourth  Article  of  this  constitu- 
tion. 

[Ante,  pp.  209  et  seq.] 

ARTICLE  VI 

RELATIONS    OF    THE    COMPONENT 
NATIONS  TO  EACH  OTHER,  AND 

TO  THE  UNION 

Section  i.  No  component  na- 
tion shall  abridge  the  privileges 
and  immunities  of  citizens  of 
other  States,  either  members  or 
not  members  of  this  union,  or  of 
citizens  of  the  United  Nations,  by 
passing  any  law  convicting  and 
punishing  them  for  alleged  of- 
fenses, or  any  ex  post  facto  law 
punishing  crime,  or  any  law  im- 
pairing the  obligation  of  con- 
tracts; or  by  depriving  such  citi- 
zens of  life,  liberty,  or  property, 
but  after  due  opportunity  to  be 
heard  in  a  regular,  orderly,  and 
appropriate  proceeding;  or  by 
denying  to  such  citizens  the  equal 
security  of  their  persons  and 
property;  or  in  violation  of  any 
treaty  or  agreement,  between  the 
nations  concerned. 

[Ante,  pp.  212  et  seq.] 
Section  2.  The  United  Nations 
guarantee  to  the  citizens  of  each 
component  nation,  as  well  as  to 
the  citizens  of  the  United  Nations, 
while  they  are  within  States  not 
members  of  this  union,  such 


290 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


The  United  States  shall  guar- 
antee to  every  State  in  this  Union 
a  republican  form  of  government, 
and  shall  protect  each  of  them 
against  invasion  .  .  .  and  on  ap- 
plication of  the  legislature,  or  of 
the  executive  (where  the  legisla- 
ture cannot  be  convened)  against 
domestic  violence. — Article  IV, 
Sec.  4. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

privileges  and  immunities  as  are 
secured  to  aliens  by  the  Law  of 
Nations,  or  by  treaty  between  the 
several  powers  concerned. 
[Ante,   pp.  215,  216.] 

Section  3.  The  United  Nations 
shall  protect  each  component  na- 
tion against  invasion. 

[Ante,  p.  217.] 

Section  4.  i.  In  case  of  inter- 
nal dissensions  within  any  compo- 
nent State,  neither  the  United  Na- 
tions nor  any  other  component  na- 
tion shall  intervene  by  force  be- 
tween the  contending  parties,  but 
the  United  Nations,  acting  on  be- 
half of  all  the  other  component 
nations,  shall  adhere  to  the  rules 
of  the  Law  of  Nations  in  such 
case  made  and  provided,  and 
shall  continue  to  recognize  the  de 
facto  government  of  such  nation 
as  the  existing  government,  which 
shall  exercise  and  enjoy  all  the 
functions,  rights,  and  privileges 
of  the  nation  under  this  constitu- 
tion, until  such  government  be 
overthrown  and  a  new  one  be 
substituted  therefor,  in  which  case 
the  new  government  shall  then 
exercise  and  enjoy  such  functions, 
lights,  and  privileges. 

[Ante,  pp.  217  et  seq.] 

2.  If,  in  consequence  of  such 
dissensions,  a  portion  of  the  ter- 
ritory of  the  aation  concerned  is 
erected  into  an  independent  State, 
the  Congress  shall  proceed  to  re- 
adjust the  representation  of  the 
original  nation  in  the  House  of 
Delegates;  and  to  admit,  if  it  be 


APPENDIX 


291 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


New  States  may  be  admitted  by 
the  Congress  into  this  Union. — 
Article  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  i. 

The  Congress  shall  have  power 
to  dispose  of  and  make  all  need- 
ful rules  and  regulations  respect- 
ing the  territory  or  other  property 
belonging  to  the  United  States; 
and  nothing  in  this  Constitution 
shall  be  so  construed  as  to  preju- 
dice any  claims  of  the  United 
States,  or  of  any  particular  State. 
—Article  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  2. 


The  enumeration  in  the  Consti- 
tution of  certain  rights  shall  not 
be  construed  to  deny  or  disparage 
others  retained  by  the  people. — 
Amendment  IX. 

The  powers  not  delegated  to 
the  United  States  by  the  Constitu- 
tion, or  prohibited  by  it  to  the 
States,  are  reserved  to  the  States, 
respectively,  or  to  the  people. — 
Amendment  X. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

desired,  the  newly  created  nation 
into  the  union  upon  the  terms  and 
conditions  provided  in  the  fifth 
section  of  this  Article. 

[Ante,  pp.  220,  221.] 

Section    5.    Other   nations   may 

be  admitted  to  this  union  by  the 

Congress,  three-fourths  of  all  the 

votes  of  both  houses  concurring, 

provided  that  such  nations  comply 

with  the  terms  and  conditions  of 

the  second  section  of  the  eleventh 

Article  of  this  constitution. 

[Ante,  p.  221.] 


ARTICLE  VII 

THE    RESERVED    RIGHTS    OF    THE 
COMPONENT  NATIONS 

Section  i.  Each  component  na- 
tion reserves  its  sovereignty  and 
independence ;  and  every  jurisdic- 
tion, power,  and  right  not  dele- 
gated to  the  United  Nations  by 
this  compact,  nor  prohibited  by  it 
to  the  component  nations. 
[Ante,  p.  222.] 

Section  2.  i.  The  right  is  re- 
served to  each  nation  acceding  to 
this  constitution  to  withdraw  in 
peace  from  the  union  after 
twenty-five  years  from  the  time 
of  such  accession,  having  pre- 
viously given  one  year's  notice  of 
such  intention  to  the  Congress. 
[Ante,  pp.  223  et  seq.] 

2.    Upon    withdrawal,    the    se- 
ceding nation  shall,  by  the  act  of 


292 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


This  Constitution,  and  the  laws 
of  the  United  States  which  shall 
be  made  in  pursuance  thereof, 
and  all  treaties  made,  or  which 
shall  be  made,  under  the  author- 
ity of  the  United  States,  shall  be 
the  supreme  law  of  the  land;  and 
the  judges  in  every  State  shall  be 
bound  thereby,  anything  in  the 
Constitution  or  laws  of  any  State 
to  the  contrary  notwithstanding. 
—Article  VI,  cl.  2. 

The  Senators  and  Representa- 
tives before  mentioned,  and  the 
members  of  the  several  State 
legislatures,  and  all  executive 
and  judicial  officers,  both  of  the 
United  States  and  of  the  several 
States,  shall  be  bound  by  oath  or 
affirmation,  to  support  this  Consti- 
tution.—Article  VI,  cl.  3. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

secession,  regain  complete  sov- 
ereignty, jurisdiction,  and  control 
of  all  land  ceded  by  it  to  the 
United  Nations,  save  such  as  may 
be  included  within  the  seat  of 
government  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, and  shall  be  entitled  to,  and 
bound  by,  such  adjustment  of  its 
share  of  the  common  property 
and  debts  as  the  Supreme  Court, 
or  the  proper  section  thereof,  may 
determine  is  equitably  due. 
[Ante,  pp.  227,  228.] 

ARTICLE  VIII 

SUPREMACY  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION, 

LAWS,  AND  TREATIES  OF  THE 

UNITED  NATIONS 

Section  i.  This  constitution 
and  the  laws  and  treaties  of  the 
United  Nations  made  in  pursu- 
ance thereof,  shall  be  the  supreme 
law  in  every  component  State; 
and  the  judges  in  every  State 
shall  be  bound  thereby,  anything 
in  the  constitution,  laws,  or 
treaties  of  any  State  to  the  con- 
trary notwithstanding. 

[Ante,   pp.  229,  230.] 

Section  2.  All  legislative,  ex- 
ecutive, and  judicial  officers,  both 
of  the  United  Nations  and  of  the 
several  component  nations,  shall 
be  bound  by  oath  or  affirmation  to 
support  this  constitution. 
[Ante,  pp.  230,  231.] 


APPENDIX  293 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

But  no  religious  test  shall  ever  [See  Article  IV,  Sec.  2,  cl.  2.] 

be  required  as  a  qualification  to 
any  office  or  public  trust  under 
the  United  States.— Article  VI, 
cl.  3. 


The  Congress,  whenever  two- 
thirds  of  both  Houses  shall  deem 
it  necessary,  shall  propose  amend- 
ments to  this  Constitution,  or,  on 
the  application  of  the  legislatures 
of  two-thirds  of  the  several 
States,  shall  call  a  convention  [of 
the  States]  for  proposing  amend- 
ments, which,  in  either  case,  shall 
be  valid  to  all  intents  and  pur- 
poses, as  part  of  this  Constitution, 
when  ratified  by  the  legislatures 
of  three-fourths  of  the  several 
States,  or  by  conventions  [of  the 
people]  in  three-fourths  thereof, 
as  the  one  or  the  other  mode  of 
ratification  may  be  proposed  by 
the  Congress. — Article  V. 

Provided  that  no  amendment 
which  may  be  made  prior  to  the 
year  1808  shall  in  any  manner  af- 
fect the  first  and  fourth  clauses  in 
the  ninth  section  of  the  first  Ar- 
ticle; and  that  no  State,  without 
its  consent,  shall  be  deprived  of 
its  equal  suffrage  in  the  Senate. 
—Article  V. 


ARTICLE  IX 

AMENDMENTS  TO  THE   CONSTITU- 
TION 

Section  i.  The  Congress,  by  a 
two-thirds  vote  of  both  houses, 
may  propose  amendments  to  this 
constitution,  which  shall  be  valid 
to  all  intents  and  purposes  as  part 
of  this  constitution  when  con- 
curred in  by  three-fourths  of  all 
the  votes  of  both  houses,  subject 
to  the  provisos  contained  in  the 
section  next  following. 

[Ante,  pp.  232  et  seq.] 


Section  2.  Unless  passed  by 
unanimous  consent  in  both  houses 
of  the  Congress,  no  amendment 
shall  be  valid  which  is  passed, 
before  the  expiration  of  four 
years  from  the  time  it  is  proposed 
by  the  Congress;  or  which  shall 
deprive  any  nation  of  its  equal 
suffrage  in  the  Senate,  or  of  its 
suffrage  in  the  House  of  Dele- 
gates in  proportion  to  population, 
or  of  its  equal  representation 
upon  the  Supreme  Court;  or 
which  shall  deprive  any  nation 
of  the  right  to  veto  a  measure  of 
the  Congress,  or  which  shall  de- 
prive any  nation  of  the  right 


294  APPENDIX 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

peaceably  to  withdraw  from  the 
union;  or  which  shall  extend  the 
judicial  power  of  the  United  Na- 
tions to  any  personal  proceeding 
against  the  sovereign  or  chief 
executive  of  any  component 
nation. 

[Ante,  pp.  240,  241.] 

ARTICLE   X 

DISCIPLINE  OF  A  COMPONENT 
NATION 

Section  i.  If  a  component 
State  shall  refuse  or  neglect  to 
fulfill  its  obligations  under  this 
constitution,  or  the  laws  or 
treaties  made  in  pursuance  there- 
of, it  shall  be  subject  to  discip- 
line by  the  Congress  after  due 
warning. 

[Ante,  pp.  242  et  seq.] 

Section  2.  Discipline  of  a  com- 
ponent State  shall  extend  no  fur- 
ther than  to  an  embargo  of  part 
or  all  of  the  commerce  between 
the  State  to  be  disciplined  and  all 
the  other  component  States,  or  to 
the  expulsion  of  such  State  from 
the  union. 

[Ante,  pp.  245,  246.] 

Section  3.  No  disciplinary 
measure  shall  be  passed  except 
by  the  assent  of  three-fourths  of 
all  the  votes  in  both  houses  of 
the  Congress. 

[Ante,  p.  247.] 

Section  4.  When  a  State  shall 
have  been  expelled  from  the 
union,  it  shall  have  the  same 
rights  and  incur  the  same  obliga- 


APPENDIX 


295 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


The  ratification  of  the  conven- 
tions [of  the  people]  of  nine 
States,  shall  be  sufficient  for  the 
establishment  of  this  Constitution 
between  the  States  so  ratifying 
the  same. — Article  VII. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

tions  with  respect  to  lands  ceded 
to  the  United  Nations  and  with 
respect  to  the  common  property 
and  the  common  debts,  as  if  it 
had  withdrawn  therefrom  under 
the  second  clause  of  the  second 
section  of  the  seventh  Article  of 
this  constitution. 

[Ante,  pp.  246,  247.] 

ARTICLE  XI 

ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  CONSTITU- 
TION 

Section  i.  The  agreement  of 
eight  nations,  of  which  at  least 
five  shall  be  from  the  following 
group:  Austria-Hungary,  France, 
Germany,  Great  Britain,  Italy, 
Japan,  Russia,  and  the  United 
States  of  America,  shall  be  suffi- 
cient for  the  establishment  of  this 
constitution  between  the  nations 
agreeing  thereto. 

[Ante,   pp.  248  et  seq.] 

Section  2.  Such  agreement 
shall  be  evidenced  by  the  assent 
of  the  constitutional  treaty-mak- 
ing power  of  each  nation,  accom- 
panied by  a  solemn  written  affir- 
mation by  the  sovereign  or  other 
chief  executive  authority,  pledg- 
ing the  sacred  honor  of  the  nation 
and  of  himself  and  his  successors 
faithfully  and  honestly  to  observe 
this  compact  in  all  its  parts,  leav- 
ing all  disputes  arising  under  it 
to  be  settled  in  the  modes  indi- 
cated therein. 

[Ante,  pp.  250  et  seq.] 


INDEX 


INDEX 


[References   are  to  pages] 


Accounting  of  assets,  by  seced- 
ing State,  227-228,  292;  by  ex- 
pelled State,  24.6-247,  294- 

295- 

Accused,  arrest  of,  182-183,  284; 
discharge  of,  on  habeas  corpus, 
168-169,  282;  entitled  to  bail, 
189,  285;  no  second  jeopardy 
of,  184-185,  284;  not  to  testify 
against  himself,  185-186,  284; 
to  be  confronted  with  adverse 
witnesses,  189,  285 ;  to  be  in- 
formed of  charge,  189,  285;  to 
be  tried  by  jury,  187-188,  284- 
285 ;  to  compel  attendance  of 
witnesses,  189,  285;  to  have 
aid  of  counsel,  189,  285;  to 
have  due  process  of  law,  181, 
212-214,  283,  289;  to  have 
equal  protection  of  laws,  181, 
212-214,  283,  289.  See  Checks. 

Adjournment  of  Congress,  53, 
261. 

Admiralty,  jurisdiction  in,  143- 
145,  277. 

Admission  of  States  to  league,  in 
case  of  civil  war  in  State,  220, 
290-291 ;  in  general,  221,  291. 

Aliens,  citizens  abroad  to  have 
rights  of,  215-216,  289;  protec- 
tion of,  in  component  States, 
212-214,  289. 

Alliances,  States  not  to  enter  into, 
200,  286. 

Alsace  and  Lorraine,  as  cause  of 
war,  xvi. 

Ambassadors,  appointment  of, 
118,  272;  delegates  in  Congress 
regarded  as,  55,  262;  judicial 
power  extends  to,  142-143,  277 ; 
original  jurisdiction  of  Su- 


preme Court  embraces,  151-153, 
278 ;  reception  of  foreign,  120- 
121,  273. 

Ambitions  of  nations,  as  cause  of 
war,  xiii,  17. 

Amendment  of  constitution,  in 
general,  232-241,  293-294;  limi- 
tations on  power  of,  239-241, 
293-294;  proposal  of,  236-237, 
293;  ratification  of,  237-240, 
294;  subverts  Supreme  Court's 
decisions,  141-142.  See  Checks. 

Appeal,  from  State  to  interna- 
tional courts,  89-91,  153,  275, 
278-279;  to  sections  of  Supreme 
Court,  132-134,  275,  278;  to 
Supreme  Court,  134-135,  153, 
275-276,  278. 

Appointment,  of  delegates  in 
Congress,  50-52,  258,  259;  of 
executive  officers,  118-120,  272; 
of  judges,  125-128,  274;  of  min- 
isters, 109-110,  268;  of  prime 
minister,  105-106,  268-269;  of 
Supreme  Court  justices  in  sec- 
tions, 130-132,  274-276.  See 
Checks. 

Appropriations  of  money,  for 
armies,  94-95,  266;  for  boun- 
ties, 162-163,  281;  for  general 
purposes,  162-163,  264,  281 ;  for 
pensions,  162-163,  281. 

Arbitration,  courts  of,  ix-xi. 

Argentina,  population  of,  42; 
votes  of,  in  Congress,  44. 

Armies,  appropriations  for,  lim- 
ited to  two  years,  94-95,  266 ; 
right  of  States  to  keep,  206- 
209,  286-287;  right  of  United 
Nations  to  raise  and  support, 
266.  See  Checks. 


299 


INDEX 


Arms,  carrying  and  keeping  of, 
172-173,  283. 

Arrest,  discharge  from  illegal, 
168-169,  282;  freedom  from,  a 
privilege  of  delegates  in  Con- 
gress, 54,  262;  warrants  of, 
182-183,  284. 

Arsenals,  forts,  etc.,  Congress  to 
control,  95-96,  267;  surrender 
of,  to  seceding  State,  227- 
228,  292;  surrender  of,  to 
expelled  State,  246-247,  294- 
295. 

Arts,  condition  of,  as  measure  of 
State's  influence,  34. 

Assembly,  popular  right  of,  172, 
283. 

Attainder,  bills  of,  general  na- 
ture, 181-182;  not  to  be  passed 
by  Congress,  182,  283-284;  not 
to  be  passed  by  States  against 
citizens  of  other  States,  213- 
214,  289. 

Austria-Hungary,  assent  of,  to 
constitution,  249-250,  295 ;  pop- 
ulation of,  40;  votes  of,  in  Con- 
gress, 44. 

Backward  populations,  how  esti- 
mated, 37-39,  41,  258. 

Bail,  grant  of,  to  accused,  189, 
285;  no  excessive,  to  be  re- 
quired, 189,  285. 

Balance  of  power,  as  cause  of 
war,  xv. 

Banking,  control  of,  by  Con- 
gress, 66-67,  74-75,  265. 

Belgium,  population  of,  41 ;  votes 
of,  in  Congress,  44,  47. 

Bills  of  attainder,  181-182,  213- 
214,  283-284,  289. 

Bolivia,  population  of,  42. 

Bonds,  Congress  may  issue,  74- 
75,  265. 

Bounty  legislation  by  Congress, 
162-163,  281. 

Boycott  of  component  States,  242- 
247,  294. 

Brazil,  population  of,  42;  votes 
of,  in  Congress,  44. 

Bribery,  judges  removable  for, 
62-63,  129,  274. 


British  Empire.     See  Great  Brit- 
ain. 
Bulgaria,  population  of,  41. 

Cable,  control  over,  by  Congress, 
86-87,  265. 

Census  of  populations,  35-48,  258. 

Checks  and  balances  in  constitu- 
tion, demand  for,  xxxii-xxxiii, 
25,  26,  27;  (i)  government  con- 
trolled by  component  States: — 
in  legislative  department,  dele- 
gates in  Congress  appointed 
and  removable  by  States,  52, 

258,  259 ;    in  executive   depart- 
ment, prime  minister  appointed 
by  Congress,  105-108,  259;  and 
removable  by  either  house,  in- 
112,     259;      subordinate     min- 
isters   appointed    and    remova- 
ble by. prime  minister,  109-112, 
268 ;     ministers    removable    by 
their  several  States,  50-52,  258, 

259,  260;   in   judiciary  depart- 
ment,     judges      appointed      by 
States,    127-128,    274;    remova- 
ble   by    Congress,    63-65,    129, 
274;    treaties   by   ministry    and 
Congress,    117,    272;     constitu- 
tion    amended     by     Congress, 
232-241,  293 ;  admission  of  new 
States    by    Congress,    220,    221, 
290-291; — (2)      Great     Powers 
balanced    against    smaller    na- 
tions:    in     legislative     depart- 
ment,   Great    Powers    to    pre- 
dominate   in    House    of    Dele- 
gates, 35-48,  258;   equal  repre- 
sentation  of    States    in    Senate, 
46-48,  259;  no  measures  to  pass 
save  by  consent  of  both  houses, 
46-47,  257,  263 ;  limited  life  of 
tax  and  commerce  laws,  55-57, 
84,    26? ;    Jn    executive    depart- 
ment,   ministry    dependent    on 
Congress,   105-112,  268-269;    in 
judiciary    department,    equality 
of    representation    on    Supreme 
Court,   130-132,  274; — (3)   pro- 
tection of  a  minority  of  States 
against     a     majority:     powers 
of  Congress  as  limited  as  pos- 


INDEX 


301 


sible,  66-67;  in  legislative  ac- 
tion, Congress  to  tax  land  only, 
70-72,  160-161,  264,  281 ;  tax 
must  be  uniform,  72,  264;  com- 
mercial laws  to  be  uniform, 
83-87,  163-165,  265,  281;  lim- 
ited life  of  tax  and  commercial 
laws,  56-57,  263 ;  veto  power 
of  States,  57-60,  263-264;  in 
executive  action,  dependence  of 
ministry  on  Congress,  105-112, 
267-269;  in  judicial  action, 
equality  of  representation  on 
Supreme  Court,  130-132,  274; 
no  personal  proceedings  against 
rulers  of  States,  155,  279;  in 
treaty-making,  treaties  made 
by  ministry  with  consent  of 
two-thirds  of  Congress,  117, 
272;  treaties  to  be  within  con- 
stitutional powers,  117-118,  272; 
in  amending  constitution,  con- 
sent of  three-fourths  of  Con- 
gress required,  237-239,  293 ;  in 
admission  of  new  States  con- 
sent of  three-fourths  of  Con- 
gress required,  220,  221,  290- 
291 ; — (4)  protection  of  each 
single  State  in  its  reserved 
rights:  no  needless  powers  to  be 
granted,  75,  77,  193;  express 
reservation  of  sovereignty  and 
rights,  222,  291 ;  State's  right 
to  veto  legislation,  57-59,  263- 
264;  State's  right  to  secede, 
223-228,  291-292;  no  "citizen- 
ship of  United  Nations,"  97, 
159,  280;  no  "treason  against 
United  Nations,"  160,  280-281; 
equality  of  representation  on 
Supreme  Court,  130-132,  274; 
no  amendment  can  deprive 
States  of  most  important  re- 
served rights,  240-241,  293 ; 
uniformity  of  legislation,  72, 
83-87,  162-165,  264,  265,  281; 
neutrality  in  case  of  dissen- 
sions in  a  State,  217,  290;  no 
personal  suits  against  rulers, 
*55»  279;  no  suit  by  private 
person  against  State,  154,  279; 
— (5)  protection  against  un- 


constitutional acts  of  govern- 
ment: legislative  action,  courts 
may  declare  laws  unconsti- 
tutional, 138-141,  277;  veto 
power  of  States,  57-60,  263- 
264;  State's  right  of  secession, 
223-228,  291-292 ;  executive  ac- 
tion, dependence  of  ministry  on 
Congress,  105-112,  267-269; 
courts  may  declare  acts  illegal 
and  actionable,  157;  appropria- 
tions for  armies  for  two  years 
only,  86-87,  266;  judicial  ac- 
tion, judges  removable  by 
Congress,  63-65,  129,  264;  Su- 
preme Court  to  declare  laws 
unconstitutional  only  by  a 
three-fourths  vote,  138-140,  277; 
Congress  may  override  Su- 
preme Court  by  a  three-fourths 
vote  amending  constitution, 
141-142,  293 ;  no  personal  pro- 
ceedings against  rulers  of 
States,  155,  279; — (6)  protec- 
tion against  wars  between  com- 
ponent States  or  between  com- 
ponent States  and  foreign 
States:  each  State  to  keep  rea- 
sonable numbers  of  troops,  206- 
208,  286-287;  each  State  to  re- 
duce its  forces  to  reasonable 
limits,  206-208,  286-288;  league 
to  raise  and  support  armies 
and  navies,  93-95,  266;  each 
State  guaranteed  against  inva- 
sion, 217,  290;  courts  to  ad- 
judge disputes  between  States, 
146,  278;  no  State  to  tax  or 
burden  commerce  of  other 
States,  201-203,  205,  286;  Con- 
gress to  control  international 
commerce  and  communication 
by  uniform  laws,  79-85,  87,  265, 
281;  no  State  to  acquire  terri- 
tory of  another  without  con- 
sent, 209-211,  280,  288-289;  no 
State  to  oppress  citizens  of  an- 
other, 137,  212-214,  289;  league 
to  protect  citizens  of  compo- 
nent States  when  abroad,  215- 
216,  289-290;  disciplinary  pow- 
ers of  Congress,  242-247,  294- 


302 


INDEX 


295;  league  and  States  to  be 
neutral  in  case  of  internal  dis- 
sensions in  sister  State,  217, 
290;  States  to  enter  into  no  al- 
liances, 197-200;  States  to  make 
no  treaties  without  consent  of 
Congress,  197-200,  286;  State 
treaties  to  provide  for  peace- 
able settlement  of  disputes,  201, 
286; — (7)  protection  against 
•wars  between  league  and  one 
or  more  component  States: 
league  not  to  interfere  in  do- 
mestic concerns  of  States,  66, 
190,  193;  league's  power  to  tax 
confined  to  land  only,  69-74, 
160-161,  264,  281 ;  league's  tax 
and  commercial  laws  to  be  uni- 
form, 72,  83-84,  163-165,  264, 

265,  281;      limited      life      of 
league's    tax    and    commercial 
laws,    55-57>    263 ;     league    to 
have  jurisdiction  of  wrongs  on 
high  seas  and  offenses  against 
Law  of  Nations,  92-93,  143-145, 

266,  277 ;   State's  right  to  veto 
international   legislation,  57-59, 
263-264;  Supreme  Court  to  de- 
clare void    and    illegal   uncon- 
stitutional  acts  of  Congress  or 
ministry,      138-141,     277;      su- 
premacy  of   international    con- 
stitution, laws,  and  treaties,  227- 
231,  292 ;  Supreme  Court  to  de- 
cide   disputes    between    league 
and  component  States,  145,  146, 
278;      States'     right     to     keep 
armies     and     navies,     206-209, 
286-287;  State's  right  to  secede, 
223-228,    291-292;     disciplinary 
powers  of  Congress  and  limits 
thereto,  242-247,  294-295  ;  pledge 
upon    ratification    of    constitu- 
tion,   252-254,    295;— (8)    pro- 
tection   against    wars    between 
league     and     foreign     States: 
league  to  embrace  majority  of 
Great    Powers,    249-250,    295; 
war   powers   of   league,   93-95, 
266-267;     league    to     levy    no 
taxes     on     international     com- 
merce,   160-161,    264,    281;    no 


secret  treaties  without  consent 
of  Congress,  117,  201,  272,  286; 
league  to  acquire  no  territory, 
157-159,  280;  States  to  acquire 
no  territory  without  consent  of 
States  concerned  and  of  Con- 
gress, 209-211,  280,  288-289;  in- 
ternational courts  to  protect 
aliens  while  in  component 
States,  137,  212-214,  289; 
league  to  protect  citizens  of 
component  States  while  abroad, 
215-216,  289-290; — (9)  protec- 
tion of  private  rights  against 
invasion  by  league:  courts  to 
construe  international  constitu- 
tion, laws,  and  treaties,  136- 
i37»  277;  Congress  not  to  tax 
imports,  exports,  business,  or 
trades,  72,  160,  264,  281 ;  com- 
mercial laws  of  Congress  to  be 
uniform,  83-84,  265,  281 ;  right 
of  discharge  from  illegal  im- 
prisonment, 168-169,  282;  free- 
dom of  press  and  of  speech, 
170-171,  283;  freedom  of  re- 
ligion, 170,  282;  right  of  as- 
sembly, 172,  283 ;  right  of  peti- 
tion, 172,  283;  right  to  carry 
and  keep  arms,  172-173,  283 ; 
quartering  of  soldiers,  173,  283; 
eminent  domain,  175-176,  283; 
due  process  of  law,  177-179, 
181,  283;  equal  protection  of 
the  laws,  179-180,  181,  283; 
jury  not  required  in  civil  cases, 
174-175;  no  grand  jury  re- 
quired, 186;  trial  by  jury  in 
criminal  cases,  187-188,  284- 
285;  bills  of  attainder,  181-182, 
283-284;  ex  post  facto  laws, 
181-182,  284;  general  warrants, 
182-183,  284;  security  of  dwell- 
ings and  effects,  182-183,  284; 
double  jeopardy,  184-185,  284; 
self-incrimination,  185-186,  284; 
other  guarantees,  189,  284-285; 
—  (10)  protection  of  private 
rights  against  invasion  by  com- 
ponent States:  in  case  of  citi- 
zens of  other  component  States 
or  of  United  Nations,  212-214, 


INDEX 


303 


289;  in  case  of  aliens,  212-214, 
289; — (n)  protection  of  pri- 
vate rights  against  invasion  by 
foreign  States:  in  case  of  citi- 
zens of  component  States  or  of 
United  Nations  when  abroad, 
215-216,  289-290. 

Chief  Justice  of  Supreme  Court, 
133-134,  276. 

Chile,  population  of,  42;  votes 
of,  in  Congress,  44. 

China,  open  door  in,  as  cause  of 
war,  xv ;  population  of,  41; 
votes  of,  in  Congress,  41. 

Citizens^  mistreatment  of,  by 
other  States  as  cause  of  war, 
xxvi;  not  protected  by  league 
against  acts  of  their  own 
States,  195;  of  component 
States  in  other  component 
States,  rights  of,  212-214,  289; 
of  component  States  abroad, 
rights  of,  215-216,  289-290;  of 
different  States,  judicial  power 
does  not  extend  to  cases  be- 
tween, 148-150;  of  foreign 
States  in  component  States, 
rights  of,  195-196,  212-216,  289; 
of  foreign  States,  rights  of, 
regulated  by  treaties,  215-216, 
289-290;  of  United  Nations, 
who  are,  97-99,  159,  280;  of 
United  Nations,  no  naturalized, 
97-99*  J59»  280;  of  United  Na- 
tions protected  in  component 
States,  212-214,  289;  of  United 
Nations  protected  in  foreign 
countries,  215-216,  289-290.  See 
Checks. 

Civil  rights,  guarantees  of,  168- 
180,  282-285. 

Civil  war  in  component  State, 
neutrality  in  case  of,  217-221, 
290-291. 

Civilization,  as  measure  of 
State's  influence,  34. 

Class  legislation,  invalidity  of, 
72,  83-84,  85-87,  163-165,  179- 
180,  264,  265,  283,  289. 

Coinage,  control  of,  by  Congress, 
66-67,  76-77,  265. 

Colombia,  population  of,  42. 


Colored  populations  and  white, 
37-39,  41,  258. 

Commerce,  as  measure  of  State's 
influence,  35-36;  control  of,  in 
United  States,  79-81 ;  control 
of  international,  to  be  sur- 
rendered to  league,  xxv,  xxx- 
xxxi,  265 ;  control  of  interna- 
tional, by  Congress,  79,  82-83, 
263,  265;  desire  for,  as  cause 
of  war,  xiii,  xxvi,  14-16,  17; 
distribution,  not  production,  81, 
83 ;  domestic,  controlled  by 
component  States,  82,  192-193, 
201 ;  embargo  of,  to  discipline 
component  States,  245-247,  294; 
emigration  or  immigration  not 
included  in,  84-85,  265!  inter- 
national, made  up  of  interstate 
or  foreign,  82;  limit  f  life  of 
laws  regulating,  55-57,  263;  no 
discriminations  in,  as  between 
States,  83-87,  163-165,  265,  281, 
286;  no  State  to  tax  or  burden, 
201-205,  286;  no  State  tonnage 
duties  upon,  205,  286 ;  routes 
or  seats  of,  as  cause  of  war, 
xiii.  See  Checks. 

Commercial  policies,  as  cause  of 
war,  xv. 

Commercial  treaties,  118,  201, 
272,  286. 

Commissions,     issuance    of,     122, 

273- 

Communication  by  cable,  wire- 
less, etc.,  Congress  to  control, 
85-87,  265. 

Commutation  of  sentence,  115,  272. 

Compensation,  for  property  taken 
under  eminent  domain,  175- 
176,  283;  of  delegations  in 
Congress,  53-54,  262;  of  judges, 
128-129,  274;  of  ministers,  112- 
113,  271. 

Component  States.     See  States. 

Conciliation  between  nations,  ix- 
x. 

Congress,  composed  of  two  houses, 
32-47,  48-50,  257;  House  of 
Delegates  with  votes  propor- 
tioned to  population,  35-48, 
240,  258;  Senate  representing 


3°4 


INDEX 


equality  of  sovereignty,  46-48, 
240,  259 ;  delegations  to  both 
houses  appointed  and  remova- 
ble by  States,  50-52,  258,  259; 
terms  of  office  of  delegates, 
50-52,  258,  259;  sessions,  re- 
cesses, and  adjournments  of, 
53,  261 ;  compensation  of  dele- 
gates to,  53-54,  262;  privi- 
leges of  delegates  to,  54-55, 
262;  summoning  and  proroga- 
tion of,  124,  261 ;  State  veto 
upon  action  of,  57-60,  263-264; 
appointment  and  removal  of 
ministry  by,  105-109,  267-268 ; 
interpellations  in,  122-123;  no 
power  of  impeachment  in,  60- 
63;  removal  of  judges  by,  62- 
63,  129,  274;  powers  of,  con- 
current or  exclusive,  68-69, 
197,  291 ;  powers  of,  express 
and  not  to  be  implied,  68-69; 
power  of,  to  tax  land,  69-74, 
264,  281 ;  tax  laws  of,  limited 
to  ten  years,  55-57,  84,  263; 
taxation  by,  limited  to  land, 
160-161,  264,  281;  taxation  by, 
for  what  purposes,  72-74,  264; 
to  borrow  money,  74-75,  265; 
to  issue  paper  currency,  75-76, 
265 ;  to  coin  money,  76-77,  265 ; 
to  punish  counterfeiting,  77- 
78,  265 ;  to  fix  standards  of 
weights  and  measures,  78-79, 
265;  to  regulate  international 
commerce  and  communication, 
79-85,  85-87,  265;  regulations 
of  commerce  and  communica- 
tion by,  to  be  uniform,  83-87, 
162-165,  265-266,  281;  regula- 
tions of  commerce  by,  limited 
to  ten  years,  55-57,  263;  to 
provide  for  international  copy- 
rights and  patents,  87-88,  265; 
to  establish  inferior  interna- 
tional courts,  88-92,  129-130, 
266;  to  define  and  punish 
wrongs  on  high  seas,  92-93, 
266;  to  define  and  punish  of- 
fenses against  Law  of  Nations, 
92-93,  266;  war  powers  of,  93- 
95,  266-267;  to  control  seat  of 


government,  arsenals,  etc.,  95- 
96,  267;  ancillary  powers  of, 
96-97,  267;  no  power  in,  to 
naturalize,  97-99,  159,  280;  ap- 
propriations of  money  by,  for 
support  of  armies  limited  to 
two  years,  94-95,  266;  appro- 
priations of  money  by,  in  gen- 
eral, 162-163,  264,  281;  bounty 
and  pension  legislation  by,  162- 
163,  281;  not  to  create  com- 
mercial preferences  as  between 
States,  163-165,  265,  281;  not 
to  establish  titles  or  privi- 
leged orders,  165-166,  281;  to 
suspend  habeas  corpus,  when, 
168-169,  282;  to  recognize  re- 
ligious liberty,  170,  282;  to  rec- 
ognize freedom  of  speech  and 
press,  170-171,  283;  not  to  pass 
bills  of  attainder  or  ex  post 
facto  laws,  181-183,  283-284; 
to  fix  number  of  jury,  187-189, 
284-285;  treaties  to  be  ratified 
by  two-thirds  of,  117,  272; 
States  to  make  treaties  only 
with  consent  of,  201,  286; 
States  to  acquire  territory  only 
with  consent  of  three-fourths 
of,  209-211,  286;  to  admit  new 
States  to  league,  220-221,  290- 
291 ;  to  readjust  representation 
of  States  in,  in  case  of  civil 
war,  218-219,  290-291 ;  notice 
to,  necessary  in  case  of  State 
veto,  57-60,  263-264;  notice  to, 
necessary  in  case  of  secession 
by  State,  226,  291 ;  acts  of,  the 
supreme  law,  229,  230,  292; 
amendments  to  constitution  pro- 
posed by  two-thirds  of,  236- 
237»  293  >  amendments  enacted 
by  three-fourths  of,  237-240, 
293 ;  limitations  on  power  of, 
to  amend  constitution,  240-241, 
293 ;  power  of,  to  discipline 
component  States,  242-246,  294- 
295;  power  of,  to  regulate 
slave  trade,  192-193  ;  not  to  con- 
trol emigration  or  immigra- 
tion, 84-85,  192-193,  265.  See 
Checks. 


INDEX 


305 


Constitution  of  United  Nations, 
amendment  of,  236-241,  293 ; 
interpretation  of,  by  Supreme 
Court,  132-133,  136-140,  277; 
number  of  nations  to  adopt, 
248-250,  295 ;  oath  of  State  of- 
ficials to  support,  230-231,  292; 
outline  of  articles  of,  .28-29; 
ratification  of,  250-254,  295 ; 
supremacy  of,  229-231,  277, 
292 ;  contrasted  with  that  of 
United  States,  8,  257-295. 

Consuls,  judicial  power  extends 
to,  142-143,  277. 

Contracts,  laws  affecting  obliga- 
tion of,  213-214,  289. 

Copyrights,  control  of,  by  Con- 
gress, 66-67,  87-88,  265. 

Costa  Rica,  population  of,  43. 

Council  of  ministers.  See  Ex- 
ecutive Department;  Ministry. 

Counsel,  aid  of,  in  criminal  cases, 
189,  285. 

Counterfeiting,  Congress  to  pun- 
ish, 77-78,  265. 

Court,  supreme.  See  Supreme 
Court. 

Courts,  distinguished  from  arbi- 
tral tribunals,  ix,  x;  establish- 
ment of  inferior,  by  Congress, 
88-92,  266;  establishment  of, 
would  not  of  itself  end  war, 
xi-xxiii;  judicial  power  vested 
in,  136-150,  273;  jurisdiction  of, 
136-150,  150-152,  153,  227-228, 
246,  276-279,  292,  294-295; 
justiciable  questions  triable  by, 
xii,  xiii;  political  questions  not 
triable  by,  xii,  xiii;  power  of, 
to  appoint  clerks,  etc.,  120,  272. 
See  Judges;  Judiciary. 

Crimes,  against  Law  of  Nations, 
Congress  to  define  and  punish, 
92-93,  144-145,  266;  against 
United  Nations,  punishment  of, 
145-146;  ex  post  facto  laws 
punishing,  181-182,  212-214, 
283-284,  289;  guarantees  in 
trials  for,  177-189,  284-285; 
judges  removable  for,  62-63, 
129,  274;  legislative  convic- 
tions of,  181-182,  212-214,  283- 


284,  289;  on  high  seas,  control 
of   Congress  over,   92-93,   266; 
on    high    seas,    judicial    power 
extends  to,   143-145,   277;    par- 
dons   for,    115,   272;    reprieves 
for,  115,  272;  retroactive  legis- 
lation  punishing,   181-182,  213- 
214,   283-284,   289;    treaties   of 
extradition   for,    118,   201,   272, 
286.     See  Accused;  Arrest. 

Cuba,  population  of,  42. 
Cupidity  of  nations   as  cause  of 

war,  xiii,  14-16. 
Currency,    control     of     Congress 

over,  66-67,  74-75,  265. 

Debates  in  Congress,  freedom 
from  responsibility  for,  54-55, 
262. 

Delegated,  power  not,  reserved 
to  States,  222,  291 ;  powers  of 
United  Nations  are,  66-69,  291. 

Delegates.  See  Congress;  Repre- 
sentatives. 

Delegates,  House  of.  See  Con- 
gress; House  of  Delegates. 

Delicts.     See  Crimes;  Wrongs. 

Departments  of  government,  pow- 
ers distributed  among,  30-31 ; 
executive  department,  100-124, 
267-273 ;  judiciary  department, 
125-155,  273-279;  legislative  de- 
partment, 32-99,  257-267,  280- 

285.  See     Checks;    Congress; 
Executive     Department;     Min- 
istry; Judges;  Judiciary. 

Denmark,  population  of,  41. 

Diplomatic  agents.  See  Ambas- 
sadors. 

Discipline  of  component  States, 
in  general,  242-247,  294-295; 
modes  of,  245-246,  294-295; 
safeguards  to,  247,  294-295. 

Discrimination,  commercial  regu- 
lations not  to  show,  as  between 
States,  83-87,  163-165,  265,  281, 
286;  general  laws  of  Congress 
not  to  show,  180-181,  283 ;  laws 
of  States  not  to  show,  212-214, 
289;  tax  laws  of  Congress  not 
to  show,  72,  264. 

District,  ceded  as  seat  of  govern- 


306 


INDEX 


ment,   Congress  to  control,   95- 

96,  267. 
Dominican    Republic,    population 

of,  43- 

Double  jeopardy,  184-185,  284. 
Due  process  of   law,   in  general, 

177-179,    181,   283,   289;    rights 

of  citizens  not  to  be  destroyed 

by    other    States   without,    213- 

214,  289. 

Duties.     See  Taxation. 
Dwelling,     protection     of,     from 

search,    183-184,    284;    soldiers 

quartered  in,  when,  173,  283. 
Dynastic   ambitions,    as   cause   of 

war,  xiii. 

Economic  boycott  of  component 
States,  245-247,  294-295. 

Economic  policies,  as  cause  of 
war,  xv. 

Ecuador,  population  of,  43. 

Embargo  of  component  States, 
245-247,  294. 

Emigration,  Congress  not  to  con- 
trol, 84-85,  265. 

Eminent  domain,  175-177,  283. 

England.     See  Great  Britain. 

Equal  protection  of  laws,  179, 
181,  213,  283,  289. 

Equality  of  States,  in  Senate,  46- 
48,  240,  259;  on  Supreme 
Court,  130-132,  241,  274. 

Establishment  of  constitution,  248- 
254,  295. 

Evidence,  against  oneself,  185- 
186,  284.  See  Witnesses. 

Executive  department,  appoint- 
ment of,  105-112,  267-268;  ap- 
pointing power  of,  118-120, 
272 ;  commissioning  power  of, 
122,  273 ;  compensation  of  min- 
isters, 112-113,  271;  distribu- 
tion of  powers  among,  113-114, 
271-273 ;  eligibility  of  minis- 
ters, 109,  260,  267-268 ;  en- 
forcement of  laws  by,  121,  273 ; 
interpellations  of,  in  Congress, 
122-123 ;  number  of  ministers, 
no-iii,  267-268;  of  European 
States  and  United  Nations, 
104;  of  United  States  with 


United  Nations,  100-104;  or- 
ganization of,  100-114,  267- 
271;  pardoning  power  of, 
115,  272;  powers  of,  115- 
124,  271-273  ;  reception  of  am- 
bassadors by,  120-121,  273 ;  re- 
moval of  ministers,  111-112, 
268;  removing  power  of,  118- 
120,  272;  selection  of  prime 
minister,  105-108,  268-269;  se' 
lection  of  subordinate  minis- 
ters, 109-110,  268;  terms  of 
office  of,  III-H2,  268;  treaty- 
making  power  of,  115-118,  272. 
See  Checks. 

Executives  of  States,  appoint- 
ment of  international  judges 
by,  126-128,  274;  commissioning 
of  officials  by,  122,  273  ;  judicial 
power  not  to  extend  to,  155, 
279 ;  oath  of,  to  support  inter- 
national constitution,  230-231, 
292;  ratification  of  constitu- 
tion by,  252-254,  295. 

Exclusive  power  of  Congress,  con- 
trasted with  concurrent  power, 
68-69,  I97j  over  arsenals,  forts, 
etc.,  95-96,  267 ;  over  seat  of 
government,  95-96,  267. 

Exports,  Congress  not  to  tax,  72, 
166-161,  264,  281 ;  States  not  to 
tax,  201-205,  286. 

Ex  post  facto  laws,  not  to  be 
passed  by  Congress,  181-182, 
283-284;  not  to  be  passed  by 
one  State  against  citizens  of  an* 
other,  213-214,  289. 

Expulsion,  of  component  States 
from  league,  242-247,  294-295; 
of  delegates  from  Congress, 
261. 

Extradition  treaties,  118,  201, 
272,  286. 

Federal  populations,  38-43,  258. 

Federal  Union  of  Nations,  con- 
trasted with  league  for  com- 
pulsory arbitration  and  con- 
ciliation, xxviii-xxx;  need  of, 
xxii,  xxiii;  not  designed  to  cre- 
ate a  single  new  nation,  8 ;  pro- 
posal of  a,  25-29.  See  Checks. 


INDEX 


307 


Federal  unions,  existing,  distin- 
guished from  a  federal  union 
of  nations,  7-9;  wars  between 
component  States  prevented  by, 
1-9. 

Financial  powers  of  Congress,  74- 
77,  265. 

Former  jeopardy,  184-185,  284. 

Forts,  arsenals,  etc.,  control  of, 
95-96,  227-228,  267. 

France,  assent  of,  to  constitution, 
249-250,  295;  population  of, 
39;  votes  of,  in  Congress,  44, 

Freedom,  from  arrest,  a  privilege 
of  delegates  to  Congress,  54, 
262;  guarantees  of  individual, 
168-189,  282-285;  guarantees  of 
national,  156-167,  190-211,  280- 
282,  286-288;  meaning  of,  178; 
no  one  to  be  deprived  of,  with- 
out due  process  of  law,  177-179, 
181,  213-214,  283,  289;  of  re- 
ligion, 170,  282;  of  speech  and 
press  in  Congress,  54-55,  262; 
of  speech  and  press  in  general, 
170-171,  283;  of  trade,  as  pre- 
ventive of  war,  14-16,  202;  of 
trade,  as  between  the  compo- 
nent States,  201-205,  286;  of 
trade,  with  States  outside  the 
league,  72,  160-161,  201-205, 
264,  281,  286;  persons  illegally 
confined  entitled  to,  168-169, 
282.  See  Checks. 

General  welfare,  found  only  in 
powers  delegated  to  league,  72- 
74,  162-163,  264,  281. 

Germany,  assent  of,  to  constitu- 
tion, 249-250,  295;  population 
°f»  39  5  votes  of,  in  Congress, 

44,  47; 

Grand  jury,  not  required,  186. 

Great  Britain,  assent  of,  to  con- 
stitution, 249-250,  295 ;  popula- 
tion of,  37,  38-39;  votes  of,  in 
Congress,  45,  47. 

Great  Powers,  assent  of  majority 
of,  to  constitution,  249-250, 
295;  balanced  against  more 
numerous  small  States,  35-48, 


258-259;  predominance  of,  in 
House  of  Delegates,  35-48,  258; 
represented  equally  with  other 
States  in  Senate,  46-48,  259. 
See  Checks;  States. 

Greece,  population  of,  41. 

Greed  of  nations  as  cause  of  war, 
xiii. 

Guaranties,  of  component  na- 
tions against  invasion,  217, 
290;  of  nonintervention  in  case 
of  civil  war,  217-221,  290-291 ; 
of  private  rights  in  civil  cases, 
168-180,  212-216,  282-283,  289; 
of  private  rights  in  criminal 
cases,  181-189,  212-216,  283- 
285,  289.  See  Checks. 

Guatemala,  population  of,  42. 

Habeas  corpus,  right  to,  168-169, 
282;  suspension  of,  169,  282. 

Haiti,  population  of,  43. 

High  seas,  Congress  to  control  in- 
ternational commerce  on,  79, 
82-83,  263»  265;  Congress  to 
control  communications  by  way 
of,  85-87,  265 ;  Congress  to  de- 
fine and  punish  offenses  on,  92- 
93,  266;  judicial  power  extends 
to  offenses  and  wrongs  on,  143- 

J45>  277- 

Holland,  population  of,  40;  votes 
of,  in  Congress,  44. 

Honduras,  population  of,  43. 

Honor  of  nations,  as  cause  of 
war,  xiv,  17-18;  pledged  to 
support  constitution,  253-254, 
295. 

House  of  Delegates,  organization 
of,  36,  46,  49,  257-262;  organ- 
ization of,  how  affected  by 
amendments,  241,  293 ;  power 
of,  to  make  rules  and  choose 
officers,  65,  261 ;  privileges  of 
members  of,  54,  262;  veto  of, 
on  acts  of  Senate,  46,  257,  263. 
See  Checks;  Congress. 

Ignorance    of    other    nations,    as 

cause  of  war,  19-20. 
Immigration,     Congress     not     to 

control,  84-85,  265. 


308 


INDEX 


Immorality  of  nations,  as  cause 
of  war,  3-7,  14;  prevented  by 
federal  union,  5-7. 

Impeachment,  no  power  of,  in 
Congress,  60-63. 

Imports,  Congress  not  to  tax,  72, 
160-161,  264,  281;  States  not  to 
tax,  201-205,  286. 

Imprisonment,  discharge  from  il- 
legal, 168-169,  282. 

Independence  of  States,  reserved, 
222,  291.  See  Checks. 

Indirect  taxes,  Congress  not  to 
levy,  72,  160-161,  264,  281; 
States  not  to  levy,  201-205,  286. 

Industrial  boycott,  to  discipline 
States,  242-247,  292-293. 

Internal  dissensions  in  States, 
neutrality  in,  217-221,  290-291. 

International  arbitration,  ix-x. 

International  commerce.  See 
Checks;  Commerce. 

International  conciliation,  ix-x. 

International  Congress.  See  Con- 
gress. 

International  constitution.  See 
Constitution. 

International  copyrights  and  pat- 
ents, 87-88,  265. 

International  courts.  See  Courts; 
Judges;  Judiciary. 

International  executive.  See  Ex- 
ecutive Department;  Ministry. 

International  law.  See  Law  of 
Nations. 

International  postal  and  other 
communications,  85-87,  265. 

Interstate  commerce.  See  Com- 
merce. 

Interstate  relations,  197-201,  212- 
214,  217-219,  289-291. 

Intrastate  commerce,  not  con- 
trolled by  Congress,  82,  265. 

Invasion,  protection  of  States 
against,  217,  290. 

Inventions,  protection  of,  by  pat- 
ents, 87-88,  265. 

Italy,  assent  of,  to  constitution, 
249-250,  295 ;  population  of, 
40;  "unredeemed,"  as  cause  of 
war,  xvi ;  votes  of,  in  Congress, 


Japan,  assent  of,  to  constitution, 
249-250,  295 ;  people  of,  treated 
as  of  white  race,  37-39,  258; 
population  of,  38,  39,  258; 
votes  of,  in  Congress,  44. 

Jealousies,  as  cause  of  war,  20-22. 

Jeopardy,  twice  in,   184-185,  284. 

Journals  of  Congress,  261-262. 

Judges,  appointment  of,  126-128, 
274;  classification  of,  on  Su- 
preme Court,  132-134,  274-276; 
compensation  of,  128-129,  274; 
in  each  State  to  support  con- 
stitution, laws,  and  treaties, 
229-231,  292;  independence  of, 
128-129,  274;  jurisdiction  of, 
136-154,  276-278;  of  States  may 
exercise  international  jurisdic- 
tion, 89-90,  273;  removal  of, 
63-65,  129,  274. 

Judicial  decrees  inadequate  to 
settle  political  disputes,  xi- 
xxiii. 

Judicial  power  of  United  Na- 
tions, cases  under  constitution, 
laws,  and  treaties,  136-142, 
277;  cases  affecting  ambassa- 
dors, etc.,  142-143,  277 ;  cases 
on  high  seas,  143-145,  277; 
cases  involving  United  Nations, 
145-146,  278 ;  cases  between 
component  States,  146,  278 ; 
cases  affecting  other  nations, 
147-148,  278 ;  not  cases  between 
citizens  of  different  States,  148 ; 
nor  suits  by  private  persons 
against  States,  154,  279;  nor 
personal  proceedings  against 
rulers  of  States,  155,  241,  279. 

Judiciary  department,  appellate 
jurisdiction  of  Supreme  Court, 
I53>  278;  appointment  of,  127, 
274;  compensation  of,  128-129, 
274;  Congress  to  create  sub- 
ordinate courts  of,  88-90,  129- 
130,  266,  273-274;  independ- 
ence of,  128-129,  274;  jurisdic- 
tion of,  136-154,  276-279;  or- 
ganization of,  125-135,  273-276; 
organization  of  Supreme  Court, 
130-I35»  274-276;  original  juris- 
diction of  Supreme  Court,  150- 


INDEX 


309 


152,  278;  removal  of  judges  in, 
62-63,  I29>  274-  See  Checks; 
Courts;  Judges;  Judicial  Power. 

Jury,  former  jeopardy  is  convic- 
tion or  acquittal  by,  184-185, 
284;  in  civil  cases,  174-175;  in 
criminal  cases,  187-188,  284- 
285 ;  no  requirement  of  grand, 
186;  number  necessary  to  con- 
stitute, 188,  285;  number  neces- 
sary to  verdict  of,  188,  285. 

Jurisdiction.  See  Courts;  Judges; 
Judicial  Power. 

Justiciable  disputes,  distinguished 
from  political,  xiv-xxii,  23-24; 
redressed  by  courts  or  arbi- 
tration, xiv-xxii,  23-24.  See 
Checks. 

Land,  Congress  to  tax  only,  71- 
72,  160-161,  264,  281.  See  Ter- 
ritory. 

Law,  as  foundation  of  morality 
among  nations,  1-7;  citizens  not 
to  be  denied  equal  protection 
of,  in  other  States,  213-214, 
289;  due  process  of,  179,  181, 
213-214,  283,  289;  equal  pro- 
tection of,  179,  181,  213-214, 
283,  289;  executive  department 
to  enforce  the,  121,  273 ;  judi- 
ciary to  interpret  the,  136-142, 
277;  passage  of,  ^  35-48,  257- 
266;  supremacy  of  international 
constitution  and,  229-231,  292; 
unconstitutionality  of  a,  138- 
142,  272,  292. 

Law  of  Nations,  Congress  to  de- 
fine and  punish  offenses  against, 
92-93,  266;  citizens  when 
abroad  protected  under,  215- 
216,  289-290;  neutrality  under, 
in  case  of  civil  war  in  compo- 
nent States,  217-221,  290- 
291. 

League  to  enforce  peace,  some 
obstacles  to,  xxix;  contrasted 
with  federal  union  of  nations, 
xxviii.  See  Checks. 

Legal  rights  of  nations  distin- 
guished from  political  powers, 
xii-xvi.  xx. 


Legal  tender,  power  of  Congress 
to  issue,  74-77,  265. 

Legislation,  limitations  on  power 
of,  as  to  Congress,  156-189, 
280-285 ;  limitations  on  power 
of,  as  to  States,  190-212,  286- 
288 ;  of  States  as  to  citizens  of 
other  States,  213-214,  289;  un- 
constitutionality of,  138-142, 
277,  292;  uniformity  of,  in  tax- 
ation, 69-74,  264>  283,  289;  uni- 
formity of,  as  to  commerce,  79- 
85,  162-165,  265,  281,  283,  289; 
uniformity  of,  as  to  communi- 
cations, 85-87,  265;  veto  of 
States  upon  international,  57-60, 
263-264.  See  Checks;  Con- 
gress; States. 

Legislative  department,  control 
of,  over  executive,  100-114, 
267-271 ;  convictions  of  crime 
by,  181-182,  212-214,  283-284, 
289 ;  oath  of  members  of,  230- 
231,  292;  organization  of,  30- 
65,  257-262;  powers  of,  66-99, 
264-267,  280-285,  290-291;  two 
houses  of,  preferable  to  one, 
32,  43-50,  257.  See  Checks; 
Congress. 

Liberty.     See  Freedom. 

Life,  no  one  to  be  deprived  of, 
without  due  process  of  law, 
181,  212-214,  283,  289. 

Limitations,  on  amendments  of 
constitution,  240-242,  293 ;  on 
discipline  of  States  by  Con- 
gress, 247,  294-295;  on  judicial 
power,  153-155,  279;  on  pow- 
ers of  Congress,  156-189,  280- 
285;  on  powers  of  executive, 
105-109,  268,  271-273;  on  pow- 
ers of  States,  190-211,  286-288. 
See  Checks. 

Majorities.    See  Votes. 

Measures,  Congress  to  fix  stand- 
ards of,  78,  265. 

Mexico,  population  of,  42. 

Migration  of  citizens,  Congress 
not  to  control,  84-85,  265. 

Military  aims,  as  cause  of  war, 
xiii,  17. 


3io 


INDEX 


Military  force,  as  measure  of 
State's  influence,  34. 

Military  officers,  appointment  and 
removal  of,  118-120,  272. 

Military  preparedness,  as  cause 
of  war,  xv. 

Militia,  States  to  keep,  206-209, 
266,  287;  use  of,  in  repelling 
invasion,  217,  266. 

Ministers,  executive.  See  Execu- 
tive Department;  Ministry. 

Ministers,  public.  See  Ambas- 
sadors. 

Ministry,  appointment  of,  105- 
no,  267-269;  compensation  of, 
112-113,  271;  composed  of 
prime  minister  and  council, 
105-110,  267-268;  Congress  not 
summoned  or  prorogued  by, 
124;  dependent  on  Congress, 
loo-no,  267-269;  distribution 
of  powers  among,  113-114, 
267-268;  eligibility  of,  109, 
260,  267-268;  interpellations 
of,  in  Congress,  122-123  ;  num- 
ber of,  iio-ui,  267-268;  powers 
of,  115-124,  271-273;  removal 
of,  III-H2,  267-268;  selection 
of  prime  minister,  105-108,  268- 
269;  selection  of  subordinates 
in,  109-110,  267-268;  terms  of 
office  of,  in-112,  267-268.  See 
Checks. 

Misdemeanor,  judge  removable 
for,  62-63,  129,  274. 

Money,  appropriations  of,  for 
army,  94-95,  266;  appropria- 
tions of,  in  general,  162,  281; 
Congress  to  borrow,  74-75, 
265 ;  Congress  to  coin,  76-77, 
265 ;  Congress  to  control,  66- 
67»  74'77>  265;  Congress  to 
issue  paper,  75-76,  265. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  as  cause  of 
war,  xv. 

Montenegro,  population  of,  41. 

Morality,  of  individual,  secured 
by  law,  1-3;  of  nations,  se- 
cured by  federal  union,  3-7. 

Nationalism,  spirit  of,  as  cause 
of  war,  xiii. 


Nations,  ambition  of,  as  cause  of 
war,  17;  cupidity  of,  as  cause  of 
war,  14-16;  honor  of,  as  cause 
of  war,  17-18;  immorality  of, 
as  cause  of  war,  3-7,  14;  jeal- 
ousies and  suspicions  of,  as 
cause  of  war,  20-22;  law  of, 
(see  Law  of  Nations)  ;  preju- 
dice and  ignorance  of,  as 
cause  of  war,  19-20;  pride  of, 
as  cause  of  war,  17-18.  See 
Checks;  States. 

Naturalization,  no  power  of,  in 
Congress,  97-99,  280. 

Naval  officers,  appointment  and 
removal  of,  118-120,  272. 

Navies,  States  to  keep,  206-209, 
287;  support  of  international, 
94-95,  266.  See  Checks;  War. 

Navigable  waters,  control  of,  79- 
85,  92,  265,  277,  281.  See  Com- 
merce. 

Netherlands,  population  of,  40; 
votes  of,  in  Congress,  44. 

Neutrality,  in  case  of  civil  war 
in  component  State,  217-218, 
290-291. 

Nicaragua,  population  of,  43. 

Norway,  population  of,  41;  votes 
of,  in  Congress,  44. 

Notice,  no  one  to  be  deprived  of 
rights  without,  177-179,  181, 
212-214,  283,  289;  States  not 
to  be  disciplined  without,  242- 
247,  294;  States  not  to  veto 
measures  without,  57-60,  263- 
264;  States  not  to  secede  with- 
out, 226,  291. 

Oath  of  office,  230-231,  292. 

Obligation  of  contracts,  laws  af- 
fecting, 213-214,  289. 

Offenses.    See  Crimes. 

Officers,  appointment  of  judicial, 
127,  274;  appointment  of  legis- 
lative, 50-52,  258,  259;  ap- 
pointment of  ministerial,  105- 
114,  267-268;  appointment  of 
subordinate,  118,  119,  272; 
commissioning  of,  122,  273; 
oath  of,  230-231,  292;  removal 
of  judicial,  62-63,  !29,  274;  re- 


INDEX 


moval  of  legislative,  50-52,  258, 
259;  removal  of  ministerial, 
105-114,  267-268;  removal  of 
subordinate,  118,  119,  272.  See 
Checks. 

Open  door  in  China,  as  cause  of 
war,  xv. 

Original  jurisdiction  of  Supreme 
Court,  150-152,  278. 

Original  suit  by  private  person 
against  State  not  permitted, 
153,  154,  279. 

Panama,  population  of,  43. 

Pan-Germanism  and  Pan-Slav- 
ism, as  cause  of  war,  xv. 

Paper  money,  Congress  to  issue, 
74-76,  265. 

Paraguay,  population  of,  43. 

Pardon,  power  of,  115,  272. 

Patents,  Congress  to  regulate,  87- 
88,  265. 

Peace,  federal  unions  make  for, 
10-24.  See  Checks;  War. 

Pension  laws  of  Congress,  162- 
163,  281. 

Peonage,  control  of  domestic,  192- 

193- 

Peru,  population  of,  42. 

Petition,  popular  right  of,  172, 
283. 

Poland,  as  cause  of  war,  xvi. 

Policy,  national,  as  cause  of  war, 
xv. 

Political  ambitions,  as  cause  of 
war,  17.^ 

Political  disputes,  breed  wars,  23- 
24;  not  justiciable,  xiii-xxi,  23- 
24. 

Political  powers,  surrender  of,  by 
States  necessary  to  prevent 
war,  xvii,  xxiv-xxvi,  286-288. 

Population,  armies  of  States  pro- 
portioned to,  207-209,  287 ;  as 
measure  of  State's  influence, 
36-43 ;  backward,  contrasted 
with  progressive,  37,  258; 
census  of,  35-48,  258;  federal, 
contrasted  with  actual,  38-43, 
258;  of  various  countries,  38- 
43 ;  unequal,  balanced  against 
equal  sovereignty,  46-47,  258- 


259 ;  votes  of  States  in  House 
of  Delegates  proportioned  to, 
46-47,  258;  white,  contrasted 
with  colored,  37-39,  41,  258. 

Portugal,  population  of,  40. 

Postal  communication,  Congress 
to  regulate,  85-87,  265. 

Powers,  distribution  of  constitu- 
tional, 30-31.  See  Constitution. 

Powers,  Great.  See  Great 
Powers. 

Powers  of  States,  limitations  on, 
190-211,  241,  286-288;  surrender 
of,  in  federal  union,  11-12;  sur- 
render of  certain,  necessary  to 
prevent  wars,  xxii,  xxiv-xxvi, 
11-12;  to  adopt  constitution, 
250-254,  295;  to  amend  con- 
stitution, 232-241,  293 ;  to  bur- 
den or  tax  commerce,  201-205, 
286;  to  control  Congress,  52, 
258,  259,  263 ;  to  control  ex- 
ecutive ministry,  105-112,  267- 
268 ;  to  control  judiciary,  127- 
129,  273-276;  to  maintain 
armies  and  navies,  201-205, 
287;  to  make  treaties,  197-201, 
286 ;  to  secede  from  league, 
223-228,  291-292;  to  veto  inter- 
national legislation,  57-60,  263- 
264;  to  wage  war,  201-205, 
287.  See  Checks. 

Prejudice  of  race,  as  cause  of 
war,  xv,  19-20. 

Presiding  justices  of  Supreme 
Court,  133-134,  276- 

Press,  freedom  of.     See  Freedom. 

Pride  of  nations,  as  cause  of 
war,  xiv,  17-18. 

Prime  minister,  appointment  of, 
105-108,  268-269;  powers  of, 
115-124,  269,  291-293;  removal 
of,  IH-II2,  269.  See  Executive 
Department;  Ministry. 

Privileges,  of  citizens  in  other 
States,  212-215,  289;  of  dele- 
gates to  Congress,  54-55,  262. 

Production  of  goods,  not  part  of 
commerce,  81,  83. 

Progressive  and  backward  popu- 
lations, 37-39,  41,  258. 

Property,    meaning    of,    178-179; 


INDEX 


not  to  be  destroyed  without  due 
process  of  law,  179,  181,  212- 
215,  283,  289. 

Proposal  of  amendments,  236- 
237,  293. 

Prorogation  of  Congress,  124,  261. 

Prosecution  for  crime.  See  Ac- 
cused; Arrest;  Trial. 

Public  ministers.  See  Ambassa- 
dors. 

Public  opinion,  as  preventive  of 
war,  xxvii. 

Public  purpose,  appropriations 
for,  162-163,  264,  281 ;  com- 
pensation for  private  property 
taken  for,  175-176,  283;  nature 
of,  162-163,  264,  281 ;  taxation 
for,  72-74,  264. 

Public  trial,  right  to,  187,  284. 

Punishments,  Congress  to  pro- 
vide, for  counterfeiting,  77-78, 
265 ;  for  offenses  on  high  seas, 
92-93,  266;  for  offenses  against 
Law  of  Nations,  92-93,  144- 
145,  266;  no  cruel  and  unusual, 
189,  285;  of  delegates  in  Con- 
gress for  disorderly  conduct, 
261.  See,  Accused;  Arrest; 
Crimes. 

Quartering    of    soldiers,    173-174, 

283. 
Quorum,  majority  of  either  house 

of  Congress  constitutes,  261. 

Race  prejudices,  as  cause  of  war, 
xv,  19-20. 

Ratification,  of  amendments  to 
constitution,  237-240,  293 ;  of 
constitution,  250-254,  295. 

Rebellion,  in  component  States, 
217-219,  290-291. 

Recess  of  Congress,  53,  261. 

Religion,  freedom  of,  170,  282. 

Removal,  of  judges,  62-63,  I29» 
274;  of  delegates  in  Congress, 
50-52,  258,  259;  of  prime  min- 
ister, iu-112,  268;  of  subordi- 
nate ministers,  109,  112,  267- 
268 ;  of  subordinate  officials, 
118-120,  272. 

Representatives  in  Congress,   ap- 


pointment of,  50-52,  258,  259; 
compensation  of,  53-54,  262; 
expulsion  of,  261 ;  privileges  of, 
54-55.  262;  removal  of,  50-52, 

258,  259;  terms  of,  50-52,  258, 

259,  260;   votes  of,  46-47,  258, 
259. 

Reprieve,  power  of,  115,  272. 
Republic  of  Nations,  league  to  be 

a,  1 66.     See  Constitution. 
Reserved    rights    of    States,    222- 

228,  291-292. 
Residents  of  seat  of  government, 

as  citizens  of  United  Nations, 

97-98,  159,  280. 
Retroactive  laws,  as  to  contracts, 

213-214,  289;  as  to  crimes,  177- 

179,   181-182,  213-214,   283-284, 

289;    as    to    property,    177-179, 

213-214,  283,  289. 
Revenue.    See  Taxation. 
Revolution    in    component    State, 

217-219,  290-291. 
Roumania,  population  of,  41. 
Russia,   assent  of,  to  constitution, 

249-250,    295 ;    population    of\ 

39 ;   votes  of,  in   Congress,  45, 

47- 

Salvador,  population  of,  42. 

Search,  warrants  of,  182-183,  284. 

Seas.    See  High  Seas. 

Seat  of  government,  Congress  to 
control,  95-96,  284;  residents 
of,  as  citizens  of  United  Na- 
tions, 97-98,  159,  280. 

Secession  of  States,  accounting 
for  assets  upon,  227-228,  292; 
compulsory,  242-247,  294-295 ; 
right  of,  223-228,  291-292; 
State's  right  of,  not  to  be  lost 
by  amendment,  239-241,  293. 
See  Checks. 

Secret  diplomacy,  check  on,  115- 
116,  272,  286. 

Sections  of  Supreme  Court,  132- 
134,  274-276.^ 

Self-incrimination,  185-186,  284. 

Senate,  appointment  to,  50-52, 
259 ;  compensation  of  delegates 
to,  53-54,  262;  equality  of 
States  in,  46,  259;  equality  in, 


INDEX 


not  affected  by  amendments, 
240,  293 ;  eligibility  to,  46-48, 
50-52,  260;  expulsion  from, 
261 ;  privileges  of  delegates  to, 
54-55,  262;  recall  from,  50-52, 
259,  260;  State  veto  upon  ac- 
tion of,  57-60,  263-264.;  to  make 
its  rules  and  choose  its  officers, 
65,  261 ;  veto  of,  on  action  of 
House  of  Delegates,  46,  263. 
See  Checks;  Congress. 

Senators.     See  Representatives. 

Serbia,  population  of,  41 ;  votes 
of,  in  Congress,  44. 

Slave  trade,  Congress  to  control, 
192-193,  263. 

Slavery,  Congress  not  to  control 
domestic,  192-193. 

Sovereign,  no  personal  proceed- 
ings against,  155,  241,  279. 
See  States. 

Sovereignty  of  States,  conception 
of,  illusory,  xxiv-xxv,  xxviii; 
equality  of,  in  Senate  bal- 
anced against  unequal  popula- 
tions in  House  of  Delegates, 
46-47,  258-259;  equality  of,  in 
Senate  not  affected  by  amend- 
ments, 240-241,  293;  reserva- 
tion of,  222,  291.  See  Checks. 

Spain,  population  of,  41. 

Speech,  freedom  of.  See  Free- 
dom. 

Speedy  trial,  right  to,  187,  284. 

Standards  of  weights  and  meas- 
ures, Congress  to  fix,  78,  265. 

Standing  armies.    See  Armies. 

States,  adoption  of  constitution 
by,  248-254,  295 ;  admission  of, 
to  league,  220,  221,  290-291 ; 
boycott  of,  242-247,  294-295; 
cession  of  territory  to  United 
Nations  by,  95-96,  157-159, 
267,  280;  citizens  of,  protected 
against  United  Nations,  168- 
189,  282-285 ;  citizens  of,  pro- 
tected in  other,  212-216,  289; 
courts  of,  may  exercise  inter- 
national jurisdiction,  88-92, 
273 ;  de  facto  government  of, 
recognized  in  case  of  civil  war, 
218-220,  290-291 ;  discipline  of, 


by  Congress,  242-247,  294-295; 
dismemberment  of,  as  result  of 
civil  war,  220,  290-291 ;  dis- 
putes between,  tried  in  Supreme 
Court,  132-133,  151-153,  278; 
equality  of,  in  Senate,  46-48; 
240,  259;  equality  of,  on  Su- 
preme Court,  130-132,  241,  274, 
293 ;  executives  of,  to  appoint 
judges,  126-128,  274;  executives 
of,  to  ratify  constitution,  252- 
254.  295;  expulsion  of,  from 
league,  242-247,  294-295;  guar- 
anteed against  invasion,  217, 
290;  internal  conflicts  within, 
217-219,  290-291 ;  jurisdiction  of 
disputes  between,  145-147,  150, 
278;  jurisdiction  of  cases  be- 
tween citizens  of  different, 
148-150;  jurisdiction  of  per- 
sonal proceedings  against  rul- 
ers of,  155,  279;  jurisdiction 
of  suits  by  private  persons 
against,  154,  279;  laws  or 
treaties  of,  unconstitutional, 
138-142,  229-231,  277,  292;  lim- 
itations on  powers  of,  190-211, 
286-288;  measures  of  influence 
of,  33-43;  neutrality  in  case  of 
civil  war  in,  217-221,  290-291 ; 
not  to  acquire  territory,  209-211, 
286;  not  to  be  interfered  with 
in  dealing  with  their  own  citi- 
zens, 195;  not  to  enter  into  al- 
liances, 200,  286;  not  to  tax 
carrying  capacity,  205,  286 ;  not 
to  tax  imports  or  exports,  201- 
205,  286;  number  of,  to  estab- 
lish constitution,  248-250,  295 ; 
officials  of,  to  swear  to  sup- 
port constitution,  230-231,  292; 
original  jurisdiction  of  Su- 
preme Court  over,  151-153, 
278 ;  populations  of,  repre- 
sented in  House  of  Delegates, 
35-48,  258;  relations  of,  to  each 
other,  212-220,  289-291;  re- 
served rights  of,  222-228,  291- 
292 ;  secession  of,  from  league, 
223-228,  291-292;  sovereignty 
of,  reserved,  222,  291 ;  treason 
against  component,  160;  treaty- 


314 


INDEX 


x  making  power  of,  200-201,  229- 
231,  286;  veto  power  of,  57-60, 
263-264;  war  powers  of,  206- 
209,  286-287.  See  Checks. 

Statute  law.  See  Law;  Legisla- 
tion. 

Subsidies,  162-163,  281. 

Suffrage.     See  Votes. 

Supremacy  of  international  con- 
stitution, laws,  and  treaties, 
229-231,  292. 

Supreme  Court,  allotment  by,  of 
share  of  common  assets  to  se- 
ceding or  expelled  State,  227- 
228,  246-247,  291-292,  294-295; 
appeals  to  sections  of,  132-134, 
275-276;  appeals  to,  from  sec- 
tions of,  134-135,  275-276;  ap- 
pellate jurisdiction  of,  153, 
278;  appointment  of  judges  of, 
127-128,  274;  classification  of, 
into  sections,  132-134,  274-276; 
compensation  of  judges  of, 
128-129,  274;  equality  of 
States  on,  130-132,  241,  274; 
established  by  constitution,  127, 
273-276;  independence  of,  128- 
129,  274;  organization  of,  130- 
135,  274-276;  original  jurisdic- 
tion of,  150-152,  278;  power  of, 
to  declare  laws  and  treaties  un- 
constitutional, 138-142,  277;  re- 
moval of  judges  of,  62-63,  I29> 
274.  See  Checks. 

Suspicions,  national,  as  cause  of 
war,  xxvi,  20-22. 

Sweden,  population  of,  41;  votes 
of,  in  Congress,  44. 

Switzerland,  population  of,  41. 

Tariffs,  Congress  not  to  lay,  72, 
160-161,  264,  281 ;  States  not  to 
lay,  201-205,  286;  unfair,  as 
cause  of  war,  xiii. 

Taxation,  bounties  and  subsidies 
not  to  be  granted,  162-163,  281 ; 
by  Congress,  for  what  pur- 
poses, 73-74,  264;  by  Congress, 
limited  to  land,  69-74,  160-161, 
264,  281 ;  by  Congress,  limited 
to  ten  years,  56-57,  263 ;  by 
Congress,  to  be  uniform,  72, 


264;  by  Congress,  may  orig- 
inate in  either  house,  56 ;  by 
States,  how  limited,  201-205, 
286;  dangers  of  power  of,  70- 
71 ;  pension  legislation  by  Con- 
gress, 162-163,  281. 

Telegraphic  and  telephonic  com- 
munication, Congress  to  con- 
trol, 86-87,  265. 

Terms  of  office,  of  delegates  to 
Congress,  50-52,  258,  259,  260; 
of  judges,  128-129,  274;  of 
prime  minister,  111-112,  268- 
269;  of  subordinate  ministers, 
HI-II2,  267-268;  of  subordi- 
nate officials,  118-120,  272. 

Territory,  cession  of,  by  States 
to  United  Nations,  95-96,  157- 
X59>  267,  280;  desire  for,  as 
cause  of  war,  xiii,  xxvi,  14-16, 
17;  no  acquisition  of,  by 
United  Nations,  157-159,  280; 
occupation  of,  by  United  Na- 
tions in  war,  157-159,  280; 
when  acquired  by  component 
States,  158-159,  209-211,  280, 
288 ;  when  divided  in  case  of 
civil  war,  217-220,  290-291. 
See  Checks. 

Titles  of  nobility  not  to  be 
granted,  165-166,  167,  281. 

Tonnage,  States  not  to  lay  du- 
ties of,  205,  286;  States  to  keep 
war  vessels  in  proportion  to 
mercantile,  209,  287. 

Torts  on  high  seas,  Congress  to 
define  and  redress,  92-93,  266; 
judicial  power  extends  to,  143- 
145,  277. 

Trade,  as  measure  of  State's  in- 
fluence, 35-36;  desire  for,  as 
cause  of  war,  xiii,  14-16;  desire 
to  control,  as  cause  of  war, 
xxvi;  freedom  of,  as  preven- 
tive of  war,  xiii,  72,  201-205; 
unfair  competition  in,  as  cause 
of  war,  xiii.  See  Checks; 
Commerce. 

Trade  marks,  88. 

Trade  routes,  desire  for,  as  cause 
of  war,  xiii. 

Treason,        against       component 


INDEX 


315 


States,  160;  against  United 
Nations,  no  such  crime  as,  160, 
280-281. 

Treaties,  authority  of  United 
Nations  to  make,  115-118,  272; 
authority  of  States  to  make, 
197-201,  212,  286;  breach  of, 
as  cause  of  war,  xvi-xvii;  citi- 
zens when  abroad  protected  by, 
213-216,  289,  290;  Congress  to 
assent  to,  116-118,  201,  272; 
constitution  the  most  solemn  of 
all,  251,  252-254;  judicial 
power  extends  to,  136-142,  277; 
limited  within  constitutional 
bounds,  117-118,  272;  ministry 
to  negotiate,  117-118,  272; 
must  provide  for  peaceable  set- 
tlement of  disputes  arising 
therefrom,  201,  286;  secret, 
checks  upon,  116,  272;  su- 
premacy of,  229-231,  292;  un- 
constitutionality  of,  138-142, 
277,  292. 

Treaty-making  power,  of  each 
State  to  assent  to  constitution, 
252-253,  295;  of  United  Na- 
tions, 116-118,  292. 

Trial,  in  civil  cases  without  jury, 
174-175;  in  criminal  cases  by 
jury,  187-189,  284-285;  public 
and  speedy,  187,  284;  punish- 
ment without,  prohibited,  181- 
182,  213-214,  283,  289.  See  Ac- 
cused; Arrest. 

Troops,  quartering  of,  173-174, 
283 ;  proportion  of,  to  be  kept 
by  States,  206-207,  287;  right 
of  United  Nations  to  raise  and 
support,  266-267.  See  Armies, 

Unconstitutionality,  of  laws  and 
treaties  of  States,  138-142,  229- 
231,  277,  286,  292;  of  laws  and 
treaties  of  United  Nations,  117- 
118,  138-142,  272,  277,  292; 
veto  of  laws  by  States  be- 
cause of,  57-60,  263-264.  See 
Checks. 

Uniformity,  of  commercial  regu- 
lations, 83-84,  162-165,  265, 
281,  283;  of  interpretation  of 


constitution,  laws,  and  treaties, 
X35»  J37i  of  postal,  etc.,  regu- 
lations, 85-87,  265;  of  tax  laws, 
72,  265,  281,  283. 

United  Nations,  constitution  of, 
257-295.  See  Constitution. 

United  States,  assent  of,  to  con- 
stitution, 249-250,  295 ;  consti- 
tution of,  257-295 ;  population 
of,  40;  votes  of,  in  Congress, 

45,  47- 
Uruguay,  population  of,  43. 

Venezuela,  population  of,  42. 

Verdict  of  jury,  188,  285. 

Vested  rights,  protected,  178-179, 
283,  289. 

Veto,  by  each  house  of  Congress 
upon  the  other,  257,  263 ;  by 
each  State  upon  Congress,  32- 
33,  57-60,  241,  263-264. 

Votes  in  Congress,  admission  of 
States  to  league  by  three- 
fourths  of,  220,  221,  290-291 ; 
amendments  to  constitution 
proposed  by  two-thirds  of,  236- 
237»  293  >  amendments  enacted 
by  three-fourths  of,  237-240, 
293 ;  appointment  of  prime 
minister  by  a  majority  of,  105- 
108,  268;  legislation  by  a  ma- 
jority of,  261 ;  majority  of,  to 
constitute  a  quorum  in  each 
house,  261 ;  removal  of  judges 
by  a  majority  of,  62-63,  I29, 
274;  removal  of  prime  minister 
by  a  majority  of,  111-112,  268; 
States  to  acquire  territory  by 
three-fourths  of,  158-159,  209- 
211,  280,  288;  State's  veto  of 
legislation  overriden  by  three- 
fourths  of,  57-60,  241,  264; 
treaties  ratified  by  two-thirds 
of,  116-118,  272.  See  Checks; 
Congress. 

Votes  in  Supreme  Court,  law  or 
treaty  declared  unconstitutional 
by  three-fourths  of,  138-142, 
247. 

Votes  of  States,  in  House  of  Dele- 
gates proportioned  to  popula- 
tion, 35-48,  240,  258;  in  Sen- 


INDEX 


ate  equal,  46-48,  240,  259; 
expulsion  of  delegate*  in  either 
house  by  two-thirds  of,  261. 

War,  acquisition  of  territory  by 
States  in  time  of,  209-211,  280, 
288-289;  acquisition  of  terri- 
tory by  United  Nations  in  time 
of,  157-159,  280;  appropria- 
tions for,  limited  to  two  years, 
94'95»  266;  causes  of,  xii-xviii, 
13-24;  federal  unions  check, 
10-24;  guarantee  to  States 
against,  217,  290;  neutrality 
towards  State  in  case  of  civil, 
217-221,  290-291;  obligations 
of  States  not  to  be  enforced  by, 
244-247,  287;  powers  of,  how 
far  surrendered  by  States,  94, 
287;  power  of,  vested  in 
league,  93-95,  266;  power  of, 
how  far  vested  in  States,  206- 
209,  287;  results  from  exercise 


of  political  powers  rather  than 
legal  rights,  xii,  xv,  xvii,  xix, 
xx ;  right  of  States  to  keep  ves- 
sels of,  206-209,  287.  See 
Checks. 

Warrant  of  arrest  or  of  search, 
182-183,  284. 

Weights,  Congress  to  fix  stand- 
ards of,  78,  265. 

White  populations,  contrasted 
with  colored,  37-39,  41,  258. 

Wireless  communication,  Con- 
gress to  control,  86-87,  265. 

Witnesses,  accused  to  be  con- 
fronted with,  189,  285;  ac- 
cused to  compel  attendance  of, 
189,  285;  not  to  incriminate 
themselves,  185-186,  284. 

Worship,  freedom  of,  170,  282. 

Wrongs  on  high  seas,  Congress 
to  define  and  redress,  92-93, 
266;  judicial  power  extends  to, 
143-145,  277. 


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